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Mahopadhyaya Dr. Satuchandra Vidyabhushan.

A HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC

*Ancient, Mediaeval and
Modern Schools*

Mahamahopādhyāya
SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA
MA, PHD, MRAJ, FASB

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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi Varanasi Patna
Bangalore Madras

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न्यायशास्त्रस्य इतिहासः ।

10527
28.12.87

महामहोपाध्याय-विद्याभूषण-शास्त्रसुधाकर-चिदम्बरमहोदधि-

चिपिटकवागीश्वर - एम,ए,— पि,एच,बि,—

एम,आर,ए,एस,— एच,ए,एस्,बि,

इत्युपाधिधारिणा

श्रीसतीशचन्द्र आचार्येण सम्पादितः ।

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महामहोपाध्याय-विद्याभूषण-प्रास्तसुधाकर-सिद्धान्तमहोदधि-
चिपिटकवागीश्वर - एम,ए,— पि,एस्,बि,—
एम,आर,ए,एस्,— एफ,ए,एच्,बि,
इत्युपाधिधारिणा

श्रीसतीशचन्द्र आचार्येण सम्पादितः ।

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TO

THE HON'BLE SIR ASUTOSH MOOKHERJEE, Kt.,
C.S.L., M.A., D.L., D.Sc., F.R.D., F.R.A.S., F.R.S.E.,

*Saranan, Sastri-Vachaspathi, Sambuddhagana-Chakravarti, Offg. Chief
Justice, High Court of Judicature, Fort William, Calcutta,*

THE FOREMOST EDUCATIONIST OF HIS COUNTRY,
WHO HAS, FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, SUCCESSFULLY
GUIDED THE POLICY OF HIGHER EDUCATION
IN BENGAL,

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
AS A TOKEN OF PROFOUND ESTEEM

BY
HIS HUMBLE ADMIRER,

THE AUTHOR

10527
28.12.89

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यासमुपायः सर्वकर्मसाम् ।

आजयः सर्वसर्माणां यशदान्वीर्यकीमता ॥

(KAUTILYA)

"Ānvikaiki (Logic) has ever been esteemed as the lamp of all sciences the resource of all actions and the shelter of all virtues"

न्यायान्वधिदौघितिकारयुतिक्लोलकोलाहलदुर्विगाहः ।

तस्यापि धातुं न ययः समर्थः किं नाम घौमत्यतिभाम्बुवाहः ॥

"Modern Logic is a veritable ocean whose water is saline and which is unapproachable owing to the tumults and uproars of the commentators. Is not then the water of that ocean capable of being drunk? Why not? Intelligent people, like clouds, can easily approach the ocean and drink its water pure and sweet."

10527
-28.12.89

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मकामम् ।

आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां शत्रुदाम्नीतिरकीमता ॥

(KAUTILYA)

"Anyikṣiki (Logic) has ever been esteemed as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the shelter of all virtues "

आद्यान्मुषिर्दोषितकारयुक्तिरुक्तीलकोनाहलदुर्विमाहः ।

तस्यापि प्राप्तुं न यद्यः समर्थः किं नाम घौमत्यतिभान्मुवाह ॥

"Modern Logic is a veritable ocean whose water is saline and which is unapproachable owing to the tumults and uproars of the commentators. Is not then the water of that ocean capable of being drunk? Why not? Intelligent people, like clouds, can easily approach the ocean and drink its water pure and sweet "

PREFACE

It pleased His Excellency the Earl of Ronaldshay, G.C.I.E., the Governor of Bengal, to utter these memorable words while

idealism further than any other thinker of any other age or country, or of the subtleties of the Nyāya system which has been handed down through immemorial ages, and is to-day the pride and glory of the isles of Navadvīpa, does, indeed, appear to me to be a profound anomaly."

Words like these coming from one who is himself a keen and ardent student of Indian Philosophy and a scrupulous and sympathetic ruler, came upon me, who have the good fortune to belong to Navadvīpa, "with double sway" and supplied the inspiration which sustained me in this my humble attempt to present a history of Indian Logic or Nyāya Darśana before the English-knowing public.

It was my revered preceptors Mahāmāhopādhyaya Mohesh Chandra and who mukt

Ātma-tattva-vivēka) first awakened in me an interest in the study of Indian Logic. That was about the year 1892. Subsequently I read Modern Logic, viz *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and *Śabda-takti-prakāśikā* under Pandit Bānācharan Nyāyāchārya and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Didhāt* under Pandit Jibanāth Mītra, both of Benares College.

I searched out and studied most of the books and manu-

some acquaintance with Indian Logic and from time to time published several books and articles on Nyāya.

With regard to Jaina Logic, I derived valuable help from my teacher

he left for England, the work of revision was very kindly undertaken by Dr W S Urquhart, of the Scottish Churches College, to whom I offer my thanks. My special thanks are due to Dr H Staddon of the Calcutta University for the attention and

from that Macenas of letters—I mean the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mukherji, Sarasvati, whose name is inseparably associated with every form of educational work in Bengal, who has spent the best years of his life in effecting various improvements in the status of the Calcutta University and who above anything else is the typical man of action—a great *Karmayogin*—unswerving in his aim and fixity of purpose, selfless in his devotion to work pursuing it through life regardless of malediction or benediction, praise or blame

CALCUTTA,
21st April, 1920

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA

The late Mahamahopādhyaya Dr Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣana had seen this book through up to p 34. After his rather sudden death the work of seeing the remainder of the book

express my thanks. The Index has been prepared by my old pupil Prof. Surendranath Bhattacharya, M A, of the Behar National College and for the Tibetan Index I have to thank Mr Johan Van Manen Librarian, Imperial Library, Calcutta.

I am well aware of my unfitness to undertake such a task requiring years of patient study. But I was tempted to do so, among other reasons, on account of the feeling of esteem and regard which I always entertained for my late friend, and I look upon this slight service to his memory as going a little way towards repaying the many kindnesses he had always shown to me ever since I first knew him.

CALCUTTA,
December, 1920

I J S TARAPOREWALA

he left for England, the work of revision was very kindly undertaken by Dr W. S. Urquhart, of the Scottish Churches College, to whom I offer my thanks. My special thanks are due to Dr H. Stephen of the Calcutta University for the interest and thoroughness with which he examined all the proofs of the present volume.

The book nowever could not have seen the light nor assumed its present form were it not for help of various kinds received from that Macenas of letters—I mean the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mukherji, Sarasvati, whose name is inseparably associated with every form of educational work in Bengal, who has spent the best years of his life in effecting various improvements in the status of the Calcutta University and who above anything

CALCUTTA,
11th April, 1920

SATI CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA

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AREWALA

Azimganj, Arrah, Bhavnagar, etc. I also used a large number of Jaina manuscripts, of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Deccan College, Poona, etc., besides those in the possession of the aforesaid Venerable Vilavatharam, etc.

from
intro-
as, nor
Buddhist books recorded in writing in 88 B.C. by Vatta-gāmini, is there any trace of a systematic culture of Nyāya. Even during my visit to Ceylon in 1909 (Appendix K), I did not come across in that island any evidence of Nyāya study. On this subject I have derived materials to some extent from Chinese, but mostly from Tibetan sources. Professor Kimura occasionally helped me in dealing with Chinese materials. Concerning the Tibetan sources almost all the materials were derived from *Bṛāhṣpurya* some volumes whereof were lent to me by the India office through the courtesy of Dr F W Thomas. Through the kindness of Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India, I was enabled to retain temporarily for my use some other volumes of *Bṛāhṣpurya* brought down from Gyantse during the Tibet Mission of 1904. To secure further materials bearing on the subject of Buddhist Logic I visited Labrang and Pamyangohi monasteries in June 1907 and October 1908, respectively (Appendices I and J), and came across a world of facts for observation and comment. Since the opening of increased intercourse between India and Tibet consequent upon the Tashi Lama's visit to India in 1904 (of which see ... traders have of, *Bṛāhṣpurya*, with me, or copy) in the University I

In regard to the chapters on modern Logic I occasionally consulted some scholars among whom ... Pramattā, Tarka-d. Mahāma vāgīśa m.

My, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, who very kindly looked through the first batch of manuscripts and made many suggestions which have stood me in great stead in preparing the volume. I am also grateful to Rev A Johnstone, M.A., Principal, CMS College, for having revised manuscripts as well as the proofs of the portion dealing with ancient Logic. Mr F J Monahan, I.C.S., Commissioner, Presidency Division, looked through a few galleys and when

As I left for England, the work of revision was very kindly undertaken by Dr W. S. Urquhart, of the Scottish Churches College, to whom I offer my thanks. My special thanks are due to Dr H. Stephen of the Calcutta University for the interest and thoroughness with which he examined all the proofs of the present volume.

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CALCUTTA,

21st April, 1920

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA

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 Pandit Pasupati Nath Sāstri, M. A., to both of whom I have to
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 pupil Prof. Surendranath Bhattacharya, M. A., of the Behar Na-
 ank Mr

INTRODUCTION.

My object in this volume is to write the history of what is called *Nyāya*, one of the six schools into which orthodox philosophy in India is divided. The word 'logic,' although it is in common parlance held synonymous with Indian *Nyāya*, is not exactly identical with it. Logic covers some of the subjects of *Nyāya* as well as *Vaiśeṣika* and is not co-extensive with either.

Indian Logic has been differently defined in different ages but the idea of an *anvaya* presented in the *anvaya* is the same.

21. Dīdhiti-rahasya by Mādhurānātha Tarkavāgīśa
22. Tattva-cintāmāni-dīdhiti-prasārini by Kṛṣṇadāsa Śārva-
bhauṃsa
23. Anumānaloka-prasārini on Pañcadhara by Kṛṣṇadāsa
24. " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
25. " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
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27. " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
28. Tattva-cintāmāni-dīdhiti-prakāśikā by Bhavaṅnanda Śa-
rādhanatāpīśa
29. Tattva-cintāmāni-dīdhiti-parikāś by Rudra Nyāsavācaśpati
30. Dīdhiti-tika by Raghudevya Nyāyālaṅkāra
31. Tattva-cintāmāni-dīdhiti-prakāśikā by Gadādhara
32. Tattva-cintāmāni-dīdhiti-tika by Kāmarudra Tarkavāgīśa

Close

- 13 Tattva-kālī-jñāna-patṛikā by Kālīsaukara
34 Tattva-cāndri-patṛikā by Candra Nārāyaṇa
35 Tattva-moḍri-patṛikā by Rudra Nārāyaṇa, etc

Of all the nations of the world the Hindus and the Greeks appear to have developed systems of logic to a large extent independently of each other. Hindu Logic in its rudimentary stage can be traced as early as the 6th century before Christ. Greek Logic assumed a definite form in the fourth century B.C. though its germs can be traced a little earlier in the controversies of the Sophists and Socrates. But so far as the five limbed syllogism of Hindu Logic is concerned the Hindu logician may have been indebted some way or other to the Greeks. While the syllogism was definitely formulated as a logical doctrine by Aristotle in his Rhetoric, Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics in the 4th century B.C., the Hindu logician shows but a vague conception of it as late as the 1st century B.C. It is not inconceivable that the knowledge of Aristotle's logic found its way through Alexandria, Syria and other countries into Taxila (vide Appendix A). This is rightly corroborated by the Hindu tradition that Nārada who visited Alexandria (Svetadvīpa) and became an expert in the handling of the five limbed syllogism. So simple is syllogistic structure that it does not seem to require any theory of gradual development to explain its growth. And Aristotle might have conceived the idea of syllogistic form into which all reasoning could be put as a complete whole.

I am inclined, therefore, to think that the syllogism did not actually evolve in Indian Logic out of inference, and that the Hindu logician owed the idea of syllogism to the influence of Aristotle (vide Appendix B). To Mr. H is one of the most important enquiries in the history of Indian Logic to ascertain at what stage the

doctrine of inference which was an indigenous growth, was happily amalgamated with the borrowed art of syllogism into a common structure of logical thought. The Buddhist work *Kathavattho* furnishes several logical terms e.g. *upanayana*, *niyama*, etc., of syllogistic reasoning. But we find not a single instance where these terms have been methodically combined so as to form a syllogism proper. An attempt has been made to discuss the point at issue in the Appendix B and I leave it to the reader to take my views for what they are worth.

[illegible]

FOREWORD.

Mahamahopādhyāya Dr. Satischandra Vidyabhushan came of a respectable Brahmana family of Faridpore. He was the third son of the well-known Pandit Pitambar Vidyāvāgīśa and was born on the 30th July, 1870, in the village of Khalkula in Faridpore. Satischandra was an infant four years old when he lost his father. The family was large and yet had no earning member, and the eldest son Biswamber Jyotisārnava who was then only sixteen maintained the family under circumstances of great difficulty.

Satischandra first went to the village school at the early age of five and rapidly made his mark amongst his fellow students. He stood first in the Minor Vernacular Examination from his Division and secured a scholarship which enabled him to proceed to Navadwip and take admission into the Hindu School. He passed the Entrance Examination of the Calcutta University in 1888, and obtained a scholarship which helped him to come to Calcutta and take his admission into the City College. In due course he passed the B. A. Examination and then proceeded to the

subject. Some years later his services were lent by the Government of Bengal to the Buddhist Text Society under whose auspices he edited a number of useful Pali Texts and published several original papers which attracted the attention of scholars in Europe and America. About this time he came into contact with Rai Saratchandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., the distinguished Tibetan Explorer at whose request his services were again lent by

The first six months of the year 1910 he spent at Benares where, under the guidance of Dr A. Venis, then Principal of the Queen's College, he studied under Subrahmanya Sastri, Bhagavatacharya, Shibakumar Sastri, Jibanath Jha and Bamacharan Nyayacharya. After his return to Calcutta from Benares he studied for six months under the guidance of Dr George Thibaut and acquired a good working knowledge of French and German. On the 1st December, 1910, he assumed charge of the Principalship of the Sanskrit College. In 1912 and 1916, he passed with great distinction the Preliminary and Final Examinations in Tibetan held by the Government, and carried off the sanctioned prizes on both occasions. He also acted as Lecturer on Pali and Tibetan in the University. His fame as a profound scholar of versatile attainments had rapidly spread and he was eagerly sought after in literary conferences. In 1913, he was the first President of the All India Digambar Jain Conference held at Benares. In 1914, he was President of the All India Svetambar Jain Conference held at Jodhpur and of the All India Sanskrit Conference held at Hardwar. In 1916, he was President of the Bengal Literary Conference held at Jessore, and of the District Literary Conference at Krishnagar. In 1919, he was a Vice-President of the First Oriental Conference held at Poona and President of the section on Pali and Buddhism. During all this period he worked strenuously as a scholar, and the value of his contributions to Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan studies cannot be easily appraised by a single individual. In the University itself he was a leading figure, and from 1912, acted as a Member of the Syndicate. His services were invaluable in reorganising Sanskrit studies of the indigenous type and his work as Secretary to the Sanskrit Board and the Sanskrit Association founded by the Government will be gratefully remembered by Pandits of the present generation all over this Presidency. There can be little doubt that he overworked himself, and in 1919 the first signs of failing health were indicated by a mild stroke of paralysis. Friends and well-wishers implored him to spare himself, but he was deaf to their entreaties, for as he

interest for me. In 1901 I had come across a monograph on "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan" by Sadajiro Sugiura who had offered it as a dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania. The work seemed to me of fascinating interest as opening up a

the Government for three years to assist in the preparation of a Tibetan-English Dictionary. He was in Darjeeling for this purpose from 1897-1900 and utilised the opportunity to acquire a thorough mastery over the Tibetan language with the help of the celebrated Lama Funchhog Wangdan then resident at Darjeeling. In December, 1900, he came to Calcutta as a Professor in the Sanskrit College. During this period he acquired a thorough knowledge of the Sramanas of Ceylon and Burma. In November, 1901, he appeared a second time at the M. A. Examination of the Calcutta University.

During the years he has been connected with the University arranged with Mr. T. W. Rhys Davids to conduct the examination. He achieved high distinction and his attainments were highly praised by the distinguished examiner. In March, 1902, he was transferred to the Presidency College as Professor of Sanskrit. In December, 1903, the Tashi Lama came to India to visit the places sacred to Buddhists. Satischandra was invited by the Government to accompany him, to act as Interpreter and to explain to him the histories and customs at the old holy places. The Tashi Lama was highly pleased and

appointed him as Philological Secretary. In 1908, the University conferred on him the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded him the Gold Medal Prize for original research. About this time the Government of Bengal and the University of Calcutta conferred on him the Principalship of the Sanskrit College.

During the time of the University I expressed my emphatic disapproval of the course proposed and expressed the opinion that Satischandra Vidyabhusan would be found admirable for the Principalship if he were offered facilities for continuing his research. This view prevailed and during 1909 and

A LIST OF THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE MAHĀMAHŪ- PĀDHYĀYA DR SATISCHANDRA VIDYABHUSHAN¹

A. Works, original or edited

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17. *...*
18. *The Nyāya-sūtras of Gotama*, translated into English (Sacred Books of the Hindus Vol. 8)—Allahabad, 1913
19. *Sāhitya-Parīkṣa-Patrīkā*—Edited by Īm S C Vidyabhūṣan from (1913-1916?)
20. *Nyāyabindu* a Bilingual Index of Sanskrit and Tibetan words (Bib Ind., Tib Ser—1917)
21. *A Report on the Revival of Buddhism*—1917
22. *A History of Indian Logic*—1922

B. Articles contributed to various English Journals,

(i) "The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society"

1. *Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna*—1900.
2. *Brahmanic References to the Buddhist Philosophy*—1901
3. *Old Indian Alphabet*—1904
4. *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*—1905.
5. *Uddyotakara*—1914
6. *Influence of Aristotle on the Development of the Syllogism in Indian Logic*—1918.

(ii) "The Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal"

1. *The Licchavi Race of Ancient India* } (xxi, 1) Abstracts also printed in
2. *Vaiśāk and Śankarā Theories of Caste* } Proc. A S B, 1902.

¹ This list has been compiled from several sources and though extensive is by no means complete.

- 2 An Analysis of the *Laṅkāraśāstra*
- 4 *Anurūpika* Thera, a learned Pāli author of Southern India in the 12th century A.D. (N 5, 1)
- 5 Dharmaśāstra and his *Prasādaśāstra*
- 6 *Śaṅkhaśāstra* a Tāntrika Hinduist author of Kashmir in the 11th cent. A.D.
- 7 A Tibetan Vinaya for 190-07
- 8 The Gyantse Rock Inscription of the 9th century, a ruler under Saṅgyapa Harsach in the 11th cent. A.D.
- 9 *Kamaka*, or the City of Rome as mentioned in the Ancient Pāli and Sanskrit Works (N 5, 14)
- 10 *Heterodoxa karmas* or Dharmaśāstra of Harsach, recovered from Lalau, in Sikkim
- 11 Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet—
- 12 " " " " —2
- 13 " " " " —3
- 14 *Nāgārjuna*
- 15 Sāṅkhya Philosophy in the Land of the Lamas (N 5, 14)
- 16 Sanskrit works on Literature, Grammar, Rhetoric and Logic as preserved in Tibet
- 17 A Descriptive List of Works on the Māhīyānaka Philosophy
- 18 Some rare Sanskrit works on Grammar, Lexicography and Prosody recovered from Tibet
- 19 Two Tibetan Charms obtained by Lt Col Stuart H. Godfrey in Ladakh: one for chasing away Evil spirits and the other for compelling Fortune (N 5, 15)
- 20 " " " " " " " " " " " "
- 21 " " " " " " " " " " " "
- 22 " " " " " " " " " " " "
- 23 " " " " " " " " " " " "
- 24 " " " " " " " " " " " "
- (N 5, 16)
- 25 The *Tattva Saṁgraha*, a most assured Work on Hindu Logic (summarised in English) (N 5, 17)

(i) a) "Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal"

- 1 The Śaṅkha Caste of India identified with the Śādr of Central Asia (1903)
- 2 The Buddhist doctrine of "Middle Path" (1904)
- [See also items 1 and 2 under heading ii, above]

(ii) b) "Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal"

- 1 On certain Tibetan Symbols and Images lately discovered from the 11th cent.
- 2 " " " " " " " " " " " "
- 3 " " " " " " " " " " " "

(iii) "The Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of India"

- 1 Brahmanic References to the Mādhyamika School of Buddhist Philosophy (iii, 2)
- 2 The Mādhyamika School of Buddhist Philosophy, together with a Short
- 3 " " " " " " " " " " " "
- 4 " " " " " " " " " " " "
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- 6 " " " " " " " " " " " "
- (iv, 1)

Upaniṣads

- 7 The Mādhyamika Aphorisms—1 (the Examination of the *Śāstra*)

- 8 The Philosophy of *Prajñāpāramitā*, Absolute Knowledge. (iv, 3.)
 9 The Philosopher *Dinnāga*, c. Contemporary of the Poet *Kālidāsa*
 10. The *Mādhyamika* Aphorisms—5 (the Examination of the Elements) } (iv, 4)
 11. The *Mādhyamika* Aphorisms—6
 12. The Story of *Haritika*. (v, 1)
 13. The *Mādhyamika* Aphorisms—7 (the Examination of the *Samskāras*, Origination, Continuance and Extinction) } (v, 4)
 14. History of the *Mādhyamika* Philosophy of *Nāgārjuna* (v, 4)
 15. The Story in *Mahakāvya* } (vi, 1)
 16. *Nirvāṇa* }
 17. The Influence of Buddhism on the Development of *Nyāya* Philosophy } (vi, 3)
 18. The *Mādhyamika* Aphorisms—8
 19. " " " "
 20. " " " "
 21. " " " "
 22. " " " "
 ■ The Buddhist Version of the *Nyāya* Philosophy }

(iv) "The Journal of the Mahabodhi Society"

- 1 The Law of Karma } (1900)
 2 Life of *Dinnāga* }
 3 Buddhist Convocations } (1901)
 4 Buddhism in India }
 5 The History of *Saṅkhya* Philosophy
 6 Alexander Cœma de *Kōra*
 7 *Ratanasūtra*
 8 *Prajñāpāramitā* or Perfection of Wisdom
 9 Conversion of the People of *Lankā* by *Buddha*
 10 *Upasampada*, or Ordination ceremony of the Buddhist
 11 Influence of Buddhism on the Development of the Hindu } (1902)
 12 Philosophy }
 13 The Northern and Southern Schools of Buddhism
 14 *Nāgārjuna*

(v) "The Dawn"

1. History of the Grammatical Literature of India } (1901)
 2 The Ancient History of *Megadha* }
 3. *Dharmatrāya*, or Forest of Justice (1902)

(vi) "The Bengalee"

1. The Influence of Bengal on the *Nyāya* Philosophy (1902).

(vii) "The Indian Mirror"

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CALLED *Pramāṇasāstra*, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

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A HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC.

PART I.

THE ANCIENT SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

SECTION I.

Ānvikṣiki—the Science of Inquiry (650 B.C.—100 A.D.).

CHAPTER I

The growth of Ānvikṣiki into an Art of Debate.

1. THE EARLY LITERATURE OF INDIA (CIRCA 1500 B.C.—600 B.C.)

The Brāhmanas maintain that their religion is eternal (*sanātana*). It is based on scriptures which are said also to be eternal but revealed in different cycles of time to seers or sages called *Rsis*. These scriptures are called the Vedas which comprise the Samhitās (Hymns) and the Brāhmanas (Rituals etc.).

The Vedas

The Vedas are regarded even by modern

scholars, who do not admit the perpetuity of their existence, to be the oldest records not only of India but of the whole Aryan world. The Samhitā of the Rgveda which is the oldest part of the Veda is said by them to have come down to us from about 1500 B.C., while the Brāhmanas such as the Aitareya, Kauṣītaki, etc. are supposed to have belonged to a period between 900 B.C. and 600 B.C. The Āraṇyakas (Forest-treatises), which are theosophic in character, form the closing section of the Brāhmanas. The Upaniṣads which deal mainly with metaphysical questions are included in the Āraṇyakas and are as such older than 600 B.C.¹

¹ Compare Macdonell's "History of Sanskrit Literature," p. 47, and my "Grimm's Phonetic Law of the Indo-European Languages."

2. PROBLEMS OF THE VEDAS (CIRCA 1500 B C—600 B C)

From the standpoint of subject-matter the Vedas (composed between 1500 B C and 600 B C.) may be divided into three sections (kāṇḍas), viz. *upāsana* (Prayer), *karma* (Rituals) and *jñāna* (Knowledge). Under *upāsana* come the Samhitās which embody expressions of wonder and awe at the Powers of Nature such as Light, Darkness, Wind, Water, Rain, etc. The Brāhmanas which treat mainly of the sacrificial rites come under the head *karma*. The *jñāna-kāṇḍa* as represented by the Āranyakas is concerned mainly with the nature of soul and its destiny.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTION OF SOUL (900 B C.—600 B C).

As already suggested, the Brāhmanas hold that the doctrine of the soul and its destiny propounded in the Āranyakas (Upaniṣads) has existed in India from the beginning of time. Their view, which seeks to place the Brāhmanic religion on a firm basis unshaken by the influences of time, does not however find favour with modern scholars according to whom all human civilizations, including even the civilizations of the Indian people, grew up by a process of evolution. The conception of the soul and its destiny, like every thing else, has undergone stages of development in the course of ages. These stages may be clearly seen if we examine the doctrine of the soul as given in the Samhitās, Brāhmanas and Upaniṣads.

The Samhitās of the Rg-veda¹ and Atharva-veda² tell us that when a person dies his spirit (called *prāṇa*, breath, *asu*, breathing, or *manāḥ*, intelligence, characterised as *ajo bhūgo*, the unborn part), which leaves behind on earth all that is uncomfortable, is conveyed by the messenger of Yama (the Lord of Death) to the world of his forefathers where it obtains a delectable abode and enters upon a perfect life which will never cease.

The Śatapatha Brāhmana³ and other later vedic works, which mention the soul as *ātman* lay much stress on its good work called *dharma* (righteous-

¹ Rg-veda Samhitā in 113, 9, 11, x 14 8-10, x 15, 14; and x 16 2, 5
² Atharva-veda in 2, 27. Vide also Muir's Sanskrit Texts, Vol V, pp 309-315.
³ Śatapatha Brāhmana in 2, 2, 27; x 6, 3, 1, xi 7, 2, 23. Vide Muir's Sanskrit Texts, Vol V, pp 309-315.

ness) which is described as the strength of strength (*ksatrasya ksatram*)¹ According to them all persons are after death reborn into another world where they enjoy pleasures or suffer pains according to their good or evil deeds

The upanishads offer a subtle treatment of the soul distinguishing carefully between *jñāna* (knowledge)

Soul in the Upanishads

who has merely done useful work passing through the path of his forefathers (*pitṛ-yāna*) reaches the moon whence he, after the exhaustion of his merits, comes back to this world and a person who has neither acquired knowledge nor has done any useful work traverses a third path—the path of transmigration (*samsāra*)—which leads him to continual births and deaths

The third path is more fully expounded in the Kathopanishad²

which gives a clear exposition of the nature of the soul called *ātman*. The soul is described as being distinct from the body

Soul in the Kathopanishad
It is not born, it does not die, it sprang from nothing and nothing sprang from it. It is eternal and everlasting and is not killed though the body is killed. The wise man who knows the soul as bodiless within the body, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent, never grieves. The soul is comparable to a person who moves in a chariot, the body is the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, the mind the reins, the senses are the horses and the surrounding objects their spheres of operation. The soul is called the enjoyer when it is in union with the body, the mind and the senses. Fools run after outward pleasures and fall into the snare of death, but wise men cognizant of the imperishable nature of the soul never hanker after unstable things

the soul
after the
go into
Such
the heart
Brahman.

¹ अतस्तु यत्तन्मयं यत्तन्मयं : तस्मात्तु यत्तन्मयं यत्तन्मयं (R̥ghadāraṇyaka 10-14)

² Chāndogyaopaniṣad 4-13, 3, 16, 5-10-3 5-10-8

³ R̥ghadāraṇyakhopaniṣad 4-4-3; 6-2-13, and 16.

⁴ Kathopanishad 1-1-20, 1-2-18, 10, 1-2-23, 1-3-3, 4, 2-1-4; 2-3-6, 7; and 2-6-14, 15. For also Max Müller's translation of the Kathopanishad in the S R F. series

1. *Ātma-vidyā*—THE SCIENCE OF SOUL (CIRCA 900 B C —600 B C)

The Upaniṣads (composed between 900 B C. and 600 B C) which dealt with the soul and its destiny constituted a very important branch of study called *Ātma-vidyā*, the science of soul, *Adhyātma-vidyā*, the spiritual science or *Brahma-vidyā*, the Divine Science, which is the foundation of all other sciences. In the previous paragraph there has been given some idea of the nature of the soul—a concrete substance—as it was understood in the ages of the Upaniṣads as well as in those of the Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas. In the ages of the Upaniṣads there arose another idea—

an abstract conception—regarding the soul which developed *pari passu* with the first idea. Thus in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,¹ Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad,² etc., we find that *ātmā*, which referred not only to the human soul but to the soul of other objects as well, signified the essence of an object as distinguished from its outward form, and as such was often designated as *Brahman* the pervading essence, that is, the essence which permeated the object in all its forms and changes. This second idea of the soul, which gave birth to the Vedānta system of philosophy, began to exercise considerable influence on the first idea which was supported in other systems of philosophy, and a compromise between the two ideas was effected when the soul belonging to our practical condition (*vyāvahārika dāśā*) was stated to be of the first description while the soul belonging to our transcendental condition (*pāramārthika dāśā*) was stated to be of the second description.

5. *Anvikṣiki*—WHICH INCLUDES A THEORY OF REASONS (CIRCA 650 B C —100 B.C.)

Ātma-vidyā was at a later stage called *Anvikṣiki*, the science of inquiry. Manu³ uses *Anvikṣiki* as an equivalent for *Ātma-*

¹ Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10-3-1 (Weber's edition)

² Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (3rd chapter, 7th Brāhmaṇa), Mundakopaniṣad, 1 1, 1, Diṣṭagavālgītā 10-32

वैविष्ट्यस्यैव विद्याम्

इत्यनेनैव ज्ञातव्यम् ।

आन्वेषिकी वाचस्पति

वाक्यरचयित्री कीदृशम् ॥ (Manu Samhitā 7-43)

Kāmandaka too in his Nītiśāstra writes —

आन्वेषिकायां विज्ञानं चर्चासौ चर्चासौ ।

चर्चासौ च चर्चासौ चर्चासौ चर्चासौ ।

vidyā, and his followers, the Mānavas,¹ describe it—evidently considering it synonymous with the Upaniṣad—as a branch of the Vedas. Ānviṣīki while comprising the entire function of Ātma-vidyā was in fact different from it, and consequently from the Upaniṣad too. Kautilya² (about 327 B.C.) recognized Ānviṣīki as a distinct branch of study over and above the three, viz. Trayī

(the Vedas), Vārta (Commerce) and Danda-nīti (Polity) enumerated in the school of Ātma-vidyā.

The distinction between Ānviṣīki and Ātma-vidyā lay in this, that while the former embodied certain dogmatic assertions about the nature of the soul, the latter contained reasons supporting those assertions. Ānviṣīki dealt in fact with two subjects, viz. ātma, soul, and hetu, theory of reasons. Vātsyāyana³ observes that Ānviṣīki without the theory of reasons would have like the Upaniṣad been a mere ātma-vidyā or adhyātma-vidyā. It is the theory of reasons which distinguished it from the same. The Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata, in so far as they treated of reasons affirming or denying the existence of soul, were included by Kautilya in the Ānviṣīki.⁴ The formation of Ānviṣīki must have commenced in the period of the Upaniṣad in which some of its technical terms were forestalled, but it did not take any definite shapes until about 650 B.C. when it was recognized as a distinct branch of learning.

6. ĀNVIKṢIKI BIFURCATES INTO PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC (ABOUT 650 B.C.).

Ānviṣīki, as previously pointed out, treated of two subjects, viz. the soul and the theory of reasons. In

The theory of soul and that of reasoning so far as it was mainly concerned with the soul, Ānviṣīki was developed into Philosophy called *Darśana*⁵, and in so far as it dealt largely with the

¹ यदी वाचा इत्यन्योन्येति साधना । यदीतिविशेषो ज्ञानोपकोतिः ।

(Arthasāstra of Kautilya, 1-2, p. 6, Shama Śāstrī's edition).

² ज्ञानोपको यदी वाचा इत्यन्योन्येति विद्याः ।

(Arthasāstra of Kautilya, 1-2, p. 6)

³ इत्यस्य अतः विद्याः इत्यहं ज्ञानानां वाच्यतायामनुपपत्त्या तदविवक्षितं वाचं चतुर्थीतम् आन्योन्यिकीं व्यावर्तिता । तस्या इत्यहं ज्ञानानां संज्ञायादयः पदार्थाः । तेषां इत्यहं ज्ञानमनन्तरं चतुर्थीविद्यायावन्ति ज्ञानं यद्येवमित्यहः (Nyāyabhāṣya, 1-1-1).

⁴ वाचं यदी कोऽप्यहं वेदाज्ज्ञानोपको (Arthasāstra of Kautilya, 1-2, p. 6)

⁵ In Sanskrit दर्शन, in Pāli दृश्य, in Prākṛta दृष्य, and in Tibetan རྒྱལ་པོ།

theory of reasoning it was developed into Logic called pre eminent
the *Śaṅkhya* or *Anvikṣiki* par excellence. This bifurcation of
Anvikṣiki into Philosophy and Logic commenced with the re-
formation of the science but specially about 550 B.C. when Medha-
tithi Gautama expounded the logical side of the Anvikṣiki. The
Anvikṣiki continued however for many centuries to be used in the
general sense of a science which embraced both the subjects
Philosophy and Logic.

7. ANVIKṢIKI IN ITS PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT CALLED Darsana

As already observed, Anvikṣiki treating of the soul was called
Darsana (philosophy). "Darsana" liter-
ally signifies seeing. It is in fact the science
which enables us to see our soul. The
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad¹ says that 'the soul is verily to be seen,'
and the Śāṅkhya-sāṃhitā² declares that 'the highest virtue
consists in seeing the soul through meditation'. In the Mundak-
opaniṣad³ we find that "when the soul is seen the knot of the heart
is untied, all doubts are dispelled and all act-forces are exhausted".
It was about the first century B.C. that the Anvikṣiki dealing
with the soul was replaced by the word 'Darsana'. The Sān-
khya, Yoga and Lokāyata which were incorporated in Anvikṣiki
were designated as Darsana or branches of philosophy. The word
Darsana in this special sense occurs in the Mahābhārata,⁴ Bhāga-
vata Purāṇa,⁵ Nyāya bhāṣya⁶ Vedānta-bhāṣya,⁷ etc.

¹ आत्मा वादे दृश्य (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, II. 4-5)

² अदम्य वसो धर्मो यद् धीमेवाय दर्शनम् (Śāṅkhya-sāṃhitā book I verse 8)

³ भिद्यते हृदयस्थि हियसो धर्मवशात्.

धीयसो आत्मा धर्मादि तत्त्वान् दृष्टे परावरे ॥ (Mundakopaniṣad, II. 2-81)

⁴ मुक्तं मोक्षं तथोक्तं द्वा गतेषु आत्मनः।

मनसा आरब्धं मुक्तं दमनं च उच्यते ॥ (Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 110-45)

⁵ अदम्यसो अनेभिः साधना नामकपथाः।

विशोचितात्मिनीनां दर्शनमेव एतदेव ॥ (Bhāgavatapurāṇa, 8-14-10)

⁶ यद् पुनरप्यसौ ज्ञानम् अन्तःकरणस्य द्वा देवदेवस्यैकमुक्तं यत्तु अर्था इति वक्ष्ये
दर्शनं तत् प्रतिनिधये। (Nyāya bhāṣya, 3-2-35)

⁷ Śaṅkara bhāṣya on the Vedānta sūtra 2-2-1

Tarka vidyā or Vāda-vidyā is referred to in the Manusmṛiti,¹ Mahābhārata,² Skandapurāṇa,³ Gautama dharma sūtra,⁴ etc.

Nyāyaśāstra yāna,⁵ Vājñavalkya samhitā,⁶ etc.
Anvikāṇṭhi was, as we shall see later

called Nyāya śāstra, the science of true reasoning.

¹ Manusmṛiti § 20, § 267-271, 290, 291

² Mahābhārata, Śānti-parva aṣṭhyāya 107 verse 4th and aṣṭhyāya 24th

³ Skandapurāṇa Kāśīkāṇṭha, aṣṭhyāya 17

⁴ Gautama dharma sūtra aṣṭhyāya 16

⁵ Jāṇakiya 1-12 23 7-33-35

⁶ Vājñavalkya samhitā, 3 292 etc

⁷ The Nyāya is called in Tibetan *Ngwa Hige pa* (vide the Mahāyāna part II p. 122 edited in Sanskrit Tibetan English by Dr F. D. Ross and Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Bibliotheca Indica series Calcutta, Bombay, 1900, 2do Qo, folios 223-277)

CHAPTER II

The Teachers of Ānvikṣikī (Philosophy and Logic).

9 CĀRVĀKA—HIS MATERIALISTIC DOCTRINE (C. 600-650 B C).

The Vedic literature¹ refers to a class of men who did not

comixture of rice, molasses, etc.

The dissolution into those elements = our death, after which our consciousness disappears. In the Rāmāyana² the same doctrine is elucidated by Javāla when he says that our parents are our progenitors, that there is no future life and that we should not believe in anything which cannot be proved through perception. This doctrine, which is referred to also in the Caraka-saṃhitā,³ etc., and which attracted a very large number of adherents, is widely known as *Lokāyata* or that which prevails in the world⁴.

10. KĀPILA—HIS DOCTRINE OF MATTER AND SOUL (ABOUT 650-575 B C)

The earliest orthodox writer on Ānvikṣikī (Philosophy) as mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara⁵ Upaniṣad was Kapila who is tradition-

¹ Vide Rigveda, 10-35-3, 8-70-7; 8-71-8, etc.

² श्रीरामायण अरण्यकाण्डे कपिलः ब्रह्मचर्यं यत्
यदीदं कुर्यात्। यमुनाया नाम्नि चतुर्विंशति व जल संज्ञायोजितः।

(Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 4-5-13)

³ यं वासि वरजितेनम् कुरु बुद्धिं मयाप्ये।

प्रत्यक्षं यत् तद्विहितं यदीदं ब्रह्म। कुरु॥

(Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, sarga 10th, verse 17)

⁴ Caraka-saṃhitā, Sūtra-sāhita, chap. XI

⁵ For a history of the Lokāyata compare Prof. T. W. Rhys Davids' Introduction to the Kāśikānta Sūtra in "Dialogues of the Buddha, vol. II."

⁶ अग्निं प्रहृतं कथितं बलमयं।

ब्रह्मैविकर्तुं जगत्तमं च योजितं॥ (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 2-2)

11 DATTATREYA HIS PARADISE OF A TREE (अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४)

A sage named Dattatreya,¹ who as the sixth incarnation of Viṣṇu was junior to Kapila, is stated in the Bhāgavata purāṇa to have taught Anvikṣiki to Alarka, Prāhila and others. The proper name of the sage was Datta while his family name was Atreya. He lived on the Girnar hills in Kathiawar where a temple associated with his name still exists. It appears from the Mārkaṇḍeya purāṇa² that the Anvikṣiki-vidyā expounded by him consisted of

¹ Śāhikhyā kṛcchā verse 20.

² Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 215.

१. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४
२. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४
३. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४
४. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४
५. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४
६. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४
७. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४
८. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४
९. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४
१०. अत्रोत्पत्तिः २३०-२३४

A sage named Bhattakṛiṣṇa¹ who, as the author of a version of Vishnu was known to Kṛṣṇa is stated in the Mārkandeya purāṇa to have taught Amśikha to the Varāṇasīśāstrī and others. The proper name of the sage was Bhatta while his family name was Aśreya. He lived on the turner hill in Kāśī where a temple associated with his name still exists. It appears from the Mārkandeya purāṇa² that the Amśikhaśāstrī's ex-sound by him consisted of

¹ Mārkandeya-purāṇa, 1-3-12.

² Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 113.

१. अमशिकेण शिष्येण अमशिकेण
 अमशिकेण अमशिकेण अमशिकेण
 अमशिकेण अमशिकेण अमशिकेण
 अमशिकेण अमशिकेण अमशिकेण
 अमशिकेण अमशिकेण अमशिकेण
 अमशिकेण अमशिकेण अमशिकेण
 (Mārkandeya-purāṇa, 1-3-12)

२. अमशिकेण अमशिकेण अमशिकेण
 अमशिकेण अमशिकेण अमशिकेण
 (Mārkandeya-purāṇa, 10-12)

A sage named Aśreya is mentioned in the Kauśika sūtra of the Atharva-veda
 vide Weber's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 153

A sage named Dattatreya lived at the east in small
Vijaya was junior to Kapila resided in the Pithavara pur
have taught Amikant to Marka Peasita and others. The
per name of the sage was Dattatreya his family name was Atreya
He lived on the Gurnar hills in Hathawar where a temple associ-
ated with his name still exists. It appears from the Marka Peasita
purana that the Amikant village, founded by him consisted of

1. የግል ጥቅም ላይ የዋለው የጥቅም ስልጣን

* *Journal of Management Studies*, 1991, 28, 219

১. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য
 ২. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য
 ৩. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য
 ৪. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য
 ৫. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য
 ৬. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য
 ৭. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য
 ৮. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য
 ৯. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য
 ১০. অসমীয়া ভাষাৰ প্ৰাচীন সাহিত্য

१. प्रथम नाम यथा श्री श्री हनुमान् चन्द्रिका ।
 अथर्ववेद पुत्रा श्री श्री हनुमान् चन्द्रिका ।
 (Archana Purāṇa, 16-17)

1 sage named Atreya is mentioned in the Kaṇḍa sūtra of the Atharva veda
 vide Weber's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 153

a mere disquisition on soul in accordance with the *yoga* philosophy

The yoga doctrine of soul He preached the doctrines of transmigration and emancipation under the parable of a tree To identify a gross object with "I" or to look upon it as "mine" is, according to him, the germ of selfishness which grows up into a large tree bearing the fruits of pleasure and pain He in whom the tree of selfishness has not grown is freed from all bondage for ever Things when looked upon in their true nature do not cause affliction but they become sources of great woes when we consider them as our own

From this summary we may conclude that Dattatreya expounded the philosophical side of Anvikṛī and not its logical aspect.

12. PUNARVASU ATREYA HIS DISSERTATION ON THE SENSES
(CIRCA 550 B C)

In the Caraka-saṃhitā, the original author of which was Punarvasu Ātreya,¹ there is a dissertation on the senses (indriya)² which seems to belong to the Anvikṣiki system. The Caraka-saṃhitā, originally called the Āyurveda, is said to have been delivered by a sage named Punarvasu better known as Ātreya who resided at the side of the Himalayas. The sage was perhaps the same Ātreya³ who is mentioned in the Tibetan books as a Pro-

Professor Ātreya of Taxila, a countryman of Pāṇini as both of them flourished in the Punjab—one at Taxila (Takṣaśilā) and the other at Śālistura. Like the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, Ātreya's Āyurveda* was divided into eight books called "sthānas" or "places". The rule which Pāṇini lays down as to the use of the word Punarvasu in the singular number shows that Ātreya whose proper name was Punarvasu was a Vedic sage

It is not known whether the Caraka-saṃhitā, as it exists at present, contains any genuine teachings of Ātreya, but the most elementary doctrines of each book of the saṃhitā are by common consent ascribed to him. The eighth chapter of sūtra-śāstra

¹ Atreya is called in Tibetan རྩལ་ཤར་གྱི་མཁའ་ལྷ་མོ་ (gyan-shar kyi-ba) (cf. Mahāvya-
saka, p. 52, Bibliotheca Indica)

१ अर्थात् इन्द्रियवस्तुमयोपन्यासः साक्षात्कार इति न आह अन्वयान्न चान्येव ।

(Caraka-saṁgraha, || 6tra othāṇa, with vāya 5).

* Mahabhyas, Dasha III. Fide Rockhill's *Life of Butika*, p. 61. Cf. *Pala Mahavyas*, *Abhandhakas* I, VIII in which there occurs the name *Arilika*.

* अन्वयि प्रनर्भेभ्योरवचनम् (Pramāṇa Anvayaśloka 1-2-01)

A good speech is (1) fraught with sense, (2) unequivocal, (3) fair, (4) not pleonastic, (5) smooth, (6) determinative, (7) not bombastic, (8) agreeable, (9) truthful, (10) not harmful, (11) refined, (12) not too laconic, (13) not abstruse, (14) not unsystematic, (15) not far-fetched, (16) not superfluous, (17) not inopportune, and (18) not devoid of an object.

A speech, if it is to be freed from the faults of judgment, should not be prompted by lust wrath, fear, greediness, abjectness, crookedness, shamefulness, tenderness or conceit

A speech is said to be lucid if there is agreement between it on one hand and the speaker and hearer on the other. A speech which, though clear to the speaker himself, is uttered without any regard for the hearer, produces no impression in the latter. That speech again, which does not convey the meaning of the speaker himself but is uttered solely out of regard for the hearer, is disingenuous and faulty. He alone is a speaker who employs words which, while expressing his own meaning, are also understood by his hearer.

14 ASTĀVAKRA—A VIOLENT DEBATER HOW HE DEFEATED A SOPHIST (ABOUT 550-500 B C)

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN ASTĀVAKRA AND A SOPHIST

"The debate between Astāvakra and a Sophist is a very famous one. It is recorded in the Mahābhārata, Vanaparva, Chapter 133-134. The Sophist was a very clever man, and he was able to defeat Astāvakra in the debate. However, Astāvakra was a very powerful man, and he was able to defeat the Sophist in the end. The debate was a very interesting one, and it is worth reading. It shows the power of Astāvakra's logic and the Sophist's cleverness. The debate was a very famous one, and it is recorded in the Mahābhārata, Vanaparva, Chapter 133-134. The Sophist was a very clever man, and he was able to defeat Astāvakra in the debate. However, Astāvakra was a very powerful man, and he was able to defeat the Sophist in the end. The debate was a very interesting one, and it is worth reading. It shows the power of Astāvakra's logic and the Sophist's cleverness."

of the work contains a dissertation which is given below.

There are five organs of sense, viz. eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. The five elements of matter are earth, water and air. The five objects of sense are sight, smell, taste and touch. The five kinds of sense are sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch.

The doctrine of the senses is different from that of the Greeks. The Greeks held that the senses are different from each other, and that each sense can attend to only one thing at a time. The Indians held that the senses are different from each other, and that each sense can attend to more than one thing at a time.

Dissertations on the senses like that of the Indians have contributed not a little to the development of the philosophy of the Anviksiki.

(15) not far-fetched, (16) not *superfluous*, (17) *not impetuous*, and (18) not devoid of an object.

A speech, if it is to be *free from the taint of judgment*, should not be prompted by *hatred, wrath, fear, greediness, anger, or violence, shamefulness, tenderness or emotion*.

A speech is said to be *incisive* if there is agreement between it on one hand and the speaker and hearer on the other. A speech which, though clear to the speaker himself, is uttered without any regard for the hearer, produces no impression in the latter. That speech again, which does not convey the meaning of the speaker himself but is uttered solely out of regard for the hearer, is *disingenuous and faulty*. He alone is a speaker who employs words which, while expressing his own meaning, are also understood by his hearer.

14 ASṬAVAKRA—A VIOLENT DEBATER: HOW HE DEFEATED
A SOPHIST
(ABOUT 650-500 B.C.)

came to attend a sacrificial ceremony at the palace of King Janaka in Mithila. Being prevented at the gate Asṭavakra went to the king and said: "A road while there is no Brahmana is open to the blind, the deaf, women, carriers of burden and the impure respectively, but when a Brahmana is there it is closed." Hearing these words the king gave him permission to enter the sacrificial ground. A wanderer in offering an apology said, that Asṭavakra entered because he was still a lad, and, under orders of King Janaka, was permitted to enter the sacrificial ground.

Asṭavakra's debate with Janaka.

vows and am in possession of my own soul. A person is not bound by

(ap 263)

(chap xvii)

(Khaṇḍa III tantra)

(in canto xvii)

(Jan in October)

1904

books, thou heedest them not." Janaka replied "Your words are excellent and superhuman. As you have defeated Vandin in debate, I place him at your disposal."

15 AṢṬĀVAKRA SOLVES PUZZLES

At Mithila King Janaka to test the ingenuity of Aṣṭāvakra¹ once made a statement as follows —

"He alone is a learned man who knows the thing which is possessed of 360 spokes (i.e. days) 12 parts (i.e. months) of 30 subdivisions (days) each, and 24 joints (i.e. new moons and full moons)"

Aṣṭāvakra who fully understood the significance of the statement replied as follows —

"May that ever-moving wheel (i.e. the sun) that has 24 joints (i.e. new moons and full moons), six naves (i.e. seasons), 12 peripheries (i.e. the signs of the zodiac or months) and 360 spokes (i.e. degrees or days) protect thee"

Janaka asked "Who amongst the gods beget those two which go together like two mares yoked to a car and swoop like hawks?"

Aṣṭāvakra said "May God, O King, forbend the presence of these two (i.e. thunder and lightning) in thy house, yea even in the house of thy enemies. He (i.e. the cloud), whose charioteer is the wind, begets them."

Thereupon the king said "What is it that does not close its eyes even while sleeping, what is it that does not move even when born, what is it that has no heart and what does increase even in its own speed?"

Aṣṭāvakra said "It is a fish that does not close its eye-lids while sleeping. it is an egg that does not move when produced, it is a stone that increases in its own space."

¹—

Medhātithi Gautama's which "Gotamaka"² was one This order
 ago referred most probably to the followers of
 Gotama or Gautama the founder of Ānvikṣikī The Brahmajāla-
 sutta³ describes a sage designated as *takki* (argumentationist)
 and *vimamsi* (casuist) who maintained that certain things were
 eternal and other things were not eternal. It is a common view that

Text Society

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We thus find that Medhātithi, Gotāma, Gautama and Medhātithi Gautama were the names for one and the same person, who founded the Anvikṛikī *par excellence*. His work on Anvikṛikī has not come down to us in its original form. We do not therefore know whether he treated of the soul and reasoning together in one volume, or dealt with them separately. His theory of reasoning has reached us in a crude form through the Caraka-saṃhitā

Medhātithi's work on Anvikṛikī

Nyāya was prevalent in the day and by "Nyāya śāstra" he really meant its prototype the Anvikṛikī. In the Śānti parva of the Mahābhārata,¹ there is mention of a Medhātithi who, along with certain other sages revealed to the world the Upaniṣad-doctrine of emancipation. This Medhātithi seems to have been the same as our Medhātithi Gautama.

Medhātithi Gautama is more often called simply Gautama. As previously noticed, Gautama was the name under which the founder of Anvikṛikī was best known in the Padmapurāṇa, Matsya purāṇa, etc., and his art of debate is still designated as Gautami Vidyā (Gotamīde science). The fame of

Gautama mentioned in the old Persian scripture

Gautama as a great master of the art of debate seems to have spread as far as Persia. In one of the yashts² of the Khorda Avesta edited during the reigns of the Sasanian Kings Ardāshīr (A D 211-241) and Shāpūr I (A D 242-272), we read³ "how the Fravashis cause

¹ Dhēśa's Pratimā nāṭaka, Act V, p. 79, M M Ganapati Śāstri's edition

অদ্বৈতবিশিষ্টা যদ্যৎ জায়াতব্জ জম :

যাশবদ্যদ্ব মৃত্যবাব নদীঃস্ব. স্বববর্ষই :

অজিতব যদে সান বিদ্র. অজীর্ষবর্ষিণি :

দৈবানিবির্ঘ্ন : .. স্বর্ষ যদ্যৎ জমবলা :

(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva Mokṣadharma, adhyāya 243, verses 14-17)

² Vide the 13th yasht, para 16

³ According to Arta-vīraś dēma, the Avesta written on cow hides with golden ink and given to the Persians by Zaratušht (Zoroaster), existed in its original form for 300 years until it was burnt by Iskander Rumi (Alexander the Great) who destroyed Persepolis about 325 B C. The fragments that survived were put together by Zoroastrian priests under the name of Avesta, which was edited and proclaimed canonical during the reigns of Ardāshīr and Shāpūr of the Sasanian dynasty. It is suggested that it was in the Sasanian period that Indian traditions entered the scripture of the Persians. Cf Dr A. Geldner's "Persia" in the Encyclopædia Britannica

⁴ Vide the 13th yasht, para 16; and Early Religious Poetry of Persia, by J H Moulton, p. 147

people might ask their advice. The debates or dialogues, such as

the councils, constituted the technical terms of the Ānvikṣikī

17. THE TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THE COUNCILS OF DEBATE (900-500 B C)

Some of the technical terms used in the councils of debate

Some of the terms used had grown up along with the Upaniṣads. in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. For instance in the Taittiriya Āraṇyaka¹

we meet with four terms, viz (1) *Smṛti* (scripture), (2) *pratyakṣa* (perception), (3) *aitihya* (tradition), and (4) *anumāna* (inference). These terms recur in the Rāmāyana² with a little alteration as (1) *aitihya* (tradition), (2) *anumāna* (inference), and (3) *śāstra*, scripture. Three of these terms, are used in the Manu-saṃhitā,³ as (1) *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śāstra*.

Similarly in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, Kathopaniṣad, etc., there occur such terms as *tarka*⁴ (reasoning), *vāda*⁵ (debate), *yukti*⁶ (continuous argument), *jalpa*⁷ (wrangling) *vitanda*⁸ (cavil), *chala*⁹ (quibble), *nirṇaya*¹⁰ (ascertainment), *prayojana*¹¹ (purpose), *pramāṇa*¹² (proof), *prameya*¹³ (the object of knowledge), etc.

१. स्मृतिः श्रवणं तैत्तिरीयम् । अनुमानं चतुष्टयम् । श्रौतं तैत्तिरीयम् । वचनं विद्यायाः ।
(Taittiriya āraṇyaka, 1-2)

२. ऐतिह्यं अनुमानं प्रत्यक्षमपि चात्र नम् ।
यौ हि वयम् वरीयाने कृतस्त्वयानुविदिताः । (Rāmāyana, 5-57-23)

३. प्रत्यक्षानुमानं शास्त्रं विविधानम् ।
यत्तु दुर्दिनं कार्यं यत्तु दुर्दिनोपयोगम् । (Manu-saṃhitā, 12-105)

¹ *Tarka* occurs in Kathopaniṣad, 2-9; Manu-saṃhitā, 12-106; Mahābhārata, 2-463; and Bhāgavata purāṇa, 8-21-2.

² *Vāda* occurs in Manu-saṃhitā, 6-37; Rāmāyana, 1-13-23 and 7-53-15, and Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā, 3-192.

³ *Yukti* occurs in Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, 6-23; Rāmāyana, 2-1-13; Bhāgavata purāṇa, 3-31-15; and Kāśikāśāstra, 1-49.

⁴ *Tarka* occurs in Mahābhārata, 2-463.

⁵ *Vāda* occurs in Mahābhārata, 2-463; Rāmāyana, 1-13-23 and 7-53-15, and Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā, 3-192.

⁶ *Yukti* occurs in Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, 6-23; Rāmāyana, 2-1-13; Bhāgavata purāṇa, 3-31-15; and Kāśikāśāstra, 1-49.

⁷ *Jalpa* occurs in Mahābhārata, 2-463; Rāmāyana, 2-37-21, and Mahābhārata, 13-5572; Kāśikāśāstra, 1-49.

⁸ *Vitanda* occurs in Mahābhārata, 2-463; Rāmāyana, 2-37-21, and Mahābhārata, 13-5572; Kāśikāśāstra, 1-49.

⁹ *Chala* occurs in Mahābhārata, 2-463; Rāmāyana, 2-37-21, and Mahābhārata, 13-5572; Kāśikāśāstra, 1-49.

¹⁰ *Nirṇaya* occurs in Mahābhārata, 2-463; Rāmāyana, 2-37-21, and Mahābhārata, 13-5572; Kāśikāśāstra, 1-49.

¹¹ *Prayojana* occurs in Mahābhārata, 2-463; Rāmāyana, 2-37-21, and Mahābhārata, 13-5572; Kāśikāśāstra, 1-49.

The Degrees of Deviation

IN A LETTER OF REQUEST (Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3512)

The theory of reasons (kārya) which I found an important subject of Śaṅkara's grew out of debates in councils of learned men. In the *Chāṇḍogya* and *Bhāṣya* there are frequent references to councils for the discussion of metaphysical subjects e.g. the nature of the soul and the *Upaniṣads*. The *Pratīpannī* reports the proceedings of a council in which Śukra, Bharaṇḍa, Saṅkha, Bāṇakī, Nārāyaṇa, Gāṇḍī, Kāṇḍī, Aśvathāma, Bhāṇḍa, Vāṇakī and Kāṇḍī were present. Such a council was called a *śāstra*, *śāstra* or *śāstra*.

A Council of learned men.

find that the council consisted generally of four, ten or twenty, one Brahmana, who were learned in the Ved and secular literatures and could give decisions in matters on which

1. **वेमवेमुकं आचवेयः वाङ्मात्मानां वरिचिद्वेदवत्**
(Vedānta-sūtras, 3-2-1)
2. **वेमवेमुकं आचवेयः वाङ्मात्मानां वरिचिद्वेदवत्**
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka 6-2-1)
3. **Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, pp 129-132**
4. **प्रश्नोपनिषद्, प्रश्न १-८**
5. **वैश्वदेवो वेमुकस्यो वैश्वदेवो यजुर्वेदवत् ।
यजुर्वेदवत् पूर्वं वरिचिद्वेदवत् आचवेयः ॥**
(Yajus-samhitā, 12-110, 111)
6. **अथाचिद्वेदवत् वेमवेमुकस्य वाङ्मात्मानां
यजुर्वेदवत् वा यजुर्वेदवत् वरिचिद्वेदवत् ॥**
(Pārāśara-samhitā, 6-10)
7. **यजुर्वेदवत् वेमवेमुकस्य वरिचिद्वेदवत् वा ।
वाङ्मात्मानां यजुर्वेदवत् आचवेयः वाङ्मात्मानां ॥**
(Yajurveda-samhitā, 1-9)

a debater can establish his own points and set aside those of his opponents who indulge in unfairness. In the department of Hetu-śāstra (Logic) there is indeed no work older than the Tantra-yukti which is a little manual on the systematization of arguments or debates.

The technical terms constituting the Tantra-yukti are the following:—

(1) *Adhikarana* (a subject), (2) *vidhāna* (arrangement), (3) *yoga*

and (32) *ūhya* (ellipsis)

In the Caraka-saṃhitā the Tantra-yukti, which consists of thirty-four

(1)

The list
differs from
Caraka's

anc-
epeti-
sam-

19. MEDHĀTITHI GAUTAMA'S DOCTRINES AS REPRODUCED IN THE CARAKA-SAMHITĀ (ABOUT 78 A D.)

The Caraka-saṃhitā¹ gives a summary of the principal doctrines of Anvikṣiki possibly as propounded by Medhātithi Gautama. Caraka is a general name for the ancient śākhās (branches) of the Yajurveda as well as for the teacher of those śākhās. The word "Carakāḥ" signifies, according to Pāṇini,² the persons who study the Veda (i.e.

¹ As Ātreya communicated his Ayurveda-saṃhitā at first in Agniveśa, the Caraka-saṃhitā is also called the Agniveśa-tantra. Agniveśa is called in Tibetan འགྲོ་ལུ་མུ་མེ་ལེན་ཅུང་ (read Mahāvīyutpatī, part I, p. 23, Bibliotheca Indica series)

འགྲོ་ལུ་མུ་མེ་ལེན་ཅུང་ (Pāṇini's Anādhyaṣṭy, 4-3-107)

Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, 2nd edition, pp. 223, 350, 364, 369

a debater can establish his own points and set aside those of his opponents who indulge in unfairness. In the department of Hetu-śāstra (Logic) there is indeed no work older than the Tantra-yukti which is a little manual on the systematization of arguments or debates.

The technical terms constituting the Tantra-yukti are the following —

(1) *Adhikāraṇa* (a subject), (2) *vidhāna* (arrangement), (3) *yoga*

The three terms, *tantra*

In the Caraka-saṃhitā the Tantra-yukti, which consists of three

The
differ
Caraka as

anc-
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sam-

19 MEDHATITHI GAUTAMA'S DOCTRINES AS REPRODUCED IN THE CARAKA-SAMHITĀ (ABOUT 78 A D.)

The Caraka-saṃhitā¹ gives a summary of the principal doctrines of Ārvīksiki possibly as propounded by Medhatithi Gautama. Caraka is a general name for the ancient śākhās (branches) of the Yajurveda as well as for the teacher of those śākhās. The word "Carakāḥ" signifies, according to Paṇini,² the persons who study the Veda (i. e.

¹ As Ātreya communicated his Ayurveda-saṃhitā at first to Agniveśa, the Caraka-saṃhitā is also called the Agniveśa-tantra. Agniveśa is called in Tibetan འགྲུ་མེ་ལེན་ཇུག (vide Mahāvīryatpallī, part I, p. 23, Bibliotheca Indica series).

² ४३४४४४४४४४ (Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-3-167)

Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, 2nd edition, pp. 225, 350, 364, 369.

As regards *Kāryābhiniṣṭyuti*, it does not appear to have been a part of the *Ānvikṣikī* of Medhātithi Gautama. Perhaps it was a part of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in an early stage. *Pratyaśā* is so.

emanated from Medhātithi Gautama? *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *aupamānya* under the sub-head *vādamārga* of *sambhāṣā vidhī*. It

is uncertain as to whether the first four or the last four were included in the *Ānvikṣikī* of Medhātithi Gautama. *Sambhāṣā-vidhī* or *vidā vidhī* was undoubtedly the principal topic of *Ānvikṣikī-vidyā*. Some of the terms coming under the sub-head *vidā-mārga* did not however form a part of the original *sambhāṣā vidhī*. For instance the terms *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samaśāya* were borrowed from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in its first stage and incorporated into the *vidā-mārga* by Caraka himself. There are other terms such as *pratipāṭi*, *sthāpanā*, *pratyakṣāpanā*, *hetu*, *upanaya*, *nigamāna*, *uttara*, *dakṣiṇa* and *sidhānta* which in their technical senses were perhaps unknown to Medhātithi Gautama and were introduced into the *vidā mārga* by Caraka while he compiled and redacted the *Āyurveda samhitā* in the first century A.D.

The terms coming under the three heads are explained in the Caraka-samhitā as follows —

- 1 *Kāryābhiniṣṭyuti*—the aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of an action

A person who is determined to accomplish an action successfully should examine the following resources —

- (1) *Kārana* or *hetu*—the actor or agent who accomplishes an action.
- (2) *Karman*—the instrument which co-operates with the actor to accomplish the action
- (3) *Kārya-yoni*—the material cause which while undergoing modification is developed into the action
- (4) *Kārya*—the action for the accomplishment of which the actor moves.
- (5) *Kārya phala*—the effect for the attainment of which the action
- (6)

- (7) *Deśa*—the place of the action
- (8) *Kāla*—the time of the action
- (9) *Pravṛtti*—the activity or exertion put forth for achieving the action
- (10) *Upāya*—a favourable circumstance or that condition of the actor, instrument and the material cause in which they can well render facilities and aids to the action being accomplished

already studied it removes that misapprehension, and if there was no misapprehension in the subject it produces zeal for its further study. It also makes debaters familiar with certain matters which were unknown to them. Moreover some precious mystic doctrines, which a preceptor imparted to his favourite pupil, come out in essence from the pupil who, owing to a temporary excitement and ambition for victory is impelled to expound them in the course of the debate. Hence wise men applaud debate with fellow scholars.

Two kinds of Debate (dvividhā sambhāṣā)

A debate with a fellow-scholar may be carried on either (1) peacefully (*śāntāyā*) or (2) in a spirit of opposition (*virhāyā*). The first is called a congenial debate (*anulomā sambhāṣā*), and the second a hostile debate (*virhāyā sambhāṣā*). The congenial debate takes place when the respondent (or opponent) is possessed of erudition, wisdom, eloquence and readiness of reply, is not wrathful or malicious, is well versed in the art of persuasion and is not out and against

are irrelevant. While using persuasion with gentleness, one should keep in view the subject of debate. This kind of debate is called a peaceful or congenial debate.

Before entering upon a hostile debate with a person one should examine one's strength through a casual conversation with him and ascertain

bility, shallowness, shyness and inattentiveness

Three classes of respondents (trividhāḥ parāḥ)

In consideration of the merits and demerits mentioned above the respondent (or opponent) may be of three kinds, viz superior, inferior, and equal

A Council of Debate (parisad)

should be defeated by being thrown into a state of nervous exhaustion. An opponent who is timid should be defeated through the excitement of his fear. An opponent who is inattentive should be defeated by being put under the restraint of a certain rule. Even in a hostile debate one should speak with propriety, an absence of which may provoke the opponent to say or do any thing.

Influencing the assembly one should cause it to name that as the subject of debate with which one is perfectly familiar and which presents an insurmountable difficulty to one's opponent.

How to influence a Council.

When the assembly meets one should observe silence after saying to one's opponent "it is not now permissible for us to make any suggestions. Here is the assembly which will fix the subject and limits of debate agreeably to its wishes and sense of propriety."

The Limits of Debate (vāda-māryāda)

The limits of debate consist of such directions, as "This should be said, this should not be said, if this occurs defeat follows, etc."

The Course of Debate (vāda-mārga)

The following are the categories¹ which should be studied for a thorough knowledge of the course of debate —

- (1) *Debate (vāda)*—a discourse between two parties agreeably to the scriptures and in a spirit of opposition on a subject such as "whether there is rebirth, or there is no rebirth." It is of two kinds, viz (1) wrangling (*jalpa*) which is a debate for the purpose of defence or attack, and (2) cavil (*vitandā*) which is a perverse debate for the purpose of a mere attack.
- (2) *Substance (dravya)*—that in which actions and qualities inhere and which can constitute a material cause e.g. ether, air, fire, water, earth, soul, mind, and space.
- (3) *Quality (guna)*—that which inheres in a substance and is inactive, e.g. colour, taste, odour, touch, sound, heavy and

¹ This trick, the knowledge of which is useful in guarding oneself against a running debater, should never be adopted in a fair debate.—R. C. Vidyabhusana.

² Udayanśrīya (10th century A.D.) following the old laws of debate observes that an objection may be removed by debate, but on no account should it proceed beyond the limit of practical absurdity.

भाषाविधिप्रमाणम् (Kusumajala, 3-7).

it is non-produced, the re-interrogation will be "why it is non-produced?"

- (33) *Defect of speech* (rūkyā-dosa)—consisting of inadequacy, redundancy, meaninglessness, incoherence, contradiction, etc

(a) "Inadequacy" or saying too little which occurs when there is an omission of the reason, example, application or conclusion

(b) "Redundancy" or saying too much which consists of (i) 'irrelevancy' e.g. a person talks of the polity of Vṛhaspati or Śukra while the subject of discourse is medicine or (ii) "repetition," e.g. when a person repeats the same thing over and over again

(c) "Meaninglessness" or saying things which are not connected in any way

(d) "Incoherence" or saying things which are not connected in any way
e.g. a connected meaning. e.g. whay, wheel, ray, thunder, morning etc

(e) "Contradiction"—consisting of opposition to the example, tenet or occasion e.g. on the occasion of sacrifices, animals should be offered up. Any thing uttered inconsistently with the occasion is contradiction

- (34) *Excellence of speech* (vīṭya-prasāda)—when a speech is free from inadequacy etc. is fraught with well expressive words and is otherwise unexceptionable it is applauded as excellent, perfect or meritorious

- (35) *Quibble* (śāṭha)—a speech consisting of mere words fraught with cunning plausibility and diversity of sense. It is of two kinds viz (1) quibble in respect of a word, e.g. a person uses the word 'navatantara' to signify a man who has studied nine scriptures though he really intends to signify a man who has stated his scriptures recently or (2) 'quibble in respect of a general term' e.g. the medicine which cures phthisis, leprosy, etc. also cures leucorrhoea as both come under the name of 'mūla'

in respect of their questionable character, e.g. the intellect is non-eternal, because it is intangible, as a sound. Here the eternity of the intellect is as questionable as that of the sound.

- (37) *Mistimed (astita-kāla)*—a fallacy which arises when that which should be stated first is stated afterwards.
 (38) *Attribution of censure (upālambha)*—imputation of defect to the reason adduced.
 (39) *Avoidance of defect (parihāra)* which occurs when the defect is corrected or amended, e.g. when the soul resides in the body the soul is not eternal, but when the soul is no longer noticed hence

(40) *(tṛṣṇā-hāra)*—which occurs when a disputant, being attacked, abandons the proposition first advanced by him, e.g.

A person advances first a proposition viz
 the soul is eternal,
 and being attacked by an opponent he abandons it saying,
 the soul is not eternal.

- (41) *Admission (abhyanujñā)*—the acceptance by a person of what is attributed to him by his opponent, whether agreeable or disagreeable, e.g.

f "

occurs when one instead of advancing the proper reason adduces a different

one

149. 01 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CHAPTER II

Reception accorded to Ācārīkāt

FROM THE 11th CENTURY

20. Ācārīkāt conveyed in explicit Clauses

Ācārīkāt known as *Hetu vidya* or *Tarka vidya*, the general principles of which might be applied to test the validity or otherwise of the injunctions and prohibitions laid down in the Vedas and Dharma-sūtras was not received with favour by a certain section of the Brahmanas, who could never think of calling in question the authority of those injunctions and prohibitions. We are therefore not surprised to find Manu enjoining excommunication upon those members of the twice-born castes who disregarded the Vedas and Dharma-sūtras relying upon the support of *Hetu vidya* or Logic. Similarly Vālmiki* in his Rāmāyana discredits the persons of perverse intellect who indulge in the frivolities of Ācārīkāt, the science of Logic, regardless

of the works on Sacred Law (Dharma-sāstra) which they should follow as their guide. Vyāsa* in the Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, relates the dole-

1. योऽप्येव ते वृक्षे हेतुमाकाशवाद् विना ।
त वायुमिधेहिष्मार्द्धौ नास्ति ते वेदनिन्दकः ॥
(Manu-samhitā, adhyāya 2, verse 11)

2. धर्ममात्रेण मुक्तं विद्वानेव दुर्बुधः ।
दृष्टिमात्रेणैव वायुं विन्दे प्रवदति ॥ 36-39 ॥
(Rāmāyana, Ayodhyā kāṇḍa, sarga 100)

3. अधमांश्च धर्मिणो हेतुको वेदनिन्दकः ।
आलोचको सर्वविद्यामनुष्ठानो निर्वर्णवान् ॥ 47 ॥
हेतुमादान् प्रवदित्वा यज्ञांश्चकृत् हेतुमन् ।
आलोका अभिज्ञा च तत्त्ववाक्यं च विज्ञानम् ॥ 48 ॥
नास्ति सर्वमाहो यः पूर्णः धर्मिण्यनिन्दकः ।
तत्त्वैव प्रवर्तिरिति श्रुत्वाकलं मन विभ ॥ 49 ॥
(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, adhyāya 180)

In the Gandharva tantra we find—

योगम प्रोक्तमासाद्येतिना सर्वं यव हि ।
हार्दिकीं योगिमायतां सर्विषयां सर्वैक्यं तु ॥
(Quoted in Prāsaśuni tantra)

ful story of a repentant Brahmana who, addicted to *Tarka-vidyā* (Logic), carried on debates divorced from all faith in the Vedas and was on that account turned into a jackal in his next birth as a penalty. In another passage of the *Sāntiparva*, Vyāsa¹ warns the followers of the Vedānta philosophy against communicating their doctrines to a *Tārkika* or Logician. Vyāsa² does not care even to review *Hetu-sāstra* in the *Brahma-sūtra* seeing that it has not been recognized by any worthy sage. Stories of infliction of penalties on those given to the study of *Tarka-vidyā* are related in the *Skandapurāṇa*³ and other works, and in the *Naiṣadha-charita*⁴ we find Kālī satirising the founder of *Ānvikṣiki* as "Go-tama" the most bovine among sages.

21. ĀNVIKṢIKI HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM IN SOME QUARTERS

On the other hand *Ānvikṣiki*, while it attached due weight to the authority of the Vedas, was held in very high esteem. There were also people who could appreciate the value of reasoning for ascertaining truths. Thus the *Gautama-dharma-sūtra*⁵ prescribes a course of training in *Āntikṣiki* (Logic) for the king, and acknowledges the utility of *Tarka* (reasoning) in the administra-

1 वातकावाभिर्दं ज्ञानं वाचं पुत्रानुसूतवन् ।

• • • • •

न तर्कमात्मदग्धः स तदेव विदुमान् च ॥ 18 ॥

(Mahābhārata Sāntiparva, adhyāya 246).

2 अवरितवाचायलनमदीया ॥ 17 ॥ (Vedānta-sūtra, 2-2)

3 ओमस्य ओम तत्त्वम् अक्षयम् नम तत्त्वम् वि ।
मन्त्रीऽयं मुनिमिक्षयं मन्त्रीकोऽपीनिक्षयम् ।
पुनश्चानुसूचीमोक्षी मुनिः सैवाम्भयम् ।
वचं लोकोपकाराय नम ज्ञानं भविष्यति ॥

(Skandapurāṇa, Kālikākhaṇḍa, adhyāya 17).

4 शुद्धये च त्रिजात्याय ज्ञानसूत्रे महाश्रुतिः ।
ओमसं तन्मतेनैव यथा विदुषः सत्येव च ॥ 75 ॥

(Naiṣadha-charita, canto xvii)

5 राजा सर्वदेहेऽज्ञातवर्णः चाधुकारो ज्ञान् चाधुकारो, यथाश्च चाभ्योपिज्ञावा-
भिविधीतः ।..... आवाधिवरे तर्कप्रवृत्तः । विवाधुश्च यथाज्ञानं ममदीन् । विपनिषतो
वैविध्यादेऽज्ञातवर्णस्य विद्यां ममदीन् ॥

(Gautama-dharma-sūtra, adhyāya 11).

tion of justice though in the case of conclusions proving incompatible, the ultimate decision is directed to be made by reference to persons versed in the Vedas. Manu¹ admits that dharma or duty should be ascertained by logical reasoning (*tarkā*), but the reasoning should not, according to him, be opposed to the injunctions of the Vedas. He recommends Anvikṣiki (Logic) as a necessary study for a king² and a *Tarkī*³ (logician) as an indispensable member of a legal assembly. Kautilya⁴ in his *Arthashastra* characterizes Anvikṣiki (Logic) as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the permanent shelter of all virtues.

Yājñavalkya⁵ counts Vyākhyāna or Logic among the fourteen principal sciences while Vyāsa⁶ admits that he was able to arrange and classify the Upanishads with the help of Anvikṣiki or Logic. In the *Pañcāngirāsa*⁷ Vyākhyāna (Logic) is included among the fourteen principal branches of learning promulgated by Śukra Vyāsa while in the *Matsyapurāṇa*⁸ Nyāya vyākhyāna (the science of Logic) together

अविष्कृतं न हि तद्विचारः ।

अविष्कृतं न हि तद्विचारः ।

Manu, *Smṛiti*, *adhyāya* 11, *śloka* 10

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

Manu, *Smṛiti*, *adhyāya* 11, *śloka* 11

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

Manu, *Smṛiti*, *adhyāya* 11, *śloka* 12

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

Manu, *Smṛiti*, *adhyāya* 11, *śloka* 13

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

Manu, *Smṛiti*, *adhyāya* 11, *śloka* 14

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

Manu, *Smṛiti*, *adhyāya* 11, *śloka* 15

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

Manu, *Smṛiti*, *adhyāya* 11, *śloka* 16

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

विचारः न हि तद्विचारः न हि तद्विचारः ।

with the Vedas is said to have emanated from the mouth of

Sāntiparva¹ refers to numerous tenets of Nyāya supported by reasoning and argument which in the *Ādiparva* we find that d by logicians r-arguments to valquish one another. Similar other instances of the popularity of Nyāya (Logic) may be cited from the Mahābhārata and other works which were composed in their present forms about the beginning of the Christian era.

It seems that the unfavourable criticism to which Anvikṣiki (the science of Logic) had long been exposed, terminated practically in the first century A D when, under the name of Nyāya sūtra, it accepted the authority of the Vedas and propounded the doctrine of syllogistic reasoning the validity of which was never challenged.

1. म्यायमिहा विविक्ता न ह्यत्र पाशुपतं तथा ।
 वेदमैव धर्मं जगत् दिव्यमानुषं चरितम् ॥ 67 ॥
 (Mahābhārata, Ādiparva adhyāya 1)
2. म्याय नञाद्यविज्ञानकर्मज्ञेयैर्द्वारयैः ॥ 42 ॥
 आदमाद्येपहिवाप्त्यवरमार्गज्ञानं नतैः ॥ 43 ॥
 (Mahābhārata, Ādiparva, adhyāya 70)
3. "म्यायमन्योक्तवैकानि तैस्तेवज्ञानि वादिभिः ।

unknown nor with regard to things that are definitely known, but it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful." Vātsyāyana defines,¹ no doubt, *nyāya* as an examination of objects by evidences, but he takes evidences to signify a syllogism which consists of a 'proposition' based on verbal testimony, a 'reason' based on inference, an 'example' based on perception, an 'application' based on comparison, and a 'conclusion' based on all the previous four. Viśvanātha² explains *nyāya svarūpa* as the essential form of a syllogism which consists of its five parts, and Mādhavācārya³ understands by the term *nyāya* an inference for the sake of others in which a syllogism is specially employed. In view of this technical meaning we may interpret *Nyāya-sāstra* as the science of syllogism or the science of inference for the sake of others, that is, the science of demonstration.

23 THE ANTIQUITY OF NYĀYA-SĀSTRA (FROM CIRCA 1 A D)

The term "Nyāya" in the sense of Logic does not appear to have been used in literature before the first century A D. Pāṇini⁴ (about 350 B C) did not know the word "Nyāya" in the sense of Logic, and even Patañjali⁵ (about 150 B.C) does not seem to have been conversant with the word, which does not occur in his *Bhāṣya* on *uṭthādi-gaṇa*. It does not find place, in this sense,⁶ in the *Artha-*

1 प्रमाचरसं परीक्षक व्यासः (*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 1-1-1)

2 Vide Viśvanātha's *Nyāya-sūtra* vṛtti, 1-1-26, 1-1-31, 1-1-33 and 1-1-40 in which *nyāya-svarūpa*, *nyāya-pūroḥaṇa*, *nyāya-ottarāṇa* and *nyāya-sāra* are defined. The five parts of *nyāya* (syllogism) will be explained later.

3 Mādhavācārya's *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, under the head *Akṣepāda-darśana*, p. 116, Calcutta edition.

4 Goldstucker in his *Pāṇini*, p. 151, says that both Kātyāyana and Patañjali knew the *Nyāya-sūtra*. There is however no proof for the statement.

5 There is no doubt that Pāṇini derives the word *nyāya* (evidently in the sense of justice) from the root *nī* in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 3-1-122 as follows:—न्यायस्य न्यायः पदराशः. Rā Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-2-60 न्यायस्य न्यायः पदराशः does not, however, presuppose *nyāya* in the sense of 'Logic'.

6 Patañjali did not use the word *nyāyika* (logician) as *nyāya* was not included in the *uṭthādigāṇa* in his *Bhāṣya*. The *Gaṇapātha*, which includes it, is a later work. For *nyāya* vide *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 4-4-92.

7 *Nyāya* signifies just or justice, equitable or equity.

प्रार्थ विप्रतिपद्यते पक्षेनान्येन चेति च ।

न्यायस्य प्रार्थ न्यायः न च पक्षो हि पक्षति ।

(*Artha-sāstra*, *śūbhāṣana* 3, chap. 1, p. 100)

śāstra¹ of Kautilya (about 327 B C) The term "Nyāya" which previously signified "right," "method," "analogy" or "maxim," is used in the sense of Logic for the first time in the Mahābhārata,² Viṣṇu purāṇa,³ Matsya purāṇa,⁴ Padma purāṇa,⁵ Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā⁶ etc., in passages which are presumed to have been written after the beginning of the Christian era.

The Nyāya-śāstra was not so called before the subject of "Nyāya" (syllogism) was introduced into it. As the Caraka-saṃhitā,⁷ so far as we know, contains for the first time an exposition of the doctrine of syllogism under the name of *sthāpanā* (demonstration), it is presumed that the word *Nyāya* as an equivalent for Logic came into use about the composition of that Saṃhitā, that is about the opening of the Christian era. The word became very popular about the second century A D when the Nyāya-sūtra was composed. Vātsyāyana (about 400 A D) uses the expression "*parama nyāya*"⁸ for the conclusion (*niṣṭamāna*) which combines in itself all the five parts of a syllogism. Dignāga (about 600 A D) explicitly mentions the five parts or members of a syllogism as *Nyāyāvayava*.⁹

24 THE EARLY TEACHERS OF NYĀYA-SŪTRA (ABOUT 100 A D)

Nothing is definitely known about the early teachers of Nyāya-śāstra. In the Ādi-parva of the Mahābhārata¹⁰ we find that the hermitage of Kaṭyāyana was filled with eager who knew the true

सबहुकालं तत्रैव आसन्ननिधिनं त्रिवं ।

दासोऽप्युत्तममतिहेतुं कथं विद्वानुपनिषत् ॥

(Nyāya-śāstra of Kautilya adhikarana II adhyaśya I, § 379, Shām Śāstrī's edition)

¹ Mahābhārata Ādi-parva adhyaśya I verse 67 adhyaśya 70 verses 42-44 and Śānti-parva adhyaśya 210 verses 22

² Viṣṇu purāṇa, third part adhyaśya 8

³ Matsya purāṇa 32

⁴ Padma purāṇa, Uttarakhanda chap 203

⁵ Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā II 1-3 etc

⁶ Caraka-saṃhitā Vimśaka sthāna, adhyaśya 8

⁷ कथं विद्वानुपनिषत् सवहुकालं तत्रैव आसन्ननिधिनं त्रिवं दासोऽप्युत्तममतिहेतुं कथं विद्वानुपनिषत् ॥

(Nyāya-śāstra I-1 1)

⁸ Nyāyāvayava called in Tibetan "nyag pa; yon lag" occurs in the Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chap VI, as follows:—तत्र यो न्ययः स न्ययः स न्ययः ।
(Tsho; me kun las tse pa, chap vi. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.)

आसन्ननिधिनं तत्रैव आसन्ननिधिनं त्रिवं दासोऽप्युत्तममतिहेतुं कथं विद्वानुपनिषत् ॥

आसन्ननिधिनं तत्रैव आसन्ननिधिनं त्रिवं दासोऽप्युत्तममतिहेतुं कथं विद्वानुपनिषत् ॥

meanings of demonstration, refutation and conclusion. As *sthāpanā*, *ātkepa* and *siddhānta*, which are the Sanskrit equivalents for demonstration, refutation and conclusion, are the technical terms of Nyāya śāstra as used in the Caraka saṃhitā, it may be reasonably inferred that the sages who dealt with them in the hermitage of Kāśyapa were the early exponents of that śāstra. Kāśyapa¹ lived on the river Mālinī in the district of Saharanpur midway between Delhi and Hardwar.

25 NĀRADA—AN EXPERT IN NYĀYA-ŚĀSTRA (ABOUT 100 A.D.).

In the Sabbhāparva of the Mahābhārata we find that a sage named Nārada² was an expert in Nyāya-śāstra³. He was skilful in distinguishing unity and plurality, conjunction and co-existence (inherence), genus and species, etc., capable of deciding questions through evidences (*pramāṇa*), and clever in ascertaining the validity and invalidity of a speech of five parts (*pañcāvayava-nīkya*). The "speech of five parts" refers undoubtedly to a syllogism of five members, and it is interesting to note that Nārada,

विद्येरक्षार्थं विदुर्भिन्नं लोकापचंपराचरैः । ४३ ॥

आपराधेद्विद्वान् पुराचक्षुर्मां प्रति ।

मन्त्राणां निरुक्तौ कामद्वानभिप्रायैः ॥ ४४ ॥

इत्यचक्षुर्गुणैश्च कार्यकारणवेदिभिः ।

(Mahābhārata, Ādi-parva, adhyāya 70)

मादिसौमित्रो राजन् मदीं पुच्छां सुखोदयात् ॥ ११ ॥

महाशौरे भवतः काष्ठपद्मं महाशयः ।

आवमगर्वं रज्जं यद्विप्रं यदेतितम् ॥ १२ ॥

(Mahābhārata, Ādi-parva, chap 70).

¹ Nārada is called in Tibetan མིག་ཏུ་ཏུ་མེག་ལྷོ་ལྷོ་པུ་ *Me ghyo-gyi-bu* (vide *Mahāvastu-pattī*, part I, p. 23, edited by Dr E. D. Ross and Dr Satō Chanda Vidyabhusana in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

² वेदोदनिषदां वेदांश्च विद्वान्मन्त्राणां ।

इति वाचस्परायज्ञं पुराचक्षुर्विदुर्भिरम् ॥ २ ॥

आपविद्वान्मन्त्राणां चक्षुर्विदुर्भिरम् ।

येन च योजनं मानाजं यन्मायविचारदा ॥ ३ ॥

महा प्रज्ञां यो वेदावो व्यतिगच्छयन्ति कविः ।

परापरविचारज्ञं प्रमादहसनिश्चय ॥ ४ ॥

पद्माययनं गुणैश्च वाच्यं च मुच्यते विदुः ।

अतरोपरवज्जां च मदीं विदुः सुखदायि ।

मदीं चैकाग्र्यमोचं यदायन् मुनिश्चय ॥

(Mahābhārata, Sabbhāparva, adhyāya 6)

who, as we shall presently see, travelled in Śveta-dvīpa (perhaps Alexandria), was one of the earliest experts in judging the merit and demerit of such a speech.

This Nārada represents the philosophical culture of the 1st century A.D. No work on Nyāya-śāstra written by him has come down to us. But Jayanta¹ in the Nyāya-mañjarī quotes a verse attributed to him which gives an expression of a logical "point of defeat" (*nigraha-sihāna*) technically known as "the abandonment of a proposition (*pratijñā-hāni*)".

Nārada was perhaps a fictitious person of the 1st century A.D.

The personality of Nārada is shrouded in a very queer position of a logical "point of defeat" (*nigraha-sihāna*) technically known as "the abandonment of a proposition (*pratijñā-hāni*)".

represented in the very quarrelsome people. Curious at any fixed habitation. He was of an imposing figure with flowing braids of hair and a long grey beard—wearing a mendicant's garment, holding in one hand a staff of gold and in the other a beggar's bowl together with a lute of tortoise shell, and chanting always the name of Hari the Lord. He carried messages of gods to men and vice versa. Once he left heaven for a pleasant ramble on earth and repaired to the court of Śrījaya who ordered his daughter Sukumārī of unrivalled beauty to attend upon him.

Nārada fell in love with her, and they were married; but owing to a curse he looked like a monkey to his bride. He however worked off the curse by severe austerities, and Sukumārī could with difficulty be reconciled to him when he appeared on the removal of the curse, in his resplendent beauty. Nārada studied music for two years under two wives of Kṛṣṇa Jambavati and Satyabhāmā but had to prolong his studies for another two years under the third wife of Kṛṣṇa named Rukmiṇī to attain mastery over the notes of the musical scale.

He visited Śveta-dvīpa: supposed to be identical with the

१ महाभारतः—

काव्य महाभारतार्थ विज्ञाना मुद्राश्रयाः

महानी वीर्ये महो नर काव्यमरी अष्टमः

(Nyāya-mañjarī, chap. XII, p. 140) Vizianagaram Ranschrift series)

For legends about Nārada consult the Mahābhārata, Bhāgavata purāṇa, Rāmāyaṇa, etc.

महाभारते वीर्ये महो नर काव्यमरी अष्टमः (Vizianagaram I-15, 178)

विज्ञानः महाभारतार्थ विज्ञानः

(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 235-8)

1 with Syria. Cf. "Comparative studies in Calcutta.

country of which the capital was Alexandria where he became the guest of a merchant in a town called Dvaidal-nāyaka, and where he saw Viṣṇu (God) worshipped with fervour by devotees who attained their suitable end through His grace

In the Varāha purāṇa¹ Nārada is stated to have in a previous birth been a Brāhmana, Śarasvata by name in the city of Avantī, who offered oblations of water to his dead ancestors in the lake of Puṣkara at Ajmere

There is extant a work on Smṛti² dated about the 4th century A D, which is said to have been written by the sage Nārada. Other works such as the Nārada-pañca-rātra are also attributed to him

The fiction about Nārada seems to have originated from one Nārada whose existence is unquestioned. This real Nārada is mentioned in the Mārvaṇukramikā of Kātyāyana as a descendant of Kanva³ and a compiler of certain mantras of the Rgveda. It appears from the many sciences including the founder of a discipline which took up his re- of thought, the various

followers of which were known to the world after him

Our Nārada, an expert in Nyāya-sāstra, was a descendant or follower of the real Nārada or was an altogether fictitious person requisitioned by the compilers of the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas who fathered upon him the sayings and doings of different ages and countries to make them authoritative

¹ Varāha purāṇa, adhyāya 2, verses 63-65, and adhyāya 3, verses 3-7, in the Bibliotheca Indica series

² The Nārada-smṛti seems to have been composed about the fourth century A D. It frequently mentions *denāra* (the Roman coin denarius) which was imported into India about the time of the Roman emperors. Compare नन्दोदयस्य च, दीनारस्य च वचनम्

(Nārada-smṛti parashuta 60, edited by Dr J. Jolly, Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta)

For also Dr J. Jolly's Introduction to the Nārada-smṛti (Minor Law books), in the S.E. series, p. xviii

Nārada smṛti, the real author of which is unknown represents the theories of Smṛti and Nyāya of the early centuries of Christ.

³ Śāyana's commentary on the Rgveda, 8-3-11 and 9-104-6. Kanva was an ancestor of Kāśyapa already mentioned

⁴ Chāndogyaopaniṣad, prapāthaka 7, khanda 1 verse 2, and "The Upanishads" translated by P. Max Müller, S.E. series, p. 110

⁵ Vākyo-vākya may signify grammar, rhetoric or debate. Śāṅkara interprets it as Logic

who, as we shall presently see, travelled in Sveta-dvīpa (perhaps Alexandria), was one of the earliest experts in judging the merit and demerit of such a speech.

This Nārada represents the philosophical culture of the 1st century A.D. No work on Nyāya-śāstra written by him has come down to us. But Jayanta¹ in the Nyāya-mañjari quotes a verse attributed to him which gives an exposition of a logical "point of defeat" (*nygraha-sthāna*) technically known as "the abandonment of a proposition" (*pratyakṣa-hīna*).

The personality of Nārada is shrouded in mystery. He² is represented in the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas to have been himself very quarrelsome and clever in exciting quarrels among other people. Cursed by Brahmā he wandered over earth without staying at any fixed habitation. He was of an imposing figure with flowing braids of hair and a long grey beard—wearing a mendicant's garment, holding in one hand a staff of gold and in the other a beggar's bowl together with a lute of tortoise shell and chanting always the name of Hari the Lord. He carried messages of gods to men and vice versa. Once he left heaven for a pleasant ramble on earth and repaired to the court of Śrājaya who ordered his daughter Sukumārī of unrivalled beauty to attend upon him. Nārada fell in love with her, and they were married; but owing to a curse he looked like a monkey to his bride. He however worked off the curse by severe austerities, and Sukumārī could with difficulty be reconciled to him when he appeared on the removal of the curse, in his resplendent beauty. Nārada studied music for two years under two wives of Kṛṣṇa Jambavatī and Satyabhāmā, but had to prolong his studies for another two years under the third wife of Kṛṣṇa named Rukminī to attain mastery over the notes of the musical scale.

He visited Sveta-dvīpa³ supposed to be identical with the

१. बदाय नादः—

कारण्य व्यवहारार्थं प्रतिष्ठां अनुदाहृतम् ।

तदागो चोक्तं नादो नरं साधुनरो भवेत् ॥

(Nyāya-mañjari, chap. XII, p. 640 Visianagaram Sanskrit series)

² For legends about Nārada consult the Mahābhārata, Bhāgavata purāṇa, Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa, Viṣṇu purāṇa, Varāha purāṇa, Bhavīya purāṇa, Adbhuta Rāmāyaṇa, etc.

तथाकोट्युक्ते हि ब्रह्म न भवेत् साधु न भवेत् । (Viṣṇu purāṇa, 1-15, 11k)

३. चोरोदभेदेनरको हि होय । सेना च नाया प्रदिनो विनाय ॥

(Mahābhārata, Śānti)

)

Sveta-dvīpa may also be identified with Syria. Cf. "Vaishnavism and Christianity," by Dr. B. N. Seal.

obtained their suitable end through his grace

In the Varāha purāṇa¹ Nārada is stated to have in a previous birth been a Brāhmana, Sārasvata by name, in the city of Avantī, who offered oblations of water to his dead ancestors in the lake of Puskara at Ajmere

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The fiction about Nārada seems to have originated from one Nārada whose existence is unquestioned. This real Nārada is mentioned in the Sarvānukramikā of Kātyāyana as a descendant of Kanva³ and a seer of certain mantras of the Rgveda. It appears from the

Was there a logician
name Nārada?

Our Nārada, an expert in Nyāya-śāstra, was a descendant or follower of the real Nārada or was an altogether fictitious person requisitioned by the compilers of the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas who fathered upon him the sayings and doings of different ages and countries to make them authoritative

¹ Varāha purāṇa, adhyāya 2, verses 63-65, and adhyāya 3, verses 3-7, in the Bibliotheca Indica series)

² The Nārada-smṛti seems to have been composed about the fourth century A D as it frequently mentions dināra (the Roman coin denarius) which was imported into India about the time of the Roman emperors. Compare नन्दारिचद्रुपदंष्ट्र
दीनारकाय न दद न ॥

(Nārada-smṛti paribhāṣa 60, edited by Dr J Jolly, Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta)

† See also Dr J Jolly's Introduction to the Nārada-smṛti (Minor Law books), in the B I S series, p xviii

Nārada-smṛti, the real author of which is unknown, represents the theories of Smṛti and Nyāya of the early centuries of Christ

³ Śākyana's commentary on the Rgveda, 8-3-11 and 9-104-6. Kanva was an ancestor of Kāśyapa already mentioned

⁴ Chāndogya-upaniṣad, prapāthaka 7, śhanda 1, verse 2, and "The Upanishads" translated by F Max Müller, S B E. series, II 110

⁵ Vākyo-vākya may signify grammar, rhetoric or debate. Śāṅkara interprets it as Logic



The first regular meeting of the Executive Committee of the Library of Congress was held on May 1, 1900, at the Library of Congress.

The Administration has
no intention of making
any further

Let us go to the *Sākyasūtra* as it is at present, and entirely the work of one person (13) as has been suggested by interpolations fix to time & place. It contains references to the Śāriṅgīya Vāṇasaka Yāga Śūtra, the Vedānta and Pāṇini's system of phonology. There are in it passages which were quoted almost verbatim from the *Lankasūtra*, the *Madhyamaśāstra* and other Rūdras' works which were composed about the third or fourth century A.D. It seems that these passages were interpolated by Vātsyayana who is said to have written the first manuscript called *Prasāsa* on the *Sākyasūtra* about 400 A.D. The *Sākyasūtra* contains in itself the principles both of Logic and Philosophy.

In the early commentaries on the Nyāya-sūtra the author of the Sūtra is distinctly named as Akṣapāda¹ Vātsyāyana² in the Nyāya-bhāṣya (about 400 A D) says that the Nyāya philosophy manifested itself (in a regular form) before Akṣapāda the foremost of the eloquent, while Uddyotakara³ in his Nyāya-vārtika (about 600 A D) affirms that it was Akṣapāda the most excellent of sages that spoke out the Nyāya-śāstra in a systematic way. In the Nyāya vārtika tātparyā-tīkā⁴ (81 A D) and the Nyāya-mañjarī,⁵ Akṣapāda is stated to have been the promul-

यथा याचा यथा यत्तो अन्वर्थकम् यथा ।

नानुपादयता स्थानम् तथा अह उदाहृतम् ॥

(Mādhyanika-sūtra, chap VII)

"The origination, continuance and cessation of a thing are said to be like a trick of jugglery, a dream or the city of the celestial quire."

वर्तमानाभावा वस्तु वस्तु-वस्तुत्व भावः, वस्तुत्वे (Nyāya sūtra, 2-3-30)

"The present time is non-existent because the falling down of an object relates to the time during which the object fell down and to the time during which it will fall down."

मार्ग न गम्यते तावत् चलन नैव गम्यते ।

अतादृश विविक्तं गम्यमानं न गम्यते ॥

(Mādhyanika-sūtra, chap II).

"We are not passing a path which has already been passed, nor are we passing that which is yet to be passed, the existence of a path, which has neither been passed nor is yet to be passed, is beyond comprehension."

¹ Akṣapāda is called in Tibetan རྒྱལ་མིག་མཆོག་ (khan-mig-can, "with eyes on his feet") (Fide Mahā-vyutpatti, part I, p 22, edited in Sanskrit Tibetan English by Dr Sur E D Ross and Dr Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana, Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta.)

* योऽवपादयति यावः प्रत्यभादयति परम् ।

तथा वानुपादयन् इह भाष्यजालमनर्थकम् ॥

(Nyāya-bhāṣya, colophon, Vissanagaram Sanskrit series)

* यदवपादः प्रवरो तुजोवा जलाय मार्गं कवली जगद ।

तुतादिवायानमिहानि देवोः करिष्यते नम यथा विदमः ॥

fourth and fifth subjects, and possibly also the first subject in its systematic form, were introduced by Akṣapāda into the *Ānvikṣiki vidyā* which in its final form was styled the Nyāya-sūtra. Akṣapāda was therefore the real author of the Nyāya sūtra which derived a considerable part of its materials from the *Ānvikṣiki-vidyā* of Gautama. Just as Caraka was the redactor of the

Upamya or *upamāna* (comparison) included in the *Tantra-vukti* and mentioned in the *Jaina* works is accepted here as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The term "*pramāṇa*" in the sense given here was not widely used even in the days of *Caraka* (about 78 A.D.) inasmuch as he employed three terms, viz. *parīkṣā*, *hetu*, and *pramāṇa*, to signify the means of knowledge.

- (2) *Pramāṇa*—the object of knowledge, that comes under the head,

- (3) *Īdā*—a disease for *kathā* (cavil). *Ī* *samāya* (of which

rebuke) was a technical term in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*. The doctrine of "*nigraha sthāna*" attained a high development in the *Nyāya-sūtra*.

- (4) *Āyama*—any one of the

systems of philosophy. There is in the Nyāya-sūtra an examination of various philosophical doctrines e.g. in Book III, chap. II there is a criticism of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of intellect (*buḥ*) and the Sāṃkhya doctrine of commentaries (*śaṅka*) in Book IV, chap. I there is a review of the Buddhist doctrine of nothingness (*śūnyatā*) and the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the transformation of Brahma (*brahma-pari-vṛtta*) etc.

29 THE ARRANGEMENT OF CATEGORIES IN THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA.

The Nyāya-sūtra treats of sixteen categories which comprise all the topics of *vāda mārga* (the course of debate) as enumerated in the Caraka-samhitā. While there is apparently no order among the topics of the Caraka-samhitā, there exists evidently a regular arrangement among the categories of the Nyāya-sūtra. The

The categories represent the stages of a debate.

categories are, according to the commentaries¹ on the Nyāya-sūtra supposed to represent stages in the course of a debate between a disputant and his respondent. The first of the categories is (1) *pramāṇa*, which signifies the means of knowledge, and the second is (2) *prameya*, which refers to the objects of knowledge. These two categories, which constitute the basis of a debate, supply the thesis or case which a disputant is to prove. The third category, (3) *samsāya* (doubt), having roused a conflicting judgment about

the nature of his (4) *pramāṇa* (purpose) which rest on That to five

parts called (7) *anvaya* (members) having carried on (6) *tarka* (confutation) against all contrary suppositions the disputant affirms his case with (9) *nirṇaya* (certainty). If his respondent, not being satisfied with this process of demonstration, advances an antithesis, he will have to enter upon (10) *vāda* (discussion) which will necessarily assume the (12) *vitandā* (a cavil). He employ (13) *hetvābhāsa* (fa and (15) *jāti* (analogues), his (16) *nigrahasaṁhāna* (defeat).

Enunciation, definition
and examination.

mere mention of the categories but ---

of the categories.

! Vātsyāyana observes —

विधिर्वाच्यं वाक्यं प्रवृत्तिः । तदेवोक्तं परीक्षा चेति ।

(Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-2)

CHAPTER II

Contents of the Nyāya-sūtra.¹

31. THE CATEGORIES THEIR EXTENSION.

As the Nyāya-sūtra is the foremost work on Nyāya-sūtra, a full summary of its doctrines is given here. Akāśpīḍa says that supreme felicity, *anuttama bhoga* (nīharaṇa) is attained by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories treated in his Nyāya-sūtra. The categories² are enumerated as follows —

(1) The means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), (2) the object of right knowledge (*prameya*), (3) doubt (*śaṅka*), (4) purpose (*prayatna*), (5) example (*dṛṣṭānta*), (6) tenet (*siddhānta*), (7) members (*ārayana*), (8) confutation (*tsrka*), (9) ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), (10) discussion (*nāla*), (11) wrangling (*jalpa*), (12) cavil (*nāraṇa*), (13) fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*) (14) quibble (*chāla*), (15) analogue (*yūga*) and (16) the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*)

32. THE CATEGORIES THEIR DEFINITION

Definitions of the sixteen categories are given below —

(1) The Means of Right Knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

Perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and word or verbal testimony (*śabda*), are the means of right knowledge.

¹ Full "The Nyāya-sūtra of Gṛhasa" translated by Dr Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana in the "Sacred Books of the Hindus" series, Allahabad, also Dr Rādhakṛṣṇa's translation of the Nyāya-sūtra, first four books, Benares.

² In Tibetan the sixteen categories, *soḍaśa paṭicāra* (ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ཀྱི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་), are designated respectively as follows —

(1) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (source of right cognition), (2) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (object of right cognition), (3) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (doubt) (4) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (motive), (5) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (example), (6) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (member of a syllogism), (7) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (established tenet), (8) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (corroborating a proposition), (9) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (debate), (10) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (analogy), (11) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (wrangling), (12) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (cavil), (13) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (fallacy), (14) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (quibble), (15) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (analogue), (16) རྟོག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེ་རྟོག་པའི་གྲ་བཅོད་ (point of defeat).

Contents of the Nyāya-sūtra.¹

As the Nyāya-sūtra is the foremost work on Nyāya-śāstra full summary of its doctrines is given here. Akṣapāda says supreme felicity, *summum bonum* (*nishreyasa*) is attained by true knowledge of the sixteen categories treated in his Nyāya-sūtra. The categories² are enumerated as follows —

(1) The means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), (2) the object of right knowledge (*prameya*), (3) doubt (*samśaya*), (4) purpose (*prayojana*), (5) example (*dṛṣṭānta*), (6) tenet (*siddhānta*), (7) members (*avayava*), (8) confutation (*tarka*), (9) ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), (10) discussion (*vāda*), (11) wrangling (*jalpa*), (12) cavil (*vitandā*), (13) fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*), (14) quibble (*chala*), (15) analogue (*yāts*), and (16) the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*).

Definitions of the sixteen categories are given below —

(1) The Means of Right Knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

Perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and word or verbal testimony (*śabda*), are the means of right knowledge.

[illegible]

of a sense with its object, being determinate, unnameable, and
non-erratic

Sense—includes the mind. The knowledge of the soul, pleasure, pain, etc., is produced by their intercourse with the mind which, according to the Bhāṣya 1-1-4 of Vātsyāyana, is a sense-organ.

Determinate—this epithet distinguishes perception from indeterminate (doubtful) knowledge, as for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust. His knowledge, which is of a doubtful character, is not perception.

Unnameable—signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears. It arises in fact without the aid of language.

Some say that there is no nonreductive antirealist theory of truth.

Non-erratic—In summer the sun's rays coming in contact with earthly heat (vapour) quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water. The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception. To eliminate such cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.

[The Sanskrit Sūtra defining perception may also be translated as follows:—

Perception is knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is non-erratic, being either indeterminate ("nirvikalpaka" as "this = something") or determinate ("savikalpaka" as "this is a Brahmana")]

¹ In Tibetan the definition is stated as follows —

དཔལ་པོ་དང་འཕྲུག་པ་ལས་ཕྱིར་བཞི་ཤིང་པ་མཆོད་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་གྱི་དུ་མེད་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་མེད་པ་རྟོག་པའི་
 འདུག་ཅིང་ Dwan po-dan-don-hphrud-pa las byun-wah! son pa-gnon sum-tian-du mod-
 pa-hphrud pa-moj pa-tlog-pahi-bdag dad It has been translated by Alexander

(*duḥkha*), and emancipation (*apararga*), are the (principal) objects of right knowledge.

Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition are the marks of the soul

These are the qualities of the substance called soul

Desire is a sign which proves the existence of "soul" A soul

is completely exhausted, our soul, freed from transmigration, attains emancipation or release (*mokṣa*)

The body is the site of gestures, senses and sentiments

Body is the site of *gestures* inasmuch as it strives to reach what is desirable and to avoid what is hateful. It is also the site of *senses* for the latter act well or ill, according as the former is in good or bad order. *Sentiments* which comprise pleasure and pain are also located in the body which experiences them

The nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear are the senses, which are produced from elements.

Earth, water, light, air, and ether—these are the elements. The nose is of the same nature as earth, the tongue as water, the eye as light, the skin as air, and ear as ether

Smell (odour), taste (savour), colour, touch and sound which are qualities of the earth, etc., are objects of the senses

Intellect is the same as apprehension or knowledge.

The mark of the mind is that there do not arise in the soul more acts of knowledge than one at a time

It is impossible to perceive two things simultaneously. Perception does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ with its object, but it requires also a conjunction of the mind. Now, the mind,

ception and non-perception.

- (1) *Recognition of common properties*—e.g. seeing in the twilight a tall object we cannot decide whether it is a man or a post, for the property of tallness belongs to both
- (2) *Recognition of properties not common*—e.g. hearing a sound, one questions whether it is eternal or not, for the property of soundness abides neither in man, beast, etc., that are non-eternal nor in atoms which are eternal
- (3) *Conflicting testimony*—e.g. merely by study one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does, while another system states that it does not
- (4) *Irregularity of perception*—e.g. we perceive water in the tank where it really exists, but water appears also to exist in a mirage where it really does not exist
A question arises, whether water is perceived only when it actually exists or even when it does not exist
- (5) *Irregularity of non-perception*—e.g. we neither perceive water in the radish where it really exists, nor on dry land where it does not exist
A question arises, whether water is not perceived only when it does not exist, or also when it does exist

(4) Purpose (*prayojana*)

Purpose is that with an eye to which one proceeds to act.

It refers to the thing which one endeavours to attain or avoid
A man collects fuel for the purpose of cooking his food

(5) Example (*dṛṣṭānta*).

An example is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion

With regard to the general proposition "wherever there is smoke there is fire," the example is a kitchen in which fire and smoke abide together, to the satisfaction of an ordinary man as well as an acute investigator

(6) Tenet (*siddhānta*)

A tenet is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication

The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between 'a dogma of all the schools' (*sarva-tantra*), 'a dogma peculiar to some school' (*prati-tantra*), 'a hypothetical dogma' (*adhikarāṇa*), and 'an implied dogma' (*abhyupagama*)

A dogma of all the schools is a tenet which is not
school and is claimed by at least one

which is an atomic substance, cannot be conjoined with more than one sense organ at a time, hence there cannot occur more acts of perception than one at a time

Activity is that which makes the voice, mind and body begin their action

There are three kinds of action, viz *bodily*, *vocal* and *mental* each of which may be subdivided as good or bad

Bodily actions which are *bad* are —(1) killing, (2) stealing, and (3) committing adultery

Bodily actions which are *good* are —(1) giving, (2) protecting, (3) and serving

Vocal actions which are *bad* are —(1) telling a lie (2) using harsh language, (3) slandering and (4) indulging in frivolous talk

Vocal actions which are *good* are —speaking the truth, (2) speaking what is useful, (3) speaking what is pleasant, and (4) reading sacred books

Mental actions which are *bad* are —(1) malice, (2) covetousness, and (3) scepticism

Mental actions which are *good* are —(1) compassion, (2) generosity, and (3) devotion

Faults are those which cause activity

They are affection (attachment), aversion, and stupidity

Transmigration means rebirths

As already explained it is a series of births and deaths Birth is the connection of a soul with a body which includes the sense-organs, mind, intellect and sentiments Death is the soul's separation from them

Fruit is the thing produced by activity and faults

It is the enjoyment of *pleasure* or suffering of *pain* All activity and faults end in producing pleasure which is acceptable and pain which is fit only to be avoided

Pain is that which causes uneasiness

It is affliction which every one desires to avoid The Sanskrit Sūtra defining "pain" may also be translated as follows Pain is the mark of hindrance to the soul

Emancipation or **release** is the absolute deliverance from pain.

.....

.....
ly of pleasure and pain

(3) Doubt (*samśaya*)

which is a conflicting judgment about the precise of an object, arises from the recognition of properties

ception and non-perception

- (1) *Recognition of common properties*—e.g. seeing in the twilight a tall object we cannot decide whether it is a man or a post, for the property of tallness belongs to both
- (2) *Recognition of properties not common*—e.g. hearing a sound, one questions whether it is eternal or not, for the property of soundness abides neither in man, beast, etc., that are non-eternal nor in atoms which are eternal
- (3) *Conflicting testimony*—e.g. merely by study one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does, while another system states that it does not
- (4) *Irregularity of perception*—e.g. we perceive water in the tank where it really exists, but water appears also to exist in a mirage where it really does not exist
A question arises, whether water is perceived only when it actually exists or even when it does not exist
- (5) *Irregularity of non-perception*—e.g. we neither perceive water in the radish where it really exists, nor on dry land where it does not exist
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(5) Example (*dṛṣṭānta*)

An example
an expert

but which an ordinary man and

know "wherever there is smoke
which fire and smoke abide
every man as well as an acute

(6) T.

of a certain

in between 'a
to some
(*śāstra*), and 'an

which is not opposed by any
ist one school

The existence of five elements or five objects of sense is a tenet which is accepted by all the schools

A *dogma peculiar to some school* = a tenet which is accepted by similar schools but rejected by opposite schools

'A thing cannot come into existence out of nothing'—this is a peculiar dogma of the Sāṃkhya

A *hypothetical dogma* is a tenet which if accepted leads to the acceptance of another tenet

'There is a soul apart from the senses because it can recognise one and the same object by seeing and touching.' If you accept this tenet you must also have accepted the following—(1) That the senses are more than one, (2) that each of the senses has its particular object, (3) that the soul derives its knowledge through the channels of the senses, (4) that a substance which is distinct from its qualities is the abode of them etc

An *implied dogma* is a tenet which is not explicitly declared as such, but which follows from the examination of particulars concerning it, e.g. the discussion whether sound is eternal or non-eternal presupposes that it is a substance

(7) Members of a Syllogism (avayava)

The members (of a syllogism) are signified by a proposition (*pratijñā*), a reason (*hetu*), an explanatory example (*uddāharana*), an application of the example (*upanaya*), and a statement of the conclusion (*niṣaṃana*).

A *proposition* is the statement of what is to be proved e.g.
the hill is fiery

A *reason* is the means for proving what is to be proved through the homogeneous or heterogeneous (affirmative or negative) character of the example, e.g.

because it (the hill) is smoky

Here 'smoke' is the reason

A *homogeneous (or affirmative) example* is a familiar instance which is known to possess the property to be proved, and which implies that this property is invariably contained in the reason given e.g.

whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen

Here "kitchen" is a familiar instance which possesses fire, and implies that fire invariably goes with smoke which is the reason given

N.B.—An *affirmative example* may according to the Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-36, be defined as a familiar instance, which being similar to the minor term (subject) possesses the property of that term as copresent with the reason

A heterogeneous (or negative) example is a familiar instance which is devoid of the property to be proved, and which implies that the absence of this property is incompatible with the reason given, e.g.

whatever is not fiery is not smoky, as a lake

Here the lake is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of fire, and implies that absence of fieriness is incompatible with the smoke, which is the reason

Application is the winding up, with reference to the example, of what is to be proved as being so or not so.

example is of a negative character

Affirmative application—"So" is this hill (smoky)

Negative application—This hill is "not so" (not smoky)

Conclusion is the re-statement of the proposition after the reason has been mentioned

It is the confirmation of the proposition after the reason and the example have been mentioned

Conclusion—Therefore the hill is fiery

The five members may be fully set forth as follows:—

(i) Proposition—This hill is fiery

(ii) Reason—Because it is smoky

(iii) Example—Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen (homogeneous or affirmative)

(iv) Application—"So" is this hill (smoky)—(affirmative)

(v) Conclusion—Therefore this hill is fiery

(8) Confutation (*tarka*)

Confutation,¹ which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing of which the character is not known, is reasoning which reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters

Is the soul eternal or non-eternal? Here the real character of the soul, viz. whether it is eternal or non-eternal, is not known. In ascertaining the character we reason as follows. If the soul were non-eternal it would be impossible for it to enjoy the fruits of its own actions, to undergo transmigration, and to attain final emancipation. But such a conclusion is absurd. Such possibilities are known to belong to the soul. Therefore, we must admit that the soul is eternal.

¹ *Tarka* may be rendered also as "argumentation," "reasoning," "hypothetical reasoning," "reductio ad absurdum," etc.

(9) Ascertainment (*nirṇaya*).

Ascertainment is the determination of a question through the removal of doubt, by hearing two opposite sides.

A person wavers and doubts if certain statements advanced to him are supported by one of two parties but opposed by the other part. His doubt is not removed until by the application of reason he can vindicate one of the parties. The process by which the vindication is effected is called ascertainment. Ascertainment is not, however in all cases preceded by doubt for instance in the case of perception things are ascertained directly. So also we ascertain things directly by the authority of scriptures. But in the case of investigation (inference) doubt must precede ascertainment.

(10) Discussion (*vāda*).

Discussion is the adoption by two parties, of two opposite theses which are each analysed in the form of five members, and are supported or condemned by any of the means of right knowledge and by confutation, without deviation from the established tenets.

A *vāda* is a disputation or controversy (*vāda*). It is the adoption of a side or thesis by a disputant and its opposite one by his opponent. It is of three kinds viz. *locution* (*vāda*) which aims at ascertaining the truth, *wrangling* (*vāda*) which aims at gaining victory, and *criticism* (*vāda*) which aims at finding mere faults. A *locution* is one who engages himself in a disputation as a means of seeking the truth.

An instance of *locution* is given below.

Disputant: There is soul.

Opponent: There is no soul.

Disputant: Soul is existent (proposition).

Because it is an absolute of some substance (reason).

Wherever soul is existent is not an absolute of some substance as a form of any negative quality.

Soul is not that it is soul is an absolute of some substance (negative application).

There is no inconsistent proposition.

Opponent: Soul does not exist (proposition).

Because it is a positive quality, and it is not a substance (reason).

Wherever soul is existent is a form of some substance is not an absolute of some substance as a form of any negative quality.

Soul is not that it is soul is an absolute of some substance (negative application).

There is no inconsistent proposition.

Disputant: The soul is existent is a positive quality, and it is not a substance (reason).

Wherever soul is existent is a form of some substance is not an absolute of some substance as a form of any negative quality.

Soul is not that it is soul is an absolute of some substance (negative application).

cognitions

Discutient—The doctrine of soul harmonises well with the various tenets which we hold, viz that there are eternal things, that everybody enjoys pleasure or suffers pain according to his own actions, etc. Therefore there is soul

(11) Wrangling (*jalpa*)

Wrangling, which aims at gaining victory, is the defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid by quibbles, analogues, and other processes which deserve rebuke

A *wrangler* = one who, engaged in a disputation aims only at

(12) Cavil (*vitandā*)

Cavil is a kind of wrangling which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side

A *caviller* does not endeavour to establish any thing, but confines himself to mere carping at the arguments of his opponent

(13) Fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*)

Fallacies of reason are the erratic (*savyābhīrāra*), the contradictory (*viruddha*), the controversial (*prakarana-sama*), the counter-questioned (*sādhya-sama*), and the mistimed (*kālāṇita*).

The *erratic* is the reason which leads to more conclusions than one

An instance of the *erratic* reason is given below —

Proposition—Sound is eternal

Reason—Because it is not destroyed

by the major term, that is, when there is no connection between the major term and middle term, as pervader and pervaded Intangible' is pervaded neither by 'eternal' nor by 'non-eternal'

The *Contradictory* = the reason which opposes what is to be established

Proposition—A pot is produced

Contradictory reason—Because it is eternal

Here the reason is contradictory because that which is eternal is never produced

The *controversial* or *balancing the point at issue* is a reason which is adduced to arrive at a definite conclusion while it is really one which can give rise to mere suspense as to the point

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal

Reason—Because it is not possessed of the attribute of eternality

The reason that sound is not possessed of the attribute of eternality does not throw any new light but keeps the parties in suspense as before

The *counter-questioned* or *balancing the question* is a reason which not being different from what is to be proved stands in need of proof for itself

Proposition—Shadow is a substance

Reason—Because it possesses motion

That which possesses quality and motion is a substance To say that shadow possesses motion is the same as to say that it is a substance Hence the reason stands as much in need of proof as the proposition itself This is a counter-questioned reason or a reason which balances the question

The *misnamed* is the reason which is adduced when the time is past in which it might hold good

Proposition—Sound is durable

Misnamed reason—Because it is manifested by union, as a colour

The colour of a jar is manifested when the jar comes into union with a lamp but the colour existed before the union took place, and similarly, the sound is manifested when it comes into union with a drum. The colour is presumed to continue to exist after the union has ceased. Similarly, the sound is presumed to continue to exist after the union has ceased. The reason adduced for the durability of sound does not take place at the time when the drum comes into union with the ear but it takes place at a subsequent moment when the union has ceased. In the case of colour however the manifestation takes place just at the time when the jar comes into union with the lamp. As the times of their manifestation is different the analogy between colour and sound is not complete, therefore the reason is misnamed

[Some interpret the spharaka as follows. The misnamed is a reason which is adduced at a time when the union has ceased. But this interpretation according to the spharaka is wrong.]

A disputant says "the soul is inactive because it is all pervading as ether"

His opponent replies "if the soul is inactive because it be similar to ether as being all pervading, why is it inactive because it bears similarity to a pot as being a real union" ?

The reason of the opponent is futile, because it bears only a far fetched analogy to that of the disputant !

or again -

Disputant—Sound is non-eternal, because, unlike ether, it is product

Opponent—If sound is non-eternal because, it is a product, dissimilar to ether, why is it not eternal because, it is object of auditory perception it is dissimilar to a pot !

The reason employed by the opponent is futile because the logic which it bears to that of the disputant is far fetched !

(16) A Point of Defeat (nigrahasthāna)

A point of defeat, also called a clincher, an occasion for retreat or a place of humiliation, arises when one misunderstands or does not understand at all

If a person begins to argue in a way which betrays his utter ignorance, or is fully understandable and yet persists in showing the other person is wrong, it is of no avail to employ counter arguments. It is quite unadvisable to be argued with and there is nothing left for his opponent but to turn him out or quit his company rebuking him as a fool who is a waste.

An instance of the point of defeat —

Whatever is not quality is substance

because there is nothing except colour etc. (quality)

A person who argues in the above way is to be rebuked as a fool for he reasons (with a finite only quality) opposes his proper (which is both quality and substance)

For this instance

Opponent — I do not see it

Disputant — I do not see it either. I do not see it either. I do not see it either. I do not see it either.

1. The opponent, as a person, begins to argue in a way which betrays his utter ignorance, or is fully understandable and yet persists in showing the other person is wrong, it is of no avail to employ counter arguments. It is quite unadvisable to be argued with and there is nothing left for his opponent but to turn him out or quit his company rebuking him as a fool who is a waste.

to

It is only meet that the opponent should quit the company of a man who argues in this way

33 THE VARIETIES OF ANALOGUE

The analogues are as follows: (1) Balancing the homogeneity (*sūdharmya-sama*), (2) balancing the heterogeneity (*vaidharmya-sama*), (3) balancing an excess (*utkarsa-sama*), (4) balancing a deficit (*apakarsa-sama*), (5) balancing the questionable (*varnya-sama*), (6) balancing the unquestionable (*avarnya-sama*), (7) balancing the alternative (*vikalpa-sama*), (8) balancing the ques-

balancing the non-reason (the
patti-sama), (19)
balancing the perception (the
(*anupalabdhi-sama*), (22) balancing the non-eternal (*anitya-sama*),
(23) balancing the eternal (*nitya-sama*) and (24) balancing the effect (*kārya-sama*).

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition —

eternal,
is incorporeal,
ether

non-eternal, is based on the homo-
pot, on the ground of both being
and is eternal, is said to be based
sky, on the alleged ground
opposition, futile as it is, is

called "balancing the homogeneity," which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides only in respect of the homogeneity of examples employed by them¹

(2) **Balancing the heterogeneity.**—If against an argument based on a heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based merely on the same kind of example, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the heterogeneity."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal
because it is a product,

whatever is eternal is not a product, as the ether

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal

whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot

The argument, viz sound is non-eternal, is based on the heterogeneity of sound from the eternal ether. The opposition, viz sound is eternal is said to be based on the heterogeneity of sound from the not-incorporeal pot. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is called "balancing the heterogeneity," which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides merely in respect of the heterogeneity of examples employed by them²

(3) **Balancing an excess.**—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example, one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof, the opposition, futile as it is, is called "balancing an excess"

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

Sound is non-eternal (and must be corporeal),
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal as well as corporeal)

¹ The opposition is futile because it is based on a mere homogeneous example. In the argument—'sound is non-eternal because it is a product, like a pot' the homogeneous example 'pot' exhibits a universal connection between durability and non-eternality—all products being non-eternal, but in the opposition—'sound is eternal because it is incorporeal like the sky' the homogeneous example 'sky' does not exhibit a universal connection between incorporeality and eternity, because there are things such as intelligence or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal.

² In the opposition—'sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot' the heterogeneous example 'pot' does not exhibit a universal disconnection between incorporeality and absence of eternity, because there are things, such as intelligence or knowledge, which are

It is based on the false supposition of a complete equality of the subject and the example. Though there is no denial of an equality of the subject and the example in certain characters, there is indeed a great difference between them in other characters. Thus the equality supposed to exist between the pot and sound in respect of corporeality, is not warranted by the reason (*viz* being a product) because there are things such as intelligence or knowledge, which are products but not corporeal.

(4) *Balancing a deficit*.—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example, one offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing a deficit."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition —

Sound is non-eternal (and cannot be audible),
because it is a product,
(which is non-eternal and not audible)

But if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it is not audible; and if sound is still held to be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile balancing a deficit," which aims at showing an identity of two characters in respect of a certain character, is really to be wanting

in "and" and "pot" is not

if one opposes an argument of an example is as question, futile, as it is, will

eternality of sound cannot be

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

A pot is non-eternal
because it is a product
like sound

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternality of sound is call^d in question why is not that of the pot too called in question, as pot and sound are both products? His object is to set aside argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the questionable" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of sides in respect of the questionable character of the subject as well of the example. It puts an end to all kinds of inference by ignoring the difference between the subject and the example altogether.

(6) Balancing the unquestionable — If one opposes an argument by alleging that the character of the subject is as unquestionable as that of the example, the opposition, futile as it is, is called "balancing the unquestionable."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound

... ..

... is not one (the pot) non-eternal and the other (sound) eternal.
This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the alternative,"
which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in
respect of the alternative characters attributed to the subject and the
example.

It introduces an equality between the pot and sound in respect
of a character (viz. being eternal) which is not warranted by the reason
(viz. being a product).

(8) Balancing the question.—If one opposes an argument by
alleging that the example requires proof as much as the subject
does, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the
question."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as
follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The person alleges that the pot and sound are on both sides.

It is based on the false supposition that the example stands
exactly on the same footing as the subject. The example does not
in fact stand on the same footing as the subject, a "pot" being
known to all, and of proof as to its characters, a "pot" being
eternal and non-eternal. Hence the opposition is
futile.

(9)

co-
it

reason being non-distin-
guishing the co-presence "
is fire in the hill, argues as

It is certain that persons who are a fair way from the hill say —

The hill has smoke
because it has fire
like a kitchen

The argument has taken the smoke to be the reason and the fire to be the predicate. The opponent raises a question as to whether the smoke is present at the same site which is occupied by the fire or absent from that site. If the smoke is present with fire at the same site there remains according to the opponent no reason to deduce the reason from the predicate. The smoke to be his reason is much a reason for the fire as the fire for the smoke. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the co-presence" which aims at bringing an argument on the alleged ground of the co-presence of the reason and the predicate.

Seeing that a potter cannot produce a pot without getting clay within his reach it is affirmed that a thing is accomplished sometimes by the cause being present at its site. Balancing the co-presence" which attaches an undue importance to the proximity of sites if there is a totally futile opposition.

(10) Balancing the mutual absence. If against an argument based on the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of mutual absence, the opposition, futile as it is still, on account of the reason being non-conducive to the predicate be called "balancing the mutual absence."

A certain person to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows —

The hill has fire
because it has smoke
like a kitchen

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

The hill has smoke
because it has fire
like a kitchen

The opponent asks "Is the smoke to be regarded as the reason because it is absent from the site of the fire?" "Such a supposition is indeed absurd." The reason cannot establish the predicate without being connected with it, just as a lamp cannot exhibit a thing which is not within its reach. If a reason unconnected with the predicate could establish the latter, then the fire could be as much the reason for the smoke as the smoke for the fire.

This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the mutual absence" which aims at bringing an argument to a close on the alleged ground of the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate.

Seeing that an exorcist can destroy persons by administering spells from a distance, it is affirmed that a thing is accomplished sometimes by

the cause being absent from its site "Balancing the mutual absence," which attaches too much importance to remoteness of sites is therefore a totally futile opposition

(11) *Balancing the infinite regression.*—If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example not having been established by a series of reasons, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the infinite regression"

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound argues as follows.—

Sound is non eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

If sound is proved to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, how is the pot again to be proved as non-eternal? The reason which proves the non-eternality of the pot is itself to be established by further

series of reasons to reveal its character

Hence the opposition called "balancing the infinite regression" is not founded on a sound basis

(12) *Balancing the counter-example.*—If one opposes an argument on the ground of the existence of a mere counter example, the opposition futile as it is, will be called "balancing the counter-example"

A certain person, to prove the non eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Proposition—Sound is non eternal
Reason—because it is a product
Example—like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

Proposition—Sound is eternal.
Example—like the ether

an argument by the introduction of a mere counter-example

A mere counter example without a reason attending it cannot be conducive to any conclusion We can rely on an example attended

by reason that it is a counter-examples positionally reason. For the opposition which is called on a more counter-example is rejected as futile.

(11) Balancing the non-produced. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the property constituted by the reason being absent from the thing denoted by the subject while it is yet produced the opposition futile as it is, will be called 'balancing the non-produced'.

A certain person to prove that sound is non-eternal, argues as follows—

Sound is non-eternal
because it is an effect of effort
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus—

Sound is eternal,
because it is a non-effect of effort
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that the property constituted by the reason viz being an effect of effort is not predicable of the subject viz sound (while it is not yet produced). Consequently sound is not non-eternal; it must then be eternal. There is according to the opponent, an apparent agreement between the two sides as to the sound being eternal on account of its being a non-effect of effort. This sort of opposition is called 'balancing the non-produced' which pretends to show an equality of the arguments of two sides assuming the thing denoted by the subject to be as yet non-produced.

It is futile because the subject can become such only when it is unproduced and that there is then no obstacle to the property of the reason being predicated of it. The opposition viz 'sound (while non-produced) is eternal because it is not then an effect of effort' carries no weight with it since we do not take the sound to be the subject before it is produced. Sound while it is produced is certainly an effect of effort and as such is non-eternal.

(12) Balancing the doubt. If one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal consequent on the example and its general notion being equally objects of perception, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called 'balancing the doubt'.

A certain person to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows—

Sound is non-eternal
because it is a product,
like a pot.

... ..
... ..
... ..

The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as potness inasmuch as both are objects of perception, but the pot being non-eternal and potness (the general notion of all pots) being eternal, there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non-eternal or eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the doubt," which aims at discarding an argument in consequence of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal.

It is futile because sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere ground of its homogeneity with potness.

can however, on the score of heterogeneity pronounce it undoubtedly to be non-eternal. In this case we must bear in mind that we cannot ascertain the true nature of a thing unless we weigh it in respect of its homogeneity with, as well as heterogeneity from, other things. If even then there remains any doubt as to its true nature, that doubt will never end.

(15) *Balancing the point at issue, or the controversial.*—It is an opposition which is supposed to be conducted on the ground of homogeneity with (or heterogeneity from) both sides.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows,—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

Sound is eternal,
because it is audible
like soundness.

The opponent alleges that the proposition, viz. sound is non-eternal, cannot be proved because the reason, viz. audibility which is homogeneous with both sound (which is non-eternal) and soundness (which is eternal), serves only to give rise to suspense for the removal of which it was employed. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the point at issue" which hurts an argument by giving rise to suspense which was to be removed.

It is futile and cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a point which happens to support one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side.

(16) *Balancing the non-reason.* It is an opposition which is supposed to be based on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product
like a pot.

Here "being a product" is the reason for "being seen" which is the predicate

- (a) The reason does not precede the predicate here for the former is called a reason only when it establishes the latter. It is impossible for the reason to be established before the establishment of the predicate.
- (b) The reason does not succeed the predicate because it would be useless if the predicate could be established without it.
- (c) The reason and the predicate cannot exist simultaneously for they will then be reciprocally connected like the right and left horns of a cow. A reason which does not establish the predicate cannot establish the latter. The opposition is called 'balancing the non-reason' and aims at setting aside an argument by showing that the reason is impossible at all the three times.

There is in fact no impossibility for the reason to operate knowledge of the knowable and the establishment of that which is to be established take place from reason which must precede that which is to be known and established. If the reason is held to be impossible then it is not the opposition itself which depends on reason but the reason itself. In the event of the

If by presumption we could draw a conclusion unwarranted by the reason, we could from the opposition cited above draw the following conclusion —

Sound is presumed to be non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

case opposed to it, and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. Hence the opposition called "balancing the presumption" = untenable

(18) *Balancing the non-difference* — If the subject and example are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of a certain property on account of their possessing in common the property connoted by the reason, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property inasmuch as they are all existent; this sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product
like a pot.

Now being no difference between the subject and the example, sound may be treated as eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference," which aims at hurting an argument by assuming all things to be mutually non-different.

It is futile because the property possessed in common by the subject and the example, happens in certain instances to abide in the reason, while in other instances it does not abide in the same

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

Here the pot and sound possessing in common the property of being a product, are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of non-eternality. On the same principle if all things are treated as non-different in consequence of their being existent, we should like to

know in what respect they are non-different. If they are treated as non-different in respect of non-eternality, then the argument would stand thus —

All things are non-eternal,
because they are existent
like (?)

In this argument "all things" being the subject, there is no left which may serve as an example. A part of the subject can be cited as the example because the example must be a well established thing, while the subject is a thing which is yet to be established. The argument, for the want of an example, leads to no conclusion. In fact all things are not non-eternal since some at least are eternal. In other words, non-eternality abides in some existent things and does not abide in other existent things. Hence all things are mutually non-different and the opposition called "balancing the difference" is unreasonable.

(10) **Balancing the demonstration** — If an opposition is made by showing that both the demonstrations are justified by reason, the opposition will be called "balancing the demonstration".

A certain person demonstrates the non-eternality of sound as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product
like a pot

A certain other person offers an opposition by the alleged demonstration of the eternality of sound as follows —

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the ether

The reason in the first demonstration supports the non-eternality of sound while that in the second demonstration supports the eternality of sound, yet both the demonstrations are alleged to be right. The opponent advanced the second apparent demonstration as a balance against the first to create a dead lock. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the demonstration".

It is futile because there is an admission of the first demonstration. The opponent having asserted that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons, has admitted the reasonableness of the first demonstration which supports the non-eternality of sound. If he would avoid the incompatibility that exists between the two demonstrations, he now denies the reason which supports non-eternality. He would have to deny the other reason which supports the eternality of sound for he can avoid incompatibility by denying either of the reasons. Hence the opposition called "balancing the demonstration" is not well availed.

(11) **Balancing the perception** — If an opposition is offered on the ground that we perceive the character of the subject even

without the intervention of the reason, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the perception."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound = non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound can be ascertained to be non-eternal even without the reason that it is a product, for we perceive that sound is produced by the branches of trees broken by wind. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the perception," which aims at demolishing an

is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot, implies that sound is proved to be non-eternal through the reason that it is a product. It does not deny other means, such as perception, etc., which also may prove sound to be non-eternal. Hence the opposition called "balancing the perception" does not set aside the main argument.

(21) Balancing the non-perception.—If against an argument proving the non-existence of a thing by the non-perception thereof one offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non-perception of the non-perception, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the non-perception."

If the non-perception of a thing is proved to be non-existent

founded

When the non-perception of a thing is proved to be non-existent

existence
as there
= balanc-

(22) Balancing the non-eternal.—If one finding that things which are homogeneous possess equal characters, opposes an argu-

of eternality of the non-eternal you have admitted sound to be *always* non-eternal, and cannot now deny its non-eternality. The eternal and non-eternal are incompatible with each other. By admitting that sound is non-eternal you are precluded from asserting that it is also eternal. Hence "balancing the eternal" is not a sound opposition.

(24) *Balancing the effect* — If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effects of effort, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the effect."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus —

The effect of effort is sound in the case of eternal things. The non-

It is futile because in the case of sound effort does not give rise to the second kind of effect. We cannot say that sound is revealed by

Application of the Analogues.

In showing the futility of analogues we may test them in the light of the following principles —

(i) If a special meaning is to be attached to a word in the opposition, the same meaning will have to be attached to the word in the original argument, e.g. the word "effect" should be used in one and the same sense by a disputant and his opponent.

(ii) Defect attaches to the *opposition of the opposition* just as it attaches to the opposition itself.

A certain person to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal
because it is an effect of effort

[Here "effect" signifies "a thing produced"]

A certain other person, seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds, offers an opposition thus —

Sound is eternal,
because it is an effect of effort

[Here "effect" signifies "a thing revealed"]

The arguer replies that sound cannot be concluded to be eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean "a thing produced"). The opponent rises again to say that sound cannot also be concluded to be non-eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean "a thing revealed"). So the defect which is pointed out in the case of the opposition, may also be pointed out in the case of the opposition of the opposition.

Here the opponent evidently took the word "effect" in the sense of "a thing revealed"

The third wing. The disputant, seeing that the reason
"effect" is erratic, charges the opposition
with a defect thus —

Sound is not eternal,
because it is an effect of effort

He means that sound cannot be inferred to be eternal from its being an effect, because "effect," which is the reason here, admits of two different meanings, viz (1) a thing [that did not previously exist but is now] produced, and (2) a thing [that already existed and is now] revealed. The reason being erratic the conclusion is uncertain.

The opponent finding that the reason "effect," which is
erratic, proves neither the eternity nor the
The fourth wing. non-eternity of sound, brings a counter-charge against the disputant thus:—

Sound is also not non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort

The fifth wing The disputant finding that the counter-

eternal. In other words the counter-charge has proved the charge, that is, it has indicated that the opponent admits the disputant's opinion.

The opponent finding that the disputant instead of rescuing
his argument from the counter-charge has
The sixth wing taken shelter under his opponent's admission
of the charge says —

The disputant by saying that "sound is also not eternal" has (by the force of the word "also") admitted that it is also not non-eternal. In other words, if the counter-charge proves the charge, the reply to the counter-charge proves the counter-charge itself.

The first, third and fifth wings belong to the disputant while the second, fourth and sixth to the opponent. The sixth wing is a repetition of the fourth.

The points of direct contact between the two parties are the places of business and the place of residence.

(1) flustering the groups into a generalization (2) shaming the proposition (specification) (3) agreeing the proposition (specification) (4) agreeing the proposition (specification) (5) shifting the ground (specification) (6) shifting the topic (specification) (7) the mean reason (specification) (8) the mean reason (specification) (9) the mean reason (specification) (10) the mean reason (specification) (11) saying too little (specification) (12) saying too much (specification) (13) repetition (specification) (14) silence (specification) (15) ignorance (specification) (16) non-ignorance (specification) (17) reason (specification) (18) admission of an opinion (specification) (19) overlooking the reasonable (specification) (20) censuring the non-censurable (specification) (21) deviating from a tenet (specification) and (22) the semblance of a reason (specification)

* A point of defeat which is the same as "a clincher," "a knockout," or "a place of humiliation" or "a point of disgrace" arises generally from a misemployment of the proposition or any other part of an argument and may implicate any disputant whether he is the deponent, the arguer or the cavalier.

(1) During the proposition occurs when one admits in one own example the character of a counter-example

A disputant argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal
because it is cognisable by sense,
whatever is cognisable by sense is non-eternal as a pot,
sound is so (cognisable by sense),
therefore sound is non-eternal

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Joyanta observes —

वृद्धकृतमनुष्योपनिषद् ।

ब्राह्मणभरतजी निरवर्त आदिवादिबन्धि प्रभि मज्जते ।

कायकोत्तरमिदं न तु कायार्थं पश्यन्त्यहं हरिकण्ठमगोष्ठौ ।

(Nyāya-mañjarī, chap. 12, p. 837, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

VARIETIES OF THE POINTS OF DEFEAT.

An opponent counter-argues thus. —

A genus (e.g. potness or pot-type), which is cognisable by sense is found to be eternal why cannot then the sound which is also cognisable by sense be eternal?

The disputant being thus opposed says —

Whatever is cognisable by sense is eternal as a pot
sound is cognisable by sense,
therefore sound is eternal

By thus admitting in his example (the pot) the character (of eternality) of a counter-example (the genus or type), that is, admitting that a pot is eternal, he hurts his own proposition (sound is non-eternal). A person who hurts his proposition in this way deserves nothing but rebuke.

(2) Shifting the proposition arises when a proposition being opposed one defends it, by importing a new character to, the example and counter-example.

A certain person argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus —

Sound is eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense,
like a genus (or type)

The first person in order to defend himself says that a genus (type) and a pot are both cognisable by sense, yet one is all pervasive and the other is not. — the sound which is likened to a pot is non-all.

The second person says — a change of proposition

is —
pervasive
his

is to be rebut
example

on a

distinct from colour, etc
that if substance is distinct
colour, etc which substance
is non-distinct from

defined as, etc., etc. The defence made in this way furnishes an instance of defeat through non-relevancy. The person who makes it deserves rebuke.

(7) The meaningless is an argument which is based on a non-sensical combination of letters in a series.

A certain person, to prove the eternality of sound, argues as follows —

Sound is eternal,
because k, c, t, t and p are j, v, g, d and d
like jh, bh, gh, dh and dh

As the letters k, c, t, etc., convey no meaning the person who employs them in his argument deserves rebuke.

(8) The unintelligible is an argument, which although repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent.

his opponent nor by the audience although they are repeated three times. This sort of defence is called "the unintelligible" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

(9) The incoherent is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung together without any syntactical order.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no other means of self-defences argues as follows —

Ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl, goat's skin and a lump of sweets.

This sort of argument, which consists of a series of unconnected words, is called "the incoherent," which rightly presents an occasion for rebuke.

(10) The inopportune is an argument, the parts of which are mentioned without any order of precedence.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows —

The hill has fire (proposition),

fore rebuked.

"A thing which is not non eternal does not possess the character of a product"—this is a mere repetition of the following —

"A thing possessing the character of a product is non-eternal "

(14) Silence is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant within the knowledge of the audience

How can a disputant carry on his argument if his opponent maintains an attitude of stolid silence? The opponent who takes up such an attitude is to be rebuked

(15) Ignorance is the non-understanding of a proposition

Ignorance is betrayed by the opponent who does not understand a proposition although it has been repeated three times within the knowledge of the audience. How can an opponent refute a proposition the meaning of which he cannot understand. He is to be rebuked for his ignorance

(16) Non-ingenuity consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply

A certain person lays down a proposition. If his opponent understands it and yet cannot hit upon a reply, he is to be scolded as wanting in ingenuity

(17) Evasion arises if one stops an argument in the pretext of going away to attend another business

A certain person having commenced a disputation in which he finds it impossible to establish his side, stops its further progress by saying that he has to go away on a very urgent business. He who stops the disputation in this way courts defeat and humiliation through evasion

(18) The admission of an opinion consists in charging the opposite side with a defect by admitting that the same defect exists on one's own side

A certain person addressing another person says ' You are a thief "

This person, instead of removing the charge brought against him, throws the same charge on the opposite side whereby he admits that the charge against himself is true. This sort of counter-charge or reply is an instance of the "admission of an opinion" which brings disgrace on the person who makes it

(19) Overlooking the censurable consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke.

It is not at all unfair to censure a person who argues in a way which furnishes an occasion for censure. Seeing that the person himself does not confess his shortcoming, it is the duty of the audience

(11) *Saying too little*—If an argument lacks even one part, it is called "saying too little".

The following is an argument which is "saying too little":

1. The hill has fire (proposition)
2. Because it has smoke (reason)
3. All that has smoke has fire as a hill has (example)
4. Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion)
5. Therefore the hill has fire (reiteration)

All the five parts—two, there are essential. A person, even one of them, will be called as "saying too little".

(12) *Saying too much* is an argument which has more than one reason or example.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues—

- The hill has fire (proposition)
- Because it has smoke (reason)
- And because it has light (reason)
- Like a kitchen (example)
- And like a furnace (example)

In this argument the second reason and the second example are redundant.

A person who having promised to argue in this (according to the established usage) employs more than one reason or example is to be rebuked as "saying too much".

(13) *Repetition* is an argument in which (of reiteration) the word or the meaning is

Repetition of the word—Sound is
Sound is

Repetition of the meaning—S

There is a difference between the two, inasmuch as the latter serves

In reiteration a word is
reiterated e.g.

- The hill has fire (1)
- Because it has
- All that has smoke
- The hill has smoke (2)
- Therefore the hill has

In this argument the "proposition" serving as a special member of the syllogism)

Repetition consists also in the thing has been indicated th

of a sense with its object. With reference to the perception of colour, for instance, it is asked whether the colour preceded perception or the perception preceded colour. If one says that perception occurred anteriorly or preceded the colour, one must give up one's definition of perception viz that perception arises from the contact of a sense with its object. If perception is supposed to occur posteriorly, it cannot be maintained that objects of sense are established by perception. Colour, for instance, is an object which is said to be established by visual perception. But this conclusion will have to be abandoned if perception is supposed to occur posteriorly to the object. If perception were simultaneous with its object there would not be any

the colour and the smell can be perceived at the same time, that is, our perception of colour must be admitted to be simultaneous with our perception of smell. This is absurd because two acts of perception, nay two cognitions cannot take place at the same time. As there is an order of succession in our cognitions, perception cannot be simultaneous with its object. Perception and other so-called means of right knowledge are therefore not only invalid but also impossible. Moreover if an object of knowledge is to be established by a means of knowledge, this latter needs also to be established by another means of knowledge. Just as a balance is an instrument when it weighs a thing, but is an object when it is itself weighed in

f
o

In reply it is stated that if perception and other means of right

auditory perception also called ear-knowledge or sound knowledge, (3) the olfactory perception also called nose-knowledge, (4) the gustatory knowledge, and (5) touch-knowledge may not see colour.

that his
or words,

because the

disturbance

In order to be able to do so

Inference

Inference is the process of drawing conclusions from the premises.

is quite different from the manner in which they do so when

imitating sounds is quite different from a man's imitation of it, for the latter is not natural. If in such cases any wrong inference is drawn, the fault is in the person, not in the process.

Comparison

Comparison, some say, is the process of comparing two things.

Is comparison a means
of right knowledge?

on the ground of complete similarity we never see a cow like a cow, on the ground of considerable similarity we do not see a cat like a cow, and on the ground of partial similarity we do not say "a mustard seed is like Mount Meru". Hence comparison is regarded by us as not a means of right knowledge. (I will not repeat the standard)

This object does not, we maintain, carry any weight, (or com-
mence to establish) through similarity in a high degree. The simi-

[illegible]

is a strange animal, one really performs an act of
invention. In reality it is good that we can

... the name *bee griseus* convey the general notion of the animal class *bee griseus*? That the name *bee griseus* signifies one and all members of the *bee griseus* class is not a result of perception, but the

at first sight through its special similarity to a row which we have often perceived. This knowledge of a previously unperceived object derived through its similarity to a perceived object

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Verbal testimony

Verbal testimony, some say, is inference because the object indi-

is "word" or verbal
intensity a mere infor-
mation?

to acquire the knowledge
and which is perceived
testimony we pass to an unperceived object through an object which
is perceived. Just as in inference there is a certain connection



between a sign (e.g. smoke) and the thing signified by it (e.g. fire), so in verbal testimony there is connection between a word and the object signified by it. Verbal testimony does not therefore differ from inference.

In reply we say that there is a great difference between inference and verbal testimony. The knowledge gained by verbal testimony is correct not simply because it comes through the medium of words but because it comes through words spoken by a reliable person. There are, it is said, paradise nymphs, *uttarakurus*, seven islands, ocean, human settlements, etc. We accept them as realities not simply because they are known through words, but because they are spoken of by persons who are reliable. Hence verbal testimony is

"cow," we think of the animal signified by it, nevertheless the word and the animal are not connected with each other by nature or necessity. In the case of inference, however, the connection between a sign (e.g. smoke), and the thing signified (e.g. fire), is natural and necessary. The connection involved in inference is not therefore of the same kind as that involved in verbal testimony. In the case of verbal testimony there is no perception of the connection. The connection between a sign and the thing signified, which is the basis of inference, is obvious to perception. For instance, the inference that "the hill

Are there any other knowledge as rumour ("aitihya") presump-
means of right know

Other means

Rumour is an account not based on direct knowledge

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1. 凡在本行開辦之各項業務，均應遵守本行所定之規章，並應隨時注意本行所定之規章，如有違反者，應即停止該項業務，並應隨時注意本行所定之規章，如有違反者，應即停止該項業務。

[illegible]

1. The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of the use of the computer on the learning of the English language. The study was conducted in a classroom of 20 students. The results of the study show that the use of the computer has a positive effect on the learning of the English language. The students who used the computer showed a higher level of achievement than the students who did not use the computer. The study also found that the use of the computer increased the students' motivation to learn the English language. The study concludes that the use of the computer is an effective method for teaching the English language.

[illegible]

we say that it is not so. "Not blue" is no doubt possible only in reference to "blue," but that blueness may exist elsewhere. For instance, we can talk of this pot being not blue in contrast to that pot which is blue. Moreover, we perceive non-existence as a mark antecedent to the production of a thing. When we say that there will be a jar, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the jar in the halves (parts) which are destined to compose it.

Non-existence or negation is not however a separate means of knowledge. It is included in inference. It infers one thing from the absence of another thing through the mutual connection of the two things, as follows. If a particular thing existed it would have been seen, it is not seen, therefore it does not exist.

In the Nyāya sūtra, 2-2-12 non-existence or negation (*abhāva*) is divided into two kinds: viz (1) *prāgabhāva*, prior non-existence, that is, the non-existence of a thing before it is brought into existence, and (2) *pradhvamsābhāva* posterior non-existence or destruction, that is the disappearance of a thing after it has come into existence.

(2) The Objects of Right Knowledge (*prameya*)

The Soul

A sense is not soul because we can apprehend an object through both sight and touch. "Previously I saw the jar and now I touch it" such recognition will be impossible if "I" is not different from the eye which cannot touch and from the skin which cannot see. In other words, the "I" or soul is distinct from the senses.

हमारे ज्ञान से तो हम जानते हैं कि हम अलग हैं ज्ञान से और हमारे अंगों से।

of explaining the apprehension of colour. In reply we say that the soul is certainly distinct from the senses. There is no doubt, a fixed relation between a sense and its object and a sense of a colour is

apprehends only one object.

The soul is immortal inasmuch as we find in a child joy, fear and grief which arise from the memory of things previously experienced. A new-born child

there is a soul continuing to his next life he will not suffer them at all. This is a "loss of merited action." Again, we often find a man suffering the consequences of action which he never did in this life. This would be a "gain of unmerited action," unless we believe that his soul did the action in his previous life.

Body

Our body is earthy because it possesses the special qualities of

The senses are material substances inasmuch as they invariably receive obstruction. Nothing can offer obstruction to a non-material all-pervading substance. The senses receive obstruction from wall, etc., and are therefore material substances.

Senses.

The senses are material. The senses receive obstruction from wall, etc., and are therefore material substances. The senses are dependent on touch, nose and sight. The senses are modifications of touch. The senses are one sense.

1 Compare—All the senses are only modifications of touch—Democritus.

If the body were soul there should be release from sins as soon as the body was destroyed. But in reality a person is bound by sins as long as the body exists.

The body is not the soul because it is atomic in nature. An atom cannot perform such diverse acts as seeing, hearing, knowing, feeling, etc. Knowledge is not a natural quality of the body because it does not, in some cases, continue quite as long as the body does. Knowledge belongs neither to a sense nor to its object because it continues even when the sense and its object are destroyed. Knowledge is a quality of the mind. Similarly, knowledge does not abide in an object of sense, and does not belong to the mind.

cannot be the agent as it is atomic in nature. An atom cannot perform such diverse acts as seeing, hearing, knowing, feeling, etc.

Knowledge is not a natural quality of the body because it does not, in some cases, continue quite as long as the body does. Knowledge belongs neither to a sense nor to its object because it continues even when the sense and its object are destroyed. Knowledge is a quality of the mind.

Similarly knowledge does not abide in an object of sense, and does not belong to the mind.

Intellect.

be a quality of a conscious agent the soul Hence the intellect is not permanent

Mind

The mind being one, there are no simultaneous cognitions. If there had been more minds than one, they could have come in contact with many senses at a time so that many cognitions could have been produced simultaneously. As many cognitions are never produced at once, the mind must be

Faults.

The faults are divided into three groups viz affection, aversion and stupidity. Affection includes lust, avarice, avarity and covetousness. Aversion includes anger, envy, malignity, hatred and implacability. Stupidity includes misapprehension, suspicion, arrogance and carelessness. Of the three, stupidity is the worst because it is only a stupid person who may be influenced by affection and aversion.

Transmigration

Transmigration belongs to the soul and not to the body. The series

¹ It may be noted that in the $N_3 K_3$ -sūtra there is only a casual mention of God

objects which are near (contiguous), but it cannot perceive objects which are far off. We can, however, perceive colour and sound to a great distance. This is certainly not the function of touch but some other sense which can reach distant objects.

In fact the senses are five. There are five objects, viz. colour, sound, smell (odour), taste (savour) and touch which are cognized respectively by the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. There are therefore five senses corresponding to the five objects. The senses must be admitted to be five also on the following grounds—(1) The characters of knowledge—there are five senses corresponding to the five characters of knowledge viz. visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile. (2) The sites—the senses are five on account of the various sites they occupy. The visual sense rests on the eye-ball, the auditory sense on the ear-hole, the olfactory sense on the nose, the gustatory sense on the tongue, while the tactile sense occupies the whole body. (3) The processes—there are five senses involving five different processes. The visual sense apprehends a colour by approaching it through its rays, while the tactile sense apprehends an object which is in association with the body and is on it. (4) The forms—the senses are of different forms e.g. the eye partakes of the nature of a disc ball as the ear is not of different form from other etc. (5) The materials—the senses are made up of different materials. The eye is fiery, the ear is ethereal, the nose is earthy, the tongue is watery and the skin is fleshy.

sleep, so there is no pressure of troubles and activities in one who

supreme felicity secured.

(3) Doubt (*sandhaya*).

1 Some say that doubt cannot arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties, whether conjointly or separately. It is said that doubt about an object is never produced, if both the common and uncommon properties of the object are recognized. For instance, if we see in the twilight a tall object which moves, we do not doubt whether it is a man or a post. We at once decide that it is a man, for though tallness is a property possessed in common by man and post, locomotion is a property which distinguishes a man from a post. Likewise doubt about an object is said never to be produced if

replies: there is no soul. The disputant and his opponent are quite sure that their respective statements are correct. Hence there is no doubt, but on the contrary there is conviction, in the minds of both.

by others who say that if God were the only source of fruits, man could attain them even without any acts. Reconciling the two views we conclude that man performs acts which are endowed with fruits by God. The acts do not produce any fruits by themselves; they become fruitful only through the grace of God.

The fruit is not pr

Time of production of the fruits

time of death when the soul departs from our body. Just as a tree, whose roots are now nourished with water, will produce fruits in future, so the sacred fire which is maintained now will enable the maintainer to attain heaven after death.

Both in birth and death

thinking that pleasure is the *summum bonum*, are addicted to the world which causes them various distresses through birth, infirmity, disease, death, connection with the undesirable, separation from the desirable, etc. It is therefore clear that one who pursues pleasure, does in reality pursue pain, or in other words pleasure is a synonym for pain.

Emancipation

Some say that there is no opportunity for us to attain emancipa-

tion because of the continual pressure of our debts,¹ troubles and activities. As soon as we are born we incur, according to them, three

Attainment of emancipation. debts, troubles and activities. As soon as we are born we incur, according to them, three

(1) Debt to sages (*ṛṣi-ras*)—which can be cleared off by student life. (2) Debt to gods (*deva-ras*)—from by performing sacrifices. (3) Debt to our progenitors to be cleared off except by begetting children.

36 TOPICS INCIDENTALLY EXAMINED

(1) Parts and Whole (*avayava* and *avayavin*)

Some say that parts alone are realities and that there is no whole behind them. A tree, for instance, is yellow in some parts and green in other parts. If the tree were one whole then the contradictory qualities of yellowness and greenness could not have belonged to it simultaneously. Hence the parts alone must, according to them, be regarded as real.

In reply Akṣapāda says:—

There is certainly a whole beyond its parts.

parts these latter again have parts and so on, until we reach the atoms. Now the atoms which possess only the thing which is said to be perceptible. We must therefore admit a whole beyond its parts. Moreover, if there were no whole we could not have held or pulled an entire thing by holding or pulling a part of it. We say 'one jar,' 'one man,' etc. This use of 'one' would vanish if there were no whole. If any one were to say that just as a single soldier or a single tree may not be seen from a distance, but an army consisting of numerous soldiers or a forest consisting of numerous trees is seen, so a single atom may not be perceptible, but a jar consisting of numerous atoms will be perceptible and these atoms being called 'one jar,' the use of 'one' will not vanish. The analogy, we reply, does not hold good because the soldiers and trees possess bulk and so are perceptible, whereas the atoms do not possess bulk and are individually not perceptible. It is absurd to conclude that because soldiers and trees are perceptible in the mass, atoms too are perceptible in the mass, to avoid this conclusion we must admit the existence of a whole beyond the parts.

(2) Atoms (*paramāṇu*)

In the Nyāya-sūtra 4-2-16, it is stated that there can never come a time when there will be an utter annihilation of things. Even at the dissolution of the world (*pralaya*), things will continue to exist in the form of atoms. An atom is that which is not divisible into parts: it is a whole without parts. The view that an atom cannot be devoid of parts because it is pervaded by ether (*ākāśa*) in its inner and outer sides, is not tenable because the terms "innerside" and "outerside" are not applicable to an eternal atom which is altogether different from an ordinary thing a constituent of which encloses, is enclosed by, another constituent of it. It is no doubt admitted

1 In reply we say that doubt does arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties etc. Doubt is not impossible.

opponent make conflicting statements, one is led to believe that both statements are worth consideration, but is unable to penetrate into the precise characters of the statements. Hence though the disputant and his opponent are both confident of their respective contentions, the umpire and the audience are thrown into doubt by their conflicting statements.

are removed. 4 It has been urged that there is the possibility of an endless doubt inasmuch as its cause is continuous. In reply we say that though materials of doubt, such as common properties, etc., continue to exist, we do not always recognize them. Unless there is recognition of the common properties etc., there cannot be doubt.

(4) Discussion (vāda)

One should hold discussions with unenvious persons, such as disciples, preceptors, fellow-students and seekers of the *summum bonum*. In case of a necessary discussion?

1. In reply we say that doubt does
 Doubt is not impossible of common and
 jointly The rec

object, but there is no precise (distinct)
 Precise knowledge (that is, knowledge of
 distinguishes a man from a post) being
 Similar arguments will apply to doubt and
 uncommon properties alone 2 In the case
 there is certainly a ground for doubt

umpire and the audience are thrown into
 statements 3 It has been said that do

(4) Discussion (vāda)

One should hold discussions with unen-
 With whom to hold discussions? disciples, preceptors, etc.
 of the summum bonum for the search of
 A person
 by him-
 establish

(5) Wrangling and Civil (vilya)

Wranglings and civils may be employed to
 truth just as fences of
 Use of wrangling and civils to safeguard the growth
 talkative people propound
 are mutually opposed, while others violate all
 of a bias for their own side Seeing that these
 are not to be followed

In reply we say that it is through convention that the meaning of a word is understood. The connection between a word and its meaning is conventional and not natural. The connection = fixed by man and is not inseparable. Moreover there is no universal uniformity of connection between a word and its meaning. The *śāsis*, *āryas* and *mlecchas* use the same word in different senses, e.g. the word "yava" is used by the *āryas* to denote a long-awned grain, but by the *mlecchas* to denote a panic-seed. So the connection between a word and its meaning is not everywhere uniform.

(5) The Veda.¹

Some say that the Veda is unreliable, as it involves the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology. For instance, the Veda affirms that a son = produced when a sacrifice for the sake of a son (*putrests*) is performed. It often happens that a son is not produced at the sacrifice.

thrice," "let the last hymn be recited thrice," etc.

In reply we say that the so-called untruth in the Veda comes from some defect in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice. Defect in the act consists

The Veda involves no faults.

These defects are avoided. There is therefore no untruth in the Veda. Neither is there any contradiction. Let a person offer the oblation before sun rise or after sun-rise, if he has agreed upon doing it at either of the times. Two alternative courses being open to him he can perform the sacrifice before sun rise or after sun rise according to his convenience. There is no contradiction in the Veda, but there is no tautology in it. Tautology means a useless repetition of the same thing.

embodies a useful repetition.

¹ It is interesting to note how the *Āṅgīrasa* defends the Veda from the attacks made against it perhaps by the followers of *Antikāṣṭhī*.

the medical science. Hence like the spells and medical science the Vedas must be accepted as authoritative.

(6) Sound (*śabda*)

There are conflicting opinions about the nature of sound. Some say that sound is a quality of ether and that it is all-pervading eternal and capable of being manifested. Others say that sound like smell, etc., is a quality of the substance in which it abides, and is capable of being manifested.

cussion of two hard substances, e.g. an axe and a tree, etc., (2) is cognised by one of our senses (the ear), and (3) is spoken of as possessing the properties of an artificial object, e.g. as

son of two hard substances. In reply it is

sound being cognised by our senses is non-eternal. In reply we say that not all things cognised by our senses are non-eternal, but only those that belong to a certain genus¹. A jar, for instance, is non-eternal because we perceive it as

¹ The aphorism (*Nyāya-sūtra* 2-1-17) may also be interpreted as follows — Sound is non-eternal because it is inferred to advance in a series. We do not say that whatever is cognised by our senses is non-eternal. Our intention is to say that

is not by modification (*vilāra*), e.g. in *bhā + t* (*bhā + t* =

animal), its form (limbs) and its genus or type (cowhood or cow type). Now it is asked what signification of a word—an individual a form or a genus. Some say that the word denotes an individual because it is a respect of individuals that we can make any statement e.g. "is going"—here "that" can be used only in reference to an individual. Others say that the word denotes form by which an individual is recognized, e.g. we use such expressions as 'this is a cow,' 'this is a horse,' only with reference to the forms of the cow and horse. Others hold that the word must denote genus (type), for if we take genus into consideration the word cow might denote any kind of animal of any kind.

We say that the word signifies all the three, though pronounced to one of them. For the purpose of distinction the

is any substance which is cognised by the senses, i.e. by the abode of colour, taste, smell, touch, weight, solidity, velocity or elasticity.

(*īkṛti*) is that which is called the token of the genus. The genus, cowhood for instance, is recognized by a certain collocation of the dewlap which is a

is a general notion of cows

of cows (i.e. derive knowledge of cowhood) and all subsequent occasions to recognize

(*cakṣuḥ*)

that is

two. the concept of duality arises from the organ of vision being divided into two. In reply we say that the destruction of one does not cause

really a notion of the material

material substance inasmuch as it is limited by its contact. As it has contact with the eye, when the eye is not connected with the material substance, it exercises its

the eye,

stege, immediate subsequencey, separation, similar employment, position excess, receipt, intervention pleasure and pain, desire and

ning

Context—is the connection of subjects such as proof (*pramāṇa*), that which is to be proved (*prameya*), etc

Exercise—is the constant repetition which confirms an impression

Sign—may be (1) connected, (2) inseparable (intimate) (3) correlated, or (4) opposite e.g. smoke is a sign of fire with which

Possession—such as a property awakens the memory of the owner and vice versa

Protector and Protrge—such as a king and his attendants

Immediate subsequencey—as sprinkling the rice and pounding it in a wooden mortar

Separation—as of husband and wife

Similar employment—as of a fellow-disciple

Opposition—as between a snake and ichneumon

Excess—awakening the memory of that which exceeded

Receipt—reminding us of one from whom some thing has been or will be received.

Intervention—such as a sheath reminding us of the sword.

Pleasure and pain—reminding us of that which caused them

Desire and aversion—reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.

Fear—reminding us of that which caused it, e.g. death

Entirety—reminding us of that which was wanted or prayed for.

careful is made to recollect by having used again and again "try and think of

function only in virtue of its contact with things. Others say that the eye had been a material substance it could have apprehended those things which coincided with itself in bulk. But we find it can apprehend things of greater and smaller bulk. So it is contended that the eye is a non-material substance.

In reply we say that
which are greater or small
reach the things to their end
a material substance then
great and the small

(9) Intellect (*buddhi*)

Some philosophers¹ [the *śāṅkhya*s] maintain that the intellect is permanent as it is capable of recognizing objects. A thing which was known before known now as the identical thing. This act of identifying knowledge is called recognition which is possible only if the intellect which existed in the past continued at the present time that is if the intellect is permanent. Knowledge

not different from the permanent intellect then various sorts of knowledge could have as permanent entities existed simultaneously and there would have been no cessation of knowledge or recognition. Finding the absurdity of such contingencies we cannot admit the intellect to be a permanent entity and knowledge a function of it.

(10) Memory (*smṛti*)²

Memory (*smṛti*) belongs to the soul which possesses knowledge of the past, present and future. Memory is awakened by such causes as attention, contemplation, exercise, signs, marks, likeness, possession, relation of protector and

protege immediate subsequence, separation, similar employment, opposition excess, receipt, intervention pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, fear, entreaty action affection and merit and demerit

Attention—enables us to fix our mind on an object by restraining it from wandering away to any other object

Context—is the connection of subjects such as proof (*pramāṇa*), that which is to be proved (*prameya*), etc

Exercise—is the constant repetition which confirms an impression

Sign—may be (1) connected, (2) inseparable (intimate) (3) correlated or (4) opposite e.g. smoke is a sign of fire with which

Likeness—as the image of Deradatta drawn on a board reminds us of the real person

Possession—such as a property awakens the memory of the owner and vice versa

Protector and Protege—such as a king and his attendants

Immediate subsequence—as sprinkling the rice and pounding it in a wooden mortar

Separation—as of husband and wife

Similar employment—as of a fellow-disciple

Opposition—as between a snake and schneemon

Excess—awakening the memory of that which exceeded

Receipt—reminding us of one from whom some thing has been or will be

Plea—reminding us of the sword
us of that which caused them.
us of one whom we liked or

that which caused it, e.g. death
us of that which was wanted or prayed for

try and think of
has received in
and such a one—
our knowledge of
by their skill
as when a Bhikkhu
reference to a book, as
says: "Bring the book here."
as when, at the sight of goods
they were pilfered)
because one has seen it, or a
smell it, or a touch
perceived it."

Action—such as a chariot reminding us of the charioteer
Affection—as recollecting a son or wife
Merit and demerit—through which there is recollection of the causes of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life

(11) The fixed signification of numbers¹ (*samkhyakānta*)

Some say that there is only *one* thing, viz. Brahma. Others say that things are *two*, viz. the eternal and non-eternal. Some find the things to be *three*, viz. the knower, the knowable and knowledge; while others treat of *four* things, viz. the agent of knowledge, means of knowledge, object of knowledge and act of knowledge. In this way philosophers indulge themselves in a *fixity* of number. Aksapāda opposes them by saying that the *fixity* of number cannot be established. In establishing the fixed number there must be a reason. Now is the reason included in the number or excluded from it, or identical with it? If the reason is included in the number, it is as unfixed as the number itself. If the reason is excluded from the number, the *fixity* of number must be abandoned. If the number and the reason are identical, there will remain no means to establish the *fixity* of number.

¹ This doctrine, which occurs in the Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-41, throws some light on the dialogue between Astāvakra and Vashishtha related in the Mahābhārata, Yana-parva, chaps. 132-134 (vide ante). It bears an analogy to the novice's question (*Kumāra-pādha*) which runs as follows—

1 एकं नाम किं ?

What is one ?

2 द्वे नाम किं ?

What are two ?

3 त्रीणि नाम किं ?

What are three ?

4 चत्वारि नाम किं ?

What are four ?

5 त्रयं नाम किं ?

Three are three

1 खं भवा खादरहितिवा ।

Food is a thing on which all animals subsist

2 नामरूप कथं ।

Name and form

3 त्रिविधो वेदना ।

Three kinds of feeling

4 चत्वारि अखरित्यसि ।

The four noble truths

5 पञ्चधादानकृत्तया ।

The five constituent aggregates, etc., etc.

(Khuddakapāṭha of the Pāli sūtra Piṭaka)

CHAPTER III.

Commentaries on the Nyāya sūtra.

36a. NATURE OF THE COMMENTARIES

In the previous chapter there has been given a summary of Nyāya-sūtra, the fundamental work on Nyāya Philosophy of the second century A.D. The Nyāya-sūtra was not followed, for several hundred years, by any other original treatise on Nyāya.

Of the sūtra, the various theories or contemporaneous philosophies. The commentaries are therefore store-houses of valuable information on Philosophy and Logic. It is not possible to give here a complete analysis of the commentaries, but a passing reference to some of their leading topics will be made in the following pages.

37 VĀTSYĀYANA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-BHĀṢYA (ABOUT 400 A.D.).

The earliest commentary extant on the Nyāya-sūtra is the Nyāya bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana¹ or Pakṣa Svāmī.² In it there are references to previous logicians designated as *eke* (some), *kecit* (certain), or *anye* (others), who were perhaps authors of commentaries³ which have not come down to us. The Nyāya-bhāṣya

¹ The name Vātsyāyana occurs in the colophon of Uddyotakara's Nyāya-vārtika thus:—

उद्द्योतकः प्रसिद्धो भाष्ये वात्स्यायनो ज्ञानो ।

अकारि मन्त्रसंज्ञा चारुमणिन वात्सिलम् ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika, Book V, Chap. II, last line)

² Vācaspati Miśra mentions the name Pakṣa Svāmī thus:—

अथ भवता अचरार्थेन नि वेद्यतेनो भाष्ये प्रदीते सुव्याख्ये च भवता-
स्वामिना विमलवर्मनस्मिन्नेत उद्द्योतकः वात्सिलकारश्च हस्ति

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyatikā, opening)

³ Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya bhāṣya, I-2-8, criticises, in definition of *kūṭstha*, the opinion of a previous commentator.

अथप्यन विद्वद्भिर्वाच्यं न च अचरार्थे ।

Action—such as a chariot reminding us of the charoteer

Affection—as recollecting a son or wife

Miser and demiser—through which there is recollection of the causes of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life

(11) The fixed signification of numbers¹ (*samkhyatikāṇḍa*)

Some say that there is only one thing, viz. Brahma. Others say that things are two, viz. the eternal and non-eternal. Some find the things to be three, viz. the knower, the knowable and knowledge. I find four things, viz. the agent, the object, the knowledge and act of knowledge.

Samkhyatikāṇḍa-vāda, the doctrine of the fixed signification of numbers

of knowledge
knowledge
number of things
of number
there must

or excluded from it, or identical with it? If the reason is included in the number, it is as unfixed as the number itself. If the reason is excluded from the number, the fixity of number must be abandoned. If the number and the reason are identical, there will remain no means to establish the fixity of number.

¹ This doctrine, which occurs in the Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-41, throws some light on the dialogue between Aśtāvakra and Vandin related in the Mahābhārata, Vāsa-parva, chapter 132-134 (vide ante). It bears an analogy to the novice's question (Kumāra-pāṭha) which runs as follows—

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What is one ?

2 द्वे नाम किं ?

What are two ?

3 त्रीणि नाम किं ?

What are three ?

4 चत्वारि नाम किं ?

What are four ?

5 पञ्च नाम किं ?

What are five ?

1 अन्नं यत्र आहारविनिश्चयः ।

Food is a thing on which all animals subsist

2 नामश्च रूपम् ।

Name and form

3 तिस्रो वेदनाः ।

Three kinds of feeling

4 चत्वारि सत्यवचनानि ।

The four noble truths.

5 पञ्चधातव्यवस्था ।

The five constituent aggregates, etc.

(Khuddakapāṭha of the Pāli sūtra Pitakas)

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¹ The name Vātsyāyana occurs in the colophon of Uddyotakara's Nyāya-vārtika thus:—

वात्स्यायनः

V, Chap. II, last line)

इति च भवता पठितं

— ng lines).

in connection with his saying—

and

as suggested in the Nyaya-shastra by at least two centuries, as far as explanations of certain terms which became almost obsolete at the time.

It is probable that the latter criticised him in connection with his explanation of the mind (manas) as sense-organ, and possibly also before Vasubandhu's theory of syllogism, so antagonistic to that of the Nyaya-shastra, as already observed, contains certain aphorisms which refer to the doctrines expounded in such well-known Buddhist works as the

327 B.C.), and in giving an example of "the incoherent" (*apārthaka*) extracts a sentence from the *Mahābhāṣya*¹ of Patañjali (150 B.C.).

Vātsyāyana, also designated as *Drāmila*² (same as *Drāvida*), was in all probability a native of *Drāvida* (the Deccan), of which the capital was *Kāñcīpura*, modern Conjeeveram. The title "Svāmin"³ appended to "Pakṣila" in the name "Pakṣila Svāmin" also points to the same country as his birthplace. We may add that *Kāñci* was a famous centre not only of Brāhmanic learning, but also of Buddhistic culture, and it was here that

lived about 400 A.D., when *Čandra Gupta II*, called *Vikrāmaditya*, was king of *Magadha* should not be confounded with the sage or sages of that name, who compiled the *Artha-śāstra* and the *Kāma-sūtra*.

38. VĀTSYĀYANA CRITICIZES NĀGĀRJUNA.

The sūtras 4-1-39 and 4-1-40 which seem to have been, as previously observed, interpolated into the *Nyāya-sūtra*⁴ deal with the Buddhist doctrine of inter-relation (*apekṣā* or *pratyaya*) evidently taken from the *Mādhyaṃika-sūtra*⁵ (Chapters I and XV) of *Nāgārjuna* who flourished about

1 इन्द्राक्षिमानि बहुपुत्रा
कुलमन्त्रिणः पञ्चदशिकाः ।
(*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 5-1-10, and *Mahābhāṣya*, 1-1-3)

2 Jaina Hemacandra supposes *Drāmila* to be another name for *Vātsyāyana* —
वात्स्यायनो मन्त्राणः श्रीशिवकवचकवचो
इति च पञ्चदशिकायां विष्णुसूक्तस्य च ॥
(*Abhisāhna-cintāmaṇi*)

Vātsyāyana would not have been called *Drāmila*, had he been a native of *Vāta*, the capital of which was *Kanṣāmbi* near *Allahabad*.

³ *Svāmin* is a common surname in *Madras*. In *Fāh* books, however, we read of a sage named *Vacchagotta* or *Vātsyāyana* living in *Ayodhya*.

⁴ *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 2-1-40, edited by *Jaya Narayan Tarkapañcāna*, *Bibliotheca Indica* series.

⁵ The *Nyāya-sūtra* of *Gotama*, translated by *Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana*, *S.B.H. Series*, *Allahabad*.

6 चरादिचरितरेष्वपि यथा कुलो न विद्यते ।
वारादिचरितरेष्वपि यथा स्वयं न विद्यते ॥

(*Mādhyaṃika-sūtra*, Chapter I, verse 3, p. 19, B.T.S. edition, Calcutta)

327 B.C.), and in giving an example of "the incoherent" (*apārthaka*) extracts a sentence from the *Mahābhāṣya*¹ of Patañjali (150 B.C.)

Vātsyāyana, also designated as Drāmila* (same as Drāvīda), was in all probability a native of Drāvīda (the Deccan), of which the capital was Kāñcīpura, modern Conjeeveram. The title "Svāmin"² appended to "Paksila" in the name "Paksila Svāmin" also points to the same country as his birthplace. We may add that Kāñcī was a famous centre not only of Brāhmanic learning, but also of Buddhist culture, and it was here that

lived about 400 A.D., when Candragupta II, called Vikramāditya, was king of Magadha should not be confounded with the sage or sages of that name, who compiled the *Artha-śāstra* and the *Kāma-sūtra*.

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इन्द्रादिकानि बहुधा

3-1-10, and *Mahābhāṣya*, 1-1-3).

to be another name for Vātsyāyana —
वैश्वदेववत्सलो

natman).

been a native of Vatsa
in, however no read of
rk.

Tarkapaddhant. Biblo-
Satis Chandra Vidyabhusane.

250-300 A.D. In the Bhāṣya on the sūtras, Vātsyāyana remarks the doctrine as follows —

Some say that things are not self-existent as they exist not in relation to one another. A thing is called short only in relation to another thing which is long, and vice versa. The long and the short are inter-related, but not self-existent.

In the same Bhāṣya Vātsyāyana controverts the doctrine the ground that it is self-destructive. If the long and short are not self-existent it will be impossible to establish a relation between them, and in the absence of all relations the doctrine of inter-relation will fall to the ground.

The sūtras 4-2-31, 4-2-32 and 4-2-33, of the Nyāya-sūtra seem also to have been interpolations.

The Mādhyamika doctrine of śūnyatā, voidness criticised

the Bhāṣya on those sūtras, Vātsyāyana criticises the doctrine, evidently taken from the Mādhyamika-sūtra,* according to which

our means and objects of knowledge are as unreal as things appearing in a dream or exhibited in jugglery or as the city of the celestial choir or as a mirage.

य कदाच सभाषका युक्तं प्रत्यक्षं वेदुमि ।

सभाषक इत्यस्य नाम भविष्यति युक्तं कदाच ।

(Mādhyamika-sūtra, Chap. XV, p. 93, B.T.S. edition, Calcutta).

य सभाषकविरुद्धावधिष्यन्माह ।

(Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-39)

साधनमाह युक्तम् ।

(Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-40, S.B.H. series, Allahabad).

1 यत्र विषयविमानवदस्य प्रकाशप्रदेशविमानः । 4-2-31

साधनसम्बन्धनरं सत्यमविद्यावदाह । 4-2-32

(Nyāya-sūtra translated into English by Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana, S.B.I. Series, Allahabad)

2 यथा साक्षा यथा सप्रोक्तं सम्बन्धनरं यथा ।

तथोक्त्यादयसा स्थाप्यं यथा भवति यदाहमाह ।

(Mādhyamika-sūtra, chapter VII)

यद्येव सम्बन्धनरं सतीति यद्येव साक्षादुच्यते यद्येव ।

सभाषकान्वाहं निमित्तसाधनं तथोक्त्याहं जानते यद्येवमाह ।

(Quoted in the Mādhyamika vṛtti p. 57, B.T. Society's edition, Calcutta)

* As explained in the Buddhist works (such as the Mādhyamika-sūtra, Laṅkāvatīra-sūtra, Dvayardha śāstikā, etc.) The doctrine of inter-relation pratyaya (apekṣā) leads to that of voidness (śūnyatā). Compare—

य इतीत्यनुपाहं शून्यतां ना प्रचक्षते । . . .

यस्य सभाषकानुपाहो साक्षात् सा शून्यता ।

य प्रत्यक्षेणावति यदाहमाहो

य सदा अनुपाहं सभाषकोक्तिः ।

110 10-12-1948 ...

2nd 3rd 4th ...

From the 1st of ...

In the same ...

The other ...

The ...

not means ...

मन्त्रावली ...
(Māṇḍūkya-sūtra, Chap. IV, p. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000)

मन्त्रावली ...

मन्त्रावली ...

मन्त्रावली ...

मन्त्रावली ...

(Quoted in the Māṇḍūkya)

As explained in the ...

thoughts alone, they say, it unreal
 that doctrine by saying that
 things are capable of being separated
 from one another and on the other
 hand are incapable of being separated
 from one another. The doctrine commits a contradiction
 by saying that things are un-
 going on to separate them from one another

The Theory of Impermanence

which refers to the doctrine of momentariness (*ksanikatva*) as explained in the *Laukāvatāra-sūtra*, etc., was evidently interpolated by Vātsyāyana into the *Nyāya-sūtra*.¹ In his *Bhāṣya*—commentary—on

Vātsyāyana cites the opinion of *ksanikavādins* according to whom all entities are momentary, as they exist for a moment only. The momentariness of entities on seeing their decay which imply production and destruction

is maintained in his *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 3-2-12, 3-2-13, controverting the doctrine of momentariness by saying that there is no absolute continuity for an entity to be replaced by another entity after the lapse of a moment and that there is a connecting link between the origination of an entity and its cessation.²

10 VĀTSYĀYANA'S EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN DOCTRINES

A Syllogism of Ten Members

Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 1-1-32, alludes to certain logicians according to whom a syllogism consisted of ten members as follows:—

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1 Proposition (<i>pratijñā</i>)—This hill is fiery | 2 Reason (<i>hetu</i>)—Because it is smoky |
| Five ordinary members | 3 Example (<i>udāharaṇa</i>)—Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen |

¹ स्यादिकेति च परापररोक्षणे चरितकमाद् कालीनामहेतुः । 3-2-11

निवर्तयेत्तन्मात्राद् यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा । 3-2-12.

मं नृपतिविनाशकारणोपक्रमे । 3-2-13

Nyāya-sūtra, pp. 80-87, edited and translated by Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana, Series, Allahabad)

see the *Laukāvatāra-sūtra*, chap. VI, called *Kuṣṇika-parivarta*, p. 99, Bengali's MSB

All is in a state of flux.—Heraclitus

between the noun and the term and the predicate (major or minor term) pointed in the example there can be no reason for an objection to say that the application of *nyāya* is a mere analogical transfer. We must not be misled by a mere similarity of form, as indicated by its particle *ev* or *et* to be less in the general principle established by the example.

19. VĀTASYĀNYA (WITH ITS OTHER FORMS) OF THE HINDUISMS

Vātsāyana's philosophy

The sūtras 4-2-26 and 4-2-27 which seem to have been interpolated into the *Nyāya-sūtra* deal with the Buddhist doctrine of the reality of knowledge (*vijñāna*) alone evidently taken from the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* chapters and X. In the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 4-2-26 Vātsāyana's summary of the Buddhist doctrine as follows:

Some say that things do not possess a reality independent of our thoughts just as a web does not possess a reality independent

Vātsāyana seems here to have referred to the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*.

बुद्धा विविक्तानामपि यथायमवयवसमूहस्यैव तदवयवसमूहस्यैव

Nyāya-bhāṣya, 4-2-26 translated by Sats. Chandra Vidyabhusana M. A. Series, Allahabad)

बुद्धा विविक्तानामपि यथायमवयवसमूहस्यैव

यथायमवयवसमूहस्यैव तदवयवसमूहस्यैव

(*Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, chap. II p. 101 and chapter XI p. 113 of the *Madhyamaka* Society of Bengal)

बुद्धा विविक्तानामपि यथायमवयवसमूहस्यैव

यथायमवयवसमूहस्यैव तदवयवसमूहस्यैव

बुद्धा विविक्तानामपि यथायमवयवसमूहस्यैव

यथायमवयवसमूहस्यैव तदवयवसमूहस्यैव

(*Madhyamaka* Society of Bengal, ed. folio 134 also 253)

The *Nyāya-sūtras*, 4-2-26 and 4-2-27, may be interpreted in such a way that they refer to the *Madhyamaka* philosophy rather than to the *Yogācāra*. In fact

dent of its threads. Hence it is our thoughts alone, they say, that are real, the external things are all unreal.

Vātsyāyana controverts this Buddhist doctrine by saying that it is self-destructive because if things are capable of being separated from our thoughts they cannot be unreal and on the other hand if things are unreal they are incapable of being separated from our thoughts. The holder of the doctrine commits according to Vātsyāyana, a contradiction by saying that things are unreal, and at the same time by going on to separate them from our thoughts.

Kaṇika-vāda—the Theory of Impermanence

The sūtra 3-2-11, which refers to the doctrine of momentariness (*kaṇikāvatā*) as explained in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, etc., was evidently interpolated by Vātsyāyana into the Nyaya-sūtra.¹ In his *Bhāṣya*—commentary—on

The doctrine of momentariness, *kaṇika-vāda*, envisioned

the sūtra, Vātsyāyana cites the opinion of *kaṇik-vādins* according to whom all entities are momentary, as they exist for a moment only. We feel the momentariness of entities on seeing their growth and decay which imply production and destruction.

Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 3-2-12, 3-2-13, controverts the doctrine of momentariness by saying that there is no absolute certainty for an entity to be replaced by another entity after the lapse of a moment and that there is a connecting link between the origination of an entity and its cessation.²

40 VĀTSYĀYANA'S EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN DOCTRINES

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¹ अविच्छेदं अपरापरोक्षं च विद्यमानं कानिकावदेषु । 3-2-11

विद्यमानं कानिकावदेषु च कानिकावदेषु । 3-2-12

च कानिकावदेषु च कानिकावदेषु । 3-2-13

(Nyāya-sūtra, pp. 80-87, edited and translated by Satish Chandra Vaidya, S.B. H. Series, Allahabad)

² Vide the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, chap. VI, called *Kaṇika-pariparīkṣā* ॥ 10, Bengal Asiatic Society's MSB.

Cf. All is in a state of flux—Heraclitus.

tion of eternal pleasure of the soul. They based their view on the ground that human activity being always directed towards the attainment of pleasure, it was natural that the end of such activity was the enjoyment of eternal pleasure. They also relied on the

.

(*mokṣa*), which was a condition of immortality freed from fear and change, was attended with a total cessation of pain, but there was no cause for production in the emancipated soul of any pleasure which was eternal. He further said that human activity was directed towards the removal of pain and not to the attainment of pleasure, which was invariably mixed up with pain and which could merely bring about bondage of an intricate form. As regards the scripture-texts these, according to Vātsyāyana, spoke, no doubt, of the essence of soul as being pleasure, but pleasure signified nothing but perfect freedom from pain. Hence emancipation or release was not, according to him, eternal pleasure but an absolute deliverance from pain.

41 UDDYOTAKARA, AUTHOR OF THE *Nyāya-vārtika* (ABOUT 635 A.D.).

Uddyotakara was the author of a sub-commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* called the *Nyāya-vārtika*.¹ The latest date assigned to Uddyotakara. The *Vāsavadattā*,² an immortal work of the poet Subandhu mentions Uddyotakara as a rescuer of the *Nyāya*, while the *Vāsavadattā* itself is mentioned in the *Harṣacarita*³ by Bāṇa as a classical work which humbled the pride of all previous poets. The *Harṣacarita*⁴ describes Bāṇa as a poet who lived at the court of King Śrī Harṣa or Harṣavardhana, and the manner in which the poet introduces himself into the work leaves no room for doubt that he was very young while his patron the king was mature in age and

1 दृष्टव्यमर्थनिर्णयो भावः वास्तविकमर्थो ज्ञेयः ।
अकारि महत्तत्त्वम् आरम्भेन वर्तितम् ॥

(*Nyāya-vārtika*, closing lines)

2 आचक्षिपिनिर्णयोऽग्रेण करणकरी बोद्धव्यमिति वाक्येन उच्यते । वासवदत्ता दृष्टं
(*Vāsavadattā*, p. 235, Hall's edition).

3 कवीनामत्रयम् इदं मूलं वासवदत्तम् ।
ज्ञानेन वास्तुवाच्यं तत्रैव कर्मयोगम् ॥

(*Harṣa-carita*, *ucchvāsa* I.)

4 (*Harṣa-carita*, *ucchvāsa* II, p. 58, *Śivara candra Vidyāśaṅkara's* edition)

43. UDDYOTAKARA CRITICISES VASUBANDHU AND NIGĀRJUNA

In his *Vārtika* on the Nyāya-sūtra, I-1-37, Uddyotakara refers to a Buddhist philosopher (identified with Vasubandhu) who remarked that the three parts of a syllogism as defined by Akṣapāda were not so ingenious as they

The Buddhist theory of example, *dṛṣṭānta*, criticised.

able fidelity by the celebrated author of the *Bhāmati*, of Brāhma-sūtra II, 2, 19. Fragments of the same sūtra are to be found in the *Śarvadāna*.

Are these last words authentic? This seems very hard, but you know, dear Mr Rhys Davids, that I cannot help thinking that the *pudgalavāda* is more in harmony with the *dṛṣṭānta* and the law of *karmā* than the *nirvāṇavāda*, etc.

GRIFFITH,

LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN

January 7, 1901.

THE SŪTRA OF THE BURDEN BEARER.

WHEATON,

April 22, 1901.

Dear Professor Rhys Davids,—It will probably not have escaped your notice that the "sūtra of the Burden and the Burden-bearer," which Professor de la Vallée Poussin, in his letter in your last issue (p. 308), refers to as quoted by the *Pudgalavāda* as an authority on their side, is actually to be found in our Pāli Piṭaka, at vol. III, p. 25, of the *Samyutta Nikāya*.

The manner in which this ancient sutta was appealed to by the opponents of the Buddhists as being against the Buddhists' doctrine of the non-*ātman* is very instructive.

Uddyotakara, in his use of the sutta, is guilty of what we call, in logic, a *subreptic* and *repugnant* argument.

Yours sincerely,

E. HARDY

[From the point of view of absolute truth the soul is unreal, but from the empirical standpoint it is real. The illusory relation between the fivefold aggregate and the soul as a burden and its bearer will continue until their absorption into *śūnyatā* or *nirvāṇa*.]

there is no soul you make an assertion contrary to your own doctrine. Your doctrine is that "I" is identical neither with *rūpa* (form) nor with *vedanā* (feeling), *śabdā* (sensation) *śakti* (impression) and *vijñāna* (knowledge). Your scripture declares 'O monk I am not *rūpa* nor am I *vedanā*, I am not *śabdā* *śakti* nor am I *vijñāna*, and neither am I *śabdā* *śakti* *vijñāna* which is not identical with the five *skandhas* (aggregates of *śeṣa*) is in fact the soul. One who does not admit the soul can make no sense out of the philosophy of Tathā-ata. The text quoted above about the existence of the soul cannot be denied) as it actually occurs in the Sarvābhisamaya-sūtra.' It is therefore clear that if Bhāṣanta says, there is no *ātman* he hurts his own system.

"A further text speaking of the soul is as follows — 'I shall teach you O Bhikṣus the burden and the burden-bearer: the five *skandhas* are the burden and the *pudgala* is the burden-bearer.' He who says 'there is no *ātman*' is a heretic."⁴

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In his *Vārtika* on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, I-1-37, Uddyotakara refers to a Buddhist philosopher (identified with Vasubandhu) who remarked that the three parts of a syllogism as defined by Akṣapāda were not so ingenious as they

The Buddhist theory of example, *dṛṣṭānta*, criticised.

able fidelity by the celebrated author of the *Bhāmati*, ad *Brāhma-sūtra* II, 2. III
Fragments of the same *sūtra* are to be found in the *Sarvadarśana*

"... the burden and the burden-bearer ..."
"... the burden and the burden-bearer ..."
"... the burden and the burden-bearer ..."
"... the burden and the burden-bearer ..."

Are these last words authentic? This seems very hard, but you know, dear Mr Rhys Davids, that I cannot help thinking that the *pudgalavāda* is more in harmony with the *dukkha* *sūtra* and the law of *karman* than the *navāstmyavāda*, etc.

Ghent,

January 7, 1901

LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN

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WEIMBURG,

April 22, 1901

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The manner in which this ancient *sūtra* was appealed to by the opponents of the Buddhists as being against the Buddhists' doctrine of the non-*ātman* is very instructive.

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Uddyotakara, in his use of the *sūtra*, is guilty of what we call, in logic, a *sub repro*

Yours sincerely,

E. HARNY

[From the point of view of absolute truth the soul is unreal, but from the empirical standpoint it is real. The illusory relation between the fivefold aggregate and the soul as a burden and its bearer will continue until their absorption into *Śōnyatā* or *nirvāṇa*.]

43. UDDYOTAKARA'S EXPLANATION OF PERCEPTION.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*), as defined by Aksapāda, is knowledge which is produced by the intercourse of a sense with its object. The intercourse (*sannikarsa*) which is of six kinds, is explained in the Nyāya-vārtika (1-1-4) of Uddyotakara as follows:—

- (1) Conjunction (*samyoga*)—e.g. a jar is perceived through its conjunction with our eye
- (2) Conjoined inherence (*samyukta-samavāya*)—e.g. in perceiving the colour of a jar there is conjunction of our eye with the jar in which colour inheres
- (3) Conjoined inherent inherence (*samyukta-samaveta-samavāya*)—e.g. in perceiving the generic nature of the colour (colourness) there is conjunction of our eye with the jar in which inheres colour wherein again colourness is inherent
- (4) Inherence (*samavāya*)—e.g. we perceive sound which inheres in our ear-cavity
- (5) Inherent inherence (*samaveta-samavāya*)—e.g. we perceive soundness (the generic nature of sound) which inheres in sound which in its turn is inherent in our ear-cavity
- (6) Qualification or particularity (*viśeṣanā*)—e.g. we perceive the non-existence of a thing through the particularistic of the spot which the thing could occupy on earth

44. UDDYOTAKARA'S DEFINITION OF INFERENCE

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-5, defines inference (*anumāna*) as that knowledge which is preceded by perception the reason (middle term) and remembrance of its invariable concomitance with the predicate (major term). For an instance I perceive that this hill has smoke which I remember to be invariably concomitant with fire, and hence I infer that this hill has fire. The form of inference is as follows:—

- (1) Whatever is smoky is fiery
- (2) This hill is smoky
- (3) Therefore this hill is fiery

Inference is divided by Uddyotakara as (1) exclusively—affirmative (*anvaya*), (2) exclusively—negative (*vyatireki*), and (3) affirmative negative (*anvaya-vyatireki*). Exclusively—affirmative inference in which the middle term abides in the major term as in things homogeneous with it, there being nothing which is heterogeneous from the major term, e.g. this is namable, because

१ अनुमानो विधवाद्योऽनुमानः ।
(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-5, p. 47, M M Vinodchandra Prasad's edition)
Apo-parāmarśa (a syllogism from sign) as aided by remembrance

knowable. Exclusively—negative is the inference in which the middle term abides in the minor term alone, there being nothing else in which that term is known to be present, e.g. the earth is different from other elements, because it possesses smell. Affirmative—negative is the inference in which the middle term, while abiding in things homogeneous with the major term, does not abide in any thing heterogeneous from the same, e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is cognised by our senses.

47. UDDYOTAKARA'S THEORY OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE

The signification of letters.

Uddyotakara.

ceding letters, viz. *c* and *o*. The letters *c*, *u* and *o* by a conventional association produce in us the cognition of the thing called cow. This is the way in which things are signified by letters or rather words composed of letters, in accordance with the Nyāya philosophy followed by Uddyotakara.

Spṛṣṭa-vāda—the doctrine of phonetic explosion.

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-sūtra has said that all words are

A rival theory
Spṛṣṭa the outburst of
a conglomerate sound

porters of *spṛṣṭa-vāda*, the theory of phonetic explosion. According to them, a thing is not signified by letters—no matter whether the letters are taken in their separate or collective form. No single

45 UDDYOTAKARA'S EXPLANATION OF PERCEPTION.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*), as defined by Akṣapāda, is knowledge which is produced by the intercourse of a sense with its object.

The intercourse (*sannikarsa*) which is of six kinds, is explained in the Nyāya-vārtika (1-1-4) of Uddyotakara as follows—

- (1) Conjunction (*samyoga*)—e.g. a jar is perceived through conjunction with our eye
- (2) Conjoined-inherence (*samyukta-samavāya*)—e.g. in perceiving the colour of a jar there is conjunction of our eye with the jar in which colour inheres
- (3) Conjoined-inherent inherence (*samyukta samavāya samavāya*)—e.g. in perceiving the generic nature of the eye (colourness) there is conjunction of our eye with the jar in which inheres colour wherein again colourness inheres
- (4) Inherence (*samavāya*)—e.g. we perceive sound which inheres in our ear-cavity
- (5) Inherence of the non-existence of a thing through the particularistic of the spot which the thing could occupy on earth

46 UDDYOTAKARA'S DEFINITION OF INFERENCE

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-5, defines inference (*anumāna*) as that knowledge which is preceded by perception the reason (middle term) and remembrance of its invariable concomitance with the predicate (major term). For an instance I perceive that this hill has smoke which I remember to be invariably concomitant with fire, and hence I infer the hill has fire. The form of inference is as follows—

- (1) Whatever is smoky is fiery
- (2) This hill is smoky
- (3) Therefore this hill is fiery

Inference is divided by Uddyotakara as (1) *etc.*

eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin and mind), (8-13) the six objects of

49 VĀCASPATI MIŚRA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-VĀRTIKA-
TĀTPARYA-ŪKĪ
(ABOUT 841 A.D.).

Dharmakīrti and several other Buddhist logicians¹ having compiled treatises subversive of the interpretations of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, a Brāhmana logician of great erudition named Vācaspati Miśra wrote, in support of the Brāhmana commentators, an elaborate gloss on the Nyāya-vārtika called the Nyāya vārtika tātparya ūkē²

Vācaspati, who is reputed to be a native of Mithilā (modern Darbhanga in North Behar), must have flourished in the ninth century A.D., as he compiled his Nyāya ūcī-nibandha³ in the year 898, which evidently refers to the samvat era and corresponds to 841 A.D. He preceded the Buddhist logician Ratnakīrti⁴ (about 1000 A.D.) who quotes him

१ यद्यपि भाष्यकृतः उक्तव्याख्यानमेतत् तथापि दिङ्मात्रं प्रवृत्तिविरुद्धाद्येनैः कुर्वीतुमशक्य-
वस्तुत्वावहेत्यादिभिर्लोक न सत्यमिदं वाच्यं यथोक्तम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ūkī, opening lines, edited by H. M. Gangadhar Sastrī in the Varanagarum Sanskrit series).

² In order to prevent interpolations into the Nyāya-sūtra, Vācaspati compiled an Index of the sūtras of the work called Nyāya-ūcī-nibandha.

³ आद्य सुखोत्पत्तिव्योऽपवादार्थि सुविश्वं कुरु ।

न्योपासकविनिर्देशः यत्कृतं सुवन्द्यम् ।

(Nyāya-ūcī-nibandha, colophon)

The year 898, if it refers to the samvat era, corresponds to 841 A.D., but if it refers to the śaka era, corresponds to 978 A.D.

⁴ Apoha-siddhi, p. 7; Kāśabhāṅga-siddhi, || 58 (included in Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, edited by H. P. Shastri).

We cannot also, they say, derive the cognition of a thing from a word on hearing its last letter as aided by the recollection of the preceding letters, because the recollection of letters can bring about only the following:—

Apoḥa—negation of the opposite

In the Nyāya-vārtika, 2-2-65, Uddyotakara mentions the
Buddhists who hold that what forms the
denotation of a word is really *apoha*,¹ ex-
clusion of the opposites. A word bears, ac-
cording to them, a denotation of exclusion; that is, it denotes ex-
clusion of what is denoted by other words. Thus the denotation
of a cow is the exclusion of the denotation of a non-cow, that is, a
cow is that which is not a non-cow. This theory is controverted
by the Nyāyikas. They say that if we conceive of a
idea of a cow from which the former idea is to be excluded, and
if there is no such thing as a non-cow, there is no
possible in the case of such a word as "all" which has nothing to
exclude.

48. UDDYOTAKARA'S THEORY OF SUFFERINGS

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-1, says that pain or suffering (*duḥkha*) is of twenty-one kinds, viz. (1) the body, (2-7) the six senses (the

For a full criticism of the Vaiśṛkara doctrine of *apoha* consult the *Nyāya*, chapter VI. Cf also *Nyāya-vārtika*, 2-2-65, *Bibliotheca Indica*, *Murks*, and *Vaiśṛkara-bhāṣana* of Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.

tattva-kaumudī occupy a most important place in the philosophical literature of India. Being equally at home in all the systems of philosophy, Vācaspati is equally at home in all systems.

Reference to the four Buddhist schools. The schools of Buddhist philosophy, viz the Mādhyamika, Viññāna-vāda, Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika including the doctrine of the Vātsīputriya sect; and repeatedly criticises Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

50 VĀCASPATI OPPOSES DIGNĀGA

Vācaspati Mīra, in his Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-tīkā, criticises the definition of the analogue called "balancing the effect," *kārya sama*, as given by the Buddhist logician Dignāga, about 500 A.D.¹ "Balancing the effect" is defined by Dignāga as an opposition which one offers by showing that the effect referring to the subject is different from the one referring to the example.

For instance, a disputant argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal
because it is an effect of exertion
like a pot

His respondent opposes this argument by saying that no conclusion can be drawn from it.

analogue called "balancing the effect"

Vācaspati² controverts Dignāga by saying, that the latter's

¹ Nyāya vārtika tātparyā tīkā, 1-1-22 1-2-4 2-1-1 4-1-32 4-2-35, etc.
² Nyāya vārtika tātparyā tīkā, 1-1-1 1-1-4 1-1-5 1-1-6 1-1-8 5-2-8, etc.
para 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
॥ श्री गणेशाय नमः ॥

(Pranīṣa samuccaya, chap. VI, quoted by Vācaspati)

³ The Tibetan version runs as follows:—

འདྲམ་པོ་ནི་ལྟ་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་མཛུ་རྒྱུ་
འདྲམ་པོ་མཛུ་རྒྱུ་མཛུ་རྒྱུ་ལོ་
ནི་ནི་འདྲམ་པོ་མཛུ་རྒྱུ་ལོ་

(Pranīṣa samuccaya, chap. VI. Tibetan text in the 13th ed. chap. VI, Pagan library, Yaddo, Co. 1010 13)

Vācaspati Miśra, whose patron was king Nrga,¹ received instruction in philosophy from a teacher

Trilocana preceptor of
Vishvanath

named Trilocana.² Vācaspati plainly admits that his explanation of *pratyak-*

(perception), in so far as it refers to its division into *avikalpaka* (the determinate), and *nirvikalpaka* (the indeterminate), is derived neither from the commentary of Vātsyāyana nor from the commentary of Uddyotakara, but reflects directly the teaching of his preceptor Trilocana. Thus Trilocana, evidently a writer of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, must have flourished before 1000 A.D. when his doctrines of generality³ (*samavāya*) and causality⁴ (*kriyā-sahakāra-lāraṇa*), etc., were criticised by the Buddhist logician Ratnakīrti the famous author of *Apoha-siddhi* and *Kṣanabhaṅga-siddhi*. Rājasekhara (about 917 A.D.) mentions Trilocana⁵ to whom is ascribed a poem called *Partha-vijaya*.

whom is ascribed a poem called *Parthivajaya*.
Vācaspati Mīśra's Nyāya-kanikā,⁶ a work on logic, is not now available. He is said to have written commentaries on the works of all the schools of philosophy. His commentary on the *Vedānta-bhāṣya* entitled *Bhāmātī-tīkā* and that on the *Sāṃkhya-karika* called *Sāṃkhy*

महेश्वरा वचनितानुसारम् दृष्टानि वस्तु म च वारवर्णि ।
मन्त्रिन जयोषी नवमेः वयोर्गो नोमहमेवार्ति मया विरभ ॥
(11th cent., last line)

विष्णोश्च नृपक्षीमवाप्तानुवन्मनीष्यते ।
व्यापारो व्यापारस्तु व्यापारविशेषोऽयम् ॥

(N2) σ -substitution: $\lambda \bar{x}. \lambda y. \lambda z. x y z$ is a σ -substitution of \bar{x} for \bar{y} in $\lambda y. \lambda z. x y z$.

2. ସମ୍ପାଦନା : ଏହି ପତ୍ରଟିର ସମ୍ପାଦନା କାର୍ଯ୍ୟକ୍ରମଟି ଶାନ୍ତି ସମାଜ ଦ୍ଵାରା
(Patna) ଓ ଏହା ଗ୍ରନ୍ଥ 12 ଶ୍ଳୋକରେ ଉଲ୍ଲେଖ କରାଯାଇଛି ଏବଂ ଏହା
ଦ୍ଵାରା ଏହି ପତ୍ରଟିର ସମ୍ପାଦନା କାର୍ଯ୍ୟକ୍ରମଟି ଶାନ୍ତି ସମାଜ ଦ୍ଵାରା କରାଯାଇଛି।

* *विष्णुसहस्रनाम* : आर्यदेव विष्णुसहस्रनामस्य नाम आर्यदेवस्य
 (Narayana's Thousand Names) : पृ. २५ लिखितं इति नाम्ना प्रसिद्धं
 "Narayana's Thousand Names"

6. The following statement is true or false: The rightmost digit of a number is the same as the rightmost digit of its square.

କର୍ମ ବିଚାରଦ୍ୱାରା କା ବାଣି ଦିଆଯିବ ।

१. हे हस्त उन्मेषप्रवृत्तिः कदाचन ।

What are the
parts for your
car parts, &
how
and the

all the way from the first to the last. If you can do
this, it is a thorough knowledge of the subject
and understanding it.

in [10] it is shown that $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{H})$ is a \mathcal{P} -algebra.

[illegible]

tattva-kaumudī occupy a most important place in the philosophical literature of India. Being especially at home in all the schools of

Reference to the four Buddhist schools

schools of Buddhist philosophy,¹ viz the Mādhyamika, Vijñāna-vāda, Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāsika including the doctrine of the Vātsīputriya sect, and repeatedly criticises Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.²

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For instance, a disputant argues as follows —

Sound is non-eternal
because it is an effect of exertion
like a pot

His respondent opposes this argument by saying that no conclusion can be drawn from it, because a sound is not an effect of exertion of the same kind as that of the former being caused by a lump of clay. This sort Dignāga, signified by the
by saying that the latter's

¹ Nyāya vārtika tātparyā tīkā, 1-1-23 1-2-3 3-1-1 4-1-13 4-2-35, etc

² Nyāya vārtika tātparyā tīkā, 1-1-1 1-1-4 1-1-5 1-1-6, 1-1-8 5-2-5, etc

³ Vācaspati Mīśra's Nyāya vārtika-tātparyā tīkā 5-1-37, pp. 449-452 Vizianagaram Sanskrit series, where Dignāga is called Bhadanta

⁴ Dignāga defines *lārya sama* (balancing the effect) as follows —

कार्यमादमनेयेन ननु बाधो विदितमनम् ।

ननु कार्यसमम् ॥

(Pratibhā samuccaya, chap. VI, quoted by Vācaspati)

⁵ The Tibetan version runs as follows —

अथ ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु

अथ ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु

ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु ननु

(Pratibhā samuccaya, chap. VI, Tibetan text in the library of the Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Dharamsala, India)

definition of "balancing the effect" is untenable, since an effect of exertion, in so far as it signifies "coming into a state of existence from that of non-existence," is exactly the same as the case of a sound as in that of a pot. Moreover, if Dignāga's definition were accepted, then the Buddhist denial of a Maker of the universe would be futile.

Those who believe in God argue as follows —

The universe has a Maker
because it is a product
like a pot.

If Dignāga were to oppose this argument by saying that the universe is not a product of the same kind as a pot, his objection continues. Vācaspati would constitute an analogous reply, called "balancing the effect." In fact Vācaspati prefers the definition of "balancing the effect" as given by Akṣapāda, according to whom an effect of exertion, even when it refers to the subject alone, may be of diverse kinds.

51. VĀCASPATI CRITICIZES DHARMAKĪRTI

In the Nyāya-vārtika tālpatyā-tika Vācaspati says that according to the Buddhist logician Kīrti (flourishing about 615 A.D.) there are only two kinds of the point of defeat (*apavāda*) in a debate, namely (1) when one adduces a reason which is false, and (2) when one adduces a reason which is true but irrelevant. Vācaspati objects to this view on the ground that there are two kinds of the point of defeat, namely (1) when one adduces a reason which is false, and (2) when one adduces a reason which is true but irrelevant. Vācaspati objects to this view on the ground that there are two kinds of the point of defeat, namely (1) when one adduces a reason which is false, and (2) when one adduces a reason which is true but irrelevant.

Vācaspati criticizes the Buddhist view by saying that there are two kinds of the point of defeat, namely (1) when one adduces a reason which is false, and (2) when one adduces a reason which is true but irrelevant. Vācaspati objects to this view on the ground that there are two kinds of the point of defeat, namely (1) when one adduces a reason which is false, and (2) when one adduces a reason which is true but irrelevant.

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kinds, the view of Dharmakīrti does not differ from that of Akṣapāda, the two kinds as laid down by the latter are clearer

those laid down by Kīrti.¹ A person defeated on the score of non-
ingenuity may remain speechless or may talk irrelevantly. This

certain. Vācaspati opposes him by saying that the uncertainty of reason being pointed out after the proposition has been renounced, the point of defeat must in this case be designated as "renouncing the proposition".²

Considering their special characters even Dharmakīrti³ admits that there are twenty two varieties of the point of defeat

82. VĀCASPATI'S EXPLANATION OF DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE PERCEPTIONS, *Saṁkalpaka* AND *Nirvikalpaka*

Vācaspati⁴ following his preceptor Trilocana⁵ divides perception into two kinds, viz determinate or
Saṁkalpaka and *Nirvikalpaka* defined
mediate (*saṁkalpaka*) and indeterminate or
immediate (*nirvikalpaka*) The determinate

¹ Jayanta similarly observes —

अथ कीर्तिराह द्वाविमतिषा निवृत्त्यावापि विमञ्जले

(Nyāya-mañjarī, śloka 12, p. 639, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

² Vācaspati says —

तज्ज्ञानं यदुक्तं कीर्तिना किमिदानीं ज्ञेयभावाद्बुद्धरविज्ञातत्वावापेक्षया तस्य इति-
वादिनो ज्ञेयभावात् इव आद्यं निवृत्त्यावधिनि मन्त्राद्यम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika-tītiparyāya śika, 5-2-3, p. 499, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

³ Jayanta says —

इदेषां चर्ककीर्तिरेव च च विमतिर्निवृत्त्यावधनाद्यम् ।

(Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 639, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series)

⁴ Vācaspati writes —

अवधारणकपदं तादातुं अविकल्पकस्य आद्यत्वं, तज्ज्ञानं अवधारणे विनिश्चयो विकल्प-
रूपमर्थान्तरम् । च इव आद्या चर्कं यथा तस्य अविकल्पकं इत्यप्यम् । तदेतदतिशुद्धज्ञानं
निर्विकल्पकं इव इति भाव्यवार्तिककाराभावात् अवधारणम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika-tītiparyāya śika, p. 87).

अथापि सिद्धीयन्तस्तद्विषयान्तरानुसन्धानेन च ।

is knowledge which admits of specification: it is the knowledge of an object as particularised by its genus, etc., e.g. this is a man (an individual coming under the genus 'man'). The indeterminate perception on the contrary is that knowledge which admits of no specification: it is the knowledge of an object derived through its first intercourse with one of our senses, e.g. this is something.

first intercourse with one of our senses, e.g. this is something
 Vacaspati further observes that the doctrine of determinate
 and indeterminate perceptions is very easy
 to comprehend and has not on that account
 been explained by Vātsāyana in his Bhāṣya or Uddyotakara in
 his Vārtika. The Niruktakāra¹ who flourished before Vacaspati
 used the term *nirvāṇa*, but they explained it as the knowledge
 of an object in which its general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*)
 features were combined. Vacaspati controverts the view of the
 Niruktakāra² by saying that if in the *nirvāṇa* stage, an object
 were to combine in itself its general and particular attributes, how
 could, in the *avivāṇa* stage, the two, viz. the general and the
 particular, be separated so that one might be predicated of the
 other in the form, 'this (particular) is man (general)' "

53 VĀCASPATI'S THEORY OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE AND WRONG KNOWLEDGE (*Pramā* and *Apramā*)

Right knowledge (*Pramāṇa* or *taṭtvā jñāna*) defined in the *Nyāya-vārtika*, 1-1-2, is the knowledge of a thing as it is while wrong knowledge or error (*apramāṇa*, *bhrama* or *mithyā jñāna*) is the knowledge of a thing as it is not

There are conflicting theories as to the exact nature of the wrong knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya vārtika* (āstīkā, 1-1 2, mentions five different theories which may be summarised as follows —

- (1) *Inner Ideality* (manifestation of the self)—is a wrong knowledge in which our cognition which exists in our mind alone manifests itself as a thing existing outside of us. The Hegelian Realists who follow this theory say that our cognition (or knowledge) alone is real and its manifestation as an external object is a wrong knowledge.

१. सद्यः विद्यमानाः विधेयानामेव उक्तव्यापि यत्तु यो यद्वदः सदा—

॥३॥ सर्वं पुण्यवत् सर्वं जगत् सर्वं भवत् ।

॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

(Nāṭyaśāstra kaṭhapaṇcādikā p. 82) Vaidyanāgārakaḥ (Pāṇinīti-śāstra)

5. It is a common mistake to think of the doctrine of equalized aid as a mere formula. The formula is only a shorthand way of stating the principle that the State must provide for the education of all children of the same age and ability to the same degree of excellence. The formula is not a substitute for the principle.

- (2) *īśat-khyāti* (manifestation of the unreal)—is a wrong knowledge in which a thing, which is non-existent or unreal, manifests itself as existent or real, e.g. when a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver. The piece of silver being non-existent or unreal, its manifestation is a wrong knowledge. The Mādhyamika Buddhists, who hold this theory

- (3) *īśat-khyāti* (manifestation of the unreal)—is a wrong knowledge in which a thing, which is non-existent or unreal, manifests itself as existent or real, e.g. when a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver. The piece of silver being non-existent or unreal, its manifestation is a wrong knowledge. The Mādhyamika Buddhists, who hold this theory
- as non-existent, e.g. when a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver our knowledge is neither that of a piece of silver (which is not present) nor that of a piece of non-silver (there being an apparent presence of a piece of silver)
- define
be a w
definab
nor are they devoid of an empirical or apparent existence

- (4) *A-khyāti* (non-manifestation)—is knowledge in which the difference of one thing (subject) from another thing (predicate) is not manifested on account of certain defects of our senses, etc., and owing to this non-manifestation we say that the one (subject) is identical with the other (predicate), e.g. when a piece of shell is supposed by us to be a piece of silver, in the form "this is silver" there is perception of "this" (shell) and recollection of "silver"

the Naiyāyik

person mistakes one thing (e.g. piece of silver), there is an actual

perception through imagination (*kalpanā*), of that which is not perceived at all. (The author would have been startled himself to pick it up. In fact when our mistake is corrected we remember that we actually perceived the thing. Here the only rational theory according to Vācaspati Miśra is the *dayatā* theory which satisfactorily explains the origin of our knowledge.)

23. VĀCASPATI'S THEORY OF CONDITION (*upādhi*)

Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā* (śkṛ, 1-1) says that an inference is based on the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of its middle term with the major term. Now, what is the nature of this invariable concomitance? The Buddhists say it is the middle term is in invariable concomitance with the major term if the former stands to the latter in causal relation (*kāraṇa*) or the relation of identity (*sambhāva*).

Seeing that the Buddhistic definition is too narrow and too wide, Vācaspati sets it aside by saying that the invariable concomitance is that relation of the middle term with the major term which is freed from all conditions (*upādhi*). A condition is illustrated in the following inference —

The hill is full of smoke
because it is full of fire

This is a wrong inference, because smoke always accompanies fire, but fire does not always accompany smoke.

The inference will, however, be right if we attach a condition to its middle term in the following way —

The hill is full of smoke
because it is full of fire (fed by wet fuel)

Here 'wet fuel' is a condition (*upādhi*), which is attached to the middle term 'fire'. A fire by itself may not always accompany smoke, but when it is fed by wet fuel it always attends by the same.

This kind of condition should not qualify the middle term

— it is — *conditioned* — *free from all conditions*. If an inference

535 THE THEORY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT (*kārya-kāraṇa*)

In the *Nyāya-vārtika* (śkṛ, 3-2-17), Vācaspati Miśra holds that an inference is based on the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of its middle term with the major term. This is the same as the theory of condition. In the *Nyāya-vārtika* (śkṛ, 3-2-17), Vācaspati Miśra holds that an inference is based on the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of its middle term with the major term. This is the same as the theory of condition. In the *Nyāya-vārtika* (śkṛ, 3-2-17), Vācaspati Miśra holds that an inference is based on the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of its middle term with the major term. This is the same as the theory of condition.

56. UDAYANA OPPOSES KALYĀṆA RAKṢITA AND DHARMOTTARA

Kalyāṇa Rakṣita (about 829 A D) and Dharmottarācārya
The doctrine of *apoha*, (about 847 A D), two Buddhist logicians

āñjali. In the *Ātma-tattva-vivēka* Udayana criticised the theories of *apoha* (the knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites), *ksana-bhanga* (the momentary existence), *śrutyaprāmānya* (denial of the authority of the Veda), etc., propounded by Kalyāṇa Rakṣita in his *Anyāpoha-vicāraśāṅkā*, *śruti-parikṣā*, etc., and by Dharmottara in his *Apoha-nāma-prakarana* and *Kṣana-bhanga-siddhi*.

57. UDAYANA'S KUSUMĀñJALI.

God.—*Īśvara*.

The *Kusumāñjali* (literally 'a handful of flowers'), which is divided into five chapters called clusters, treats of the supreme soul (*Paramātmā*) or God (*Īśvara*) whose worship enables us, according to Udayana, to attain paradise and emancipation. "Although all men worship Him alike under various names, there is," says he, "no harm in carrying on a logical investigation about Him which may also be called His worship."

In the course of the investigation, Udayana says that there is an unseen cause called desert (*adṛṣṭa*)¹ which determines our happiness and misery. When we perform a good or bad action, the merit or demerit that ensues therefrom resides in our soul under the name of *adṛṣṭa* or desert. Associated with a suitable time, place and object, it produces in us pleasure or pain.

¹ That there is an unseen cause called *adṛṣṭa* (desert) is proved on the following grounds—

(a) An effect proceeds from a cause. If there had been no interdependence

... of the Vedas ...

... of the Vedas ...

It has been contended that this is no authority to us ...

There are many proofs to establish the existence of God ...

(c) The effects which are diverse in character imply a diversity of causes ...

(d) It is a universal practice to perform good actions and avoid bad actions ...

God having made this world causes it to collapse, and having destroyed it remakes it as a magic show. His will manifests itself unhindered in all actions

Kusumāñjali, as follows—

"Iron-souled are they in whose hearts Thou canst find no place, though repeatedly washed by the inundations of ethics and sacred texts; still in time, O Merciful One, Thou in Thy goodness wilt save those people too, because even in going to controvert Thy existence they have earnestly meditated on Thee"¹ "As for us, O Thou Essential Beauty, though our minds have been long plunged in Thee, the ocean of joy, yet are they verily restless still and unsatisfied therefore, Oh Lord, haste to display thy mercy, that, our minds being fixed only on Thee, we may no more be subject to the afflictions of death"²

58. UDAYANA'S ĀTMA-TATVA-VIVEKA.

The Ātma-tatva-viveka (lit a discussion about the true nature of the soul) is otherwise called Baudhānalya-dhikkāra (a discourse concerned with the Buddhists) or Baudhā dhikkāra (Fie to the Buddhists). It³ proposes to refute four Buddhist theories in order to establish a permanent soul. The four theories are (1) *krāya-bhanga*—that every thing is momentary, (2) *vāhyārtha-bhanga*—that things possess no external reality, (3) *guna-gunibheda-bhanga*—that a substance is not distinct from its qualities;

इत्येव बुद्धिर्बोद्धव्यमस्मिन्बोधिराद्याकृति
येषां नास्ति दृग्माद्यपि हृदये वे मेव सारावसा ।
बिम्बे प्रकृतविप्रतीकविषयोऽप्युद्वेगविविक्तता
कासे कावचिक अयेव लक्षणा वे सारथीया वरा ॥

(Kusumāñjali, stavaka 5, edited and translated by E. B. Cowell and M. C. Nyāyaratna, Calcutta)

अस्माकम्बु निवर्त्तमानं विराचेतो निवृत्तं मयि
अस्मान्मयिचो मयापि सर्वं मयापि समुद्यते ।
मन्त्राय मरितं विधेहि कवचां येन मदेकापरा
वादे चेतसि वाग्मवाच मन्त्रो वाग्मा पुनर्वानवा ॥

(The Kusumāñjali, stavaka 5, edited and translated by E. B. Cowell and M. C. Nyāyaratna, Calcutta)

¹ The Ātma-tatva-viveka, edited by Jaya Nārāyaṇa Tarkapañcāna, pp. 1, 9, 10, 24, 30, 31, 32, 34, 38, 39, 45, 46, 47, 53, 69, 89, 92, 93, etc

known as *Vṛttilāra*, was the son of Paṇḍita Candra.¹ If we suppose him to be identical with his namesake the great-grandson of Śakti Svāmin,² minister of King Muktāpīḍa, he must have flourished in Kāśmīra in the 10th century A.D.

He could not have lived earlier than the 9th and later than the 11th century A.D. as he quotes Vācaspati Miśra³ (841 A.D.) and Māgha⁴ (about 905 A.D.) in the *Nyāya-mañjari*, and is himself quoted in the *Ratnā-vatārikā*⁵ by Ratnaprabhā (1181 A.D.), and in the *Syādvāda-ratnākara*⁶ by Deva Sūri (1096-1169 A.D.).

60 JAYANTA'S EXPLANATION OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE

Words and their meanings

In explaining verbal knowledge Jayanta reviews two theories⁷ called respectively the *Connection of the Expressed* (*abhidhātavya-vāda*) and the *Expression of the Connected* (*avivṛtābhidyāna-vāda*). The *Īhātta Mīmāṃsaka*s, who uphold the first theory, main-

वादेभ्यस्तयोऽप्यत्र इति च. आत्मा वनाच्छब्दो
अन्वयः। नवद्विज्ज्ञात इति च अर्थानि तादा वृथा।
अनुसारेद्विज्ञानरस्य वदता अन्वयः अन्वयिना
यस्य अन्वयः कदाचिदुक्त अर्थवत्तयो व यथा इति च।

(N) *Nyāya-mañjari*, chapter XII, col. 1, line 10. (Vijaynagarana Sanskrit series)

² The lineage of Jayanta is described in the opening lines of the *Kāśmīrī Kathāvatārikā* which was composed by his son Abhinavānanda.

³ नवद्वि ज्ञात - वाचिज्ञानरस्य वदता अन्वयः - इति नवद्वि वदितुमनाचार्यो
जातः च अर्थः अन्वयः कदा इति वदितुमिति।

(N) *Nyāya-mañjari*, p. 312, col. 1, line 10. (Gangotri Series, in the Vijaynagarana Sanskrit Series)

⁴ *Nyāya-mañjari*, p. 31. Māgha is said to be a cousin of Abhinavānanda's author of *Upaniṣad-śāstra* by Kathāvatārikā.

⁵ तथा च अन्वयः

अवधारयन् आत्मा अवधारयन्वादिताम्। न वि अन्वयः अर्थः इति
(Ratnāvatārikā chap. 13.)

⁶ अन्वयः इति अन्वयः अन्वयः अन्वयः इति।

अन्वयः अन्वयः अन्वयः अन्वयः अन्वयः

(R) *Ratnāvatārikā* chap. 11.

In 1314 A.D. *Īhātta Mīmāṃsaka* Sūri's Jayanta as 1.10.10. —

अन्वयः अन्वयः अन्वयः अन्वयः अन्वयः

(Malāthēri *Īhātta Mīmāṃsaka* Sūri's *Kāśmīrī Kathāvatārikā* Sanskrit series, vol. 1, chapter on *Āvāśya*.)

⁷ (N) *Nyāya-mañjari*, chapter VI, pp. 472-473. (Vijaynagarana Sanskrit series)

...action which
...and by words
...sense arises
...ing their respective meanings disappear, and then the meanings
themselves produce in us a knowledge of their mutual connection
which is called verbal knowledge. The Prābhākara Śāstrins
who uphold the second theory, say that it is only in a sentence the
words can express to us any meanings, and produce in us the
knowledge of a mutual connection among those meanings called
verbal knowledge.

Jayanta dismisses the second theory on the ground that it

The Nyāya doctrine of *śāstrya* intention presupposes a word to bear various meanings in connection with various words in a sentence. It is indeed absurd to suppose that a word bears no definite meaning. He also does not completely accept the first theory inasmuch as words alone do not produce verbal knowledge, as is evident from the fact that a sentence composed of disorderly and ungrammatical words does not express a systematic meaning. As an amendment of the first theory we must assume that a sentence, if it is to convey a consistent meaning, must have, underlying it, a power called intention (*śāstrya*) over and above its component words.

Jayanta opposes *spṛṣṭa-vāda*

Jayanta examines *spṛṣṭa*,¹ the theory of phonetic explosion

Spṛṣṭa vāda—the theory of phonetic explosion

which he pronounces to be untenable. The grammarians (*Pāṇinīyāna*), who propound the theory, define *spṛṣṭa* (explosion) as the essence of sound revealed by a letter, word or sentence. The sound-essence, which is revealed by a letter, is called *varṇa-spṛṣṭa*, a letter-explosion, that revealed by a word is called *pada-spṛṣṭa*, a word-explosion, and that revealed by a sentence is called *vākya-spṛṣṭa*, a sentence explosion. As there is a constant relation between a sound and the thing signified by it, the sound-essence of a letter, word or sentence, as soon as we hear it, reminds us of a thing corresponding to the same.

Suppose a person utters the word *cow* composed of the letters *c*, *o* and *w*. As soon as we hear *c*, there is revealed to us the

¹ *Spṛṣṭa* *vāda* is an indistinct form and then as we go on
the sound -

¹ Nyāya māñjarī, śloka 6. Cf. Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, kāṇḍa 1, *Vākyakaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa* and *Baḥḍa-kaustubha*, and Max Müller's *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 402.

essence of the entire word in a distinct form is called *śphoṭa* or phonetic explosion,

A single letter, unless it is a complete word, cannot signify any thing. While some, the advocates of *pada-śphoṭa*, say that a

the words are mere parts of a sentence and the letters are parts of words.

Now, what is the nature of a sound-essence (*śphoṭa*)? A sound-essence is eternal and self-existent, bearing a permanent relation to the thing signified by it. It is revealed by a letter,

is eternal, persists to signify the thing called cow

Jayanta, as a Naiyāyika, opposes the above theory by saying that it is a most cumbrous one. In the case of the word "cow," c and o, after being heard, no doubt pass away, but they leave on our soul (which is eternal) impressions which coupled with our

not perceive it in all times and everywhere? If, on the other hand it

61 JAYANTA CRITICISES THE DOCTRINES OF KALYĀṢA RAKṢITA (ABOUT 829 A.D.) AND DEARMOTTARA (847 A.D.).

Jayanta in his Nyāya-mañjarī (chapters V, VII, IV and III) severely criticises the doctrines of *apoha* (the knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites), *ksana-bhāga* (the momentary existence), *śrutya-prāmāṇya* (denial of the authority of the Veda),

Apoha, *Kṣana-bhāga*,
Śrutya-prāmāṇya, etc.

Īvara-bhaṅga (the non existence of God), etc., propounded by Kalyāṇa Rakṣita, (*bhanga-kārikā*, and his *Apoha-nāma-pra*

62 JAYANTA'S REVIEW OF SEVERAL OTHER BUDDHIST DOCTRINES

In the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, chapters I-III, Jayanta criticises the definition of *pratyakṣa* (perception) as given by Dharmakīrti who is designated a *Bhikṣu*, *Saṅgha*, *Bauddha* or *Sākya*. The *Mādhyamika*, *Yogācāra*, *Sautrāntika* and *Vaiśiṣṭika*, etc. tries also to refute the Buddhist theories that there are only two means of right knowledge (perception and inference).

... mentioned and criticised in chapters I, II and III. The *Mādhyamika*, *Yogācāra*, *Sautrāntika* and *Vaiśiṣṭika*, etc. are referred to as saying that the so-called external objects are mere forms of our cognition which alone is real. The *Mādhyamika* is said to hold that the world is void as our cognition is transparent and formless.

In chapter XII Jayanta observes that even Dharmakīrti maintained that Points of Defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) were of 22 kinds. In the same chapter as an instance of the incoherent (*aparīkṣita*) Jayanta cites the metaphysical views of the *Vaiśiṣṭika*, *Sautrāntika*, *Yogācāra* and *Mādhyamika*.

Jayanta carried on such a vehement crusade against the Buddhists that in the *Nyāya-mañjarī* he actually reproached them as follows—

... as follows—

guides. What a strange character the Bauddhas possess, they are verily a monument of conceit."¹

63 ŚRIKANTHA
(BEFORE 1409 A D).

About 1409 A D Gunaratna, a Jaina philosopher, in his *Saddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti* mentions a Brāhmaṇa logician named Śrikantha¹ who wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra called *Nyāyālakṣaṇa*.

64 ABHAYATILAKOPĪDHYĀYA
(BEFORE 1409 A D)

In the *Saddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti* the Jaina philosopher Gunaratna mentions a Brāhmaṇa logician named Abhayatilakopīdhyāya¹ who wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra called *Nyāya-vṛtti*.

65 OTHER COMMENTATORS ON THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA.

These are the principal Brāhmaṇa commentators on the Nyāya-sūtra. Subsequently there arose a number of commentators such as Vardhamana, author of the *Nyāya-nibandha prakāśa*, Vācaspati Miśra the junior, author of *Nyāya-tattvāloka*, Viśvanātha, author of *Nyāya-vṛtti*, etc., whose names are not mentioned here as they belong to the modern school of Nyāya in respect of their style and method of interpretation.

1

नाह्यस्या सकृभीजनाचमस च अर्जोच पेत्यार्चनं
उन्माराय कथिका मुक्तिमिति अतश्चेति विचारो ह्यन्यः ।
वर्जं गृह्यमिदं वक्तुं न शक्ये ईदृशीति आदिष्यते
बोद्धव्यं अस्ति किमन्वदितुं शक्यं इति परा ॥

(N) Sjn madjarī, 7th Shuka, p 467, Gangādhara Śrīvṛta edition)

1, 2 Gunaratna observes —

इति तत्त्वस्या म्मादृश्य-माद्य-कार्मिक-मात्त्वार्थोपा-मात्त्वर्थे परिग्रहि व्यापककार-
इत्यर्थः । अनेन अत्रादाय मात्त्वार्थस्य सहायिकर मात्त्वार्थमिति-लोच्यत्व-यो कश्च अत्रमिति-
सहायार्थो विरहितः ॥१००॥

(*Saddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti* called *Nyāya* (Tarka)-*śaṅkha-dīpikā*, chap II, p 96, edited by Dr L. Bual, in the Bibliotheca Indica)

CHAPTER IV.

The Nyāya recognized as a Branch of Orthodox Learning

66 A COMPARATIVE ESTIMATE OF THE *Ānvīkṣikī* AND THE NYĀYA

The Indian Logic at its first stage called *Ānvīkṣikī* was often looked upon with positive disfavour and subjected to adverse criticisms, as its deductions were held apparently to be sophistical and heterodox. But at the second stage when it was named Nyāya, it gradually got a steady foothold and an increasing number of followers, nay it succeeded, as we read in the writings of Yājñavalkya¹ and others, in gaining recognition as a branch of orthodox learning. On account of its intrinsic worth it became the most prominent of the six systems of philosophy called *Saddarśana*. Although the *Peda* and adapting itself into the orthodox communal approbation.

67 THE NYĀYA INCLUDED IN *Saddarśana*.

After the term *darśana* (philosophy) had come into use at the beginning of the Christian era, widely divergent systems of thought were designated by this common appellation. We learn that at a later period six systems of *Saddarśana*. Opinions differ as to the exact date, but it is according to the *Saddarśana-samuccaya* (about 1000 A.D.) that the Nyāya, the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Jaiminiya (comprising the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta). Jinadatta Śūri² (about 1220 A.D.) reviews the same six

¹ The Yājñavalkya-smṛiti, I-3.

² श्रीनिरुक्तिरुचिर्ज्ञानविशेषिकमया ।

निरुक्तिरुचिर्ज्ञानविशेषिकमया ।

(*Saddarśana-samuccaya*, verse 3, Dr. B. S. Sahasrabudhe)

³ About the date of Jinadatta Śūri, Dr. H. C. Bhattacharya in his *Report of the Sanskrit Manuscript Commission for 1903-04*, p. 156, observes: "Jinadatta flourished in the first half of the 13th century of the Christian era." He also in his *Chandrasekharendra*, no. 46, maintains on the authority of *Bhāṭya-smṛitiharsana* and *Pratimata*

systems in his *Viveka-vilāsa* under the head of *Śaddarśana vicāra*. Another Jaina writer named Maladhāri Śrī Rājasekhara Śūri¹ (1348

The Brāhmanic writers recognize Nyāya as a constituent of *Śaddarśana*.

Prakāśa on the *Naiṣadha-carita*, speaks of *Śaddarśana* in which he evidently includes the *Nyāya*. In the *Hayaśirṣa-pañcarātra*,² a Brāhmanic work supposed to have been introduced into Bengal by Rājā Vallāla Sena (about 1158–1170 A.D.) as well as in the *Gurugītā* of the *Viśvasāra-tantra*, the six systems comprising *Śaddarśana* are specified as the philosophies of Gotama (*Nyāya*), Kanāda (*Vaiśeṣika*), Kapila (*Sāṃkhya*), Patañjali (*Yoga*), Vyāsa (*Vedānta*) and Jaimini (*Mīmāṃsā*). By the term *śaddarśana* the Brāhmanic writers understand at present these six systems to the exclusion of the Jaina and the Buddhist which are considered by them as lying outside the pale of it.

68 THE NYĀYA SUPPORTS THE VEDA.

In the *Nyāya-maṅjarī*³ Jayanta observes that the authority of the Veda was to a large extent established through the aid of the science of reasoning called the *Nyāya*. The reasoning

established Authority of the Veda established

1. *जैन वाक्य जैमिनीयं बोधं वैदिकं तथा ।
बौद्धं दर्शनार्थं नास्ति नृप दर्शनम् ॥*

(Maladhāri Rājasekhara Śūri's *Śaddarśana-samuccaya*, p. 1, Yaśovijaya-granthamālā, Benares)

2. *साङ्ख्यं वचस्पतिं च वचस्पतुष्टिं नौ
नवामप्रतिपि च वचस्पतुष्टिं नवे ।
यदा दधे निवचराङ्गं विमती यदावाङ्
चदितमन्त्रं दधे चदितद्विपि सौम्यः ॥* (*Naiṣadha-carita*, 13–36)

In the commentary on this verse Nārāyaṇa says —

मतादी वाक्यादि पद दर्शनार्थं नवे . परमार्थतो विदुमानेति चदितद्विपि नवे
पुनरावृत्तिवार इत्यो जगो यदा यदा न चते ।

3. *मोक्षमन्त्रं कथाद्वयं कपिलस्य पदमन्त्रोः ।
वाक्यं जैमिनीयं च दर्शनार्थं नवे च वि ॥*

(*Hayaśirṣa-pañcarātra*, a work which is quoted by Raghunandana in his *Deva-pratiśāhā tāṭṭva*) This verse is quoted in the *Gurugītā* of the *Viśvasāra-tantra*.

¹ The *Nyāya-maṅjarī*, pp. 4–5, edited by Gangādhara Śāstri, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series

required for the establishment of such authority has been dealt with in the Nyāya more fully than in any other system of philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā treats of the Vedic inflections and prohibitions, but it does not examine their worth through the employment of reasoning. The Nyāya¹ alone demonstrates that the Veda is authoritative, because it was delivered by sages who were true worthy persons. It is true that the Buddhists and Jains too wrote treatises on reasoning but these being opposed to the Veda cannot properly be included in the Nyāya, one of the fourteen branches of orthodox learning. In fact it is the work of Akṣapāda that should really be called Nyāya the supporter of Veda. The Nyāya-śāstra actually defends the Veda from the attacks of those who find in it untruth, contradiction and tautology, and declares the sacred text to be infallible like a spell or the medical science.

99 THE NYĀYA ADAPTS ITSELF TO ŚAIVISM

Nyāya-śāstra was promulgated by the gracious Siva himself

¹ The Nyāya-śāstras 2-1-89 and 2-1-89, translated by Satyachandra Vidya bhushana, S B H series, Alambhadr.

² The Nyāya-śāstra were also called Yāgyas.

अथादौ मेधाधिकार्या सीमापराविधानाया विज्ञादिविज्ञाव्यवस्थे । यदा विवक्ष्यमाना
मेवा इत्युच्यते । वैशेषिकाश्च पाश्चात्तरा इति । तेन मेधाधिकार्यस्य मेवमाख्यायते । वैशेषिक-
दर्शनं च पाश्चात्तरा इति । . . .

अथवादयते इति कश्चिद्वारणसिद्धिः ।

विश्वमित्येवमर्थो निवृत्त्यविधानात् ।

(Śāddarśana samuccaya of Haribhāṭa Rājā khara Śūtri, edited by Dr Sural, pp 49-52)

³ Śāddarśana samuccaya of Haribhāṭa Rājā khara Śūtri, pp 8-11, published in the Yadvotya's granthamālā series, Benares.

अथो कश्चिद्वारणसिद्धिः ।

तेन चान्वेषिकीयतां विद्यां श्रवणं च विज्ञेयं ।

आदेशेन विवक्ष्यते च विद्यां दमयिष्ये ।

अथवादयते इति कश्चिद्वारणसिद्धिः ।

(Śāddarśana samuccaya of Haribhāṭa Rājā khara Śūtri, chapter XVI, MS 9, in the col.

The Naiyāyikas are called Śaivas because they look upon, as their tutelary deity, Śiva who is the creator and destroyer of the universe. As described by Maladhāri Rājasekhara Sūri the

Characteristics of the Naiyāyikas
 Naiyāyikas, identified with Śaivas, walked nude, wore matted hair, beameared their bodies with ash and subsisted on roots and fruits. They always meditated upon Śiva and worshipped his eighteen figures, muttering the formula *om namah Śivāya*, "hail! obeisance to Śiva."

Akṣapāda, author of the Nyāya-sūtra, was a son of Soma-Sarmā¹ who was Śiva incarnate. Vātsyāyana begins his Nyāya bhāṣya with obeisance to the *Pramāṇas* (Means of Knowledge), but in the body of the book he describes God² (*Iśvara*) in a style applicable only to Maheśvara (Śiva).

Whatever might have been the faith of Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana, there is no doubt that all the Brāhmanic Naiyāyikas from Uddyotakara downwards were Śaivas. Uddyotakara, as is evident from the colophon of his Nyāya-vārtika, was a leader of the Pāśupata Śaiva sect. The Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-tīkā of Vācaspati Miśra opens with salutation to Pinākin (Śiva) while the Nyāya works of Udayana³ contain abundant proofs that their author was a Śaiva by faith. Bhāsarvajña, author of the Nyāya-sāra,⁴ and Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, author of the Tattvacinātamanī, begin their works with salutation to Sambhu or Śiva "the Supreme Lord and the Seer of all truths."

70 THE POPULARITY OF NYĀYA ESTABLISHED

From the above it is clear that three distinct causes contributed to the popularity and predominance of Nyāya as a school of philosophy. The first was the intrinsic worth of the system which was acknowledged as most useful in carrying on processes

Three causes make Nyāya popular

¹ *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* published under the name of *Vāyupurāṇa* by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, adhyāya 23, verses 200 seq.

² *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 4-1-16, ||

³ *Kusumāñjali*, chapter I, opening line chapter II, last verse, chapter IV, last verse, etc.

*
 प्रसन्नं त्वं जगत्, पतितम्
 समस्तजगत्पिदं जगत् ।
 हिमालयोद्यत्तं जगत्पिदम्
 प्रसन्नं त्वं जगत्, पतितम्

(*Nyāya-sāra*, II 1, edited by Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta)

of reasoning and which obtained for the system the foremost rank among the schools of philosophy called *Saddarsana*. In the second place we notice that having supported the authority of the Ved the Nyāya was readily recognized as an approved branch of learning, and the charge of heterodoxy levelled against it at its early stage was proved to be baseless. Thirdly, the fact that Nyāya adopted the Śaiva cult gave it a positive stamp of orthodoxy and gained for it an unquestionable recognition.

PART II.

THE MEDIÆVAL SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC

CALLED

PRAMĀNA-SĀSTRA—THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE.

(400 A D —1200 A D)

SECTION I.

The Jaina Logic (400 A.D.—1700 A.D.).

CHAPTER I.

Topics of Logic mentioned in the Jaina Canons

1. THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF MEDIÆVAL LOGIC
(FROM CIRCA 500 B C. ONWARDS)

Termination of the Ancient School.

In Part I a short account has been given of the Ancient School of Indian Logic which deals as we have seen, with the doctrine of the soul and its salvation, as well as with the rules of debate and true reasoning. The Ancient School, which reached the height of its development at the hands of Akṣapāda about 150 A.D., extended over a period of one thousand years, beginning with Gautama about 550 B C and ending with Vātsyāyana about 400 A D. It must not however be supposed that the Ancient School became extinct at 400 A D. A host of commentators such as Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayanācārya, who flourished subsequently, kept the stream of that Logic flowing. But the thousand years from 550 B C to 400 A D. represent what may be termed the period of organic growth of the Ancient School.

Formation of the Mediæval School.

Part II will represent a system of logic called the Mediæval School, the foremost exponents of which were the Jainas and the Buddhists—two powerful sects that were founded by Mahāvīra and Buddha about 600 B C. At the time of the founders, and in

subsequent times, the Jaina and Buddhist writers occasionally handled the principles of pure logic in expounding the dogmas of their own religion and metaphysics. Some of the writers even took a turning towards logic, but there were other frag-

Medieval School of Indian Logic This school covered a period of nearly eight hundred years from 400 A D to 1200 A D. In matter and method the Medieval School conducted by the Jains and Buddhists differs markedly from the Ancient School which was essentially Brahmanic. The Ancient Logic dealt with sixteen

only in so far as these are necessary for its proper elaboration. The doctrine of *pramāṇa* is treated in such a way that it may be equally applied to the religious systems of the Brāhmanas, Jainas and Buddhists. Inference, a kind of *pramāṇa*, which was briefly noticed in the Ancient Logic, receives a full treatment in the Mediaeval School. Numerous technical terms are coined and great subtleties are introduced into the definition of terms, the theory of syllogism, etc. *Prameya*, the object of knowledge, is

The works
tute the Jaina La
tute the Buddha
Jainism, precede
treat of the Jaina Logic

2. MAHUVIRA—THE FOUNDER OF JAINISM (699-527 B C)

The Jains maintain that their religion is coeval with time. According to their traditions there appeared at various periods in the world's history sages whom they call *Jinas*, conquerors of

subsequent times, the Jaina and Buddhist writers occasionally handled the principles of pure logic in expounding the dogmas of their own religion and metaphysics. Some of the writers even

and metaphysics, laid the true foundation of what is termed the Mediæval School of Indian Logic. This school covered a period of nearly eight hundred years from 400 A.D. to 1200 A.D. In matter and method the Mediæval School conducted by the Jainas and Buddhists differs markedly from the Ancient School which was essentially Brâhmanic. The Ancient Logic dealt with sixteen categories such as *pramāna*, *prameya*, etc. comprising such heterogeneous elements as doctrine of salvation and nature of the soul, etc. The Mediæval Logic, on the contrary, concerns itself with one category viz *pramāna*, which touches upon other categories only in so far as these are necessary for its proper elaboration. The doctrine of *pramāna* is treated in such a way that it may be equally applied to the religious systems of the Brâhmanas, Jainas and Buddhists. Inference, a kind of *pramāna*, which was briefly noticed in the Ancient Logic, receives a full treatment in the Mediæval School. Numerous technical terms are coined and great subtleties are introduced into the definition of terms, the theory of syllogism, etc. *Prameya*, the object of knowledge, is

tute the Buddhist Logic. Seeing that Māhāvīra, the founder of Jainism, preceded Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, I shall first treat of the Jaina Logic.

II MAHĀVĪRA—THE FOUNDER OF JAINISM (599-527 B.C.)

The Jainas maintain that their religion is coeval with time. According to their traditions there appeared at various periods in the world's history sages whom they call *Jinas*, conquerors of their passions, or *Tirthankaras*, builders of a landing place in the sea of existence. These sages preached the religion of the Jainas. The Jainas hold that in every cycle of time (*utarpini* or *avastarpini* *lila*) 24 sages are born. The first sage of the last series was

In the *Sthānāṅga sūtra*¹ an example, called in *Prākṛta nāa* (in Sanskrit *yūāta*), is divided into four kinds, viz (1) *āharana*, a complete example which bears similarity to the thing exemplified in all respects, (2) *āharana-taddesa*, a limited example which bears similarity to the thing exemplified only in respect of a part, (3) *āharana-taddosa*, a defective example, and (4) *upanyāsisopanaya*, an anecdote used as an example.

In the *Sthānāṅga sūtra*² the following are enumerated as expedients in a hostile debate or debate *ā l'ou-trance* (1) *Asakkautā* taking some time in making oneself ready, (2) *ussakkautā*,

defects (*dosa*) of a debate.—

(1) *Tayyāta-dosa*, the defect arising from a disputant being agitated in mind (2) *matibhanga-dosa*, the defect arising from the failure of his memory, (3) *prāśāsa-dosa*, the defect arising from the authorities, e.g. the president or the members, showing partiality, (4) *pari-harana-dosa*, avoidance of the charges brought by a disputant, (5) *laksana-dosa*, the defect of definition [which may be too wide, too narrow or altogether incomprehensible], (6) *kāraṇa-dosa*, the defect of arguing, (7) *hetu-dosa*, committing fallacies, (8) *samkramaṇa-dosa*, diversion to other subjects, (9) *nigraha-dosa*, the defect of understanding, and (10) *vastu-dosa*, the defect of the subject (of debate)

¹ दृष्टान्तिरे वाद वस्तुने न कदा. आहरणे, आहरणतद्देशे, आहरणतदोषे, उपन्यासोपनये।

(*Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, p. 300, published by Dhanapati Singh, Calcutta)

² दृष्टान्तिरे विवादे वस्तुने. न कदा. उपसङ्गता, अकुलमहता. परिशीलनता, भवता भवता।

(*Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, p. 421, published by Dhanapati Singh, Calcutta).

³ दृष्टान्तिरे दोषे वस्तुने. न कदा. तज्ज्ञानदाहे महर्ष्यदोषे, वस्तुवारदोषे परिहरणदोषे, परस्पर-आपद-हेतु-दोषे संक्षाम-निग्रहवस्तुदोषे।

(*Sthānāṅga sūtra*, p. 500, published by Dhanapati Singh, Calcutta).

one of Mahāvīra's śūtras in the *śāstra*

MAHĀVĪRA was the author of the *Dasavaikārika-niryukti*, but hold the view that the second was the author of several of existing Tīkā works. The *Śāstra*

be concluded that Bhadrabāhu lived in the reign of Candrarāja

7. BHADRABĀHU'S SYLLOGISM.

ith
39-

॥ १ ॥ ॥ २ ॥ ॥ ३ ॥ ॥ ४ ॥ ॥ ५ ॥ ॥ ६ ॥ ॥ ७ ॥ ॥ ८ ॥ ॥ ९ ॥ ॥ १० ॥
 ॥ ११ ॥ ॥ १२ ॥ ॥ १३ ॥ ॥ १४ ॥ ॥ १५ ॥ ॥ १६ ॥ ॥ १७ ॥ ॥ १८ ॥ ॥ १९ ॥ ॥ २० ॥
 ॥ २१ ॥ ॥ २२ ॥ ॥ २३ ॥ ॥ २४ ॥ ॥ २५ ॥ ॥ २६ ॥ ॥ २७ ॥ ॥ २८ ॥ ॥ २९ ॥ ॥ ३० ॥
 ॥ ३१ ॥ ॥ ३२ ॥ ॥ ३३ ॥ ॥ ३४ ॥ ॥ ३५ ॥ ॥ ३६ ॥ ॥ ३७ ॥ ॥ ३८ ॥ ॥ ३९ ॥ ॥ ४० ॥

revali by Munivandana-śāstra published in the *Jaina Yāsovijaya-granthasālā* res. II 4)

the Sarasvatī gaccha-pattikāvali in the *Indian Antiquary*, October 1891 vol. 1892

Dr R. G. Bhandarkar's Reports on Sanskrit MSS. during 1891-92

the *Śāstra*

the *Śāstra*

the *Śāstra*

the *Śāstra*

the *Śāstra*

(halpa-sūtra-subodhikā-vṛtti printed in Banbha).

nirvāṇa of Mahāvira, that is, up to 365 B.C., and that the second¹ (Bhadrabāhu the junior) to 516 years from the nirvāṇa of Mahāvira that is, up to 12 B.C. They do not state definitely which of these Bhadrabāhus was the author of the Daśavaikālika-niryukti, but they hold the view that the second was the author of several of the existing Jaina works. The Śvetāmbaras records do not contain any mention of the second Bhadrabāhu, but in the Rāmāṇḍala-prakarana-vṛtti² and Kalpa-sūtra-subodhikā-vṛtti,³ two commentaries of the Śvetāmbaras, and in the Caturvimsatī prabandha, it is stated that Bhadrabāhu lived in the south in Pratiṣṭhāna and was a brother of Varāhamihira. Now Varāhamihira is popularly believed to have lived in the first century B.C. It is possible therefore, even according to the Śvetāmbaras, that the Daśavaikālika-niryukti was the work of a commentator who, if we rely on popular belief, lived about the time of the opening of the Christian era. As a fact Bhadrabāhu could not have lived much earlier than 500 A.D. if he was a brother of Varāhamihira.

From the confusing traditions preserved by the Jainas, it may be concluded that Bhadrabāhu lived in the reign of Candragupta II, called Vikramāditya, about 376 A.D.

Whatever was his date, the author of the Daśavaikālika-niryukti wrote commentaries (niryuktis) on the following Jaina scriptures.—Āvaśyaka-sūtra, Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Ācārāṅga-sūtra, Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra, Daśāsruta-skandha-sūtra, Kalpa-sūtra, Vyavahāra-sūtra, Sūrya-prajñapti-sūtra, and Rāsibhāṣita-sūtra.

7. BHADRABĀHU'S SYLLOGISM

Bhadrabāhu did not set himself to analyse knowledge with the object of evolving a system of logic. His object was to illus-

निर्दिष्ट विद्यालयवीथीपर
 १९०५ ई. १०००

सर्वप्रथम प्रकाशित १९०५ ई.

महोदयों के लिये प्रकाशित.

प्रीतिलाल शर्मा द्वारा १९०५ ई.

(Cur. Evald by Munisūndara-sūtri published in the Jaina Yādavyaya-granthaṁśā of Benares, II 4)

¹ Vide the Sarasvatī gaccha-paṭiśvalī in the Indian Antiquary, October 1891, and March 1892.

² Vide Dr. B. G. Bhanderkar's Reports on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, III 128. Bhadrabāhu must have lived as late as the 6th century A.D., if he was really a brother of that Varāhamihira who was one of the nine Gems at the court of Vikramāditya. Munis Dharmaviṇaya and Indravijaya maintain that Bhadrabāhu's brother was not the same Varāhamihira that adorned the court of Vikramāditya.

³ इतिहासपुरे परावर्तिविषय भद्रबाहु विज्ञो प्रहसितो । भद्रबाहुवाच्ये परदत्ते वदः
 ननु परावर्ति विज्ञेयनाथस्य परावर्ति निर्दिष्टो ज्ञाता विज्ञेय निर्दिष्टः ।

(Kalpa-sūtra-subodhikā-vṛtti printed in Benares).

CHAPTER II.

Early Jaina writers on Logic.

BHADRABĀHU THE SENIOR (CIRCA 433-357 B.C.)

BHADRABĀHU THE JUNIOR (CIRCA 376 A.D. OR 450-37 A.D.)

Though we come across some technical terms of Aristotelian logic in the canonical scriptures of the Jainas, yet we have no proof that the Jainas undertook at that stage to write any regular treatise on logic. The early Jaina writers who discussed definite problems of logic, were Bhadrabāhu and Umasvāti. An elaborate discussion of certain principles of logic is found in a Prakṛa commentary on the Dāśa-vaiśhika sūtra, called *Dāśavaiśhikīyukti*. This commentary was the work of one Bhadrabāhu of the Prācīna Gotra. For 45 years this sage lived the ordinary life of the world; 17 years he passed in the performance of religious vows (*Vratas*), and for 14 years he was acknowledged by the Jainas to be the foremost man of his age (*Yuga pradhāna*).¹ He was a *Śrutakevalin*,² that is, one versed in the 14 *Pūrvas* of the *Dṛṣṭivāda*.

The above-mentioned incidents are generally accepted as having taken place in the life of the author of the commentary. There is, however, some doubt as to the time in which he lived.³ According to the records⁴ of the *Śvetāmbaras* he was born in 473 B.C. and died in 357 B.C. The *Digambaras* maintain there were two Bhadrabāhus, that the first (Bhadrabāhu the senior) lived to 162 years from

¹ In Weber II, p. 919, in which the *Gacvāvalī māhāgaragani* is noticed, we read of *Bambhūstīyav* *satthapajjadhāra*.

² 'अवधि' पूर्वज्ञाना द्विवैक.

बीमदवाक्य (७) अथ १

ज्ञान परादिद्वयसर्वतो

the gods. It is as likely that fire will be cold as that they will be
 moved by the gods, as to do them honour will be attended by men.

ute truth "

(7) An instance or example (*Dṛṣṭānta*),—"the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* do not even cook food, lest in so doing they should take life. They depend on householders for their meals "

(8) Questioning the validity of the instance or example (*Āśankā*),—"the food which the householders cook is as much for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* as for themselves. If, therefore, any insects are destroyed in the fire, the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* must share in the householders' sin. Thus the instance cited is not convincing."

(9) The meeting of the question (*Āśankā-pratiseḍha*),—"the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* go to householders for their food without giving notice and not at fixed hours. How, therefore, can it be said that the householders cooked food for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus*? Thus the sin, if any, is not shared by the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* "

(10) Conclusion (*Nigamana*),—"to refrain from taking life is therefore the best of virtues, for those who so refrain are loved by the gods, and to do them honour is an act of merit for men."

8 BHADRABĀHU'S EXPLANATION OF *Syādvāda*

Bhadrabāhu in his *Sūtra kṛtāṅga niryukti*¹ mentions another principle of the Jaina Logic called *Syādvāda*

Syādvāda

(*Syāt* "may be" and *Vāda* "assertion," or

the assertion of possibilities) or *Saptabhaṅgi-naya* (the sevenfold paralogism)

The *Syādvāda*² is set forth as follows —(1) May be, it is, (2) may be, it is not, (3) may be, it is and it is not, (4) may be, it

अविच्छेद विविधार्थ

अविदितात् अ दीर्घं वृत्तवतीति ।

अभावितात् वृत्तवती

देवदत्तार्थं अ वृत्तवती ॥ ११ ॥

(*Sūtra kṛtāṅga niryukti*, skandha 1, adhyāya 12, p. 448, edited by Bhims Singh Manak and printed in the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay).

Et *Śāhāṅga-sūtra*, p. 216, published by Dhanspat Singh, Benares edition.

² Cf. *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, translated by Cowell and Gough, p. 63. For full particulars about *Syādvāda* or *Saptabhaṅgi-naya* vide *Saptabhaṅgi-taraṅgi* by Vimala Dāsa printed in Bombay.

trate the truth of certain principles of the Jaina religion. In this he in his *Dadaśāślikā niryuktī*,¹ elaborated a syllogism consisting of ten parts (*śatāvayava nīṭya*), and then demonstrated how the religious principles of Jainism satisfied the conditions of this syllogism.

The following is an example —

(1) The proposition (*Pratijñā*),—"to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues."

(2) The limitation of the proposition (*Pratijñā nīṭya*),—"to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues, according to the Jaina Tirthankaras."

(3) The reason (*Hetu*),—"to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues, because those who so refrain are loved by the gods and to do them honour is an act of merit for men."

(4) The limitation of the reason (*Hetu-nibhakti*),—"not those who refrain from taking life are allowed to reside in the highest place of virtue."

(5) The counter-proposition (*Vipakṣa*),—"but those who despise the Jaina Tirthankaras and take life are said to be loved by the gods, and men regard doing them honour as an act of merit. Again, those who take life in sacrifices are said to be residing in the highest place of virtue. Men, for instance, salute their father-in-law as an act of virtue, even though the latter despise the Jaina Tirthankaras and habitually take life. Moreover, those who perform animal sacrifices are said to be beloved of the gods."

(6) The opposition to the counter-proposition (*Vipakṣa-pratishedha*),—"those who take life as forbidden by the Jaina Tirthankaras do not deserve honour, and they are certainly not loved by

ने उ वदन् विभक्तो विभक्तो विषयवद्विषयो ।

विद्वतो ज्ञातव्या तथद्विषयो विप्रसव ॥ १११ ॥

(*Dadaśāślikā-niryuktī*, p. 74 published under the patronage of Dhanraj Singh by the Nirvaya Sāgara Press, Bombay, and Dr E. Leumann's edition *Dadaśāślikā-niryuktī*, p. 649)

The Jains characterise a syllogism of ten parts as the best (*uttama*) a syllogism of five parts as the mediocre (*madhyama*), and a syllogism of two parts the worst (*jaghanya*). Candrar Prabhā Sūri (1102 A.D.) observes —

अथवाहीयथा जयम् मन्मथोद्गृह्णातिथ कथा भवति रति । अथ केतुप्रतिपादना
जयम् । ह्याप्यवयवनिवेदन मथमा, चतुर्थं द्वावयववचनवद्गृह्णाति ।

(*Nyāyavārtā-vivrtiṇ* 100 verso 20 of *Nyāyavārtā*, p. 8, edited by Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana, Calcutta) Similarly Ratnaprabhā Sūri (1131 A.D.) says —

वत्तादिप्रवचनं पक्षपाताः । नत उद्गृह्णं द्वावयव वराचानुमानम् इत्युक्तं भवति
मथम् तु त्रयावयवादाय त्रयम् ह्यावयवम् । अथर्वं पुन त्रयावयवावयवनाद
प्रतिपादना मन्मथप्रवृत्तिरुद्गृह्णाति ।

(*Svād vāda-ratnā kūrā vārtikā*, ॥ 20 Chap. III and Bochar Das in the *Yāsojyaya Series* Benares)

tanaya. He was also known as Vātsi-sūta, because his mother was Umā of the Vatsagotra. In the Tīrthakalpa of Jinaprabhāsūri, it is stated that Umāsvatī was the author of 500 Sanskrit prakāraṇas (treatises). He is said to have belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, though it is probable that the distinction between that sect and the Digambaras had not in his time come into existence.

is indescribable, (5) may be, it is and yet is indescribable, (6) or
be, it is not and it is also indescribable, (7) may be, it is and is
not and it is also indescribable

U. UMĀSVĀTĪ (1 NS A D)

Jaina philosophy recognises seven categories, viz (1) the soul
(Jīva), (2) the soulless (Ajīva), (3) the
The Tattvārthasūtra (4) bondage (Bandha), (5) re-
straint (Samvara), (6) destruction of the
consequences of action (Virjaya), and (7) release or salvation
(Moksha). According to the Tattvārthasūtrasūtra, these
categories can be comprehended only by *Pratyak*, the means of
valid knowledge and by *Naya*, the method of comprehending things
from particular standpoints.

Umāsvātī is better known as Vācaka-śramana. He was
Umāsvātī's life

genealogy) The Hin

Umāsvātī-vācakaśācārya

days and ascended heaven in Samvat 142, i.e. in 504 A.D.

the following account
is given, but he
Kusumapuri
gotra. His
name was Svātī

महोपाध्यायस्यैव विद्वत्ता पुत्रस्य कुसुमाग्रि ।
कोटीपतिना स्नातिनयेन नाम्नीकृतो नाम्नी ॥ १ ॥
अर्चयन् सर्वभूतकल्याणाय समुपधायां ।
दुःखार्थं च दुःखनिवर्धनस्यैव शोचयन्महोपाध्याय ॥ २ ॥
एतदुच्यते विद्वत्तैः सर्वभूतकल्याणाय ॥ ३ ॥
नानाविधनाम्ना अष्टभुजास्त्राग्निना नाम्नी ॥ ४ ॥

(Tattvārthasūtrasūtra chap. X, p. 233, edited by Mody Keshavlal Pre-
chand in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta)

A similar account is found in the commentary on the Tattvārthasūtrasūtra
by Siddhasenagani. This account is mentioned by Peterson in his 4th Report.

Sanskrit Manuscripts, p. xv.
For further particulars about Umāsvātī see Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit
Manuscripts, p. xv, where he observes that in the Digambara Pāṭavālī published
by Dr. Hoernle in the Indian Antiquary, XX, p. 311, Umāsvātī (probably) is

Samgraha, the collective, is the method which takes into consideration generic properties only, ignoring particular properties

Vyavahāra, the practical, is the method which takes into consideration the particular only. The general without the particular is a nonentity

If you ask a person to bring you a plant, he must bring you a particular plant, he can not bring plant in general

Rjū-sūtra, the straight or immediate, is the method which considers a thing as it exists at the moment, without any reference to its past or

its future. It is vain to ponder over a thing as it was in the past or as it will be in the future. All practical purposes are served by considering the thing itself as it exists at the present moment.

For instance, a man who in a previous birth was my son is now born as a prince, but he is of no practical use to me now. The method of *Rjū-sūtra* recognises the entity itself (*bhāva*), but does not consider its name (*nāma*) or image (*śīlāpandā*), or the causes which constituted it (*dravya*). The fact that a cowherd is called *Indra* does not make him lord of the heavens. An image of a

śabda is of three kinds, viz *Sāmprata*, the suitable, *Samabhirūḍha*, the subtle, and *Evaṃbhūta*, the such-like. In Sanskrit a jar is called *ghaṭa*, *kumbha* or *kalasa*, and these are synonymous terms. *Sāmprata* consists in using a word in its conventional sense, even if that sense is not justified by its derivation. For example the word "*Sātru*," according to its derivation, means "destroyer," but its conventional meaning is "enemy." *Samabhirūḍha* consists in making nice distinctions between synonyms, selecting in each case the word which on etymological grounds is the most appropriate. *Evaṃbhūta* consists in applying to things such names only as their actual condition. Thus a man should not be called *Śakra* (strong), who really possesses the *Śakti* (strength) which the name

(*Pratyakṣa*) verbal testimony or reliable report (*śruti*) and assumption (*lākṣya*), probability (*Samāhara*), and *Pratyakṣa* (*Pratyakṣa*) are not separate sources of valid knowledge but are them under *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). According to them the majority of them are the result of the contact of senses with the objects which they apprehend; and would be are not sources of valid knowledge at all.

It is interesting to note that according to Uccattakāśī earlier Jain philosophers all sense perceptions (visual, auditory, etc.) are indirect apprehensions, inasmuch as the soul acquires them not of itself but through the medium of the senses. The words *Parokṣa* and *Pratyakṣa* are thus used by these authors in senses quite opposite to those which they bear in Brāhmanic logic and in the later Jain Logic.¹

11 UMĀSVĀTI'S EXPLANATION OF *Naya* (THE MOOD OF STATEMENTS)

In the *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, *Naya*² is described as method by which things are comprehended from particular standpoints. It is of five kinds — (1) *Naigama*, the non-distinguishing or non-analytical, (2) *Samgraha*, the collective, (3) *Vyavahāra*, the practical, (4) *Rjū-sūtra*, the strict immediate, (5) *Śabda*, the verbal or nominal.

Naigama, the non-analytical, is the method by which a subject is regarded as possessing both general and specific properties, no distinction made between them. For instance, when you use the "bamboo," you are indicating a number of properties which are peculiar to the bamboo, while others are possessed in common with other trees. You do not distinguish between these two classes of properties.

In his *bhāṣya* on 1—6 of the *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, Umāsvatī observes:
 चतुर्विधमित्येकैः । (Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra, p. 9)

In his *bhāṣya* on 1—35 he mentions the four *Pramāṇas* thus:—

यदा वा प्रत्यक्षानुमानवश्यादवश्यं यथावदेकादृशं
 विप्रतिपत्तयो भवन्ति तद्वचनवादा इति ॥ (Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra)

"... to refer to those in the kinds are of the Jainas.

pratyakṣas and
 1. Here *Parokṣa* means the *Pramāṇa naya tattvavasthānāṁ*,
 2. ...

14 SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA *alias* KṢAPAKA
(ABOUT 480—550 A D)

The first Jaina writer on systematic logic was Siddhasena Divākara. It was he who for the first time laid the foundation of a science called Logic among the Jainas by compiling a treatise called *Nyāyāvatāra* ¹ in thirty-two short stanzas.

Siddhasena Divākara is also famous as the author of the *Sammatitarka-sūtra* which is a work in *Prākṛta* on general philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. This author, who belonged to the *Svctāmbara* sect, has been mentioned by Pradyumna Sūri (q v) in his *Vicāra-sāra-prakarana* ² and by Jina Sena Sūri in the *Ādipurāṇa* dated 783 A D.

Siddhasena, who was a pupil of *Vṛddha-vādīsūri*, received the name of *Kumuda-candra* ³ at the time of ordination. He is said to have split, by

to Jainism 470 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra, that is, in 57 B C ⁴.

But *Vikramāditya* of *Ujjainī* does not seem to be so old, as he has been identified by scholars with *Yaśodharma Deva*, king

वज्रवत्तः यः बहिरुक्तं विद्वत्पदिव्यासरोः कः कल्पवतीः

वज्रवत्तः श्रीवत्तः यः कल्पवत्तः यः कल्पवत्तः ३ ११ ३

(*Vicāra-sāra-prakarana*, noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, p. 272)

¹ Cf. *Prabhāvakasūtra* \ III. V 57

and 597 A.D. It is therefore very probable that Vā and his contemporary Siddhasena Divākara lived at C. 570 A.D. I am inclined to believe that Siddhasena was than *Kṣapanaka*⁶ (a Jain sage) who is traditionally known to have been one of the nine Gems that adorned of Vikramāditya.

Siddhasena Divākara seems to have been a contemporary of Jinabhadra Gani Kasmāramana (466-544) criticises *Dvātrimsat-dvātrimsūkī* of which the Nyāya part

15 SIDDHASENA'S NITYATARA

The Nyāyavārtā written in Sanskrit was given
tion of the doctrine of *Pramāṇa* (sources of valid know-
Naya (the method of comprehending things from parts,
points).

Freedom - Right Knowledge

Pramāṇa is right knowledge which illumines itself

Partnership: 100%

Perception is of two kinds: (1) direct valid knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) and (2) indirect valid knowledge (*Parokṣa*). Direct valid knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) is twofold: (1) *Ādya* (initial) which is the knowledge acquired by

[illegible]

५३ श्री वेदव्यास महादेवकृत श्री महाभारत

ਅਰਥ ਭਾਗੀਨੀ ਨੂੰ ਕੀ ਕਰਨਾ ਪੈਂਦਾ ਹੈ ?

(P.S. Don't forget to sign it before you send it to me)

Factorial design (2x2x2) with 2 levels of each factor: 2x2x2 = 8 conditions. The design is a 2x2x2 factorial design.

ସଂସ୍କୃତି, ଶିକ୍ଷା, ସ୍ୱାସ୍ଥ୍ୟ, ଶାନ୍ତି, ଶାନ୍ତି, ଶାନ୍ତି

ॐ नमो भगवते वासुदेवाय ॥ श्रीकृष्णाय नमः ॥

[illegible]

co fa il suo dovere

In the Far East, the British Government has been very active in the
 support of the Chinese Government in the fight against the Japanese.
 The British Government has been very active in the support of the Chinese Government
 in the fight against the Japanese.

॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

00 0000 00000 00000 000

[illegible]

본 연구는 2014년 12월 1일부터 2015년 11월 30일까지 1년간 실시되었다. 연구기간 동안 전국 17개 시도에서 11개 시군구에서 11개 읍면동에서 11개 마을에서 11개 가정에 11명씩 총 1111명(11×11×11×11×11)의 표본을 선정하였다. 표본 선정은 2014년 12월 1일부터 2015년 11월 30일까지 1년간 실시되었다. 연구기간 동안 전국 17개 시도에서 11개 시군구에서 11개 읍면동에서 11개 마을에서 11개 가정에 11명씩 총 1111명(11×11×11×11×11)의 표본을 선정하였다.

[illegible]

through the five senses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch) and the mind (*Manas*), and (2) transcendental (*Pāramārthika*) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlightenment of the soul: it is called *Kevala* or absolute knowledge.

Indirect valid knowledge (*Parokṣa*) = also of two kinds (1)

inference (*Anumāna*) and (2) verbal testi-

Verbal Testimony

mony (*Śabda*) Verbal testimony is the

knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons including knowledge from scripture. Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable: the word of the old man is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge called personal testimony or *Laukika Śabda*. Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge for it lays down injunctions on matters which baffle perception and inference: for instance, it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice. Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony or

Inference (*Anumāna*) is the correct knowledge of the major

Inference

term (*Sādhyā*) derived through the middle

term (*Hetu*, reason or *Linga*, sign) which

is inseparably connected with it. It is of two kinds: (1) inference for one's own self (*Svārthanumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of others (*Parārthanumāna*).

The first kind is the inference deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated

If the inference is communicated to others through words, it

आलोचनानुसङ्गमपराधविरोधम् ।

बलीयदेवतम् वाचं वाचं वाचयन्तम् ॥

(Verse 9, Nyāyavārtika).

and 597 A.D.¹ It is therefore
and his contemporary Śiddhasena
570 A.D. I am inclined to believe
than *Keapānaka*² (a Jaina sage) was
Hindus to have been one of the
of Vikramāditya

Siddhasena Dirākara seen
porary of Jinabhadra Gani K
criticism *Drāṣṭrīmāst-drāṣṭrīmā*
part

15 SIDDHASENA

The Nyāyāvatāra written
tion of the doctrine of *Pramāṇa*
Naya (the method of comprehen-
points)

Pramāṇa—Ri

Pramāṇa is right knowledge

Perception other than
is of two

or perception (*Pratyakṣa*) and
indirect (Vaidhārṣika) which is the

¹ Varāhamihira's *Bṛhat-Saṃhitā* 427 or 4
and calculation showing there is that the

यस्य विद्वत्स्य सत्यं
सत्यं सत्यं सत्यं

(Pāṇinī's *Śāstra*, chap. 1,

Page also Dr. Thibaut's

2 The same is also

is called an inference for the sake of others. A type of this kind of inference is as follows:

- (1) The hill (minor term or Pakṣa) is full of fire (major term or Sādhya).
- (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term or Vyākhyāna).
- (3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire (e.g. a hill, a house, etc.).
- (4) as is this hill full of smoke, (application of the principle).
- (5) therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion or Vyapti).

In a proposition the subject is the minor term (Pakṣa) and the predicate the major term (Sādhya). The middle term is that with which the

connection of the major term is to be shown. The minor term is that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. In the proposition "the hill is full of fire" the hill is the minor term and fire major term. The middle term (Vyākhyāna) is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. Thus in the proposition "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke," smoke is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term. The example (Dṛṣṭānta) is a familiar case which assures the connection between the major term and the middle term. It is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous or affirmative (Sādharmya), such as "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke" as a kitchen," and (2) heterogeneous or negative (Vaidharmya) which assures the connection by showing that the absence of the major term is attended by the absence of the middle term, such as "where there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a lake."

In an inference for the sake of others the minor term (Pakṣa) must be explicitly set forth otherwise the reasoning might be misunderstood by the opponent, e.g. This hill has fire because it has smoke.

This instance, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form —

1. Because having smoke

Having fire.

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any instance of which the major term or predicate is affirmed, is evidence, public opinion, one's own statement, etc., at which is known as the fallacy of the minor term (a) of which there are many varieties.

The semblance or fallacy of the minor term (*Pakṣābhāsa*) arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact that which is yet to be proved, or which is incapable of being proved, or which is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with public opinion or incongruous with one's own statement, thus —

this is opposed to perception

(4) "There is no omniscient being"—this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference

(5) "The sister is to be taken as wife"—this is inconsistent with public opinion

(6) "All things are non-existent"—this is incongruous with one's own statement

Inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (*Vyāpti*) is the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major term. In the inference "this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke," the connection between fire and smoke, that is, the constant presence of fire with smoke, is called *Vyāpti* or Inseparable Connection. It is of two kinds (1) Intrinsic, and (2) Extrinsic

Intrinsic inseparable connection (*Antar-vyāpti*) occurs when the minor term (*pakṣa*), itself as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*), shows the inseparable connection between them thus —

(1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term)

(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term)

Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke shown by the hill (minor term) in which both of them abide

Extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahir-vyāpti*) occurs when an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) from the outside introduced as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) to assure the inseparable connection between them, thus:—

(1) This hill is full of fire (major term),

(2) because it is full of smoke (middle term);

(3) as a kitchen (example)

Here the reference to the kitchen is no essential part of the inference, but is introduced from without as a common instance

of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it reaffirms the inseparable connection between them.

Some logicians hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*sādhya*), can be established by intrinsic inseparable connection (*Antar vyapti*) only hence the extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahir vyapti*) is superfluous.

The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (*Madhyama*) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it (the middle term). It is of three kinds —

Fallacies of the middle term
(1) The unproved (*Asiddhy*) This is fragrant because it is a sky-lotus.

Here the reason (middle term), viz. the sky-lotus, is unreal.

(2) The contradictory (*Viruddha*) "This is fiery, because it is a body of water."

Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) The uncertain (*Anāikāntika*) "Sound is eternal, because it is always audible."

Here the reason or middle term is uncertain, because audibility may or may not be a proof of eternity.

The fallacy of example (*Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) may arise in the homogeneous or heterogeneous form, from a defect in the middle term (*hetu*) or major term (*sādhya*) or both, or from doubt about them.

Fallacies of homogeneous of example
Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*Sādārmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) are as follows —

(1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term), like perception (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (middle term), like a dream (homogeneous example).

(3) The omniscient being is not apprehended by the senses (middle term), like a jar (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *hetu*), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is devoid of passions (major term), because he is mortal (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions

(5) This person is *mortal* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions

(6) This person is *non-omniscient* (major term) because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example)

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and non-omniscient.

It is stated in the *Nyāyīvārtā-vivṛti* that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*), viz —

(1) Unconnected (*Ananyasya*), such as. This person is *full of passions* (major term), because he is a *speaker* (middle term), like a *certain man in Mṛgaḍha* (example)

Here though a certain man in Mṛgaḍha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions"

(2) Of connection unshown (*Apradarśitānaya*), such as —

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term), as a *jar* (example)

Here though there is an inseparable connection between "produced" and "non-eternal," yet it has not been shown in the proper form as —

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a jar"

(3) Of inverted connection (*Viparikṣeya*), such as —

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term)

Here if the inseparable connection (*vaiśpā*) is shown thus—

"Whatever is non-eternal is produced as a jar," instead of—

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar," the example would involve the fallacy of inverted connection

Fallacies of heterogeneous example

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example (*Vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) are of six kinds, thus —

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term). whatever is not invalid is not a source of knowledge, as a *dream* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for the dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid

(2) Perception is *non-reflective* or *nirvikalpaka* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term): whatever is reflective or *savikalpaka*, is not a source of knowledge, as *inference* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form

of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it re-affirms the inseparable connection between them

Some logicians hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*sādhya*), can be established by intrinsic inseparable connection (*Āntar-vyāpti*) only hence the extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahir vyāpti*) is superfluous

The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (*Heṭvābhāsa*) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it (the middle term) It is of three kinds —

Fallacies of the middle term

(1) The unproved (*Asiddha*) This is fragrant, because it is a lotus

Here the reason (middle term), viz the sky-lotus, is untrue

(2) The contradictory (*Viruddha*) "This is fiery, because it body of water"

Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) The uncertain (*Anavāntika*) "Sound is eternal, because always audible"

Here the reason or middle term is uncertain, because audibility may or may not be a proof of eternity.

The fallacy of example (*Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) may arise in homogeneous or heterogeneous form, from a defect in the middle term (*heṭu*) or in the major term (*sādhya*) or both, or from doubt about them.

Fallacies of homogeneous example

Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) are as follows:—

(1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a ledge (middle term), like perception (homogeneous example)

Here the example involves a defect in the middle term for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is invalid (major term), because valid knowledge (middle term), like a dream (homogeneous example)

Here the example involves a defect in the middle term for the dream is not a source of valid knowledge

(3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term), is not apprehended by the senses (middle term), like example)

Here the example involves a defect in the middle terms (*sādhya* and *heṭu*), for the jar is not apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is devoid of passions (major term), mortal (middle term), like the man is

Refutation (*Dūṣana*) is the pointing out of defects or fallacies in the statements of the opponent in any of the forms enumerated above. The sem-

blance of a refutation (*Dūṣaṇābhāsa*) is the contrivance to allege defects where there are no defects at all.

The immediate effect of *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance. The consequence of the transcendental perception (*Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa*) is bliss and equanimity consisting in salvation (*Mokṣa* or final emancipation), while that of the other kinds of *Pramāṇa* (direct and indirect knowledge) is the facility which they afford us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things.

Nava—the method of descriptions

Naya is the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. Thus we may conceive rose

Naya or the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes which are peculiar to the rose as distinguished from other flowers. The *Naya* is of seven kinds, *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *śruti*, *śabda*, *samādhivāda*, and *saṃbhāṣa*.

Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided *nayas*, is called *Syādvāda-vṛta*. It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., according as we take it from one or other standpoint.

The soul (*Jiva*) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self does not change. It is not affected by anything and is not subject to birth and death.

not be traced to its beginning or followed to its end.

16 JINABHADRA GAYI KṢAMĪSRAMAYA
(484—598 A D).

17 Syntherisma Clay
(see A D)

Siddhasena Gani, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, was the author of a commentary on Ummāvalī's *Tattvārthasūtra* called *Tattvārthasūtra* in which the logical principles of *Pramāṇa* (the sources of knowledge), and *Naya* (the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints), have been fully discussed. He was a pupil of Bhīṣavāmin^o who was a spiritual successor of Simhaśūri, himself a disciple of Dinnā Gani. Siddhasena Gani² is generally believed to have been a contemporary of Devardhigani Kāmaśramana, who flourished 240 years after Mahāvīra, or about 453 A D. But as he has in his *Tattvārthasūtra* quoted Siddhasena Divākara and was posterior to Simhaśūri or Simhaśūri, a contemporary of Vikramāditya, I am inclined to suppose that he lived after 533 A D or about 600 A D.

18 SAMANTAPADRA
1600 A D 1

Śaṃantabhadra, who belonged to the Digambara sect of Southern India, was famous as the author of a well-known commentary on Uṃśavāṭi's Tattvarthadhigama-sūtra called Gandhasthi mahābhāṣya. The introductory part of this commentary is called Devāgamaśloka¹ or Āptamīmāṃsā, and is replete with discussions of logical principles besides a review of the contemporary schools of philosophy including the Advaita Vāda.² The Āptamīm-

1 A palm-leaf manuscript of the Tattvārthasūtrā in the temple of Śāmunītha-Cambay, has been noticed by Paterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 63-64.

[illegible]

मन्त्रार्थभाष्यटीकाभिर्वा कथं वा पितृवैद्यविः ॥ ७

(Tatvegrihatskå, noticed in Peterson's 3rd Report, p. 83)

■ Simhaasuri is identified by Peterson with Simhagiri who was a contemporary of
dramaditya (Peterson's 4th Report, pp. 2722 and 2723a)

(Peterson's 4th Report, pp. cxxx: and cxxvii)

Mun, Dharmavijaya and his pupil Indra-vijaya tell me that Sudhaseṇa Gaṇi

masiata —

maestro —

सुप्रसन्नस्यो अत्रापि स्यात् भारतभूषण

देवः। अमेन वेमाय भवती देवात्मनः सत्य ॥

(Pāṇḍavapurāṇa, noticed in Peterson's 4th Report, p. 187)

ਜਾਇੰਗੇ ਜਾਨਾਪਦੀ (ਜਿਹਾ ਭਾਈ ਘੋਰੀ ਵਿਚਾਰਦੇ ।

कारणादी निपायाश्च नैकं लक्ष्यान् प्रजापते ॥ १४ ॥

(Antiprismosmear, versio 24)

māmeś has been cited by the Hindu philosopher Vācaspati Miśra¹ in explaining Śaṅkarācārya's criticism of the Sādvāda doctrine in the Vedānta-sūtra

Samantabhadra, who was styled a Kavi and whose works

His age

were commented on by Vidyānanda² and

Prabhācandra, was also the author of the

Yuktyanuśāsana, the Ratnakarandaka (also called Upāśakādhya-
yana), the Svayambhū-stotra, and the Caturvimsatī-jina-stuti.
He is mentioned by Jina Sena in the Adipurāṇa composed about
838 A D, and is referred to by the Hindu philosopher Kumārila,³
Kumārila, a contemporary of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, is
generally held to have lived in the 7th century A D. Samanta-
bhadra is supposed to have flourished about 600 A D.

¹ Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāṣaṭī-tīkā on Śaṅkara's exposition of the Vedānta
Sūtra, 2-2-33, quotes the following verse:—

सामाहः सर्वलोकानामाज्ञानं विद्वत्परिहितम् ।

समप्रत्ययवादेनो वेदादेव विवेकम् ॥

(Bhāmatti, Bibliotheca Indica, II 453)

The same verse occurs in the Āptamīmāṃsā as follows:—

सामाहः सर्वलोकानामाज्ञानं विद्वत्परिहितम् ।

समप्रत्ययवादेन वेदादेव विवेकम् ॥ १०३ ॥

(MSB of the Āptamīmāṃsā, verse 103, borrowed from Mr Jain Vaidya of
Jaipur)

² Vidyānanda at the closing part of his commentary on the Āptamīmāṃsā
(called Āpta mīmāṃsā-kāṅkṛtī tīkā aptasāhaṛtī) refers to Samantabhadra thus —

वेदादेवकुर्वीतिनिवृत्तिरिति वेदादेवो भवितुः ।

सामप्रत्ययवादेनो विद्वत्परिहितं ज्ञानं वाच्यम् ।

स वेदादेव समप्रत्ययं विद्वत्तुं शक्यं विद्वत्तुं शक्यम् ।

विद्वत्तुं शक्यं वेदादेवो विद्वत्तुं शक्यं ।

(Folio 218, Āptamīmāṃsā-kāṅkṛtī tīkā, Govt Collection, in the Asiatic Society
of Bengal, No 1325)

Prabhācandra in his commentary on the Ratnakarandaka (or Upāśakādhya-
yana) observes —

वेदाज्ञानमज्ञानं विद्वत्तुं शक्यं ज्ञानं वाच्यम् ।

सामप्रत्ययवादेनो विद्वत्तुं शक्यं ज्ञानं वाच्यम् ।

स वेदादेव समप्रत्ययं विद्वत्तुं शक्यं विद्वत्तुं शक्यम् ।

वेदादेव समप्रत्ययं विद्वत्तुं शक्यं विद्वत्तुं शक्यम् ॥

(Upāśakādhyaṇa with the commentary of Prabhācandra noticed in Peter
son's 4th Report, pp 137-38)

³ Vide Dr R. O. Bhattacharya's Report on Sanskrit MSS during 1883-84, p. 118,
and J. B. B. R. A. S., for 1887, p. 227.

19. SAMANTABHADRA'S ĀPTAMIMĀMSĀ

Syād-vāda

The Āptamimāmsā consists of 115 stanzas in Sanskrit, divided into ten chapters called *Paricchedas*, in the course of which a full exposition of the seven parts of the *Syād-vāda* or *Sapta bhāṅgī-naya* has been given. The first and second parts of the doctrine, viz. *Syād-asti* ("may be, it is"), and *Syād-nāsti* ("may be, it is not"), have led to a most interesting discussion of the relation between *asti*, that is, *bhāva* or existence, and *nāsti*, that is, *abhāva* or non-existence.

Non-existence (*Abhāva*) is divided into four kinds: (1) antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), e.g., a lump of clay becomes non-existent as soon as a jar is made out of it, so the jar is an antecedent non-existence with reference to the lump of clay; (2) subsequent non-existence, e.g., a subsequent non-existence of a thing which has already existed; (3) absolute non-existence, e.g., the inanimate is not a living object.

It is observed¹ that, on the supposition of mere existence to the entire exclusion of non-existence, things become all-pervading, beginningless, endless, indistinguishable and inconceivable. For instance, if the antecedent non-existence is denied, action and substance become beginningless, while on the denial of the subsequent non-existence, they become endless, and in the absence of

- 1
 भाविकात् सर्वार्थानामभावात्पञ्चमाह ।
 सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाप्यन्यत्राप्यन्यत्र ॥ ८ ॥
 कार्यद्वयमन्यथाह । कार्यं प्राकभावात् निवर्त्ते ।
 प्रथमस्य च कार्यस्य पञ्चवेदितव्यं ननु ॥ १० ॥
 सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह । सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह ।
 सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह । सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह ।
 सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह । सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह ।
 सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह । सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह ।
 सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह । सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह ।
 सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह । सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह ।
 सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह । सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह ।
 सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह । सर्वत्रास्त्यन्यथाह ।

mutual non-existence, they become one and all-pervading, while on absolute non-existence being denied, they are to be supposed as existing always and everywhere

In the same way on the supposition of mere non-existence to the entire exclusion of existence, it becomes impossible to establish or reject anything (since it is non-existent). If on the other hand existence and non-existence, which are incompatible with each other, are simultaneously ascribed to a thing, it becomes indescribable. Therefore the truth is as follows —

- (1) A thing is existent—from a certain point of view
 Sevenfold paradox (2) It is non-existent—from another point of view
 (3) It is both existent and non-existent in turn—from a third point of view
 (4) It is indescribable (that is both existent and non-existent simultaneously)—from a fourth point of view
 (5) It is existent and indescribable—from a fifth point of view
 (6) It is non-existent and indescribable—from a sixth point of view
 (7) It is both existent and non-existent and indescribable—from a seventh point of view

20 AKALANKADEVA (ABOUT 750 A D)

Akalanka, otherwise known as Akalankadeva or Akalankacarya.

Āptamīmāṃsā called *Aṣṭa śatī*¹ which is a most precious work on the Jaina philosophy, dealing mainly with logic. Maṇikyaṇandī's *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra* (q v) was based on another work on logic, called *Nyāya-viniścaya*, written by Akalanka, to whom the following works are also attributed: *Tattvārtha vārtika-vyākhyānālāṅkāra*, *Laghīyastraya*, *Akalanka-stotra*, *Svarūpa-sambodhana* and *Prāyaścitta*. *Laghūsamantabhadrā*² in his *Aṣṭa-sāhasī-viṣamapada-tātparya-tikā* calls Akalanka as *Saṭaṭa-tārṅika-cakra-cūdā-maṇi* or "the crest gem of the circle of all logicians."

¹ For an explanation of the term "Kavi" vide O Bhanderkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS during 1943-54, page 122.

² A manuscript of the *Aṣṭa śatī* was kindly supplied to me by Mr Jain Vaidya of Jaipur early in 1907.

³ Vide *Aṣṭasāhasī viṣamapada tātparya tikā* by Laghūsamanta bhadrā, noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p 217.

Ինքնագրող հեղինակը գրում է երևանակի անհատական լեզուներով:

Author of "The Great Gatsby"

He is a

且據

dba philo
Dharmaki
Sureśvara

Patra Kesari or **Patra Kesari Svāmi**, who has been praised by Jina

The lines in Chapter X referred to run thus —

नीमद्वयसहस्रविहारी समस्तभद्रोद्दिश्य सत्सुखात् ।

पुस्तकालय संविधान, १९४७ ई. १९४७ ई.

(Aptaakhaari, 1859, Asiatic Society of Bengal)

१. यदुक्तं चण्डीतंत्रिणा ।—

ਅਨੁਕੂਲ ਭਰਾਤਮਕ ਮਾਹੌਲ ਵਿਚ ਪੜ੍ਹਾਈ ।

शामाश्विपञ्चमोऽंशः सप्तमेऽहसि स्थितः ।

(Quoted in Astasheer, chap I)

अर्थात् वही देवपुत्र पुनः काले अवतारपीडनम्

शक्योदयसंयंत शोऽर्थो जगदिमो भवेत् ।

(Quoted in *AstaeKharfi*, chap. II)

¹ *प्रजापदस्यैव* यथा ३-१००

अमरवर्णोऽपि स्यात् प्रथमकारणवत् इति ।

तस्यामर्थात् प्रमः यथाह मतः कर्ता भतीष्वे ।

(Quoted in *AsterEherti*, chap. I)

This extract may be an interpolation, or else this Prajñāka must be different from the Buddhist logician Prajñāka Gupta to the mentioned hereafter

न कोऽपि प्रत्यसौ लोके चः एवमावभाहवे ।

पञ्चमः विषयभाति सर्वं मन्ते प्रतिष्ठितम् ।

a by Bhartṛhari is quoted in the *Aśtaśākhī*, vide

अभिज्ञान १

[illegible]

and the

ed by Manohar Lal, Bombay.

Sena in the *Ādi Purāṇa*¹ composed about Śaka 760² or A.D. 835. He is believed to have lived early in the 9th century A.D.³ at Pāṭaliputra.⁴

22 MANIKYA NANDI (ABOUT 800 A.D.)

Manikya Nandi was a Digambara author whose *Parikṣā mukha sūtra*⁵ or *Parikṣā mukha sūtra* is a standard work on Jaina logic. As his work is based on that of Akalanka,⁶ he must have lived after 750 A.D. The earliest commentary on the *Parikṣāmukha-sūtra* is the *Prameya-kamala mātṛtāṇḍa* of Prabhācandra. Vidyānanda, Manikya Nandi and Prabhācandra have been pronounced to be contemporaries.⁷ So Manikya Nandi seems to have lived about 800 A.D.

23 MANIKYA NANDI'S PARIKṢĀMUKHA SŪTRA

The *Parikṣāmukha-sūtra* is divided into six chapters thus:
 Subjects (1) the characteristic of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa śārāṅga*); (2) direct apprehension or perception (*Pratyakṣa*), (3) indirect apprehension (*Parokṣa*), (4) the object of valid knowledge (*Vastu*), (5) the result of valid knowledge (*Phala*) and (6) the semblances or fallacies (*Ālambana*).

परीक्षक विचार परीक्षवर्तिनः सूत्रः ।

विदुषः सुवचनस्य साक्षात्परिनिर्वाणः ॥ १ ॥

(1) *Parikṣa* quoted by Mr. K. H. Puri in J. B. R. A. S. for 1912 p. 272.

Mr. Puri has quoted *Parikṣā-sūtra* to show that Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra were identical.

एषः सुवचनस्य विदुषः सुवचनस्य साक्षात्परिनिर्वाणः सुवचनं च विदुषः साक्षात्परिनिर्वाणः ॥ १ ॥

As Mr. K. H. Puri has written in *Journal of B. R. A. S.* for 1912 pp. 17-18.

1. *Parikṣā-sūtra* quoted by Mr. K. H. Puri in *Journal of B. R. A. S.* for 1912 p. 272.

2. A manuscript of the *Parikṣā-sūtra* quoted by Mr. Puri in *Journal of B. R. A. S.* for 1912 p. 272. The manuscript is a copy of the work of the author of the *Parikṣā-sūtra*. I have put it in the list of the works of the author of the *Parikṣā-sūtra*.

3. *Parikṣā-sūtra* quoted by Mr. Puri in *Journal of B. R. A. S.* for 1912 p. 272. The manuscript is a copy of the work of the author of the *Parikṣā-sūtra*. I have put it in the list of the works of the author of the *Parikṣā-sūtra*.

परीक्षक विचार परीक्षवर्तिनः सूत्रः ।

विदुषः सुवचनस्य साक्षात्परिनिर्वाणः ॥ १ ॥

4. *Parikṣā-sūtra* quoted by Mr. Puri in *Journal of B. R. A. S.* for 1912 p. 272. The manuscript is a copy of the work of the author of the *Parikṣā-sūtra*. I have put it in the list of the works of the author of the *Parikṣā-sūtra*.

Valid knowledge—*Pramāṇa*

Pramāṇa, valid knowledge, = defined by Māhikya Nandi as
 Right knowledge knowledge which ascertains the nature
 what was uncertain to one's self. It gen-
 ally arises in the form "I know the jar by myself," which c-

and the scripture (*Āgama*) Recollection is a knowl-edge of the fo-

Kinds of right know- "that" which arises through the awak-
 ledge of impressions, thus "that Devadatta

Recognition is a knowledge which ar-
 from perception through recollection in the forms, "this is the
 "this is like that," "this is different from that," "this is
 counterpart of that," etc., thus: "this is that Devadatta," "
Bos gaurus is like the cow," "the buffalo is different fr
 the cow," "this is far from that," "this is a tree," etc. As-
 sentmentation is a knowledge of the connection between the mi-
 term and the major term based on the presence or absence of
 latter, in the form, "if this is, that is, if this is not, that is no
 thus smoke arises only if there is fire, but it cannot arise if th
 is no fire Inference' is the knowledge of the major term aru
 through the middle term. there is fire here, because there is am-

middle term is called *saddhāna* or that by which it is to be proved. Sometimes the major term is also called *dharma* or predicate, and the middle term *liṅga*, mark or sign.

The minor term is called *ṭakṣa*, the place or locus (in which the major term abides, or *Dharmas*, the subject, thus: "this place is fiery"; "sound is mutable" here "this place" and "sound" are the minor terms. No philosophers, who divide the middle term (reason) into three phases, should dispense with the minor term in an inference.

The middle term (*Hetu*) is defined as that which is inseparably connected with the major term, or in other words, which cannot come into existence unless the major term exists. For instance, smoke could not come into existence unless the fire existed.

Reason—*Hetu*

The middle term or reason (*Hetu*) is divided as (1) perceptible (*upalabdhi*), and (2) imperceptible (*anupalabdhi*). Each of these again may occur in the form of an affirmation (*vidhi*) or negation (*pratishedha*).

The perceptible reason in the affirmative form admits of six subdivisions according as it is —

- (i) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—sound is mutable, because it is factitious.
- (ii) the effect (*lārya*)—the man has not become old because there is no son.
- (iii) the prior (*pūrvā*)—the Rohini stars will rise, for the Kṛttikā have risen.
- (iv) the posterior (*ustara*)—the Bharani stars certainly rose for the Kṛttikā have risen.
- (v) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—the man had a mother, for he had a father, or this mango has a particular colour because it has a particular flavour.

The perceptible reason in the negative form admits of six subdivisions as follows.—

- (i) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—there is no cold sensation, because of heat.
- (ii) an effect (*lārya*)—there is no cold sensation because of smoke.
- (iii) the prior (*pūrvā*)—the Rohini stars will not rise, for the Kṛttikā have not risen.
- (iv) the posterior (*ustara*)—the Bharani stars certainly did not rise for the Kṛttikā have not risen.
- (v) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—the man had no mother, for he had no father, or this mango has no particular colour because it has no particular flavour.

- (v) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharani did not rise a moment ago, for the Pusa has risen
 (vi) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—there is no doubt of the existence of the other side of this wall, for this side of it is perceived

The imperceptible reason in the negative form admits of seven subdivisions as follows —

- (i) identity (*svabhāva*)—there is no jar here, because it is imperceptible,
 (ii) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—there is no Śimsapā here, because there is no tree at all,
 (iii) an effect (*kārya*)—there is no smouldering fire here, because there is no smoke,
 (iv) a cause (*kāraṇa*)—there is no smoke here, because there is no fire,
 (v) prior (*pūrva*)—Rohini stars will not rise in a moment, for the Kṛttikā are not perceptible,
 (vi) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharani did not rise a moment ago, for the Kṛttikā are not perceptible,
 (vii) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—in this even balance there is no bending upwards, because it is not perceptible

The imperceptible reason in the affirmative form may appear in the following ways —

- (i) as an effect (*kārya*)—in this man there is some disease, because there is no healthy movement in him;
 (ii) as a cause (*kāraṇa*)—this man is sorrowful, because he has no union with his beloved ones;
 (iii) as an identity (*svabhāva*)—there is uncertainty here, because certainty is not discernible

Example—*dṛṣṭānta*

The middle term and the major term are the parts of an inference, but the example (*udāharana*) is not. Nevertheless for the sake of explaining matters to men of small intellect, the example (*udāharana* or *dṛṣṭānta*), nay, even the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*), are admitted as parts of an inference. The example is of two kinds: (1) the affirmative or homogeneous (*samaya* or *sādharmaṇya*) which shows the middle term as covered by the major term, such as: wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen; and (2) the negative or heterogeneous (*vyatireki* or *raidharmaṇya*) by which the absence of the middle term is indicated by the absence of the major term, e.g. wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a lake.

est commentary on the Parikṣa-mukha sūtra of Māṇikya Nandi. He was also the author of the Nyāya-kumuda-candrodaya (or briefly Candrodaya), a commentary on the Laghūyāstrapañcīka of Akalanka. He has in his Prameya-kamala-mārtanda mentioned Bhagavan Upavarṣa, Śabarasaṁvāmi, Bhartṛhari, Bāṇa, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Dignāga, Uddyotakara, Dharmakīrti, Vidyānanda and others. He himself has been mentioned by Jina Sena in the Jñāna-purāṇa¹ composed about Saka 760 or A.D. 838. Prabhā Candra as a contemporary of Māṇikya Nandi and Vidyānanda, is believed to have lived in the first half of the 9th century A.D.

25. RAHASA NANDI (CIRCA 850 A.D.)

Rahasa Nandi, author of the Nyāya-kumuda-candrodaya and work called...

and before 1444 A.D., which is the date of the copy of the work acquired for the Bombay Government.²

26. MALLAVĀDIN (ABOUT 827 A.D.)

He belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the famous author of a commentary on the Buddhist logical treatise Nyāy...

¹ Prabhā Candra has quoted the following verses from Bāṇa's Kādambarī —

रजोमये जगति जगद्वन्द्वे
धियो जगतां प्रकटे नव आदौ ।
जगत् सर्वधिति-नाम धेनवे
वर्षीयदाय विमुक्त्याये नमः ॥

(Prameya-kamala-mārtanda, Deccan College, 1893, p. 21a, quoted by J. K. B. Pathak in J. B. B. R. A. S., for 1892, p. 221)

² Prabhā Candra refers to Kumārila, otherwise called Śhaṭṭa, thus —

नया चर्चाविरहितं समाचारं तदर्थं चर्चाविरहितं ददा मुनी वा चर्चाविरहितं तदर्थं
दत्तव्यावर्तकम् । कुम्हारिकोऽपि वन्देव मातृकादयश्चोक्तम् ॥

(Prameya-kamala-mārtanda, quoted by Mr. J. K. B. Pathak in the J. B. B. R. A. S. for 1922, p. 227)

³ In the Ādi-purāṇa Prabhā Candra is thus mentioned —

चर्चाविरहितं समाचारं तदर्थं चर्चाविरहितं ददा मुनी वा चर्चाविरहितं तदर्थं

दत्तव्यावर्तकम् । कुम्हारिकोऽपि वन्देव मातृकादयश्चोक्तम् ॥

(Quoted by Mr. J. K. B. Pathak in J. B. B. R. A. S., for 1892, p. 222)

On p. 227 of the same journal, the date of the Ādi-purāṇa is given as Saka 760 or 834 A.D.

⁴ Peterson's Third Report, p. 47.

29 PRADYUMNA SŪRI (ABOUT 980 A D)

He¹ belonged to the Rājagaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect. In Mānikyācandra's Pārśvanātha caritra,² his prowess in logic discussions is referred to in the following terms —

"There was born the preceptor Pradyumna Sūri—the first of his kind who removed all corrupt

made his irrelevant opponents to sweat and thereby to cure of the fever of pride."

In the same work reference is made to his victory over the Digambaras of Venkapattā in the presence of the king of the province. He delighted the kings of various countries by no fewer than eighty-four triumphs in discussion. He was eleven generations from Mānikyācandra Sūri, who wrote his Pārśvanātha caritra in Samvat 1276 or 1219 A D. Pradyumna must have flourished about 980 A D, for he was the preceptor of Abhayadeva Sūri (q v.) who lived a little before 1039 A D.

30 ABHAYADEVA SŪRI (ABOUT 1000 A D)

Abhayadeva Sūri belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect³, and was the pupil and successor of Pradyumna Sūri of the Rājagaccha. He was an eminent logician and author of Vādamahārpaṇa, a treatise

¹ For further particulars about Pradyumna Sūri, see Peterson's 6th Report, p. 151, 152.

पुनः विद्वत्तं विद्वत्तमपि विद्वत्तमुत्तमं
जगत्ता वनपुत्रं अथावधिष्यत्तुल्यमिदं
॥२॥ ॥३॥ ॥४॥ ॥५॥ ॥६॥ ॥७॥ ॥८॥ ॥९॥ ॥१०॥
॥११॥ ॥१२॥ ॥१३॥ ॥१४॥ ॥१५॥ ॥१६॥ ॥१७॥ ॥१८॥ ॥१९॥ ॥२०॥
॥२१॥ ॥२२॥ ॥२३॥ ॥२४॥ ॥२५॥ ॥२६॥ ॥२७॥ ॥२८॥ ॥२९॥ ॥३०॥
॥३१॥ ॥३२॥ ॥३३॥ ॥३४॥ ॥३५॥ ॥३६॥ ॥३७॥ ॥३८॥ ॥३९॥ ॥४०॥
॥४१॥ ॥४२॥ ॥४३॥ ॥४४॥ ॥४५॥ ॥४६॥ ॥४७॥ ॥४८॥ ॥४९॥ ॥५०॥
॥५१॥ ॥५२॥ ॥५३॥ ॥५४॥ ॥५५॥ ॥५६॥ ॥५७॥ ॥५८॥ ॥५९॥ ॥६०॥
॥६१॥ ॥६२॥ ॥६३॥ ॥६४॥ ॥६५॥ ॥६६॥ ॥६७॥ ॥६८॥ ॥६९॥ ॥७०॥
॥७१॥ ॥७२॥ ॥७३॥ ॥७४॥ ॥७५॥ ॥७६॥ ॥७७॥ ॥७८॥ ॥७९॥ ॥८०॥
॥८१॥ ॥८२॥ ॥८३॥ ॥८४॥ ॥८५॥ ॥८६॥ ॥८७॥ ॥८८॥ ॥८९॥ ॥९०॥
॥९१॥ ॥९२॥ ॥९३॥ ॥९४॥ ॥९५॥ ॥९६॥ ॥९७॥ ॥९८॥ ॥९९॥ ॥१००॥

² The text is as given by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 87-100.

³ The text is as given by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 87-100.

ise on logic called the Ocean of Discussions, and of a commentary on the Sammati-tarka-sūtra called Tattvārtha-bodha-vidhāyini.¹ "He is described as a lion that roamed at ease in the wild forest of books on logic. That the might not sweep away the pa his Vada-mahārṇava." He

31. LAGHUSAMANTABHADRA (ABOUT 1000 A.D.)

He² wrote a commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasī of Vidyāpanda called the Aṣṭasāhasī-viśamapada-tātparyā tīkā³ and seems to have belonged to the Digambara sect and lived about 1000 A.D.

वदामि तिस्रस्तथा ननु वरी कोलादलाद्विही
विना विहरणञ्च विनयतो ग्राह्यो वरीवाचकः ॥ १ ॥
इह मित्राः समये रमेता
दुर्बल इति ज्ञाति ज्ञेयः समेता ।
इति च दीपाव चकार तादा
समयं सर्वं वादनाचारं य ॥ २ ॥
विद्वत्सलकीर्तिमयमपि उक्तं तयोऽर्थं हि-
मिर्मात्रेण निवेद्य समजनि नौपाश्च यद्व-
यं यत्तद्वत्पुण्यजगतीजिह्वोः पुत्र इति ताव-
दादि वादितान् विजित्य विनायकोत्तमं यं यथा ॥ ३ ॥

(Pārivaṅśha-cantara by Miśraśāstra, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, pp 158-59)

¹ See R. Mitra's Catalogue, X, pp 39-40

² For particulars about Abhayadeva Śūri, see Peterson's Fourth Report, p 111

³ Weber's Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse, etc., p. 851, v. 1, 2, and p 121, vv 4-5 Jineśvara Śūri was probably a spiritual brother of Dharmāśvara Śūri

यथाहं वदामि ननु विहि नोपदेयताम्
अरीदीनपदेऽहं इति विद्वत्सलपदेऽपि यः ।
मयेऽहं ननु वदामि ननु (२) दत्ताविविद्यायुः (२)
गताविविद्यायुः चिदं पुत्रि प्रवर्तु नौपाश्चिद्वि- ज्ञाति ॥

of women [at the court of Jaya-simha-deva at Anahilla-na in N. Guzerat] and thereby practically stopped the

ord Śrī Deva Sūri, who was the crest-gem of the pupils of, emed Municandra Sūri and succeeded him in his patta chair), conquered the Digambaras in the council-room of ya-simha Deva and raised a pillar of victory by maintain- nirvāṇa or salvation of women [that is, holding that even were capable of attaining nirvāṇa]

चन्द्राद्विषयैः वैशाखे पूर्वमादिने ।

जाद्वयो वादिमाकाशो वादिमिमादिनो ॥

Shāvakacar, XXI, v 95, quoted by Dr Kiatt in his article on "History of the Jains" in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1892, p 251)

Upadēśa Sūri observes:—

मिमांसी निबन्धनरितमभिर्मीमांस्यमानि ।

यदे के विनिर्दिष्टमस्तदनु च नोद्विष्यतिभुः ।

आकाशे च चरित्तेष्वपदेऽप्युक्तदिग्वापरा

स्त्रीनिर्वाचनार्थेनैव विमलकलाः समुत्पद्यन्ते ॥

तत्राप्यप्यपि भवत्यत्र नुवचामभिरामोद्वा

चीमर्तव्यरूपेण युचिषिष्यतआमचोदये ।

चीरममस्तुतिभिः सुमहते नोद्विष्यतिभुः

मिमे विमलकलाः समुत्पद्यन्ते विनिर्दिष्टवाचिनाम् ॥

(Upadēśa Sūri's, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, p 167)

Upadēśa Sūri, in his Gurvāṇi composed in Śāhval 1666, gives a similar

मिमांस्यमनुमतिरिति सुवादिनीका-

कलीकपण्यवयवमप्युक्तमिमांस्यो ।

वादापरे कुतश्चन्द्राद्विषयवरेण

नोद्विष्यतिमिमांस्यदि पचनेऽस्ति ॥ ७७ ॥

आकाशवयवमप्युक्तमिमांस्यो

तदे च केचि नचि देवद्विष्यति ।

नमस्तुविमलकलादिनाम्

॥ ७८ ॥

In Samvat 1204 or 1147 A D Deva Sūri founded a caitya, raised a *vimba* at Phalavardhigrāma, and established an image of Neminātha at Arāsana¹. He was born in Samvat 1143 or 1086 A D, attained the rank of Sūri in 1174 Samvat or 1117 A D, and ascended to heaven in Samvat 1226 or 1169 A D².

35 DEVA SŪRI'S *Pramāṇa naya tattvālokālaṅkāra*

Pramāṇa—right knowledge

The *Pramāṇa naya tattvālokālaṅkāra*³ consists of eight chapters (*pariccheda*), viz —

| | |
|---|--|
| Subjects of the <i>Pramāṇa naya tattvālokālaṅkāra</i> | (1) Determination of the nature of valid knowledge (<i>pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya</i>); (2) determination of the nature of perception (<i>pratyakṣa-svarūpa-nirṇaya</i>), (3) determin- |
|---|--|

verbal testimony of scripture (*śāstrīya-pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*), (5) determination of the nature of objects of knowledge (*viśaya-svarūpa-nirṇaya*), (6) determination of the consequences and fallacies of knowledge (*phala pramāṇa-svarūpādhyābhāsa-nirṇaya*); (7) determination of the nature of one-sided knowledge (*nayātma-*

| | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Nature of right or valid knowledge | ledge which ascertains the nature of itself as well as other things. The intercourse between the sense-organs and the objects of |
|------------------------------------|--|

¹ Fiske Peterson's Fourth Report, p. 11. also Klatt, Ind. Ant. XI p. 254

²
 मिथिदेदमिह जगद्दीक्षा युष्माकरेश्वरे ।
 देवावस्यस्ये नमो हरिजनमन्त्र प्रधीतः ।
 एषमुष्माकरो नमो नावसे नासि सज्जते ।
 ज्ञानवसुधा समस्तवपराङ्गे गुरोर्दिशि ।
 नमोस्तुभ्यस्तु स्तोत्रं प्रतिबोध पुरन्दर-
 बोधका ह्य वे जगद्दिग्विरोचनस्य ॥

(Prabhāvakṣar, XXI vs. 287 seq. quoted by Dr Klatt in his article on "Historical Records of the Jains" in the Indian Antiquary, Sept. 1892, Vol. XI, p. 254). According to some authorities Deva Sūri was born in Samvat 1134 or 1077 A.D.

The *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* has been printed and published in Benares in the Jaina Yashovijaya series.

sense is not *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), for though it can ascertain the nature of objects outside itself, it cannot ascertain its own nature, since it has no consciousness. *Pramāṇa* must certainly be *knowledge*, for it is capable of choosing what is desirable and rejecting what is undesirable. It must also be definite in character, for it is opposed to superimposition (*samāropa*). Superimposition = of three kinds (1) inversion (*viparyaya*)—such as looking upon a pearl oyster as a piece of silver, (2) doubt (*samśaya*)—such as is this a post or a man? and (3) uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*) consisting in a mere cogitation in the mind as to what the thing might be.

Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) is of two kinds (1) direct (*pratyakṣa*, perception) and (2) indirect (*parokṣa*, outside the senses). The direct knowledge or perception is of two kinds: practical (*sām-*

including *avadhī-jñāna* (limited knowledge), i.e. knowledge of special objects which, near or remote, are not differentiated, and *manah-pariyāya*, i.e. definite knowledge of another's thoughts and the laying bare of the secrets of the heart, and (2) *sakala*, i.e. perfect, which is the unobstructed intuition of the entire aspects of a thing. One who possesses that perfect transcendental knowledge is called an *arhat*, a one freed from all faults.

¹ The explanation of *anagraha*, etc., as given here is taken from Col Jarrett's translation of the *Ain-i-Akbari*, published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. III, p. 180, as the portion related to *pramāṇa* in the *Jama* chapter of *Ain-i-Akbari* very closely resembles that in the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokaśāstāra*. Dr R. G. Bhandarkar's explanation of these terms given on p. 23, footnote, of his *Report on Sanskrit MSS.*, for 1883-84, is, however, different.

Inference is of two kinds (1) *svārtha*, for one's own self, and (2) *parārtha*, for the sake of others. *Heṭu* (reason or the middle term) is defined as

that which cannot happen except in connection with the major term. The definition that the *Heṭu* (middle term) is that which possesses three characteristics, is to be rejected as involving fallacies.¹ Those who maintain the threefold characteristic or division of the *Heṭu* (reason or middle term), cannot but admit the necessity of using the minor term (*pakṣa*) in an inference.²

According to some, as the connection or absence of connection between the middle and the major terms can be shown by internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*), the example forming the external inseparable connection (*bahir-vyāpti*) is useless.³ For instance —

The hill (minor term) is fiery (major term), because it is smoky (middle term), as a kitchen (example)

Here the hill is an integral part of the inference, and in it may be found the necessary connection between fire and smoke. Why then should we burden our inference with an example from without? The kitchen certainly shows the same connection; fire and smoke are found together there but it is not an essential

unessential is brought across its track

The application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) as

1 निदितामयानुपपत्तेरुक्तचरो हेतुः न तु निरुक्तचर इति ।

ननु हेतुभाष्यस्यापि धनवान् ॥ ११ ॥

(*Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* Śāstra, Chap. III)

This is an attack on Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist logicians who define the three characteristics of *Heṭu* as follows:—

निरूप्यं पुनर्निर्दिष्टं अनुदेवि कथमेव ।

अथवा इव वक्तव्यं ; अथवा चैव चैव निश्चितम्

(*Nyāyabandha*, Chapter II)

2 निश्चितं वाच्यमभिप्रायेण नान्यदर्थेन निरुक्तम् अ ननु न वक्तव्यमप्येतत् चोक्तव्यम् ॥ ११ ॥

(*Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* Śāstra, Chap. III)

3 अथवा हेतुः वाच्यमप्यपि नान्यदर्थेन च निश्चितमप्येतत् चोक्तव्यम् ॥ ११ ॥

(*Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* Śāstra, Chap. III)

the syllogism are also useless, but these together with the
are to be employed to convince men of small intellect.

Avayava or parts of an inference or
syllogism are therefore stated to be the
—

Pakṣa-pratyaya (use of the minor term, otherwise called propo-
sition) —

non-existence (*abhāva* or *anupalabdhi*) is subdivided as (1)
(2) subsequent
mutual (*śārdhā-*
is kinds of *ābhāsa*
equal testimony (i.e.
as also under the method of one-sided interpretation
there is given an elaborate exposition of the *Saptāṅga-*
sevenfold paralogism). The mediate and immediate results
knowledge (*pramāṇa*) have been clearly laid down.
results of knowledge and the practical use made of them
ed to be not illusory (*samvrtā*), but real (*pāramārthikā*)

Fallacies of *Naya*.

der *naya* (the method of comprehending a thing from
lar points of
thus —

- (5) *Śabdābhāsa* (the verbal fallacy)—occurs when we recognize the distinction of times into past, present and future, but go on attaching one and the same meaning to a word in all the three cases, e.g. if we now use the word "krato" (sacrifice) in the sense of "strength" which it signified a thousand years ago.
- (6) *Samābhīrūdhābhāsa* (the fallacy of the subtle)—occurs when we interpret synonymous words such as Indra, Śakra, Parandara, etc., signifying altogether different things.
- (7) *Īśambhūṭābhāsa* (the fallacy of the such-like)—occurs when a thing is discarded simply because it does not, at the moment, possess the properties implied by the name, e.g. Rāma is not a man (a thinking animal), because he is not at present thinking.

The Soul—*ātma*

The soul (*ātma*) which is the doer and enjoyer, and an embodiment of consciousness, is of the same size as its body. In every person there is a separate soul which, having got rid of the bondage of its *karma* (act-fruits), attains emancipation.

The Method of Debate.

The last chapter expounds the method of debate. Discussion (*Vāda*) consists in assertion and counter-assertion for the establishment of a certain proposition by rejecting its opposite. The disputant or the person who opens the discussion may be eager either to gain a victory or to ascertain a truth. The truth may be sought either for one's own self as a disciple seeks it, or for others as a teacher seeks it. The same remarks apply to the opponent or respondent. There are four constituents of a council of discussion, viz. (1) the disputant (*vādi*), (2) the opponent

members must be acceptable to both the parties in respect of their skill in grasping their dogmas, they must have a good memory, be very learned, and possess genius, patience and impartiality. Their duties consist in stating the assertions and replies of the disputant and his opponent with reference to the particular sub-

must be impartial. His duty consists in judging the speeches of the

parties and the members, as also in preventing quarrels, etc., among them. In the event of the parties being desirous of victory alone, they may continue the discussion with vigour as long as the members wish, but if they are eager to ascertain the truth alone, they may continue the discussion so long as the truth is not ascertained and so long as they retain their vigour.

36 HEMACANDRA SURĪ.
(1088—1172 A D.)

Hemacandra Sūri' (surnamed Kalikāla-sarvaśāṣṭra), born at Dhandhuka in Ahmedabad, was a pupil of Devacandra of the Vajrasākha. He was a contemporary of King Jaya Simha and is said to have been the preceptor of Māharāja Kumāra Pāla of Guzerat about Samvat 1199-1229. He was the author of a large number of works such as Karmasiddhi-samuccaya, Śāstradīpanī, Abhinavagrāha, Dvāśraya, etc., part of which is

He was also the author of a most important work on logic called *Pramāṇa mīmāṃsā*,² on which he himself wrote a commentary. This work, which is divided into five chapters, is written in the *Sūtra* or aphoristic style, and not in the form of a *pralāna* (expository treatise).

He was a spiritual brother of Pradyumna Śūri,⁴ was born in Samvat 1145 or 1088 A.D., took the vow (*vratā*) in 1150 Samvat or 1093 A.D., attained the rank of Śūri in 1168 Samvat

¹ For details about Hemacandra, see Bühler's "Ueber das Leben des Jama Monches Hemacandra", Peterson's Fourth Report, p. cxh, and p. 82, and also Peterson's lecture on the story of Hema Candra published in the *Bombay Gazette*, August 28, 1895.

¹ A manuscript of the *Pravāna-mīmāṃsā* with a commentary by the author himself has been noticed by Peterson in his Fifth Report on Sanskrit MSS, pp 147-149. In explaining why the *Pravāna-mīmāṃsā* was written in the form of aphorisms, Hemacandra in the first chapter of the commentary says —

यथाकमुच्छिरित्यानि सङ्कषमाक्षय्यामधिमुत्तानि तन्नाशेष्ययोति पद्यमकङ्कह-
धर्मोत्तानादिवत् प्रकरणेन हि आरभ्यते किमनया सूत्रकात्माद्योपपत्तिरपि नैव दोषः । भिन्न
वर्तिष्यं जनकनो माया क्षेत्रादिति चोत्तानात्माद्योपपत्तिरपि नैव दोषः । भिन्न
वर्तमानाद्योः पदभिरपि मायाक्षेत्रादिति चोत्तानात्माद्योपपत्तिरपि नैव दोषः । भिन्न
वर्तमानाद्योः पदभिरपि मायाक्षेत्रादिति चोत्तानात्माद्योपपत्तिरपि नैव दोषः । भिन्न

(Quoted in Peterson's Fifth Report, p. 148)

चौमोसुप्रकुलेऽथवदुषनिधिं प्रत्युत्सृष्टिषु-
र्वैश्वं दंष्ट्रा स धिक्चौमनिधये चौमोत्सृष्टिनिधिः ॥

(Candraseena's commentary on *Utpadadibhaskarana*, a manuscript of which is noticed in Peterson's Third Report, p. 209)

word of the Arhata like a mother by his 1,400 works. He is said to have used the word *viraha* (separation or sorrow) as his mark in the last verse of each of his works. He was by birth a Brahmana and was chaplain to king Jitāri whose capital was Chittore near the Citrakūṭa hill.¹ He was instructed in the Jaina doctrine by Jinabhaṭa. Two of his pupils, named Hamsa and Parama hamsa, are said to have left him as missionaries of the Jaina faith, and to have been slain in the Bhota country (Tibet) by the fanatical Buddhists whom they sought to convert. The sorrow caused by the death of these two pupils is said to have been symbolised in the word *viraha*.

It is generally supposed that Haribhadra Śāri, whose pupils were killed in Tibet, was the first author of that name. But there will be no inconsistency if we suppose him to be the second Haribhadra Śāri, for the religious intercourse between India and Tibet was more frequent in the 12th century A D than in the 5th century, when Tibet had scarcely emerged into the ken of history.

41 PĀRŚVADEVA GAṆĪ (1133 A D).

Pārśvadeva was the author of a commentary on Nyāya-praveśa, called Nyāyaspravaveśapañjikā.² He assisted Amradeva Śāri in Samvat 1190 or 1133 A D in writing his commentary on the Akhyāna-maṇi-kośa of Nemicaṇḍra.³

42 ŚRICANDRA (ABOUT 1137—1165 A D)

Candra or rather Śri Candra,⁴ a disciple of Hema Candra Śāri of the Harṣapuriya gaccha wrote about 1137 A D a work

¹ Vide Introduction to Śaṅkaraśāstrīya published in the Chowkhamba series, Benares, and Peterson's Third Report p. 33.

² दुर्गाचार्यादि दुष्कृतप्रवेदवचोदर विषयवि २२२ पत्रम् ।

साधवैदवचवि विषये दुर्गाके साधने समुचितानि वि विहितेवम् ।

(Quoted in Peterson's First Report, p. 81)

³ Peterson's Fourth Part, p. xxvii

⁴ Vide "Jainistic Notices" by Professor N. D. Mironow published as a Bulletin of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, 1911.

⁵ Vide Peterson's Fourth Report, pp. xxvii-xxviii

43. DEVABHADRA (ABOUT 1150 A D.)

Devabhadra,¹ a disciple of both Hemacandra Sūri and Śrī Candra,² was the author of a logical treatise entitled the *Nyāyāvatāra-tippaṇa*, a super-commentary on the *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti*. In this work there are quotations from Vindhyavāsini, Dharmabīrti, Dharmottara, Jñānāśrī Mitra³ and others. He lived about 1150 A D.

44. CANDRASENA SŪRI (ABOUT 1150 A D.)

Candrasena, who seems to have been a pupil of Pradyumna Sūri, wrote, with the assistance of Nemicaandra, a work called *Utpāda-siddhi-prakaraṇa* with a commentary on the same in Sanskrit in Samvat 1207 or 1150 A D.⁴

45. RATNAPRABHA SŪRI (1181 A D.)

Ratnaprabha Sūri, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, was a logician of repute, being the author of a light commentary (*laghu-ṭīkā*) on the *Pramāṇa-naya tattvālokāṅkāra* called *Syādvāda-ratnākara-vatīrikā*,⁵ in which are quoted the views of the Buddhist logicians Arcata (q v) and Dharmottara (q v.).

¹ Vide "Devabhadra and his *Nyāyāvatāra-tippaṇa*" in the *Januario Notices* by Professor N D Mironov published as a Bulletin of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg, 1911.

² Vide also Peterson's Fourth Report, p. liv.

³ *सिद्धिप्रकाशनां नमः इति सर्वेषु वाक्येषु ।
नमः सिद्धिप्रकाशने नमः इति सिद्धिप्रकाशने ।*

(Preface of *Pāṇḍava-candra*)

⁴ Devabhadra, in his *Nyāyāvatāra-tippaṇa*, quotes Jñānāśrī Mitra thus —

⁵ *ननु चार्थक्रियासामर्थ्येव सत्यं मान्यम् । ननु हि ज्ञानेनैव — यदि ज्ञानं इति सर्वं न
सत्यमेव सत्यं चार्थक्रियासामर्थ्येव सत्यमभिप्रेतमिति ।*

⁶ *दाहमवर्तमानेषु यो विज्ञायते तेषु तुल्यमिति ।
यदेव सत्यमिति साक्षात् वाच्यं नैवेति ।*

(Colophon of *Saṅkha Utpāda-siddhi-prakaraṇa* quoted in Peterson's Third Report, p. 209).

⁷ *प्रमाणं च इति च वाक्यानां बुद्धिप्रतिपत्तिः ।
किञ्चित् सत्यवाक्यानां वाच्यत्वं वाच्यम् ।
इति यत्किञ्चित् बुद्धिं नोक्तं च वाच्यम् ।
ननु वाच्यत्वं वाच्यं नैवेति ।*

(*Syādvāda-ratnākara-vatīrikā*, Muni Dharmavijaya's MSS., p. 98). A part of the *Syādvāda-ratnākara-vatīrikā* has been printed and published in the Benares Jaina Yāśovijaya series.

While in Broach at the Āśvāvabodhatīrtha in Śamvat 1233 or 1181 A.D., he wrote another work called Upadeśamālā-vṛtti¹ to please Bhadrēśvara Sūri and in payment of the debt he owed to Vijayasena Sūri, the brother of Bhadrēśvara. There he gives his spiritual descent in the Vṛhadgaccha as follows: (1) Munīcandra Sūri, (2) Deva Sūri, (3) Bhadrēśvara Sūri, and (4) Ratna-prabha Sūri².

46 TILAKĀCĀRYA
(ABOUT 1180—1240 A.D.).

Tilaka Ācārya, who belonged to the Candragaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect, was a spiritual descendant of Candraprabha Sūri through Dharmaghōṣa, Cakreśvara and Śivaprabha. He was author of several works such as the Āvaśyaka-laghu-vṛtti written in 1239 A.D., and, the Pratyeka-buddha-caritra in 1204 A.D.³

47 MALLISENA SCRI
(1292 A.D.)

Mallisena belonged to the Nagendra Gaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect, and was the author of the Śyādvāda-maṅjarī, a commentary on Hemacandra's Vitarāga-stuti or Dvātrīṃśikā. The Śyādvāda-maṅjarī contains an exposition of the Pramāṇa, Saptaśāstī-naya, etc., and criticises Akṣapāda's theories of Pramāṇa, Chakṣu, Jñāna, Nigrahasthāna, etc. The doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, Aśāṅkya, Jaiminiya, Bhāṭṭapāda Vedānta, Yogācāra Mādhyamika, Cārvāka, etc., have also been his favourite subjects of attack. At the close of his work Mallisena describes himself as a pupil of Udaya-prabha Sūri and as having composed the work in Śaka 1214 or A.D. 1292.⁴

1. 101-102-103-104-105-106-107-108-109-110-111-112-113-114-115-116-117-118-119-120-121-122-123-124-125-126-127-128-129-130-131-132-133-134-135-136-137-138-139-140-141-142-143-144-145-146-147-148-149-150-151-152-153-154-155-156-157-158-159-160-161-162-163-164-165-166-167-168-169-170-171-172-173-174-175-176-177-178-179-180-181-182-183-184-185-186-187-188-189-190-191-192-193-194-195-196-197-198-199-200-201-202-203-204-205-206-207-208-209-210-211-212-213-214-215-216-217-218-219-220-221-222-223-224-225-226-227-228-229-230-231-232-233-234-235-236-237-238-239-240-241-242-243-244-245-246-247-248-249-250-251-252-253-254-255-256-257-258-259-260-261-262-263-264-265-266-267-268-269-270-271-272-273-274-275-276-277-278-279-280-281-282-283-284-285-286-287-288-289-290-291-292-293-294-295-296-297-298-299-300-301-302-303-304-305-306-307-308-309-310-311-312-313-314-315-316-317-318-319-320-321-322-323-324-325-326-327-328-329-330-331-332-333-334-335-336-337-338-339-340-341-342-343-344-345-346-347-348-349-350-351-352-353-354-355-356-357-358-359-360-361-362-363-364-365-366-367-368-369-370-371-372-373-374-375-376-377-378-379-380-381-382-383-384-385-386-387-388-389-390-391-392-393-394-395-396-397-398-399-400-401-402-403-404-405-406-407-408-409-410-411-412-413-414-415-416-417-418-419-420-421-422-423-424-425-426-427-428-429-430-431-432-433-434-435-436-437-438-439-440-441-442-443-444-445-446-447-448-449-450-451-452-453-454-455-456-457-458-459-460-461-462-463-464-465-466-467-468-469-470-471-472-473-474-475-476-477-478-479-480-481-482-483-484-485-486-487-488-489-490-491-492-493-494-495-496-497-498-499-500-501-502-503-504-505-506-507-508-509-510-511-512-513-514-515-516-517-518-519-520-521-522-523-524-525-526-527-528-529-530-531-532-533-534-535-536-537-538-539-540-541-542-543-544-545-546-547-548-549-550-551-552-553-554-555-556-557-558-559-560-561-562-563-564-565-566-567-568-569-570-571-572-573-574-575-576-577-578-579-580-581-582-583-584-585-586-587-588-589-590-591-592-593-594-595-596-597-598-599-600-601-602-603-604-605-606-607-608-609-610-611-612-613-614-615-616-617-618-619-620-621-622-623-624-625-626-627-628-629-630-631-632-633-634-635-636-637-638-639-640-641-642-643-644-645-646-647-648-649-650-651-652-653-654-655-656-657-658-659-660-661-662-663-664-665-666-667-668-669-670-671-672-673-674-675-676-677-678-679-680-681-682-683-684-685-686-687-688-689-690-691-692-693-694-695-696-697-698-699-700-701-702-703-704-705-706-707-708-709-710-711-712-713-714-715-716-717-718-719-720-721-722-723-724-725-726-727-728-729-730-731-732-733-734-735-736-737-738-739-740-741-742-743-744-745-746-747-748-749-750-751-752-753-754-755-756-757-758-759-760-761-762-763-764-765-766-767-768-769-770-771-772-773-774-775-776-777-778-779-780-781-782-783-784-785-786-787-788-789-790-791-792-793-794-795-796-797-798-799-800-801-802-803-804-805-806-807-808-809-810-811-812-813-814-815-816-817-818-819-820-821-822-823-824-825-826-827-828-829-830-831-832-833-834-835-836-837-838-839-840-841-842-843-844-845-846-847-848-849-850-851-852-853-854-855-856-857-858-859-860-861-862-863-864-865-866-867-868-869-870-871-872-873-874-875-876-877-878-879-880-881-882-883-884-885-886-887-888-889-890-891-892-893-894-895-896-897-898-899-900-901-902-903-904-905-906-907-908-909-910-911-912-913-914-915-916-917-918-919-920-921-922-923-924-925-926-927-928-929-930-931-932-933-934-935-936-937-938-939-940-941-942-943-944-945-946-947-948-949-950-951-952-953-954-955-956-957-958-959-960-961-962-963-964-965-966-967-968-969-970-971-972-973-974-975-976-977-978-979-980-981-982-983-984-985-986-987-988-989-990-991-992-993-994-995-996-997-998-999-1000-1001-1002-1003-1004-1005-1006-1007-1008-1009-1010-1011-1012-1013-1014-1015-1016-1017-1018-1019-1020-1021-1022-1023-1024-1025-1026-1027-1028-1029-1030-1031-1032-1033-1034-1035-1036-1037-1038-1039-1040-1041-1042-1043-1044-1045-1046-1047-1048-1049-1050-1051-1052-1053-1054-1055-1056-1057-1058-1059-1060-1061-1062-1063-1064-1065-1066-1067-1068-1069-1070-1071-1072-1073-1074-1075-1076-1077-1078-1079-1080-1081-1082-1083-1084-1085-1086-1087-1088-1089-1090-1091-1092-1093-1094-1095-1096-1097-1098-1099-1100-1101-1102-1103-1104-1105-1106-1107-1108-1109-1110-1111-1112-1113-1114-1115-1116-1117-1118-1119-1120-1121-1122-1123-1124-1125-1126-1127-1128-1129-1130-1131-1132-1133-1134-1135-1136-1137-1138-1139-1140-1141-1142-1143-1144-1145-1146-1147-1148-1149-1150-1151-1152-1153-1154-1155-1156-1157-1158-1159-1160-1161-1162-1163-1164-1165-1166-1167-1168-1169-1170-1171-1172-1173-1174-1175-1176-1177-1178-1179-1180-1181-1182-1183-1184-1185-1186-1187-1188-1189-1190-1191-1192-1193-1194-1195-1196-1197-1198-1199-1200-1201-1202-1203-1204-1205-1206-1207-1208-1209-1210-1211-1212-1213-1214-1215-1216-1217-1218-1219-1220-1221-1222-1223-1224-1225-1226-1227-1228-1229-1230-1231-1232-1233-1234-1235-1236-1237-1238-1239-1240-1241-1242-1243-1244-1245-1246-1247-1248-1249-1250-1251-1252-1253-1254-1255-1256-1257-1258-1259-1260-1261-1262-1263-1264-1265-1266-1267-1268-1269-1270-1271-1272-1273-1274-1275-1276-1277-1278-1279-1280-1281-1282-1283-1284-1285-1286-1287-1288-1289-1290-1291-1292-1293-1294-1295-1296-1297-1298-1299-1300-1301-1302-1303-1304-1305-1306-1307-1308-1309-1310-1311-1312-1313-1314-1315-1316-1317-1318-1319-1320-1321-1322-1323-1324-1325-1326-1327-1328-1329-1330-1331-1332-1333-1334-1335-1336-1337-1338-1339-1340-1341-1342-1343-1344-1345-1346-1347-1348-1349-1350-1351-1352-1353-1354-1355-1356-1357-1358-1359-1360-1361-1362-1363-1364-1365-1366-1367-1368-1369-1370-1371-1372-1373-1374-1375-1376-1377-1378-1379-1380-1381-1382-1383-1384-1385-1386-1387-1388-1389-1390-1391-1392-1393-1394-1395-1396-1397-1398-1399-1400-1401-1402-1403-1404-1405-1406-1407-1408-1409-1410-1411-1412-1413-1414-1415-1416-1417-1418-1419-1420-1421-1422-1423-1424-1425-1426-1427-1428-1429-1430-1431-1432-1433-1434-1435-1436-1437-1438-1439-1440-1441-1442-1443-1444-1445-1446-1447-1448-1449-1450-1451-1452-1453-1454-1455-1456-1457-1458-1459-1460-1461-1462-1463-1464-1465-1466-1467-1468-1469-1470-1471-1472-1473-1474-1475-1476-1477-1478-1479-1480-1481-1482-1483-1484-1485-1486-1487-1488-1489-1490-1491-1492-1493-1494-1495-1496-1497-1498-1499-1500-1501-1502-1503-1504-1505-1506-1507-1508-1509-1510-1511-1512-1513-1514-1515-1516-1517-1518-1519-1520-1521-1522-1523-1524-1525-1526-1527-1528-1529-1530-1531-1532-1533-1534-1535-1536-1537-1538-1539-1540-1541-1542-1543-1544-1545-1546-1547-1548-1549-1550-1551-1552-1553-1554-1555-1556-1557-1558-1559-1560-1561-1562-1563-1564-1565-1566-1567-1568-1569-1570-1571-1572-1573-1574-1575-1576-1577-1578-1579-1580-1581-1582-1583-1584-1585-1586-1587-1588-1589-1590-1591-1592-1593-1594-1595-1596-1597-1598-1599-1600-1601-1602-1603-1604-1605-1606-1607-1608-1609-1610-1611-1612-1613-1614-1615-1616-1617-1618-1619-1620-1621-1622-1623-1624-1625-1626-1627-1628-1629-1630-1631-1632-1633-1634-1635-1636-1637-1638-1639-1640-1641-1642-1643-1644-1645-1646-1647-1648-1649-1650-1651-1652-1653-1654-1655-1656-1657-1658-1659-1660-1661-1662-1663-1664-1665-1666-1667-1668-1669-1670-1671-1672-1673-1674-1675-1676-1677-1678-1679-1680-1681-1682-1683-1684-1685-1686-1687-1688-1689-1690-1691-1692-1693-1694-1695-1696-1697-1698-1699-1700-1701-1702-1703-1704-1705-1706-1707-1708-1709-1710-1711-1712-1713-1714-1715-1716-1717-1718-1719-1720-1721-1722-1723-1724-1725-1726-1727-1728-1729-1730-1731-1732-1733-1734-1735-1736-1737-1738-1739-1740-1741-1742-1743-1744-1745-1746-1747-1748-1749-1750-1751-1752-1753-1754-1755-1756-1757-1758-1759-1760-1761-1762-1763-1764-1765-1766-1767-1768-1769-1770-1771-1772-1773-1774-1775-1776-1777-1778-1779-1780-1781-1782-1783-1784-1785-1786-1787-1788-1789-1790-1791-1792-1793-1794-1795-1796-1797-1798-1799-1800-1801-1802-1803-1804-1805-1806-1807-1808-1809-1810-1811-1812-1813-1814-1815-1816-1817-1818-1819-1820-1821-1822-1823-1824-1825-1826-1827-1828-1829-1830-1831-1832-1833-1834-1835-1836-1837-1838-1839-1840-1841-1842-1843-1844-1845-1846-1847-1848-1849-1850-1851-1852-1853-1854-1855-1856-1857-1858-1859-1860-1861-1862-1863-1864-1865-1866-1867-1868-1869-1870-1871-1872-1873-1874-1875-1876-1877-1878-1879-1880-1881-1882-1883-1884-1885-1886-1887-1888-1889-1890-1891-1892-1893-1894-1895-1896-1897-1898-1899-1900-1901-1902-1903-1904-1905-1906-1907-1908-1909-1910-1911-1912-1913-1914-1915-1916-1917-1918-1919-1920-1921-1922-1923-1924-1925-1926-1927-1928-1929-1930-1931-1932-1933-1934-1935-1936-1937-1938-1939-1940-1941-1942-1943-1944-1945-1946-1947-1948-1949-1950-1951-1952-1953-1954-1955-1956-1957-1958-1959-1960-1961-1962-1963-1964-1965-1966-1967-1968-1969-1970-1971-1972-1973-1974-1975-1976-1977-1978-1979-1980-1981-1982-1983-1984-1985-1986-1987-1988-1989-1990-1991-1992-1993-1994-1995-1996-1997-1998-1999-2000-2001-2002-2003-2004-2005-2006-2007-2008-2009-2010-2011-2012-2013-2014-2015-2016-2017-2018-2019-2020-2021-2022-2023-2024-2025-2026-2027-2028-2029-2030-2031-2032-2033-2034-2035-2036-2037-2038-2039-2040-2041-2042-2043-2044-2045-2046-2047-2048-2049-2050-2051-2052-2053-2054-2055-2056-2057-2058-2059-2060-2061-2062-2063-2064-2065-2066-2067-2068-2069-2070-2071-2072-2073-2074-2075-2076-2077-2078-2079-2080-2081-2082-2083-2084-2085-2086-2087-2088-2089-2090-2091-2092-2093-2094-2095-2096-2097-2098-2099-2100-2101-2102-2103-2104-2105-2106-2107-2108-2109-2110-2111-2112-2113-2114-2115-2116-2117-2118-2119-2120-2121-2122-2123-2124-2125-2126-2127-2128-2129-2130-2131-2132-2133-2134-2135-2136-2137-2138-2139-2140-2141-2142-2143-2144-2145-2146-2147-2148-2149-2150-2151-2152-2153-2154-2155-2156-2157-2158-2159-2160-2161-2162-2163-2164-2165-2166-2167-2168-2169-2170-2171-2172-2173-2174-2175-2176-2177-2178-2179-2180-2181-2182-2183-2184-2185-2186-2187-2188-2189-2190-2191-2192-2193-2194-2195-2196-2197-2198-2199-2200-2201-2202-2203-2204-2205-2206-2207-2208-2209-2210-2211-2212-2213-2214-2215-2216-2217-2218-2219-2220-2221-2222-2223-2224-2225-2226-2227-2228-2229-2230-2231-2232-2233-2234-2235-2236-2237-2238-2239-2240-2241-2242-2243-2244-2245-2246-2247-2248-2249-2250-2251-2252-2253-2254-2255-2256-2257-2258-2259-2260-2261-2262-2263-2264-2265-2266-2267-2268-2269-2270-2271-2272-2273-2274-2275-2276-2277-2278-2279-2280-2281-2282-2283-2284-2285-2286-2287-2288-2289-2290-2291-2292-2293-2294-2295-2296-2297-2298-2299-2300-2301-2302-2303-2304-2305-2306-2307-2308-2309-2310-2311-2312-2313-2314-2315-2316-2317-2318-2319-2320-2321-2322-2323-2324-2325-2326-2327-2328-2329-2330-2331-2332-2333-2334-2335-2336-2337-2338-2339-2340-2341-2342-2343-2344-2345-2346-2347-2348-2349-2350-2351-2352-2353-2354-2355-2356-2357-2358-2359-2360-2361-2362-2363-2364-2365-2366-2367-2368-2369-2370-2371-2372-2373-2374-2375-2376-2377-2378-2379-2380-2381-2382-2383-2384-2385-2386-2387-2388-2389-2390-2391-2392-2393-2394-2395-2396-2397-2398-2399-2400-2401-2402-2403-2404-2405-2406-2407-2408-2409-2410-2411-2412-2413-2414-2415-2416-2417-2418-2419-2420-2421-2422-2423-2424-2425-2426-2427-2428-2429-2430-2431-2432-2433-2434-2435-2436-2437-2438-2439-2440-2441-2442-2443-2444-2445-2446-2447-2448-2449-2450-2451-2452-2453-2454-2455-2456-2457-2458-2459-2460-2461-2462-2463-2464-2465-2466-2467-2468-2469-2470-2471-2472-2473-2474-2475-2476-2477-2478-2479-2480-2481-2482-2483-2484-2485-2486-2487-2488-2489-2490-2491-2492-2493-2494-2495-2496-2497-2498-2499-2500-2501-2502-2503-2504-2505-2506-2507-2508-2509-2510-2511-2512-2513-2514-2515-2516-2517-2518-2519-2520-2521-2522-2523-2524-2525-2526-2527-2528-2529-2530-2531-2532-2533-2534-2535-2536-2537-2538-2539-2540-2541-2542-2543-2544-2545-2546-2547-2548-2549-2550-2551-2552-2553-2554-2555-2556-2557-2558-2559-2560-2561-2562-2563-2564-2565-2566-2567-2568-2569-2570-2571-2572-2573-2574-2575-2576-2577-2578-2579-2580-2581-2582-2583-

48 RĀJASEKHARA SŪRI
(1348 A.D.)

Rājasekhara Sūri, or Maladhārī Śrī Rājasekhara Sūri, belonged to the Svetāmbara sect and was the author of the *Ratnārikā-pañjikā*,¹ a sub-commentary on the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvā-lankāra*, as also of two other works called *Syādvāda-kalikā* and *Caturvīṃśatiprabandha*.² He is also the author of a *Pañjikā* (commentary) on the *Nyāya-kandali* of the Hindu philosopher Jhara. He studied the *Nyāya-kandali* under the guidance of prabha,³ and completed his *Caturvīṃśatiprabandha* in Samvat 1348 A.D.⁴

49. JĪNA CANDRA
(1350 A.D.)

He belonged to the Svetāmbara sect.

Jīna Candra's date may approximately be fixed at about 1350 A.D.

A part of the *Ratnārikā-pañjikā* has been printed and published in Benares Jaina Yāsojyaya series.

This work has been published by Hira Lal Hemchandra at Jāmanagara in Jaisalmer.

चौदविंशत्यध्यायविधिरभिधीयते व्याचक्षरको विधिम् ।

तस्या विहितसमस्तं करैः क्षयरोपचाराय ॥

Nyāyikandali of Śrīdhara with the *Pañjikā* of Rājasekhara noticed in Peterson, p. 273, cf. also Peterson 3, pp. 28-29)

¹ Vide Weber II, p. 1207

अद्वयममनुनिनादो ज्ञेया बुद्धीय धनस्यस्यम् ।

निष्पन्नसिद्धिं साधने चोप चोपो दृष्टं तस्याम् ॥

(Colophon of *Caturvīṃśatiprabandha*)

तेनाद्यादीचविधया प्रोक्ता सामान्यविधया ।

तस्याच दुरुपयोगं यत्तुमेवामुच्यते ॥

अथ आद्या तेनाद्यादिविध्यानेव

अद्यादीचविधया ... प्रोक्ता ॥

Jānaka ... *trippanaka*, chap I, § 7, published in Yāso-

परिचयं ननु
चो क्षयनि पश्यी ।

अथ विद्वत्पात्र ॥

trippanaka, lent to me by Muni
Shastri and published in the Benares

60. (JYANATKA
(1409 A.D.)

Guraratna belonged to the Tapasaccha of the Śi sect, and was the distinguished author of a commenta Śaṅkara's *śaṅkaraśāstra* called *Śaṅkaraśāstra śaṅkaraśāstra* in which the Nyāya (logic) along with oth has been lucidly explained. He also wrote the *Kriyā rat*

He is mentioned by Ratna Sekhara Śūri in the *pratikramana-śāstra-vṛtti* composed in Samvat 1496 or A. In that work Gunaratna is mentioned as a pupil of Dev who attained the exalted position of Śūri at Anahillaj Samvat 1420 or A.D. 1363.² Gunaratna must, therefore, have lived between A.D. 1363 and A.D. 1439. Devaśundara, teacher of Gunaratna, was a contemporary of Muniśundara the famous author of the *Gurvāvalī*³ composed in Samvat or A.D. 1409. Gunaratna himself says that his *Kriyā samuccaya*⁴ was composed in Samvat 1466 or A.D. 1409.

Guparatna, in his elaborate commentary (*Tīrti*) on the *darśana-samuccaya*, has mentioned *Saundhodani*, *Dharmo*

¹ Śaddarśana-samuccaya with Vṛtti, edited by Dr Suati and published Asiatic Society of Bengal. There is another commentary on Śaddarśana-caya called Laghuvṛtti by Maṇibhadra. It has been published in the Chowk series.

* The *Śraddha-pratīkramana* sūtra viii, by Ratnadekhara Śūri, has noticed in Peterson 3, pp 226-227 whence the following lines are quoted —

निष्पातनस्योच्छ्वासाः अत्रापि अत्रयन्मुहुरात्रोत्पन्नम् ।
 नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया नन्दमुक्तामयादिदिनाः ११ ।
 यत्र च रैवा निष्पातस्योच्छ्वासाः प्राग्वयादयः मुक्ता ।
 क्लृप्तमयसा दिनीयः नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया १२ ।
 क्लृप्तमयसा दिनीयः नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया १३ ।
 क्लृप्तमयसा दिनीयः नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया १४ ।
 क्लृप्तमयसा दिनीयः नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया १५ ।
 क्लृप्तमयसा दिनीयः नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया १६ ।
 क्लृप्तमयसा दिनीयः नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया १७ ।
 क्लृप्तमयसा दिनीयः नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया १८ ।
 क्लृप्तमयसा दिनीयः नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया १९ ।
 क्लृप्तमयसा दिनीयः नौरैरुत्पन्नमुक्तामया २० ।

* Vide Dr Klatt on the Pattāvali of the Kharataragaccha in the Ind. Vol. XI, September 1882 pp 255-256, cf also Weber II, p 834 and Dr Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p 187

४ एष्वसमनुमितवर्षे १३११ सुविद्यमानरुद्रिणा ज्ञाता युष्मन् । ।

मध्यमोपरधार्म्या मुवांक्षीय ज्ञयबोधा ॥ ८९ ॥

(Garvāvalī, Jaina Yāsoṃjaya granthamālā series, p. 109)

काशी बहरसपूर्व १८९१ बल्लरमिते श्रीवितालाभाभादिते
मुनिदेवराजद्विषयक च यथा साम्योपकार करत।

सुखाद्वयमपि चैव त्रैलोक्येऽपि न विद्यते ।
सर्वं नोदरमध्यस्थिरसमोऽपि प्रजाविद्योऽपि न ।

(Kryšna samuccaya, Jaina Yāgyavata grantham III series, p. 3)

cārya, Arcata, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Kamalaśīla, Dignāga and other Buddhist authors, as well as Tarkabhāṣā, Hetubindu, Arcata-tarkatikā, Pramāna-vārtika, Tattvasamgraha, Nyāya-bindu, Nyāyapraveśaka, and other Buddhist works on logic, etc., in the chapter on the Buddhist system. Mention has also been made, in the chapter on the Nyāya, of such Hindu logicians as

have also been mentioned

51. ŚRUTAŚĪGARA GAṆĪ (ABOUT 1493 A D)

Śrutaśīgara Gaṇī, author of *Tattvārthadīpikā*, was a pupil of Vidyānandin of the Sarasvatī Gaccha of the Digambaras. Nemi-datta, who wrote in Samvat 1585 or 1528 A D, describes himself as devoted to the service of Śrutaśīgara whose literary activity must be referred to about Samvat 1550 or 1493 A D.¹

52. DHARMA-BHUSANA (ABOUT 1600 A D)

Dharmabhūṣana, a disciple of Vardhamāna Bhaṭṭāraka, was a Digambara who wrote the *Nyāya-dīpikā* about 300 years ago. He has been mentioned in the *Tarkabhāṣā* by Yaśovijaya Gaṇī.

The *Nyāya-dīpikā* begins with a salutation to Arhat Vardhamāna. It is divided into three chapters (*Prakāśa*), viz. (1) general

Tattvārtha-sūtra, Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, Tattvārtha-śloka-tāṭkā,
 Āptamīmāṃsā vivaraṇa, Nyāyaviniścaya, Pramāṇa nīṣaṇḍa,
 Pramāṇa-parīkṣā, Parīkṣāmukha, Nyāyabindu, etc.

62a VINAYAVIJAYA
 (1613 A D — 1681 A D)

Vinayavijaya was born in a Vaiśya family in Guzerat in
 Samvat 1670 or A D 1613. His spiritual teacher Kirtivijaya¹
 was a great devotee of Akbar's time.

on his pilgrimage to the Girnar hills in 1651 A D. He visited
 Marwad, etc., and died at Rander in Guzerat in 1681 A D. Of the
 numerous works written by him the undermentioned treatise on
 Jaina Nyāya deserves a special notice —

Naya karpikā—"an ear-ring of Naya, the method of des-
 criptions," which was composed at Diva near Junāgadh in
 Kathiawad in 1651 A D for the satisfaction of Guru Vijayasimha
 Sūri. Naya aims at describing things from all possible stand-
 points. There are altogether seven standpoints, viz naigama,
 samgraha, vyavahāra, rjjuśūtra, sabda, samabharūdhā and evambhūta,
 explanations of which have already been given. The first four of

¹ Vide the concluding verses of the chapters of Vinayavijaya's Lokaprakāśa.

एतन्मार्गदर्शनम् कुतश्चिन्तितम्-
 कीदृशम् अविद्यम् विद्वद्भिर्भवेत् ।
 कीदृशम् अविद्यम् विद्वद्भिर्भवेत्
 कुतश्चिन्तितम् अविद्यम् कुतश्चिन्तितम् ॥ ११ ॥

(Naya karpikā)

एतन्मार्गदर्शनम् कुतश्चिन्तितम्-
 कुतश्चिन्तितम् अविद्यम् विद्वद्भिर्भवेत् ।
 कुतश्चिन्तितम् अविद्यम् विद्वद्भिर्भवेत्
 कुतश्चिन्तितम् अविद्यम् विद्वद्भिर्भवेत् ॥ ११ ॥


(Naya karpikā)

though the standpoints are mutually conflicting, they serve collectively to establish the dogmas of the Jaina scripture¹

53 ΥΑΘΟΥΛΙΑ Α ΓΑΤΙ
(1608—1688 A D)

Yāśovijaya Gani, a member of the Śvetāmbara sect, was a distinguished logician who flourished at Dabhoi in the Baroda State (Guzerat), approximately between 1608 A.D. and 1688 A.D. He was a spiritual descendant of Hīravijaya Sūri, the well-known Jaina High-priest of the time of the Moghul Emperor Akbar.¹ In about 1626 A.D. he came to Benares,² where he studied Nyāya-śāstra in the disguise of a Brāhmana ascetic. By about 1638 A.D. he confessed that he was a Jaina and was asked at once to leave the Sanskrit academies of the Brāhmanas. On account of his vast erudition in Logic and Metaphysics he obtained the titles of Upādhyāya, Nyāya-viśārada and Nyāyācārya. He died at Dabhoi in 1688 A.D.³

¹ Vide Introduction to *Najā-karnikā* edited by Mohan Lal Desai, pp. 3-4 —
The *Chaitanyam* of 31-1-1922.



Yasovijaya wrote more than one hundred works (in Sanskrit and Guzerati) in which he has preserved a detailed criticism on the Logic of Mithila and Nadia as taught in the Benares academies of the 17th century A.D. He must have been a man of extraordinary talent, or else he would not have ventured to

"The ocean of Logic is hard to approach owing to the uproar of waves of the Dīdhitī—Commentary (of Diogenes); yet, is not the water of that ocean capable of being drunk by our cloud-like genius?"

54. YASOVIJAYA'S WORKS

Yasovijaya was the author of several rare works on Logic such as *Nyāya-pradīpa*, *Tarkabhāṣā*, *Nyāya-rahasya*, *Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī* and *Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*. He also wrote a commentary on the Digambara work *Astasāhasī* called *Astasāhasī-vṛtti*.

The *Tarkabhāṣā*, which begins with a salutation to Jina, consists of three chapters, viz (1) Valid knowledge, *pramāṇa*; (2) Knowledge from particular standpoints, *naya*, and (3) Imposition, *niḥśeṣa*. It contains an occasional discussion on *vyāpti*, *grāha*, *inductio*, and *induction* between term and the major term.

— वाच विरोधितः ।

MS. in possession of Vyāsa-dharma or Dharma

एवम वि वाच धीमन् प्रतिभासुताम् ।

MS. of Vyāsa-dharma Sūtri and Indravajya

as follows —

whose water is saline and which is unsap-
pyroars of commentators. Is not then the
drunk? Why not, intelligent people like
'I drink its water pure and sweet'

Yasovijaya, see *Pāṇini* §. III. xiv. For his works

Indravajya there has been established as
"under the auspices" which
published in a series called *Jaina Yasovijaya*

— वाच विरोधितः ।

— वाच विरोधितः ।

(*Tarkabhāṣā* Chapter I.)

term and major term (*vyāpka-vyāpaka*), knowledge and external world (*vyjñānavāda-rāhyārthanāda*), etc. The undermentioned philosophers, philosophical treatises and systems are referred to —

Śūnikhya, Kanabhakṣa, Akṣapāda, Naiyāyika, Bauddha, Mādhyamika, Prabhākara, Mīmāṃsaka, Bhīṣya, Vārtika, Tikā, Samantabhadra, Gaṇḍhahastī, Sammatī, Miśra, Bhaṭṭa, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Nārāyaṇa,¹ Nārāyaṇācārya, Śiromaṇī² Dīdhiti-kāra, Vardhamāna, and Gaṇānanda.³

The *Aṣṭasāhārī-vivaraṇa*,⁴ which is a gloss on the *Aṣṭasāhārī* of Viśvaṇanda, opens with an obeisance to Indrabhūti Gautama. The work makes reference to the undermentioned philosophers, philosophical treatises and systems — Vācaspati, Naiyāyika, Maṇḍana Miśra, Prajñākara, Bhaṭṭa, Prabhākara, Hemacandra, Vācakaśaṅkara (Umāsvatī), Vaidānti-paśu, Kuṣumāñjali, Gurumata, Muraṇibhaṭṭa, Muraṇi Miśra, Gautamiya, Udayanācārya, Bhaṭṭācārya, Jarannaiyāyika, Raghudeva Bhaṭṭācārya,⁵ Bhūṣanaśāra,⁶ etc.

1 वन्देनैव अचभहो वल्लभ इत्येकमभिप्राय इति शाराध्यायाय ।

(Vākyabhāṣā-khāṇḍya, leaf 3 Bombay)

2 जातिर्हि इतिविशयो यदि सभाष्य
जाति विना न च ततो व्यवहारविधि ।
उन्नेयिनः कसु निरोधवि व्यवहरे
महाका पीयूषविनय न विधिर्ह्येव ॥

(Vākyabhāṣā-khāṇḍya, leaf 42, Bombay)

3 वन्देनैव इति तत्रैव भावयुक्त्याल्लोकानि सिद्धावपि शराध्यायस्य कालतया व्यवहार-
व्यवहार व्यवहारेण प्रतीयमानमिति गुणानन्देनोक्तं तद्वत् ॥

(Vākyabhāṣā-khāṇḍya, leaf 2 Bombay)

4 ऐश्वर्यमयं प्रविष्टाव न्यायविशारदविशेषो विनयः ।
विशारदप्रविष्टावपीयूषावयव्या विनयवति ॥

(*Aṣṭasāhārī-vivaraṇa*, MSS. belonging to Vijayadharma Śūci and Indravijaya Śūci)

⁵ Raghudeva is referred to in leaves 4, 5 of *Aṣṭasāhārī*

⁶ The Bhūṣanaśāra (Vākyāraṇa) is referred to in leaves 34, 35, etc.

CHAPTER IV.

Continuity of Jaina Logic.¹

65 THE CONCILIATORY CHARACTER OF JAINA LOGIC

In the previous pages there has been given an indication of the services rendered by the Jainas and the Buddhists in the formation of the Mediæval School of Indian Logic. Since the Brāhmanas did not in respect of their social practices differ so markedly from the Jainas as they did from the Buddhists, their attack on the Jaina Logic was not so violent as that on the Buddhist Logic. In fact the logical theories of the Jainas are in many instances akin to those of the Brāhmanas. The terms *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison), *āgama* (verbal testimony), *āharaṇa* or *udāharaṇa* (illustration), *śābāṅga-sūtra* and the meanings similar to, if corresponding terms of the Brāhmanas. There was in the Logic of the Brāhmanas a casual review of the syllogism of ten members as propounded in certain works of the Jainas, but there was no protracted quarrel on that account between the two parties. The Jaina logicians quoted Brāhmanic authors generally in an academic spirit. The special Jaina doctrines of *Naya* (method) and *sapta-āhaṅgī* (sevenfold paralogism), though occasionally criticised, did not receive any rude blows from the Brāhmanas.

The Jainas, so far as they wrote regular treatises on Logic, did not differ much from the Buddhists in respect of their subject and style. The *Vyāyavatāra*, by the Śvetāmbara Jaina (500 A.D.), traverses almost the *vyāyava* praveśa of the Buddhist logician. Rabhasa Nandi, a Digambara Jaina called *Sambandhodyota* on the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (635

¹ The Jainas' "Logic" is the "School of Indian Logic," his

book of *Jāyambha Sūtri*, Epigraphia Indica Vol. II; and

Jaina in the *Sammatistarka*, and *and Anukūta-jayapattikā*, a Sūtri of Rā, āgaccha.

A.D) The *Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭīkā* of *Jaina Kalyāṇa-candra* is likewise a commentary on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of the Buddhist *Dharmakīrti* (635 A.D). *Dharmottara-tiṣṭhanaka* is the title of a *Jaina* commentary by *Mallavādin* (about 962 A.D) on the Buddhist work *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā* of *Dharmottara* (847 A.D.) If the Buddhist author *Śānta Rakṣita* (749 A.D) instituted in his *Tattvasamgraha* an inquiry into the *Jaina* doctrine of soul, the *Jaina* author *Haribhadra Sūri* (1129 A.D) gave in his *Saddarśana-samuccaya* a complete summary of the Buddhist philosophy. In fact there was no bitter rivalry between the *Jainas* and the *Buddhists*.

NO ROYAL PATRONAGE AND PERSECUTION

From time to time Jainism enjoyed patronage as well as suffered persecution at the hands of the rulers. King Candra Gupta,¹ who carried on controversies in the spirit of scholars, was a great supporter of the Jaina religion which spread widely in Northern India and was introduced into Mysore by Bhadrabahu Samprati, a grandson of Emperor Asoka, accepted the Jaina faith which was welcomed throughout the Deccan about 215 B.C. The Svetāmbara Jaina

throughout the country. The Chinese and Pandya sailing religion it was popular Maratha

about 1142-1172 A.D.

In the latter half of the seventh century A D there occurred, however, a terrible persecution of Jainism in Southern India. King Kūṇa, Sundara or Nedumāraṇa Pāṇḍya, who had been brought up as a Jaina, became a pupil of Saint Tiruṇḷāna Sambandar and accepted the Śaiva faith. Displaying the zeal of a convert he persecuted with savage cruelty his late co-religionists of whom no fewer than eight thousand were put to death. Mahendra Varman of the Pallava dynasty, whose rule extended to Trichinopoly, was

1 If we suppose this Candia Gupta to be identical with Candia Gupta Maurya, the date of introduction of Jainism into Mysore must be about 379 B.C. On the contrary if he is the same as Candia Gupta II, Mysore could not have welcomed Jainism as early as A.D. The date of Bhadrabahu will have to be determined.

originally a Jaina. Through the influence of a Tamil saint he accepted Śaivism, and destroyed the large Jaina monastery of Pāṭaliputtrīam in South Arcot at about 810 A.D. In the Cālukya Kingdom of Vātāpi, where Jainism flourished to a certain extent during 550-750 A.D., Buddhism was supplanted by Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism. King Amoghavarṣa of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa line, whose capital was at Mānyakheta (in the Nizām's Dominions) devoted the last part of his life to ascetic practices and patronised the Digambara Jaina faith during 815-877 A.D. Jainism made a rapid progress in his kingdom up to the 10th century A.D. Ajaya Deva, a Śaiva King of Guzerat (about 1174-78 A.D.) mercilessly persecuted the Jainas and put their leader to death.

In spite of such persecutions the Jaina religion went on flourishing in the Hindu period up till 1200 A.D. During the Mahomedan rule which followed, Jainism remained unperturbed.

No hostility from the
Mahomedans.

certain days

57. SUPPORT OF THE JAINA COMMUNITY.

Though in all periods the Jainas enjoyed a fair share of royal patronage, the main source of their stay and strength lay in the community of Jaina laymen. The founder of Jainism left the church not entirely at the mercy of the monks (*sādhu*) and nuns (*sādhvī*), but placed it also in the hands of the laymen (*śrāvaka*) and laywomen (*śrāvikā*) called respectively the male and female devotees. In all religious and social ceremonies the lay people exercise control in the full measure. It is at their choice and with their permission that the head of the church called *Ācārya* can be appointed. The management of temples and places of pilgrimage is entrusted entirely to the lay people, who select the residence of monks and nuns.

It is on account of the mutual help of the monks and lay people that the Jaina church has continued undisturbed. The lay people, who belong mainly to the Vāsīya (merchant) community command the wealth of India. They have uniformly supported Jaina authors, and so long as they continue, the Jaina logicians will never have to recede from literary pursuits for want of funds.

And literary men

54. Jaina Law will not be extinct

We have seen that the Jaina Law was very well maintained against the Brahmanical influence. They always did as far as practicable in giving the dispensation of their rules and formed their ecclesiastical rules in liberal spirit to secure the sympathy of the laity. Under such circumstances it is not at all probable that Jainism has not died and there is no fear that the Jaina Law will ever be extinct.

SECTION II.

The Buddhist Logic. (Circa 570 B.C.—1200 A.D.).

CHAPTER I

Topics of Logic mentioned in the old Buddhist Literature

59. BUDDHA GAUTAMA (570 B.C.—490 B.C.)

four Buddhas are said to have already appeared, viz. Krakus' chanda, Kanaka Muni, Kasyapa and Gautama, while the fifth, viz. Maitreya, is yet to be born.

Of the past Buddhas the last, viz. Buddha Gautama, otherwise called Sākya Muni, was born at Kapilavastu (modern Nigliwa in the Nepal Terai) about 570 B.C., and attained nirvāṇa at Kuśinagara (modern Kuśināra or Kasia near Gorakhpur) about 490 B.C.¹ He passed almost his whole life in Magadha (modern Behar). He is regarded by modern scholars as the real founder of Buddhism, while his predecessors are considered as purely mythical.

60. ORIGIN OF THE PĀLI BUDDHIST LITERATURE (490 B.C.—76 B.C.)

Buddha Gautama is said to have delivered his teachings in the Māgadhī or Pālī language. On his death these teachings were rehearsed by the Buddhist monks in three councils² held at Rājā-

81 LOGICAL TOPICS IN THE PALI LITERATURE

In the *Tipiṭaka*—nay in the whole Pālī literature¹—there is not a single mention of Science. But even in the *Tipiṭaka* there is

tion has not been carried far enough to lay the foundation of a Logic that deserves the name of science

In the *Tipiṭaka* there are, however, occasional references to logical topics and to a class of men who were called *Takkī* (in Sanskrit, *Tarkin*) or *Takkīla* (in Sanskrit *Tārṇika*)—that is, those

in quibble and casuistry.

82. Suttapitaka. Dīgha-nikāya: Brahma-jāla sutta (490 B C)

In the *Brahma-jāla-sutta*,² which forms a part of the Dīgha Nikāya of the Sutta Pitaka and was rehearsed in the First Buddhist Council about 490 B C, there is mention of certain Śramanas and Brāhmanas who were *takkī* (argumentationists) and *vimamsī* (casuists) and indulged in *takka* (argumentations) and *vimamsā* (casuistry). These Śramanas and Brāhmanas from the standpoints of their philo-

Casuists and sophists

sophical views were divided into various classes such as the eternalists (sazsala rddi), eternalist-non-eternalists (sloens-sazsallik eluens azsallik), and the annihilationists (uccheda-vadi)

With regard to the eternalists who were perhaps the followers of (the Sāṃkhya philosophy of) Kapila, Buddha says —

There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmanas who are
Eternalists eternalists, and who, on four grounds, pro-
claim that both the soul and the world are
eternal. . . . They are addicted to logic and reasoning
(argumentation and casuistry), and give utterance to the following
conclusion of their own, beaten out by their argumentations and
based on their sophistry "eternal is the soul, and the world, giving

spring up in

With regard to the eternalist non-eternalists who were perhaps the followers (of the Ārvikaṅki) of Medhātithi-Gautama, Riddha says :—

There are, brethren, some recluses and Brāhmanas who are

With regard to the annihilationists who were perhaps the followers of the Lokāyata philosophy, Buddha observes —

There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmanas who are annihilationists, who in seven ways maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation.

In the first place, brethren, my view "Since, my friends, and the world has been destroyed on the day of death; and then,

There are other classes of Śramanas and Brāhmanas such as

a class of fortuitous-originate (*adhicca-samuppannika*) of whom Buddha speaks as follows:—

"*Adhicca-samuppanniko* ... *Adhicca-samuppanniko* ...
 " ...
 " ..."

63. Suttapitaka, Majjhimanikāya. Anumāna sutta
 (490 B C).

"Anumāna sutta," which presupposes the use of the word *anumāna* in the sense of "inference" or rather "guess," is the title of a chapter of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, while the word *ākāra* in the sense of discussion occurs in the *Upālivāda-sutta* of the same *Nikāya* of the *Suttapitaka*!

64. Suttapitaka. Khuddaka Nikāya: Udāna
 (490 B C)

In the *Udāna*, which is included in the *Khuddaka Nikāya* of the *Sutta Pitaka* and is supposed to have been rehearsed in the three Buddhist Councils during 490 B C.—255 B C, we read —

"As long as the perfect Buddhas do not appear, the *Takkikas* [sophists] are not corrected nor are the *Savakas* owing to their evil views they are not released from misery."

This passage leaves no doubt that the *Takkikas* were sophists

65. Vinaya-pitaka. Parivāra
 (490 B C).

The logical procedure of a Judicial Council of Monks

Four kinds of cases for settlement (*adhikarana*)

In the *Parivāra*,¹ a work of the *Vinaya-pitaka*, there is mention of four kinds of *adhikarana*, cases for settlement, viz., (1) *vivādādhikarana*, a case pertaining to differences of opinion, (2) *anuvāda-dhikarana*, a case in which one party accuses another party of the violation of a rule of good conduct; (3) *āpattiādhikarana*, a case in

¹ *Veds Majjhima Nikāya*, vol. I, 15th sutta, and vol. II, 8th sutta.

² The original of this passage runs as follows:—

Yāva sammā sambuddhā loke n'uppijanti, na, takkikā majjhanti na c'āpi
 āvakkā, dukkhitā na dukkhā paṇṇocareti

—*Udāna*, vi, 10, edited by Paul Stenhal in the Pāli Text Society series, London.

³ The *Parivāra*, chapters IV—XIII included in the *Vinaya-pitaka*, vol. II.

A complaint (*codanā*)

A complaint (*codanā*) is intended for humiliating a person by reminding him of the nature of his criminal action. The complaint may be well founded or unfounded. It may arise from any

A complaint, complainant and respondent

The respondent, accused or defendant (*codutaka*) must speak the truth and must not show temper

A judicial council of monks (*sangha*).

A council of monks (*sangha*) engaged in trying a case, must receive the arguments of the complainant and the respondent who are the parties of the case. Deliberation (*matikamma*) must be shared in by each member of the council

Members of a council (*sangāmaṇvacaṛa bhikkhū*).

The monks who constitute the members of a judicial council (called in Pāli *sangāmaṇvacaṛa bhikkhū*) must approach the council with meekness of spirit. They must know how to take their respective seats. They must refrain from irrelevant and useless talk. They may speak on good law, or they may solicit their brother monks to speak on it, or they may remain absolutely silent.

The members must ascertain the nature of the case under trial, the nature of the breach of morality, the section of the moral code applicable to the case and the nature of the personnel of the council and the parties. They must not be biassed. They should, when necessary, employ persuasion and exhortation towards the respondent and should at times express their satisfaction at his conduct.

They must not, on account of their own superiority in knowledge or seniority in age, hold anybody in contempt.

The judge or umpire (*anurijjaka*)

The judge (*anurijjaka*), elected by the council to act as such, must not talk rashly or in haste. He must refrain from talking of a subject which is in itself unprofitable, and which may rouse dispute or ill-feeling. He must hear attentively what the parties have to say. Having the welfare of all at heart, he must not hastily accept the version of one party as true. The complainant will say that the respondent "is guilty," *āpanno*, while the respondent himself will plead "not guilty," *anāpanno*. Instead of

discarding the statement of either of the parties, the judge must see that each party is consistent with his first statement

The judge must satisfy himself that the complainant understands the nature of the complaint he makes. As regards the respondent the judge must not put to him questions which may refer to his preceptor, teacher, brother-priest, resident pupil, caste, name, family, tradition, clan or native place. The reason is that thereby the judge may be biased towards or prejudiced against the respondent, and his judgment may be influenced by affection, hatred, fear or delusion

the case in season and not out of season, as it is and not as it is not, gently and not rudely, with good will and with his limbs and sense-organs duly restrained

He must control the complainant and the respondent, must take note of what they say, and must not add any thing that they do not say. He must make the languid cheerful, the timid hopeful, and the angry cool. He must not act from affection, hatred, fear or delusion. A judge who behaves himself in this way is a true follower of Buddha and is justly loved by all people

66. Vinaya pitaka: Pātimokkha (490 B C)

As an instance of the method in which monks combined in a council (*sangha*) used to perform an ecclesiastical act (*kucādhikarana*), I explain the several stages and requisites of the Buddhist sabbath called *uposatha*¹ in accordance with the Pātimokkhupadesa¹ of the Vinaya-pitaka

Upasatha (*Sabbath*)

1. *Pubba-karana*, preparation, which refers to the following requisites —

- (a) *Sammajjani*, brooming or cleansing the ground, on which monks are to assemble
- (b) *Paṭipā*, lighting a lamp, if the uposatha is celebrated in the night

¹ Vide the Pāli Pātimokkha of the Vinaya-pitaka, and also the translation of the Vinaya texts by F W Rhys Davids and H Oldenberg. Compare also the Tibetan version of the Pātimokkha called *So-er-thar-pa* edited with the Tibetan text and an English translation by Dr Satou Chandra Vidyabhucana in J A S B, nos. 1 and 4, 1913. *Pubba-karana* and *pubba-paṭipā* are explained fully in the *Kaṅkhā-vitaranī* and *Kamantapāṭikā* of Buddhaghosha

- (c) *Udaka*, water, for drinking or washing one's face and leg
 (d) *Āsana*, seat, on which monks are to sit

2. *Pubba-kicca*, the preliminary acts, which refer to the following. —

- (a) *Chanda*, vote by proxy. If a monk cannot, owing to any unavoidable cause, attend a council, he may authorize a brother-monk to exercise his vote. The formula of authorization runs thus —

chādam dammi, I give authority,
chādam me kara, do ye receive my authority.
chādam me āroceti, do ye convey my authority to the council

- (b) *Pārisuddhi*, purity. A monk who cannot attend a council of sabbath, must inform it of his purity through a brother-monk
 (c) *Utukkāna*, naming the season. In a year there are three seasons, viz the winter, summer and rain, in each of which there are celebrated eight *uposathas* (sabbaths). The third and seventh *uposathas* of every season are held on the 14th day of the moon while the remaining six are held on the 15th day of the moon. *Upasathas* are of three kinds, viz those

- (d) ..
 or more monks

- (e) *Ovāda*, arrangement for the instruction to be imparted to a council of nuns by a monk deputed for the purpose

3. *Pattakallam*, in season. When the *pubba-karaṇa* and *pubba-kicca* are over, the council should see whether it was the right time when every thing was in order and there was nothing objectionable

4. *Pātimokkhuḍḍesa*, recitation of the code of monastic laws. The introductory part of the *Pātimokkha*, called *nidāna*, is cited below —

68. METHODS OF DISPUTATION AS ILLUSTRATED IN
THE KATHĀVATTHU

As a specimen of the method of reasoning carried on during the time of Aśoka, the following controversy (*kathā*) between a Theravādin (a Buddhist disputant who did not admit the existence of the soul, *puggala*, as a genuine reality) and a Puggalavādin (a heretic respondent who asserted that there was a genuine reality called soul, *puggala*) is quoted from the Kathāvatthu¹ —

A case presented by a disputant in a regular form (*anuloma*)

Theravādin Is the soul (*puggala*) known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin Yes

Theravādin Is the soul known in the same way as a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin No, that cannot be said

Theravādin Acknowledge your defeat

(i) If the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should also say that the soul is known in the same way as any other genuinely real thing is known

(ii) That which you say here is wrong, viz (a) the soul is known

(iii) " " " " " "

(iv) " " " " " "

(b), you are wrong

A rejoinder by the respondent (*paṭikkamma*)

Puggalavādin Is the soul not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Theravādin No, it is not known

Puggalavādin Is it unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known?

Theravādin: No, that cannot be said

Puggalavādin Acknowledge the rejoinder

(Kathāvatthupparakasaṃ-attakathā, published by the Pālī Text Society of London, p. 13)

¹ Kathāvatthū, vol. I, pp. 1-63, edited by A. C. Taylor and published by the Pālī Text Society, London.

Compare the English translation called "Points of Controversy," by Mr. Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, published by the Pālī Text Society, London, pp. 1-70

- (i) If the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should also say that the soul is unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.
- (ii) That which you say here is wrong, viz (a) the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.

Conclusion (*niggamana*).

Puggalavādin. As for ourselves we do not deserve any defeat

The following assumptions which you made are wrong—

- (i) If the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, it must also be known in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.
- (ii) It is wrong to couple the statement (a), viz. the soul is
- (iii) also be denied
- (iv) If the statement (a) is admitted, then the statement (b) must also be admitted

The defeat you propose to inflict on us is unfair. But our rejoinder is fair and demonstration well done

respectively as follows: "Is the soul known *everywhere, always* or *in everything* in the sense of a genuinely real thing?" "In the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Defeats *not known* is substituted for *known* in the question.

A case presented through a simple comparison (*suddhika
samsandana*)

Theravādin. Is the soul known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, and is matter also known in the same sense?

Puggalavādin. Yes

Theravādin. Is matter one thing and the soul another?

Puggalavādin. No, that cannot be said

Theravādin. Acknowledge defeat.

mer be admitted. To say that the soul and matter are both known in the sense of genuinely real things but that they are not mutually distinct things, is wrong

Definition of terms (lakṣaṇadyuti-kāṇḍa)

Definition of terms (*lakṣhaṇāyukti-kāṇḍa*)

Theravādin 'Is the soul known in the sense of a genuinely real thing'

Puggalevadin Yes

Theravādin Is the soul related or absolute compounded or un-compounded eternal or temporal is possessed of form or without form ?

Puggalavadin No these cannot be said
to knowlege defent

Theravadin Acknowledge defeat

Clearing the meaning of terms (marriage, husband)

The extension of the subject in relation to its predicate is clearly set forth in the following controversy -

The extension of the subject in relation to the
is set forth in the following controversy -
Thomassin is the soul (subject) known and is that which is
known (predicate) the soul?
is known but of that which is known is not soul

Thomson is the soul (subject) which is known (predicate) the soul.

Pageland is The soul is known but of that which is known is not soul and the remaining portion is not soul.

Can this with respect to the soul fact also be the remaining portion?

There is no way this with respect to the subject also is of the said a portion is known and the remaining portion is not known.

Investigation is that cannot be said or

A race presented through an ecology (systemic analysis)

A case presented through an ecology system was discussed.

There is a Master paper in the case entitled, "History of a
 case which resulted in the death of a child."

Page 1023

1. The first of these is the fact that the
2. Government has not been able to
3. secure the necessary funds to
4. carry out its policy of
5. maintaining the peace in
6. the country.

Page 1010

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various positions in the Department of the Interior, under the act of March 3, 1879, entitled "An Act to provide for the better management of the public lands, and for other purposes."

Faint, illegible handwritten notes.

A case presented through the four fold method (*catulka-naya-samsandana*)

Theravādin Is the soul known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin Yes

Theravādin: (i) Is matter the soul? or (ii) Is the soul in matter? or (iii) Is the soul apart from matter? or (iv) Is matter in the soul?

Puggalavādin No, that cannot be said

Theravādin Acknowledge defeat

The doctrine of impermanence (*khaṇika-kathā*)

The doctrine of momentariness (*khaṇika-kathā*;¹ in its crude form is discussed in the following dialogue —

Theravādin Do all things exist in our consciousness for a moment only?

Pubbaseliyas Yes

Theravādin: Do you mean that it is in our consciousness that there exist the earth, ocean, Sumeru, water, fire, wind, grass, twigs and trees?

Pubbaseliyas No

Theravādin Do you mean that our sense-organs have grown along with our sense-cognitions?

Pubbaseliyas No

Theravādin: Do you mean that the sense organs are coincident in time with our sense-cognitions?

Pubbaseliyas Yes

Theravādin: Do you accept the authority of the scripture which

Pubbaseliyas Yes.

Theravādin Therefore you can not say that the sense-organs are coincident in time with our sense-cognitions.

Pubbaseliyas: Should we say that things do not exist in our mind for a moment only?

Theravādin: Yes

¹ Kathāvatthu, Khasika-kathā XXII—8, pp. 620—621, edited by A. C. Taylor in the Pali Text Society. Compare also the translation called "Points of Controversy" by B. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids. Also Majjhima Nikāya, I, 190.

Definition of terms (lakṣaṇadyutiḥ)

Theravādin Is the soul known in the sense of a 'thing'.

Pugolavadin Yes

Theravāda Is the soul related or absolute, compounded or uncompounded, eternal or temporal, is perceived without form?

Fugitive—No, these cannot be said

Theravadin Acknowledge defeat

Clearing the meaning of terms (पर्याय शब्दों)

The extension of the subject in relation to its ¹ clearly set forth in the following controversy -

There is no subject known and no object known; reflected the self.

Plato: The soul is known, but of that which is in it is not known the remaining part of the soul.

There are 100 lbs. of dry fish with preserved fish oil
if the fish is a good one, it is known and the price of the
fish is low.

Pizza and a \$1.344,000 fine on 10/1/00.

A case presented through an analogy (epistemic dimension)

The next step is to determine the nature of the problem. This is done by asking the following questions:

INDEX

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

For example, if

$$P_{\text{Laser}} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot A_0 \cdot \omega \cdot \epsilon_0 \cdot E_0^2$$

$\frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{\partial L}{\partial \dot{x}} \right) = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x}$

[illegible]

1. The first group of people who are interested in the results of the study are the researchers themselves. They want to know if the study was successful in achieving its objectives and if the results are consistent with their expectations.

[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]

‘When scholars talk a matter over with one another, then is there a winding up, an unravelling, one or other is convicted of error, and he then acknowledges his mistake, distinctions are drawn, and contradistinctions, and yet thereby they are not sugged. Thus do scholars, O King, discuss.’

‘And how do kings discuss?’

‘When a king, Your Majesty, discusses a matter, and he advances a point, if any one differ from him on that point, he is apt to fine him, saying: “Inflict such and such a punishment upon that fellow!” Thus, Your Majesty, do kings discuss.’

‘Very well. It is as a scholar, not as a king, that I will discuss. Let Your Reverence talk unrestrainedly as you would with a brother, or a novice, or a lay disciple, or even with a servant. Be not afraid!’

70 ORIGIN OF THE MAHĀYĀNA (ABOUT 78 A.D.)

At the opening of the Christian era the north-western part of India was invaded by the Kuṣāṇas, Turuṣkas or Scythians. Kaniska,¹ who was one of their chiefs, conquered Kāśmīra, Palhava and Delhi, and is said to have founded the era called *Śakābda* in 78 A.D. He accepted the Buddhist faith and established a new system of Buddhism called *Mahāyāna*,² the Great Vehicle. The
 1. Tipiṭaka was
 2. The *Mahā-*
 3. China, Japan,
 4. lon and thence
 spread to Burmah, Siam, etc. In India both the systems prevailed.

in oneness,¹ (2) the *Vaitheśikas* who believe in difference, (3) the *Nirgrantha putras* who believe in both, and (4) the *Jātīputras* who believe in neither²

The *Lankavatāra* speaks in a prophetic style of the *Naiyāyikas* (logicians) and *Tārkikas* (dialecticians) Thus in Chapter II of the work Mahāmātī asks Buddha —

" Say how in time to come *Naiyāyikas* will flourish ! "³

" How is *tarka* (reasoning) corrected and how is it carried on ! "⁴

" What is the nature of the doctrine that draws conclusion from a reason and an example ! "⁵

In Chapter X of the work we read. —

" Whatever is produced is destructible this is the conclusion of the *Tārkikas* " ⁶

¹ Here the word *Sāṃkhya* stands for the Upaniṣad or Vedānta. The *Sāṃkhya* as mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* really teaches the doctrine of oneness. Even *Vijñāna Bhikṣu*, the author of *Sāṃkhya-phāṣya*, admits that the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy is not opposed to the doctrine of oneness. Cf.

वकनेवातिशय मन्त्राय इति कुतश्चिन्तयिष्येत् सर्वतत्त्वानां प्रपञ्चे विज्ञानेन
प्रतिपत्तिमप्येवेतित्यविरोधः । (Sāṃkhya bhāṣya, Chap. I, Sūtra 61)

² *Pade Bunyiu Nanjio*, no. 1259 Cf. *Lankavatāra-sūtra*, A.S.B. MSS., leaf 135 —

सोऽपि वैशेषिका मन्त्राय विज्ञानं वायुवशात्तथा ।

अकल्पदुष्टं विनिर्मा विनिर्माय-विनिर्माता ॥

³ The Sanskrit original runs as follows —

निर्वायिका कथं भूवि भविष्यन्ति अवाप्तया ।

(*Lankavatāra sūtra*, Asiatic Society of Bengal's MSS. Chap. II, leaf 11).

The Tibetan version runs thus —

हे म ह्यमय भूत हे भू भूत ।

म ह्यमय भूत म ह्यमय भूत म ह्यमय भूत ॥

(*Bkaḥ-hgyur*, *Ḥdo*, vol. V, Asiatic Society of Bengal's xylograph)

⁴ सर्वं हि प्रपञ्चे तर्कं कथं तर्कं प्रपञ्चे ।

(*Lankavatāra sūtra*, Chap. II, leaf 11, A.S.B. MSS.)

हे भूत हे भूत हे भूत हे भूत हे भूत ।

(*Bkaḥ-hgyur*, *Ḥdo*, vol. V)

⁵ दृष्टान्त-प्रमाण-विज्ञान-विनिर्मा-विनिर्मा-कथम् ॥

Lankavatāra sūtra, || 35, Buddhist Text Society's edition)

⁶ अकल्पक विचार्य क्वाय् मादिंकावाययं मय ॥

(*Lankavatāra sūtra*, Chap. X, leaf 143, A.S.B. MSS.)

भूत म ह्यमय भूत म ह्यमय भूत म ह्यमय भूत ।

म ह्यमय भूत म ह्यमय भूत म ह्यमय भूत ॥ (*Bkaḥ-hgyur*, *Ḥdo*, vol. V).

In Chapter II, the doctrine of idealism¹ (*viñāṇa-vāda*) is explained. According to this doctrine our knowledge alone is real and the so-called external objects are mere manifestations of it. Knowledge (*viñāṇa*) is stated to be of two kinds, *pratyakṣa-viñāṇa* (direct knowledge) and *parokṣa-viñāṇa* (indirect knowledge) (*vastu-pratīkṣita-viñāṇa*) or knowledge which is manifested as external objects through the act-force (*lābha*) inherent in our aforesaid potentialities, reminiscences, tendencies or impressions.

These two kinds of knowledge combined are called *viñāṇa*.

compared to an ocean, the former is compared to high winds which agitate it.

This basic knowledge, *ālaya-viñāṇa*, is otherwise called an ego (*ātman*). As we pass on our *pratyakṣa-viñāṇa* changes but our ego persists. By means of concentration (*yoga*) we can understand the true nature of the ego. It alone is perfect (*pariṇirvāṇa*). Non-ego or the external world is false (*parikalpita*) and conditional (*paratantra*). When emancipated, our *pratyakṣa-viñāṇa* totally disappears, but the ego or *ālaya-viñāṇa* continues.² The

¹ *Viñāṇa-vāda* is called in Tibetan *nam-par des-pahi lta-wa*, ནམ་པར་དེས་པའི་ལྟ་བུ།. It is designated in Sanskrit as *gyōcāra-darśana* corresponding to Tibetan *mal-bhyor-pahi lta-wa*, མཎ་པའི་ལྟ་བུ།. *Pratyakṣa-viñāṇa* is called in Tibetan *len-pahi nam-par des*, ལེན་པའི་ལྟ་བུ་ལྟ་བུ།, signifying knowledge as received. *Ālaya-viñāṇa* is called in Tibetan *kun-gshi nam-par des pa*, ལུང་གཤི་ལྟ་བུ་ལྟ་བུ།, signifying knowledge which constitutes the base or foundation of all. *Parinirvāṇa* is called in Tibetan *yong grub*, རྟོག་པར་ལྟ་བུ།, complete in itself, *paratantra* *gahan-dwa*, གཤམ་དང་ལྟ་བུ།, dependent on others, and *parikalpa* *kon-brtag*, ལྟ་བུ་ལྟ་བུ།, fanciful or

not quite accurate to say that when emancipated the ego or *me* becomes identical with the void or *śūnyatā* of the whole the former look upon *ālaya* as perfect (*pariṇirvāṇa*) consider *śūnyatā* to be so.

the *vi-
sophy
of ālaya*

to *āśaṃkāra* (and *parava*) of the on *āśaṃkāra*, according to the *Sāṃkhya*, *viñāṇa-vāda* persists. The *Sāṃkhya* do not call *parava* (soul) which continues to be noted in the following passage

(*गीतेवरोचेदशरीरं च सर्वं वादः शब्दः*) वादः

ego, unruffled by the external world and freed from all potentialities, reminiscences, tendencies or impressions, attains its pristine purity. This is its emancipation or final rest.

In chapter VI of the *Lankavatāra-sūtra* entitled *ksanikaparivāra* (a chapter on momentariness), there is a clear explanation of the theory that everything is momentary. In a passage the sūtra the author observes as follows:—

"A momentary thing is that—"

The doctrine of momentariness

after being produced "

75 EIGHTEEN SCHOOLS OF THE BUDDHISTS

We have previously found that—

- I. Ārya Sarvāstivāda
 - (1) Mūla Sarvāstivāda
 - (2) Kāśyapīya
 - (3) Mahāsāaka
 - (4) Dharma-guṇṭhiya
 - (5) Bahusrūtiya
 - (6) Tāmradattīya
 - (7) Vibhajjavādīn
- II. Ārya Sammitīya
 - (8) Kurukullaka
 - (9) Āvantika
 - (10) Vātsīputrīya

Belonging to the Vaiśāṅhika School of Philosophy

विश्वामित्रं चरितं विविक्तं चरितं भित्तम् ।

चतुर्विधं चरितं चरितं चरितं चरितम् ।

चतुर्विधं चरितं चरितं चरितं चरितम् ।

(*Lankavatāra-sūtra*, Chap. VI, p. 99, *Bangal Asiatic Society's MS.*)

¹ See the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Ceylon*, vol. I, part III, 15. Takakura's *Index*, pp. xxvi, xlvii and xxv. *Shyō Dōkin's* article in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1891, p. 411, 1892, pp. 1-37; Rockhill's *Book*, p. 121 f; Takakura's *Index*, pp. 1-37, 1892, pp. 1-37; Rockhill's *Book*, p. 121 f; Takakura's *Index*, pp. 1-37, 1892, pp. 1-37, and Wijnhoud's *Mahāvastu*, part I, after V, p. 11.

III Ārya Mahāsāṃghika

- (11) Pūrvaśāila
- (12) Aparāśāila
- (13) Haimavata
- (14) Lokottaravādin
- (15) Prajñaptivādin

IV Ārya Sthavira

- (16) Mahāvibhāra
- (17) Jetavanīya and
- (18) Abhayagiriśāsin

} Belonging to the *Sautrāntika*
School of Philosophy

All the sects mentioned above belonged to the *Hīnayāna*, though later on they joined the *Mahāyāna* too

76 FOUR SCHOOLS OF THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

The philosophical views of the sects mentioned above were gradually formulated into two schools, viz the (1) *Vaiśhāṣika* and (2) *Sautrāntika*. The *Mahāyāna* sect of the Buddhists founded by Kāśika established two other schools of philosophy, viz the (3) *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra*. So there were altogether four schools of philosophy, two of the *Hīnayāna* and two of the *Mahāyāna*!

Vaiśhāṣika was a later appellation of the philosophy of the Sarvāstivāda (Pali: Sabbatthivāda) sect¹ who, as their name implies, admitted the

Vaiśhāṣika

reality of the world—internal and external. In fact the *Vaiśhāṣika* said that our cognition and its corresponding external object were both real. The fundamental philosophical work of this sect is Kātyāyana-putra's *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra*,² or simply *Jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra*, composed 300 years after the nirvāṇa of Buddha. The next work of this sect is the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāsa-śāstra*,³ or simply *Vibhāsa*, compiled at the council of Kāśika about 78 A D. It was from this *Vibhāsa* that the name *Vaiśhāṣika* was derived. *Vibhāsa* means "commentary," and the

Vaiśhāsika philosophy seems to have been so called because based on the commentaries rather than on the original teachings of Buddha. Sanghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra*, otherwise called *Kosa-kāraka śāstra*, composed about 489 is a most learned work of the *Vaiśhāsika* philosophy.

Sautrāntikas admit cognition and therefrom infer the existence of the external objects. The *Sautrāntika* philosophy seems to have been so called, because it was based on the original text of the teachings of Buddha rather than on commentaries thereon. The text, on which the *Sautrāntika* philosophy was based, belonged to the sect of Ārya Śīhāvīras, called in Pāli Theras, who held the First Council in 480 B C, and possibly also to the sect of the Mahāśārngīkas¹ who were the first dissenters in 390 B C. The philosophical principles of this school are said to have been formulated in Kāśmīra² during the reign of Kaniska about 78 A D by a sage named Dharmottara or Uttara-dharma³. But the Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang who visited India early in the 7th century A D, states that the renowned teacher Kumāralabdha⁴ of Takṣaśīla (Taxila in the Punjab) was the founder of the *Sautrāntika* school and wrote several very valuable treatises on it. He is supposed to have lived about 300 A D, as he was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna (q v), Ārya Deva (q v), and Āśvaghoṣa. There was another very famous teacher named Śrīlabdhā⁵ who wrote *Viśvāśāstra* (or commentary on a work) of the *Sautrāntika* school. Hwen-thsang saw in Ayodhyā the ruins of a Sanghtrāma where Śrīlabdhā resided.

¹ This work exists in Chinese and Tibetan, vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka no 1203.

² Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka Appendix II, p 81. For Sanghaśāstra vide also Hwen-thsang's Travel in India's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol I, pp 183-194.

³ Compare the explanation of the term *Sautrāntika* given by the Hind philosopher Mādhvācārya in the *Satyajadānandamūlaka*, chapter on *Bandha* translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition p 24. Vide also Satyajadānandamūlaka's "Mādhvācārya's School" in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of America for 1925, part II, p 4.

⁴ Vide Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India*, p 167, and Hsueh Fa-hien and Hsueh Fa-hien's *On Yuan Chwang*, vol II, p 161.

⁵ Vide the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of America, vol I part III, pp 18, 19, and Takṣaśīla's *Viśvāśāstra* (Mādhvācārya's *Viśvāśāstra* p 3).

⁶ For the 14 commentaries on *Viśvāśāstra* see *Viśvāśāstra* p 3.

⁷ Vide Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India*, p 167, and Hsueh Fa-hien's *On Yuan Chwang*, vol II, p 161.

⁸ Vide Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India*, p 167, and Hsueh Fa-hien's *On Yuan Chwang*, vol II, p 161.

⁹ Vide Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India*, p 167, and Hsueh Fa-hien's *On Yuan Chwang*, vol II, p 161.

Yogācāras maintained that the external objects were unreal

but the reality of our cognition could not be denied. The word 'yogācāra' (called in

Tibetan *rnal-hbyor-wah* [ta-wa]) is compounded of *yoga* meaning 'meditation' and *ācāra* meaning 'practice'. The *yogācāra* or the contemplative system was so called, because it emphasised the practice of meditation as the means of attaining *bhūmis*¹ or the seventeen stages of Buddhist Perfection. The chief dogma established in it is *ālaya-vijñāna*,² the basis of conscious states, which is the same as our 'ego' or 'soul'. It is not known who was the founder of the *yogācāra* school, but in the Tibetan and Chinese books³ the *Lankāvatāra sūtra*, *Mahāsamaya sūtra*,⁴ *Bodhisattva-caryā-nirdeśa* and *Saptadaśa-bhūmi śāstra-yogīcārya* have been named as the prominent old works of the system. *Maitreyanātha* and *Ārya Asaṅga* were the early teachers of it. The *yogācāra* school seems to have originated about 300 A.D. when the *Lankāvatāra sūtra* etc. were composed.

Mādhyamikas held that our cognition and its corresponding

external object were neither absolutely real

nor totally unreal. The name *Mādhyamika*⁵

(called in Tibetan *Dwu ma*) was derived from *mādhya*, the

¹ The *yogācāra* philosophy is generally known in China, Tibet and Nepal as *yogīcārya*. For an account of this system, vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 356; Dr. Schlagintweit's *Buddhism*, chap. V. Compare explanation of the word *yogācāra* given by the Hindu philosopher *Mādhavācārya* in the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, chapter on Buddha-darśana, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 111. Vide also Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana's "The *Mādhyamika* School" in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, 1897, pp. 11-12.



যদি বাহ্যবাস্যঃ পরিত্যজ্যঃ তদ্ব্যবসায়মুপনিষত্ত্বা দুঃখনা বজ্রং বিনিবৃত্তম্ভো
মর্মে দেহতঃ ॥

(*Mādhyamika* vṛtti, chap. XXIV, p. 143, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition)

Compare the explanation of the term *Mādhyamika* given by the Hindu philosopher *Mādhavācārya*, in the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, chapter on Buddha-darśana, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 21; and also Dr. Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana's *History of the Mādhyamika philosophy of Nāgārjuna* in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, 1897, part IV, pp. 7-20.

Vide Dr. Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Descriptive list of works on the *Mādhyamika* Philosophy, no. I" in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, no. 7, 1908.

middle. The *Mādhyamika* philosophy was so called because it avoided two extremes, i.e. advocated neither the theory of absolute

CHAPTER II

Early Buddhist Writers on Logic

77. RISE OF THE BUDDHIST LOGIC

With the growth of the four philosophical schools just mentioned, the study of Logic spread far and wide in the Buddhist community. The adherents of each of the schools considered it

Akṣapāda, and to produce a band of logicians among the Buddhists.

78. ĀRYA NĀGĀRJUNA (ABOUT 250—320 A D)

Nāgārjuna or rather Ārya Nāgārjuna, the founder of the

¹ Fide Hsueh tsang's *Travel in India's Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. II, Book XIII, p. 97, and Book X, p. 210. Watters' 'On Yuan Chwang,' vol. II, pp. 201—202 and Wamijew quoted by Schuefer in the *Geschichte des Buddhismus*, p. 201.

² Śaśvāha is the same as Śāstavihāna, which is a general name of the kings of the Andhra dynasty—Fide Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's *Early History of the Deccan*, second edition, pp. 25—27.

³ Nāgārjuna wrote an instructive letter to Śāstavihāna, whose private name in Chinese was Sh'yen-tō-hen. This letter is called Ārya Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva

79 NĀGĀRJUNA'S *Mādhyamika-kārikā*
(ABOUT 300 A D)

The middle path doctrine—*Mādhyama-mārga*

The *Mādhyamika-kārikā*¹ is the first regular work on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy

The doctrine which permeates this work, = that of the middle path² which = to be comprehended from four aspects, viz (1) in contradistinction to oneness, (2) as the abnegation of oneness, (3) as unity in plurality, and (4) in the sense of absolute truth

As we cannot conceive of being (existence) independently of non-being (non-existence), it will be taking an oneness view if we are to say that the world *exists* or that it *does not exist*. The middle path furnishes a contrast to this oneness by avoiding the two extremes of being and non-being. This is the first aspect of the middle path

Denying the two extremes the middle path reveals itself
then is a complete harmony between them

The middle path, which unifies all particulars, does not lie beyond them. The particulars attain their characters of particularity only through our conception of the unity among them

printed in Hanoi, 1903, and for his hymns such as *चर्मोद्धारस्तव, विद्वत्तव* etc., vide *Ānāgaur, Bṛhad pa, vol. Ka*.

For an account of other works, vide the article "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet, No 3," by Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana, in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, new series, vol III, No 7, 1907. For the philosophical works of Nāgārjuna, see Bunyiu Nanjo's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Appendix 1, no 3.

The *Nyāya-dvāra-tarke-śāstra* or *Hetu-vaiyāhārya dvāra śāstra*, as noticed in Bunyiu Nanjo's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Nos 1223, 1224, is not a work of Nāgārjuna but of Dignāga.

¹ The *Mādhyamika-kārikā* with the *Vṛtti* of Candrakīrti has been published by the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta. It has also appeared in the St. Petersburg Buddhist Text Series under the editorship of Professor Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Dr Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana's translation of the *Kārikās* with notes appeared in several numbers of the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, 1895-1900.

अनो भवतामन्नद्वयविनयान् सर्वसंसारानुत्पत्तिस्तथा

मूल्यानां शेषान् प्रतिपद्य सर्वतोपार्थं हनुमते ॥

(*Mādhyamika* *vṛtti*, chap XXIV, p 185, Buddhist Text Society's edition, Calcutta)

For an Indian account of the *Mādhyamika* philosophy or the middle path doctrine, see Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana's articles on the subject published in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society*, 1895-1900. For the Chinese account, see Dr T Suzuki's article named "the *Mādhyamika* School in China" published in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society*, part IV, 1898.

Had there been no unifying principle, the particulars would have ceased to be such. This is the third aspect of the middle path.

Ily "middle path" it is not to be understood that there is something between the two extremes of being and non-being. In fact, we must avoid not only the two extremes, but also the middle. The middle path, which discards all limitations, expresses the human conception of the absolute truth. This is the fourth aspect of the middle path.

The absolute (śūnyatā or void) is demonstrated through the summation of two truths—the conditional (saṃvṛti) and the transcendental (paramārtha). Judged by the transcendental truth no being It is from the

existence or non-existence. objects come into nature or self-existence. Taking a substance and its qualities we find that the latter exist in relation to the former, and the former exists in relation to the latter. So a whole exists in relation to its parts, and the latter exist in relation to the former. Proceeding in this way we find that the world is an aggregate of relations or conditions in virtue of which it revolves like a water-wheel. These conditions being causes of confusion, the whole world is no better than an illusion.

Origination and cessation, persistence and discontinuance, unity and plurality, coming and going—these are the eight fundamental conceptions of relation or condition. These conceptions, which are in es-

आद्यं उपाधिरानी चोक्तं भवत्यतः —

अधीति नाधीति उभेऽपि अनातः ।

अधीति अग्रहीति हनेऽपि अनातः ॥

नानादुर्भेदा विषयविषयाः ।

अपेक्षि आद्यं न करोति अक्षितः ॥

(Quoted in Mādhyamikā Vṛtti, Chap V, p. 41, Buddhist Text Society's edition Calcutta)

śūnya-vāda is called in Tibetan ston-pa-śīd, མེད་པ་ཤིད་ । Saṃvṛti satya is called in Tibetan Kun-paob-bden-pa, ཀུན་པོའ་བདེན་པ་ । Paramārtha satya is called don-dam pañ-bden-pa, དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ ।

Vide Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana's article on the "absolute" in Dr H. H. King's Dictionary of Religion, J and T Clark, Edinburgh

हेतवे अनुपादितं वृत्तादी चोक्तं भवत्यतः ।

चोक्तं अनुपादितं वृत्तादी चोक्तं भवत्यतः ॥

(Mādhyamikā Vṛtti, chap XXIV, p. 180, Buddhist Text Society's edition Calcutta).

अतिरोक्षानुपादय अनुपादे वृत्तादी चोक्तं भवत्यतः ।

अतिरोक्षानुपादय अनुपादे वृत्तादी चोक्तं भवत्यतः ॥

sence unreal, give rise to our prejudices and wrong judgments. There nestles in them the principle of unrest and misery, and as people cling to them, their life is an everlasting prey to the pendulous feeling of exultation and mortification.

Where there is conditionality, there is no truth. Truth and conditionality are incompatible. Therefore, to attain truth, conditionality must be completely cast aside. When our mind is

It may be asked as to whether there is actually a thing called

The absolute *śūnyatā* "suchness," "transcendental truth," or "the absolute." The answer will be that the thing which lies beyond conditionality, cannot be expressed in terms of "is" and "is not" or "being" and "non-being." It avoids the two extremes of "being" and "non-being," nay, it unifies both by underlying each of them. This so-called thing (*śūnyatā*) is called *Nirvāṇa*,¹ which is an unconditional condition in which all contradictions are reconciled. Attempts have been made to express this condition by the term "Infinite," "Eternal," "Profound," "Unconditioned," "Absolute" or "Blissful," but in reality no language can give adequate expression to it.²

80 NĀGĀRJUNA'S REFERENCES TO THE LOGICAL DOCTRINES OF AKṢARĀDA

In the *Mādhyamika-kārikā* Nāgārjuna has occasionally referred to certain technical terms of Ancient Technicalities of Logic. Such as *punarulā* (repetition) in

॥ अतोऽयं बहुमुपाहृतं बहुकोटिं सर्वं विदुः
इत्येवमेव बहुमुपाहृतं बहुमुपाहृतं बहुमुपाहृतं ॥

(*Mādhyamika-kārikā*, chap. 1).

॥ अथाप्येवमिदं विदुः
कुलं अथवा भावना ।
आवधानं अथवा भावना ।
अथ विदुः कुलं ॥

(*Itatōkavali* quoted in *Mādhyamika-kārikā*, p. 104)

॥ अथवा अथवा अथवा अथवा अथवा अथवा ।
अथवा अथवा अथवा अथवा अथवा अथवा ॥

(*Mādhyamika-kārikā*, chap. 5).

There is also a criticism of Āksapāda's doctrine of *Pramāṇa* (evidence). Āksapāda says that just as a lamp illumines itself and other objects, so does a *pramāṇa* establish itself as well as other objects. Nāgārjuna opposes him by saying that a lamp cannot illumine itself as there is no darkness in it. If a lamp could remove darkness even without coming in contact with it, why could it not, standing here, remove the darkness of the entire universe?

81 NIGIRJUNA'S VIJRAHA-VYAVARTANIRIGET
(ABOUT 300 A.D.)

Vigraha-vyāvartanikārikā is a work on the Mādhyamī philosophy which eventually criticises the Nyāya-theory of *pramāṇa*, the evidence or means of knowledge, as laid down in *Akṣapāda*. The work, the Sanskrit original of which is lost, is called in Tibetan *Ḥi-toḡ-pa bzlog paḥ tshig-lebur byas-pa*, signifying memorial verses on quelling disputes. It consists of folios 26—29 of the *Ḥi-tan-bgyur* Mdo, *tsa*. The original Sanskrit text which had been composed by Ārya Nāgārjuna, was translated into Tibetan by the Indian sage Jñāna garbha and the Tibetan interpreter Ka-wa ḡpal bzḡrga. Subsequently the translation was recast by the Kāśmīrian Pandita Jayananta and the interpreter Khu ḡnduḡde ḡpal.

1 The following verse refers to the law of additive color —

विद्युते वा अतीवाह कते श्रुत्येतया नदीपु ।

॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

(Miyayama 1994, chapter 14)

• **Διάρθρωση του κράτους** —

॥ इति श्रीमद्भगवद्गीतायाः अष्टादशोऽध्यायः ॥

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पुणेचे अर्थशास्त्रज्ञांचे संस्थानाभिवृत्ति यात्रा ।

॥ श्री गणेशाय नमः ॥

अथ हिन्दु धर्मस्य अष्टांगम् ।

[illegible]

(M&P version dated approx. 1971, p. 17, contains identical text history.)

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Figure 1. A schematic diagram illustrating the experimental setup for measuring the time delay between the emission of a photon and the detection of its partner. The setup includes a source of entangled photons, a beam splitter, and two detectors labeled D1 and D2. The distance between the beam splitter and the detectors is denoted as L. The time delay is measured by recording the arrival times at both detectors and calculating the difference.

U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE

The Chinese version of the *Vigraha-vyāvartanī kārīkā* is noticed by Bunyiu Nanjo under the name of *Vivāda-śamana-śāstra*. It was translated into Chinese by the sage Vimokṣa-prajña and others in 641 A.D.

In the *Vigraha-vyāvartanī kārīkā* (as reproduced in Tibetan) Nāgārjuna criticises the validity of *pramāṇa*, the evidence or means of knowledge, as follows —

If you establish objects through a *pramāṇa*, the *pramāṇa* itself must be established through another *pramāṇa* and that again by a fresh *pramāṇa*, until you commit the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum*. If, on the other hand, you attempt to establish objects without a *pramāṇa*, your tenet (viz. that objects are established through *pramāṇa*) falls to the ground.

A *Pramāṇa* is not self-established. Had it been so, there would

The validity of Akṣapāda's *pramāṇa* criticised

have been a complete cessation of gloom or ignorance. The view that a *pramāṇa* establishes itself as well as other objects, is untenable. A fire, which is cited as an illustration, can illumine other objects by removing darkness which besets them, but it cannot illumine itself inasmuch as a fire never co-abides with darkness.

A *pramāṇa* cannot be so called, if it is totally independent of *prameya* (objects). If, on the other hand a *pramāṇa* is dependent on *prameya* (objects), how can it, having no self-existence, establish the latter? etc., etc.

82. NĀGĀRJUNA'S *Pramāṇa-viśetana* OR *Pramāṇa-vidhvamsana* (ABOUT 300 A.D.)

To Nāgārjuna is attributed the composition of a logical treatise called *Pramāṇa-viśetana* or *Pramāṇa-vidhvamsana*, which literally signifies "the quelling of *pramāṇa*," and which was in fact a review of the definition of the sixteen categories as given by Akṣapāda. The Sanskrit original of this work is not available. There is however extant the Tibetan version of a commentary on the work called *Prāmāṇa-viśetana-toṣṭitaka-vṛtti* or *Pramāṇa-vidhvamsana-sambhāṣita-vṛtti* dated probably about 610 A.D. It extends over folios 415—418 of the *Bstan-hgyur*, Mdo, ba. In Tibetan the commentary is called *Tahad-ma-rnam par-hjoms-pa mdor-hsad-pahi-hgrel*, which literally signifies "a magic-stick commentary on *Pramāṇa-viśetana*, or *Pramāṇa-vidhvamsana*." ¹

¹ Called by P. Cordier in his *Tibetan Catalogue* as *Prāmāṇa-vidhvamsana-toṣṭitaka-vṛtti*.

This work does not perhaps represent the views of Nāgārjuna but refers to those of the commentator.

The commentator, whose name is not mentioned, pays obeisance to Mañju-śrī-kumāra-bhūta and introduces his work as follows.—

To please the learned people, I give an exposition of the vihetana or vidhvamsana (i.e. Pramāṇa-vihetana or Pramāṇa-dhvamsana).¹

Then he observes that the instructions on Nyāya deivered by Nāgārjuna are put together to constitute the present work.

He further observes that Nāgārjuna, who bore special marks of greatness, proceeded once for the dissemination of culture to the region of the Nāgas. They exhibited their magical powers which could not overcome him. Beholding his superhuman greatness Upendra, king of the Nāgas, offered him his daughter, while the other Nāgas worshipped him in a besotted manner. They took orders and coming to the region of men practised the austerities of monks.

The commentator reproduced Nāgārjuna's definition of the categories which are stated in Tibetan as follows.—

(1) Tshad-ma (pramāṇa), (2) gshal-bya (prameya), (3) the-tshon (samāya), (4) dgos-pa (prayojana), (5) dpe (drśānta), (6) grub-pah-mthab (siddhānta), (7) cha-śag (arayaṇa), (8) rtog-ge (tarka).

Categories defined in the work.

an example It may

appear in one of the (1) raq-bu, kārya), (2) an identity (rnam-bshin, svabhāva), and (3) non-perception (mi-dmigs, anupalabdhi).

An example* (dpe, drśānta) is defined as the place in which

མཁའ་བུ་ལྷ་མོ་ལ་བཞུགས་པའི་ཁྱེད་ །

ཤིང་ལ་འཇམས་པའི་རྟོག་པའདྲ་ལྟོ །

(Hsiao-hgyur, Ydo, ha, folio 415)

* ཤིང་ལ་བཞུགས་པའདྲ་ལྟོ་ཤིང་ལ་བཞུགས་པའདྲ་ལྟོ་ཤིང་ལ་བཞུགས་པའདྲ་ལྟོ་ ། ཤིང་ལ་བཞུགས་པའདྲ་ལྟོ་ ཤིང་ལ་བཞུགས་པའདྲ་ལྟོ་ ཤིང་ལ་བཞུགས་པའདྲ་ལྟོ་ །

(Hsiao-hgyur, Ydo, ha, folio 417)

* It is doubtful whether this was the original doctrine of Nāgārjuna. It might

is decisively shown the connection between the reason (middle term) and its universal companion the predicate (major term)

83. *Upāya kauśalya hrdaya-śāstra* (ABOUT 300 A D)

The *Upāya-kauśalya-hrdaya-śāstra*,¹ the Essence of Skill in the Accomplishment of Action, is stated to be a work on the art of debate by Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. In Chinese this work is called *Fān-pien-sin-lun*. It was translated into Chinese by Ci-cia-ye and Thān-yao in A.D. 472.

Seeing that the Vaiśeṣika and other systems were obscure in their terminology, Nāgārjuna, it is reported, undertook to write this book to give a clear exposition of the art of debate. The book is divided into four chapters styled respectively as (I) an elucidation of debate [*vāda-vivādhikarana*], (II) an explanation of an explanation of the dialogue or far-fetched

(1) The first chapter consists of eight sections which treat respectively of (1) an example (*udāharaṇa*), (2) a tenet, truth or conclusion (*siddhānta*), (3) the excellence of speech (*vākya prasamśā*), (4) the defect of speech (*vākya doṣa*), (5) the knowledge of inference (*anumāna* or *hetu-jñāna*), (6) the appropriate or opportune speech (*samayocta vākya*), (7) the fallacy (*hetuvādhāsa*), and (8) the adoption of a fallacious reason (*duṣṭa vākyaṇusarāna*)

(1) The example is a statement to which the reason is applied.

(2) The tenet is a statement which is the object of knowledge.

The means, by which the tenets, truths or conclusions are established, are called *pramāṇas* (the sources of valid knowledge) which are of four kinds, viz perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and scripture (*āgama*)

¹ This definition is contained by Uddyotakara in his *Vārtika* on *Nyāya-śāstra*, 1-1-37.

² Some suspect that the work was not composed by Nāgārjuna whose name, though mentioned by some Chinese editors, does not appear in the Chinese version. In the absence of any introduction to the Chinese version we cannot deny altogether the authorship of Nāgārjuna. Festschrift Bunyio Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, no 1237.

- (3) A *speech* is said to be *excellent* if its words are neither inadequate nor redundant, and its reason and example well expressed.
- (4) A *speech* is said to be *defective* if its words are inadequate, or redundant, or if it employs the same word to convey different meanings or different words to convey the same meaning.
- (5) The *speech* of a *man* is said to be *excellent* if it is *excellent*. (2)

east and sets in the west, must have moved

- (6) The *appropriate or opportune speech* consists in its being pertinent to the subject and occasion, e.g. in the discussion as to whether there will be rain to-morrow, one may appropriately speak of the condition of the sky of the previous day.
- (7) The *fallacies* signify reasons which are derived from an imperfect perception, inference, or comparison, or which deviate from the scripture. There are various kinds of fallacies designated respectively as follows —
- (a) The *quibble in respect of a term* (*vāk-chāla*), e.g. a man pretends to use the term *nava-kambala* in the sense of nine blankets while he really means a new blanket.

(d)

(e)

non-eternal. If you say so it will follow that a tortoise possesses hair and salt possesses smell, because they are apprehended by the mind: this is absurd.

- (A) The *contradictory* (*viruddha*)—either in respect of the example or in respect of the conclusion.

- (8) The *adoption of a fallacious reason*—If in the course of one's argument one commits fallacies, one will be thrown into difficulties and disgrace

(II) "The points of defeat" are the following —

- (1) *ma-* ... *bhā*),
ūna),
īrar-
sraut

(III) "An explanation of the truths" deals mainly with the admission of an opinion (*maññuṃ*)

(IV) The "analogous" or far-fetched analogy is of various kinds as follows —

- (1) Ba' ...
amā)

84 ĀRYA DEVA (ABOUT 320 A D).

Deva,¹ or rather Ārya Deva, was the next writer on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy. He is otherwise known as Karnaripa, Kāna Deva, Nila-netra and Puṅgala-netra. He was born in Southern India and was an eminent disciple of Nāgārjuna. According to Hwen-thsang,² he visited the countries of Mahā-kāśala, Srughna, Prayāga, Cola and Vaiśālī, in all of which he won great renown by defeating the Tīrthikas and preaching

assigned to Deva is 401 A D,³ when his biography was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva. He wrote numerous works on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy, such as the *Śataka śāstra*, *Bhrama-prama-*

¹ Vide Bunyio Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 4; and Watters' "On Yuen Chwang," vol. I, p. 321, vol. II, pp. 225-226.

² Vide Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, Book IV, pp. 186-190, Book V, p. 231, vol. II, Book X, pp. 219, 227, Book XII, p. 202, Book VIII, pp. 98-102.

³ Vide Larus Tīrthakā's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 83-85 and 93.

⁴ Vide Nāgārjuna. Cf. Dr Jacob's "Dates of philosophical sūtras," J A O S. for 1911, p. 2.

⁵ Vide Bunyio Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 4.

thana-yukti-hetu-siddhi,¹ etc., all of which bear evidences of his knowledge of Logic

85 MAITREYA (ABOUT 400 A.D.).

Maitreya,² or rather Maitreya-nātha, who was an eminent teacher of the Yogācāra School, was called His life and age in Chinese 'Mirok' and in Tibetan 'Rya' pahi-mgon-pa'. He was the author of several works such as Bodhisattva-caryā-nidāna which was translated into Chinese during 414—421 A.D., the Saptadāśa-bhūmi-śāstra-yogicārya which was translated into Chinese in 646—647 A.D., and the Abhisamayalankāra-kārikā which was translated into Tibetan during 1103—1109 A.D. Maitreya, who lived 900 years after the nirvāṇa of Buddha that is, about 400 A.D.,³ is reported by Hsueh to have communicated the materials of three Buddhist treatises to Ārya Asaṅga while the latter was residing in a monastery, Ayodhya.⁴

86 MAITREYA'S ABHISAMAYALANKĀRA KĀRIKĀ

Maitreya strongly supported the doctrines of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda) and voidness (śūnyavāda). This is evident from the Abhisamayalankāra-kārikā in which he says that we attain perfect wisdom in our thought neither precedes nor follows it, just as a lamp which removes darkness neither precedes nor follows the same. Profound indeed are the eight character-istics.⁵ Profound is the origination of an object, and so at

¹ See also Chandra Varāha-muni's 'Indian Logic as preserved in the 12th Century' in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. 1, 111, 112.

² See also 'The Buddhist Logic of the Chinese' by the same author, p. 27.

³ See 'The Buddhist Logic of the Chinese' by the same author, p. 27.

⁴ See 'The Buddhist Logic of the Chinese' by the same author, p. 27.

⁵ See 'The Buddhist Logic of the Chinese' by the same author, p. 27.

⁶ See 'The Buddhist Logic of the Chinese' by the same author, p. 27.

⁷ See 'The Buddhist Logic of the Chinese' by the same author, p. 27.

⁸ See 'The Buddhist Logic of the Chinese' by the same author, p. 27.

tion and suchness. The knowable, knowledge, action, means expedients are all profound. Inasmuch as the objects partake in character of a dream, there is no reality underlying our sense and its emancipation.

Taking one's stand on the dreamy character of objects, one practising charity, etc., realizes that these are void. One awakes in a moment that a dream and a seer of the dream are connected but are non-dual in their essence.¹

The knowledge of objects and their connection and separation is momentary.²

87. MAITREYA'S TREATISE ON the Art of Debate

In the 15th volume of Maitreya's *Saptadśa-bhūmi śāstra-lārya*³ there is a treatise on the art of debate. It consists of seven chapters styled respectively as follows —

1. *The subject of debate*

In beginning a debate on a subject, we must first see that the subject of the treatise is a useful one. A useless subject should be abandoned.

2. *The place of debate*

Debate should not be entered upon in any and every place. It should be carried on in the presence of scholars, in the palace of a king or the office of a minister or in a council (*pariśad*).

उपस्थापयेत्तु चार्थानां महतीषां कीदृशी ।

समाधेयत्वात् चार्थानां महतीषां कीदृशी ।

(*Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā*, Chap. IV, p. 22, MSS. of the Asiatic Society of India.)

अप्रीयतेषु चर्चयेत्तु विद्यां द्वावादिष्वर्थानां ।

चर्चयेत्तु चार्थानां महतीषां कीदृशी ।

समाधेयत्वात् चार्थानां महतीषां कीदृशी ।

चार्थानां महतीषां कीदृशी चर्चयेत्तु चार्थानां ।

(*Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā*, Chap. VII, p. 28, MSS. of the Asiatic Society of India.)

अप्रीयतेषु चर्चयेत्तु विद्यां द्वावादिष्वर्थानां ।

(*Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā*, Chap. III, p. 14, MSS. of the Asiatic Society of India.)

¹ It is perhaps this work which is called *yoga* by Dr. Sugata, vide its Chinese version *Yüa Ron*, Book XV.

2. The manner of debate

The three qualities of a debater are that which he should possess, that which he should not possess, and that which he should possess in a particular manner. The first of these is that which he should possess in a particular manner. The second is that which he should not possess. The third is that which he should possess in a particular manner.

- He should possess the quality of being able to speak in a particular manner.
- He should possess the quality of being able to speak in a particular manner.
- He should possess the quality of being able to speak in a particular manner.

3. The qualifications of a debater

- The debaters must be versed in each other's arguments.
- They must not enter any premises and avoid all respectful language in addressing each other but use empty words of dignity.
- They must remain fraternal.
- They must speak continuously without any break, and be intelligible to the entire assembly.
- They must speak in harmony—sometimes alone and sometimes aloud—to draw the audience.

4. Points of defeat (nigrahasthāna)

- If a debater at first opposes an assertion and afterwards speaks in agreement with it he is defeated.
- If a debater being unable to defend the subject which he has been discussing introduces another subject, he is defeated.
- If a debater talks irreverently (asāh-vīrye), he is defeated.

5. Attending a place of debate

- A person, in proceeding to a place of debate, should consider whether the debate will be of any benefit to him.
- He should, before proceeding there consider whether the debate will exercise any good influence on the debater, the opponent, the umpire, and the audience.
- He should consider whether the debater and his opponent are persons worthy of carrying on debate through process of a proposition (siddhānta), a reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), etc.

6. Confidence of a Debater.

The debater should appear to the audience in such a way that he is, as it were, sure to gain victory. He should be understood by them to be one who knows the scripture of both the parties, who is self-possessed and full of enthusiasm, and who can speak without a break.

It is evident from the titles of the chapters just mentioned that Maitreya mainly discussed the practical questions of Logic. But occasionally there was mixed with the discussions some Pure Logic also. A thesis [*pratyñā*], according to Maitreya, is to be supported by a reason [*hetu*] and two examples [*dṛṣṭānta*]. Validity of the reason and of the examples requires that they be based either (1) on fact or perception [*pratyakṣa*], (2) on inference [*anumāna*], or (3) on holy saying [*śāgama*]. Analogy or Comparison [*upamāna*] is omitted. The form of his reasoning is illustrated as follows:—

(1) Sound is non-eternal,

" " " " " " " " " " " "

88. ĀRYA ASAṄGA (ABOUT 405—470 A.D.)

Asaṅga,¹ called in Chinese Mucak and in Tibetan Thogs-med, was born in Gāndhāra (modern Peshwar). His life. He was at first an adherent of the Mahāśāsaka² sect and followed the Vaiśāṣika philosophy of the Hīnayāna. Later on he became a disciple of Maitreya and adopted the Yogācāra philosophy of the Mahāyāna. He is said to have lived for some years as a paṇḍita in Nālandā.³ He lived about 450 A.D.⁴ The latest date that can be assigned to him is 531 A.D.,⁵ when one of his works, called the Mahāyāna-saṃpangraha-śāstra, was translated into Chinese. Hwen-thsang in the 7th century A.D. saw the ruins of *Saṅghārāma* in Kauśāmbī and Ayodhyā, where Asaṅga resided for some years.⁶ He wrote 12 works, most of which still exist in Chinese and Tibetan versions.⁷

A short summary of the Logic of Asaṅga is found in the 11th volume of *Prakaraṇpūrya vācā śāstra*⁸ and His logical views. 7th and 16th volumes of *Mahāyānaśbhidharma saṃyukta saṅgiti-śāstra*. The first work called in Chinese

¹ Vide "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," p. 30.

² Vide Hwen-thsang's *Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Vol. I, pp. 98, 227 and 238.

³ Vide H. H. H. "On Yuan Chwang," Vol. I, p. 257.

⁴ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 122.

⁵ Asaṅga is approximately placed at 450 A.D. as he was the eldest brother of Vasubandhu (q.v.) who lived about 480 A.D.

⁶ Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Appendix I, No. 5.

⁷ See Beal's *Buddhist Records*, Vol. I, pp. 98, 227, 238.

⁸ Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Appendix I, No. 5.

⁹ Bunyiu Nanjo's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Nos. 1177, 1178.

Hsien-yao shan ciao lun (signifying 'a sastra on expounded holy teaching') was composed by Bodhisattva Asaṅga. It translated into Chinese by Hsien thsang (Yün chwang) of the T'ang dynasty in A.D. 615-616. The second work called Chinese Ta-shan o-phi-ta-mo tai-ti-lun was compiled by Bodhisattva Śhīlamati. It was translated into Chinese by Hsien-ths of the T'ang dynasty in A.D. 616.

In logical views Asaṅga follows Maitreya except in respect of the three 'śāstram' 'pro' 'Asaṅga'

(1) an application (*upanaya*), (5) a conclusion (*niṣamāna*), perception (*pratyakṣa*), (7) comparison (*upamāna*), and (8) structure (*āgama*).

The first five subdivisions constitute what is called an inference (*anumāna*).

Asaṅga's form of reasoning, which is somewhat different from Maitreya's, is given below —

(1) Sound is non-eternal,

(2) Reason is

(3)

(4)

nal, so is sound

(5)

89 VASUBANDHU (ABOUT 410-490 A.D.)

by F.
was F.
the F.

brother Asaṅga to the Yogācāra school of the Mahāyāna

of Buddha, that is before 500 A.D. He was a contemporary of another Vaiśhāṣika teacher, named Saṅghabhadra, who lived about 489 A.D.¹

¹ Vide Hsien-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World I, pp. 98, 105, 172, 193, 225, 235, and Watters "On Yün-chwang," Vol. I

Vāmana,¹ who lived at the end of the 8th and beginning of the 9th century A.D., quotes a verse alluding to Vasubandhu as a counsellor (possibly of Kumāra Gupta during 413—455 A.D.). A biography² of Vasubandhu was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese during 557—569 A.D. Paramārtha,³ the translator of the biography (499—569 A.D.), tells us that Vasubandhu, who was patronised by Vikramāditya (possibly Skanda Gupta), died at the age of eighty years during the reign of Balāditya Narasimha Gupta (485—490 A.D.). He was therefore a contemporary of Kumāra Gupta, Skanda Gupta, Pura Gupta and Balāditya (from about 410 A.D. to about 490 A.D.).

Vasubandhu was the author of a large number of very valuable works,⁴ some of which are available in Sanskrit and the rest in Chinese and

Tibetan translations

In the 7th century A.D. while Hwen-thsang was travelling in India, he saw three works on the art of debate attributed to Vasubandhu.⁵ The Sanskrit originals of these works as well as their Chinese versions are now lost. The works were styled in Chinese as (1) Ronbi (*Vāda vidhi*—the method of debate), (2) Ronshiki (*Vāda-mārga*—the course of debate), and (3) Ronshin (*Vāda-kauśala*—the expedients of debate).

90 VASUBANDHU'S Tarka Śāstra

Besides these three works, there was a treatise on Logic called

वाचिस्पत्यस्य वाच्यम्,—

वाच्यं वदन्ति वाचस्पत्यस्य वाच्यम् वाच्यम् ।

वाच्यं वाचस्पत्यस्य वाच्यम् वाच्यम् वाच्यम् ॥

वाच्यं वाचस्पत्यस्य वाच्यम् वाच्यम् वाच्यम् वाच्यम् वाच्यम् ।

(Kāvyālekha-sūtra-vṛtti, 3-2 2, p. 85, Benares Sanskrit series)

Tarka-śāstra¹ composed by Vasubandhu. There exists a Chinese

An analysis of the version of this work called *Eu shih tsu*
Tarka-śāstra. The Chinese version was prepared by

Paramārtha of the Chan dynasty in A.D.
550. The Tarka-śāstra consists of three chapters dealing respec-
tively with (1) the five parts of a syllogism (*pañcāvaya*), (2) the
analogous rejoinder (*jāti*), and (3) the points of defeat (*nigraha-*
sthāna).

In chapter I, Vasubandhu treats of a proposition (*pratijñā*),
a reason (*hetu*), an example (*udāharana*), an application (*upanaya*),
and a conclusion (*nigamana*), which constitute the five parts of a
syllogism.

Though according to the Tarka-śāstra a syllogism consisted
of five parts, in the Ronki quoted by Kwei-ke, Vasubandhu
maintained that a thesis could be proved by two parts only, viz.
the necessary terms
the minor term
a term (*hetu*)
analogous Rejoinder

(*jāti*) which is subdivided under three heads as follows:—

A. A rejoinder on the basis of reversion (*viparyaya-khāṇḍana*)
which consists of (1) balancing the homogeneity (*sādharmya-*
samā), (2) balancing the heterogeneity (*asādharmya-samā*), (3)
balancing the thesis (*sādhya samā*), (4) balancing the unquestion-
able (*avarnya-samā*), (5) balancing the mutual absence (*aprāpti-*
samā), (6) balancing the non-reason (*ahetu-samā*), (7) balancing
the demonstration (*upapatti-samā*), (8) balancing the doubt

(*saṃśaya-samā*), (9) balancing the non-difference (*aviseśa-samā*),
(10) balancing the singleness (*niravasthā-*
gati-samā), (11) balancing the point in dispute
(*prakarana-samā*), (12) balancing the counter-example (*pratid-*
ṛṣṭānta-samā), and (13) balancing the infinite regression (*prasaṅga-*
samā).

C. A contrary rejoinder (*viparīta-khāṇḍana*), which consists
of (14) balancing the non-produced (*anutpatti-samā*), (15) balanc-

¹ Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No. 1232

² The Jaina logician Buddhadeva Divākara probably refers to Vasubandhu, when he says that according to some logicians *anavayāpka* (internal inseparable connection) consisting of *pakṣa* or minor term, *sādhya* or major term and *hetu* or middle term, is quite enough in establishing a thesis, and that *dṛṣṭānta* or example is altogether useless. Buddhadeva Divākara writes:—

अथवाऽपि वाक्य विवेचिष्यतामि ।

अथवा वाक्यद्वयैवैवमिदं आशयिष्ये विदुः ॥ १० ॥

(Buddhadeva Divākara, edited by Dr. Satya Chandra Vajra
1 by the Indian Research Society of Calcutta)

ing the eternal (*nitya-samā*), and (16) balancing the presumption (*arthāpatti-samā*)

Chapter III deals with twenty-two kinds of points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*) enumerated below —

- (1) Hurting the meaning of a proposition
- (2) *virodha*, (4)
- (3) shifting
- (4) *lāra*, (7) t
- (5) *śānta*
- (6) *śānta*
- (7) *śānta*
- (8) *śānta*
- (9) *śānta*
- (10) *śānta*
- (11) *śānta*
- (12) *śānta*
- (13) *śānta*
- (14) *śānta*
- (15) *śānta*
- (16) *śānta*
- (17) *śānta*
- (18) *śānta*
- (19) *śānta*
- (20) *śānta*
- (21) *śānta*
- (22) *śānta*

(*śānta*), *śānta* the sense of a reason or fallacy (*hetvabhāsa*)

It is to be regretted that neither the Ronki nor its Sanskrit original is available. Vasubandhu seems, however, to have used two forms of syllogism, viz a syllogism of five parts at the time of a debate and a syllogism of two parts on an ordinary occasion. The two forms are exhibited below —

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| A syllogism of five parts. | (1) Sound is non-eternal |
| | (2) Because it is a product |
| | (3) Products are non-eternal like a pot, which is a product and is non-eternal, |
| | (4) Sound is an instance of a product |
| | (5) Therefore sound is non-eternal |
| A syllogism of two parts. | (1) Sound is non-eternal. |
| | (2) Because it is a product. |

CHAPTER III

Systematic Buddhist Writers on Logic

91 THE COMMENCEMENT OF MEDIEVAL LOGIC (450—1200 A D)

In the previous chapter we have seen that from the original Buddhism in the 6th century B C to its expansion into four philosophical schools in the 4th century A D , there were no systematic Buddhist works on Logic, but only a few stray references to the science in the works on philosophy and religion. Nagarjuna, about 200 A D , is the first Buddhist philosopher who gave a review of the

with the problems of the *Yogacara* and *Vaidhanika* schools of philosophy. Vasubandhu's three works ' on Pure Logic ' mentioned by Huen Tsing are now lost and consequently their merits cannot be judged. With 450 A D began a period when Logic was completely differentiated from general philosophy, and a large number of Buddhist writers gave their undivided attention to that branch of learning. The works brought out by these writers, along with those brought out by the Jains, constitute the Medieval School of Indian Logic. Dharmakīrti is the earliest known writer of this school.

92 ARYADEVA THE FATHER OF MEDIEVAL LOGIC (Circa 450—520 A D)

A portrait of Dharmakīrti

The Ācārya returning from his rounds for a meal met the Brāhmana they began a controversy, either staking his own doctrine. When he had vanquished the Tirtha (Brāhmana) several times and challenged him to accept the Buddhist doctrine, the Tirtha scattered ashes, pronouncing incantations over them, and burnt all the goods of the Ācārya that happened to lie before him, and while the Ācārya was kept back by fire, the Tirtha ran away. Thereupon Dignāga reflected that, since he could not work the salvation of this single individual, he would not be able to work that of others.

with mean persons. Please know that when you have demonstrated it, this Śāstra cannot be injured by the host of Tirthas. I undertake to be your spiritual tutor till you have attained the stage of perfection. In later times this śāstra will become the sole eye of all the śāstras."

So saying Mañjuśrī disappeared, and Dignāga resumed his work and completed *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*.

The *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*¹ is a Sanskrit work written in anuṣṭubh metre. The Sanskrit original of it is lost, but a Tibetan translation still exists. The

The Tibetan version of
Pramāṇa-samuccaya

- 1 ཐུ་མཐོང་མཐོང་གྱི་ཐོ་དམན་དང་འགྲུ་ལས་ཐོ་གྲོམ་པར་རྟེན།
ཐོང་གྱི་འཇམ་དམ་པོའི་ལུ་རྟེན་ལས་ཤིག་གཞིར་ཐོ་རྒྱལ་པར་རྟེན།
ཐོང་གྱི་ལས་མཐོང་གྱི་འགྲུ་དཔེ་འདི་འགྲུ་ལྟར་གྱི།
ཐོ་མཐོང་དུ་ལུ་འཇམ་པོའི་ལུ་རྟེན་ལས་ཐོ་གཞིར་འགྲུ་ལྟར་རྟེན།

Dpaṅ-bleam-hon-bleam, edited by Rei Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C I E, p. 101

¹ Probably the same as "The Śāstra on the grouped inferences," *see* Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. 167

section *Ydo*, volume *Ce*: In Tibetan it is called *Tshad-mah* kun-las-btun pa (—*Pramāṇa sūtra-samuccaya*) or briefly *Tshad-ma-kun las-btun-pa* (—*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*) signifying a compilation of aphorisms on *Pramāṇa*, valid knowledge. It begins thus: "Bowling down before Sugata—the teacher and protector—who is *Pramāṇa* incarnate, and benefactor of the world, I, for the sake of expounding *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), put together here various scattered matters, compiled from my own works." In the closing lines it is stated that "Dignāga, the subduer of controversialists in all regions and the possessor of elephantine strength, compiled this from his own works."

It is divided into six chapters which are named respectively: (1) Perception (Sanskrit *Pratyakṣa*, Tibetan *Yñon-sum*); (2) Inference for one's own self (Sanskrit *Svārthanumāna*, Tibetan *Ran-don gyi-rje-dpag*), (3) Inference for the sake of others (Sanskrit *Parārthanumāna*, Tibetan *Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rje-dpa*), (4) Reason and example (Sanskrit *Hetu-dṛṣṭānta*, Tibetan *Gtshig-dan-dpe*), (5) Negation of the opposite (Sanskrit *Apoha*, Tibetan *Tshan-sel-wa*); and (6) Analogue (Sanskrit *Jāti*, Tibetan *itag-good*).

Chapter I—Perception

In opposition to Akrapāda who propounded four *pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge), Dignāga states in Chapter I of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*

Pramāṇa

¹ The volume *Ce* of the *Bstan bgyur*, section *Ydo*, was put at my disposal by the India Office, London through Mr Thomas

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

ཐུན་པ་འདི་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

(*Bstan bgyur*, *Ydo*, *Ce*, folio 1)

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

(*Bstan bgyur*, *Ydo*, *Ce*, folio 12)

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

འདྲིམ་གྱི་ཡ་འཕྲོ་ལ་ཡན་པར་བཞུགས།

(*Tshad-ma kun-las btun pa*, Chapter 1)

that *pramānas* are only two, viz perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). All objects being known through them, there is no other *pramāna*.

Dignāga does not give any formal definition of Perception, which is well known as the knowledge of objects derived through the channel of the senses. But he describes Perception as that

Dignāga's description of Perception. which, being freed from preconception, is unconnected with name, genus, etc.¹ Suppose a man in twilight mistakes a rope for a snake his knowledge of the snake is a preconception and is not, according to Dignāga, an act of Perception. Dignāga contends that Perception is not connected with the name, as we can perceive a thing without knowing its name. It is also unconnected with genus, so that the perception of a thing consists of the knowledge of its individual characteristics alone. Suppose I see a cow. This cow, which I see, is a peculiar one. Its infinite peculiarities can only be realised by me who have seen it. If I proceed to indicate this cow to other persons by saying that I saw a cow which is named *Dittha* or which is red, etc., I can only convey to those persons the idea of a cow.

the common characteri-
press to them
that (a result
genus, etc.
ledge

tion

and can be well ex-
tended through Percep-
tion properly communi-

Dignāga reviews the doctrines of perception of the Yecst (or Yogācāras called in Tibetan Bonkhorst pa) and the Sāmkhyas (called in Tibetan Grang-can pa) or Kāpilasst (called in Tibetan

Perceptions as defined in other schools

Ser-skyā-wa)

Akṣapāda, whom Dignāga designates as Naiyāyika (in Tibetan rigs-pa-can), defines perceptionst as kno-

Dignāga criticises the definition of perception as given by Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana

ledge which arises from the intercourse of sense organs with their objects, being determinate, unnameable and non-erratic. Vā-

tsyāyana in his *Bhīṣya*, commentary,st admits that this definition enumerates only the special factors of perception. The *ātman*, etc. which co-operate in producing not only perception but also inference, etc., are general factors and as such not mentioned in the definition. As to the objection that the definition fails to enumerate even the special factor of perception, viz. *manas* which through its intercourse with the soul, pleasure, etc. brings about their perception, Vātsyāyana observes that the *manas* is included in the sense-organs, it has been designated a sense organ in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and the designation has been tacitly

འདི་མཁའ་ཤིས་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ནས་

འདི་མཁའ་ཤིས་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ནས་

(Pravāṇa on: 1000 Chapter 1)

འདི་མཁའ་ཤིས་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ནས་

འདི་མཁའ་ཤིས་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ནས་

འདི་མཁའ་ཤིས་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ནས་

As to the mind it is not, says Dignāga, a sense-organ, and pleasure (*sukha*) etc. are not objects of knowledge. The view, that the Naiyāvika, not having opposed the mind as a sense-organ, tacitly accepts it as such, is untenable. If non-opposition was a proof of assent, it was useless for the Naiyāvika to have mentioned the other sense-organs.¹

Chapter II—Inference for one's self

Inference (called in Sanskrit *anumāna* and in Tibetan *rtse-dpag*) is of two kinds viz inference for one's self and inference for the sake of others.

An inference for one's self¹ (*svārthānumāna* *rañ-don-gyi* *rtse-dpag*) is defined as the knowledge of a thing derived through its mark or sign of three

characters

The mark or sign (reason or middle term) should possess one of the following three characters —

- (1) *Effect* (*kārya* *hybras* *bu*)—the mark may be an effect of the thing to be inferred (predicate or middle term), e.g. smoke of fire
- (2) *Identity* (*svabhāva* *rañ* *bshin*)—the mark may be in essence identical with the thing to be inferred, e.g. a *śimśāpā* identical with a tree

¹ Dignāga observes —

མདེན་གསལ་གསལ་ཐུ་མིན་འཇམ
 དབང་མི་གསལ་མོད་མིན་དབང་མི
 བཀའ་མི་མིན་ཏུ་རྒྱ་ཆེ་ན
 དབང་མི་གསལ་ཏུ་རྒྱ་ཆེ་མིན་མི

(*Pramāṇa samuccaya*, Chapter I)

The original Sanskrit text of the verse is quoted by Vācaspati Miśra thus —

न ह्यकारि प्रत्येकं वा स्वतो वास्वोपनिषत्वात् ।
 —————

- (3) *Non-perception (anupalabdhi, mi-dmug-pa)*—non-perception of the mark may be due to the non-existence of the thing to be inferred, e.g. non-perception of a pot is a mark of non-existence thereof.

Dignāga mentions the views of some logicians who from smoke, which is the middle term, infer fire, the major term, which is inseparably connected with it, and also of others, who from smoke infer the connection between fire (the major term) and the hill (the minor term). He argues against the first mentioned logicians saying that if they infer fire from smoke they gain no new knowledge from the

things, whereas here only one thing, viz. the hill, is visible, but the other, viz. fire, is not visible. What then do we really infer from smoke? Dignāga says it is not fire nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the *fiery hill* that is inferred.¹

¹ Dignāga writes —

རྟགས་ནི་འཕྲུག་པ་མེད་པའི་རྟུང་།
 རྟེན་མཚན་གཤམ་དཔག་ལྷན་ཟེང་།
 མཚན་དང་མཚན་པར་རྟུང་པའི་རྟུང་།
 རྟེན་འབྲེལ་པ་མེད་པའི་མེད་།
 མཚན་པར་རྟགས་ནི་རྟུང་ཟེང་།
 གཤམ་དེས་ཅི་ནི་གདམས་པར་ཟེང་།
 ཅི་ནི་མཚན་པར་དེ་ཟེང་།
 ཅི་རྟུང་རྟེན་ལུ་དཔག་མི་ཟེང་།
 འབྲེལ་པར་ཡང་གཉེན་པོ་མེད་།
 དེ་མཚན་པར་ནི་རྟགས་པ་མཚན་།
 མཚན་པར་དེ་དཔག་ལྷན་པར་འབྲུང་།
 མཚན་པར་རྟགས་དང་འབྲེལ་པ་མེད་།
 རྟགས་ཀྱི་མི་འཕྲུག་པ་ཡང་མཚན་།
 མཚན་དང་གཤམ་ལུ་པར་ཟེང་པར་ཟེང་།
 དེ་ལ་རྟུང་ན་མཚན་པར་ནི་།
 དེ་དང་མཚན་པར་རྟགས་པར་འབྲུང་།

(*Pratimā-samuccaya*, chapter II)

The Sanskrit originals of these lines are as follows —

རྟགས་ལུ་མཚན་པར་མེད་པའི་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་།
 མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་།
 མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་།
 མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་མཚན་པར་།

Chapter III Inference for the sake of others

An inference for the sake of others¹ (called in Sanskrit *parā-*
śruti and in Tibetan *gshan-gyid-*
gyi rje dpaṅ) takes place when a person

demonstrates to others the conclusion drawn by him through an
 inference for one's self

The predicate² or major term (called in Sanskrit *anvaya* or
śābhyas and in Tibetan *dpag-bya* or *gyeub-*
hya) is the object which is desired by one's

self to be predicable of (attributed to) the subject (or minor term)
 and which is not opposed to perception, inference or verbal test-
 mony, e.g. the hill is fiery

चर्वमेवैव चर्व मां चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 चर्वामात्रमात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 न चर्वि चर्वो चर्वो चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ॥

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter II).

The Hindu logician Vācaspati Miśra has quoted and criticised these lines in
 the *Nyāya-vārtika-tīkā*, I-1 B.

¹ Dignāga observes —

चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 न चर्वि चर्वो चर्वो चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ॥

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter III).

The Sanskrit original of this verse runs thus —

चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।

(Quoted in *Śloka-vārtika-tīkā*, p. 237)

Pradastapāda defines *parāśruti* thus —

चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।

(*Pradastapāda Bhāṣya*, p. 231, edited by M M Vinayachandran Press, Dordrecht,
Vijayanagarani Sanskrit Series)

² Dignāga observes —

चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ॥

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter III)

The Sanskrit original should run thus —

चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ।
 चर्वाम नृपरोममात्र चर्वो चर्वो न चर्वि ॥

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter III)

The law of extension —The law of extension of the middle term (called in Sanskrit *pakṣa-dharma*¹ and in Tibetan phyogs-chos), which refers to the local area of a reason or middle term in relation to its minor and major terms, is stated as follows —

- (1) The reason or middle term must cover the subject or minor term (*pakṣa*)
- (2) The reason or middle term must be present in the homologue (*sapakṣa*) of the predicate or major term
- (3) The reason or middle term must be absent from the heterologue (*vipakṣa*) of the predicate or major term.

Nine Reasons —It is possible to conceive of nine reasons or middle terms —

A table of nine reasons, in reference to their homologues and heterologues, is given below —

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 | <p> རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ </p> |
|---|---|

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter III)

The Sanskrit originals of these lines are quoted by Vācaspati Miśra as follows —

རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter III, quoted in *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-tīkā* on *Nyāya-sūtra*, I 1 35, ¶ 199, Viśvanagaram Sanskrit series)

¹ In the commentaries on *Nyāya-sūtra*, I 1-35, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra both severely criticize Dignāga's theory of Nine Reasons. Dignāga too reviews the definitions of a proposition (*pratijñā*) as given by Akṣapāda and the Mīmāṃsaka.

| | |
|---|---|
| 2 | <p> རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ </p> |
|---|---|

(*Pramāṇa*)

The Sanskrit originals quoted by Vācaspati

རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་
 རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་ རྩལ་མ་

Chapter III Information of the case of crime

As it happens the above authorities failed in their purpose
and the Government and the British agents of the
Government of India have given them a general
disqualification for holding the office of member by their refusal to
refuse to give a vote

[illegible]

ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ, ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ।
 ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ।
 ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ।
 ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ଶ୍ରୀମତୀ ।

የጥቅም ላይ የዋለው የጥራት ደረጃ

71.0 Effect of long-term VFA exposure on the rate of growth and feed utilization of broiler chickens

¹ *Stigmidium* is a monotypic genus.

1990 年 10 月 27 日 星期四

as found to merge the

(Frobenius, 1903, p. 103, Chap. III)

The Parasitic origin of this genus is also shown

ಅಭಿವೃದ್ಧಿಗಾಗಿ ಸರ್ಕಾರದ ಸಹಕಾರವನ್ನು ಪಡೆಯುವುದು.

(4) *United States v. Shubert*, 193 F.2d 1001, 1002 (7th Cir. 1952).

Professing the Difference 203

ရန်ကုန်မြို့နယ်၊ ရွှေဘိုမြို့နယ်၊ ရွှေဘိုမြို့နယ်၊ ရွှေဘိုမြို့နယ်

... *adventitious* ...

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

1. The first reason

25 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Aspergillus fumigatus

အမှတ်စဉ် ၁၃၁

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இந்திய அரசின் உத்தரவுப்படி, இந்திய அரசின்

... ..

— 1945 —

अनुसंधान केन्द्र (अनुसंधान केन्द्र)

संस्कृत-भाषा-पत्रिका

प्रमाणित कीजिए कि

• **Stress** = $\frac{\text{force}}{\text{area}}$

The law of extension—The law of extension of the middle term (called in Sanskrit *pakṣa-dharma*¹ and in Tibetan *phyogs-chos*), which refers to the local area of a reason or middle term in relation to its minor and major terms, is stated as follows —

- (1) The reason or middle term must cover the subject or minor term (*pakṣa*)
- (2) The reason or middle term must be present in the homologue (*sapakṣa*) of the predicate or major term
- (3) The reason or middle term must be absent from the heterologue (*vipakṣa*) of the predicate or major term.

Nine Reasons—It is possible to conceive of nine reasons or

dictory and the others are uncertain.²

A table of nine reasons, in reference to their homologues and heterologues, is given below —

- 1
- | |
|---------------------------------------|
| ཕྱགས་ཤིང་མཐུན་ཕྱགས་ཡོད་མེད་དང་ |
| ཤིང་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་དག་ལ་མང་། |
| ཤིང་གཡུང་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱགས་ལས་ |
| ཡོད་མེད་ཤིང་ལ་གཉིས་ཕྱིར་རྟོག་པར་ཀྱང་། |

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter III)

The Sanskrit originals of these lines are quoted by Vācaspati Miśra as follows —

ཅན་ཅེ་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་
 ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་
 ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་
 ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter III, quoted in *Nyāya-vārtika-sūtrāya-nīkā* on *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1 I 35, p. 199, *Vijñānagarāṇa* Sanskrit series)

¹ In the commentaries on *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1 I 35, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra both severely criticize Dignāga's theory of Nine Reasons. Dignāga too reserves the definitions of a proposition (*pramāṇa*) as given by Akṣapāda and the Mīmāṃsaka.

- 2
- | |
|---------------------------|
| རེ་དག་མཐུན་ཕྱགས་ལ་ཡོད་དང་ |
| ཤིང་གཉིས་རེ་མེད་ལ་ཡོད་པ་། |
| རེ་དག་རེ་ལས་མཐུན་ལས་ |
| ལགས་པ་ལས་རེ་མེད་པར་ཀྱང་། |

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter III)

The Sanskrit originals quoted by Vācaspati are these:—

ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་
 ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་ཅན་

Nine species

| No. | Homologue of the major term (sādhya) | Heterologue of the major term (sādhya) | Nature of the reason |
|-----|--|--|------------------------------|
| 1 | The reason is wholly present (sat) in the homologue | The reason is wholly present (sat) in the heterologue | The reason is uncertain. |
| 2 | The reason is wholly present (sat) in the homologue | The reason is wholly absent (asat) from the heterologue | The reason is valid. |
| 3 | The reason is wholly present (sat) in the homologue | The reason is partly present (sadhasat) in the heterologue | The reason is uncertain. |
| 4 | The reason is wholly absent (asat) from the homologue | The reason is wholly present (sat) in the heterologue | The reason is contradictory. |
| 5 | The reason is wholly absent (asat) from the homologue | The reason is wholly absent (asat) from the heterologue | The reason is uncertain. |
| 6 | The reason is wholly absent (asat) from the homologue | The reason is partly present (sadhasat) in the heterologue | The reason is contradictory. |
| 7 | The reason is partly present (sadhasat) in the homologue | The reason is wholly present (sat) in the heterologue | The reason is uncertain. |
| 8 | The reason is partly present (sadhasat) in the homologue | The reason is wholly absent (asat) from the heterologue | The reason is valid. |
| 9 | The reason is partly present (sadhasat) in the homologue | The reason is partly present (sadhasat) in the heterologue | The reason is uncertain. |

Illustration of the nine reasons.—The nine reasons¹ are illustrated by Dignāga in his Hetucakṛa (Wheel of Reasons) in which he assumes the following as reasons (or middle terms) and major terms respectively—

Reasons or middle terms (hetu²)—(1) knowable (prameya), (2) a product (kṛtaka), (3) non-eternal (anitya), (4) produced

यत्तु निर्दिष्टोऽप्यस्य

निर्दिष्टोऽप्यस्य निमित्तः

Pratyaṅga Samuccaya, chapter III, quoted in Nyāyavārtika tātparya-tīkā on

Udrā from Pramanasamuccaya.

(*krta*), (5) audible (*śrāvana*), (6) a product of effort (*yatnaja*), (7) non-eternal (*anitya*), (8) a product of effort (*yatnaja*), and (9) tangible (*spṛśa*)

Predicates or major terms (*sādhya*¹)—(1) eternal (*nitya*), (2) non-eternal (*anitya*), (3) a product of effort (*yatnaja*), (4) eternal (*nitya*), (5) non-eternal (*anitya*), (6) eternal (*nitya*), (7) a non-product of effort (*ayatnaja*), (8) non-eternal (*anitya*), and (9) eternal (*nitya*)

Application of the Law of Extension.—Applying the Law of Extension to the Table of Nine Reasons or the Wheel of Reasons we find that the second and the eighth reasons are valid, and the remaining seven are invalid inasmuch as these are either contradictory or uncertain. Take the case illustrating the first reason in the Wheel of Law. It stands thus —

Sound is eternal,
Because it is knowable,
Like ether and like a pot

Here "knowability," the reason, is wholly present in "sound" which is the subject and in "ether" which is a homologue of "eternal" the predicate. But being wholly present also in "a pot" which is a heterologue of the "eternal," knowability becomes an uncertain reason. Take the case illustrating the eighth reason which stands thus —

This sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product of effort,
Like a pot, unlike lightning and ether

Here "a product of effort" abides in "this sound" which is the subject, and in "a pot" which is a homologue of "non-eternal" the predicate, but does not abide in "lightning" which is also a

प्रमेय कृत्यानिवृत्तस्य वाच्यं यथार्थाः ।

अनिवृत्तवस्तुत्वस्यैव निवृत्तवस्तुत्वस्यैव वाच्यं ।

(Nyāyavārtika tātparyā tīkā on 1-1-33, p. 199, Vyāsanagrate Sanskrit series).

The Tibetan version runs thus:—

क्षयवत्त्वमुक्तं निवृत्तवस्तुत्वस्यैव वाच्यं ।

वस्तुत्वस्यैव वाच्यं यथार्थाः ।

निवृत्तवस्तुत्वस्यैव वाच्यं यथार्थाः ।

क्षयवत्त्वमुक्तं यथार्थाः ।

(Pratīpaka-samuccaya, chap. III).

The Sanskrit originals are quoted by Vācaspati Mītra from Pratīpaka-samuccaya, chapter III, thus —

1

निवृत्तवस्तुत्वस्यैव वाच्यं यथार्थाः ।

निवृत्तवस्तुत्वस्यैव वाच्यं यथार्थाः ।

(Nyāyavārtika tātparyā-tīkā on 1-1-33).

homologue and in "ether" which is a heterologue of the predicate. Here the reason is partly present in the homologue and wholly absent from the heterologue and as such is valid.

Chapter IV Reason and Example

From a certain point of view, the reason or middle term (nyaya) in Sanskrit logic and in Tibetan *gtan tshe* is of two kinds: affirmative (dassya) and negative (nyatya). The affirmative reason signifies that the thing signified by it is identical with the thing signified by the thing signified by the predicate or major term, e.g. the hill is fiery because it is smoky (where smoke is an affirmative reason). The function of the negative reason is stated thus: wherever there is absence of the thing signified by the major term, there is absence of the thing signified by the reason or middle term, e.g. the hill is not smoky because it is not fiery.

A further point to be noted in this connection is that in the affirmative reason the middle term is stated as a whole, e.g. "the hill is smoky" and the reason as a whole is stated as a whole, e.g. "the hill is not smoky because it is not fiery".

In the negative reason the middle term is stated as a whole, e.g. "the hill is not smoky" and the reason as a whole is stated as a whole, e.g. "the hill is not smoky because it is not fiery".

knowledge Dignāga asks "What is the significance of a Credible Word? Does it mean that the person who spoke the word is credible, or that the fact he averred is credible?" "If the person," continues he, "is credible, it is a mere inference. On the other hand if the fact is credible, it is a case of Perception." Hence Dignāga concludes that Credible Word or Verbal Testimony is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception and Inference.¹

The mark (middle term)² is present where the thing to be inferred (major term) or its homologue is present, but absent where the thing or its homologue is non-existent, e.g. smoke is present only where there is fire or any thing homogeneous with it, but absent where there is no fire nor any thing homogeneous with the same.

Chapter VI—Analogues or Far-fetched analogy

In this chapter there is an explanation of the Analogue³ or Far-fetched Analogy (called in Sanskrit *yāts* and in Tibetan *Itag-good*) which is of various kinds⁴, such as (1) *prāptisamā* (phrad-mtshun*), (2) *apṛāptisamā* (ma-phrad-mtshun*), (3) *varnyasamā*

लब्धानुमानयोरेकं भूमादप्रानुमानवत् । ६ । ॥

अन्वयानिवृत्तिप्रामाणिकप्रत्यक्षद्वयमात्रम् ।

अन्वयपूर्वकत्वाच्च प्रतिपत्तिरित्येवमत्र ॥ ६ ॥

प्रत्यक्षः सप्रामाण्यत्वात्तद्व्याप्येवोपपन्नम् ।

आमानान्वयवत्त्वाच्च वैकल्याणविवक्षावत्तम् ॥ ६ ॥

(Śloka-vārtika, 4abda paricheḍa)

१ निरुद्धं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं ।

२ त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं ॥

(Pramāṇa samuccaya, chapter II)

The Sanskrit original is quoted by Vācaspati Miśra thus —

आप्रामाण्यविवक्षाद्व्याप्यत्वात्तदनुमानवत् ।

(Nyāyavārtika-tātparyā-tīkā on Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1 7)

Vide Uddyotakara's rejoinder in the Nyāyavārtika, 1 1 ॥

१ त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं ।

२ त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं ॥

(Pramāṇa samuccaya, chapter II)

The Sanskrit originals of these lines which have been quoted and criticised by Uddyotakara, run as follows —

अनुमानेति त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं त्वं ।

(Nyāyavārtika, 1 1-5 p. 59 Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta)

1 For an explanation of these terms vide the Nyāya-sūtra

(*brjod-mtshun*), (4) *anārya-samā* (*ma brjod mtshun*), (5) *anupatti samā* (*ma-skye-mtshun*), (6) *lārya samā* (*hbra-mtshun*), (7) *sādharmya-samā* (*chos-mthun-mtshun*), (8) *vaidharmya-samā* (*chos-mi mthun mtshun*), (9) *vikalpa-samā* (*rnam-rtog-mtshun*), (10) *upalabdhi-samā* (*dmigs pa-mtshun*), (11) *samāya-samā* (*the-tshom-mtshun*), (12) *arthāpatti samā* (*don-rtog-mtshun*), (13) *sādhya-samā* (*h-grub-bya mtshun*) and (14) *prasanga-samā* (*thal-wa-mtshun*). Some other kinds of *analogie* are said to be enumerated in the Tirthika works.

95. DIGNĀGA'S Nyāya-praveśa.

The Nyāya-praveśa¹, or rather "Nyāya-praveśa-nāma pramāna-prakarana," is another excellent work on Logic by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original is lost. There exists a Tibetan translation of it which extends over folios 1-3-148 of the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Mdo*, volume *Ce*. The translation was prepared by the great Kāśmīrian Pandita Sarvajña-śrī Raksita and the Śākya monk Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan-dpal-bzan, in the great Śākya monastery of Western Tibet. The work in Tibetan is called *Tshad-ma-rig-par hjug pahi-rgo* signifying the "Door of Entrance to Logic." It opens thus —

A Syllogism—Nyāyāvayava.

Parts of a Syllogism : Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noticed below —

¹ I consulted the *Nyāya-praveśa* in the volume *Ce* of the Tibetan *Bstan-hgyur* which was placed at my disposal by the India Office, London. I have also

ཐུག་པ་དང་ནི་ཡུན་འཕྱུར་ནི།
ཁྱེད་ཀྱང་འདྲམ་པ་གཤམ་ནི་ལྟོན།
མཛོད་ཡུམ་དང་ནི་རྩེམ་ཡུ་དཔག་།
ཁྱེད་ཀྱང་འདྲམ་པ་གཤམ་ནི་ལྟོན།
རྩེམ་པ་འདྲམ་པ་ལྟོན་ལྟོན་ལོ།

(*Nyāya-praveśa*).

² In Tibetan: *Rigs pahi-yan-log* (རིག་པ་འདི་ལ་ལག་) and in Sanskrit: *Nyāya-vaśya* (न्यायवश्य).

(4) A thesis incompatible with one's own belief or doctrine, such as A Vaiśeṣika philosopher saying "sound = eternal"

(5) A thesis incompatible with one's own statement, such as "My mother is barren."

(6) A thesis with an unfamiliar minor term, such as The Buddhist speaking to the Sāṃkhya, "Sound is perishable." (Sound is a subject well known to the Mīmāṃsaka, but not to the Sāṃkhya)

(7) A thesis with an unfamiliar major term, such as The Sāṃkhya speaking to the Buddhist, "The soul is animate"

(8) A thesis with both the terms unfamiliar, such as The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Buddhist, "The soul has feelings as pleasurable, etc."

(The Buddhist deals neither with the soul nor with its feelings)

(9) A thesis universally accepted, such as "Fire is warm" (This thesis cannot be offered for proof, as it is accepted by all)

The Middle Term and the Major Term.

Three Characteristics of The Middle Term (*hetu*) must possess the Middle Term¹ three characteristics, viz —

(1) The whole of the minor term (*pakṣa*) must be connected with the middle term, e.g.

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Like a pot, but unlike ether

In this reasoning, "product" which is the middle term includes the whole of "sound" which is the minor term

(2) All things denoted by the middle term must be homogeneous with things denoted by the major term, e.g.

All things produced are non-eternal, as a pot

(3) None of the things heterogeneous from the major term must be a thing denoted by the middle term, e.g.

No non non-eternal (that is, no eternal) thing is a product, as ether.

Thus, the middle term is connected with the minor term, and is homogeneous with the major term.

(1) All M is R.

(2) All R is P

(3) No R is non-P.

¹ Called in Tibetan, *gtan tshegs-ni-tshul-gsum* (གྲླེན་མེད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་གསུམ་) and in Sanskrit *Lingasya tsakṣipyaṃ* (लिङ्गस्य त्रैकष्यम्).

Now, the negative aspect of the middle term, viz no R is S-P, only confirms the truth conveyed by one of the positive aspects, viz all R is P. Hence we may put aside the negative aspect, and exhibit the positive aspects as follows :—

- (1) All S is R
- (2) All R is P

Again, in the above instance 'R' and 'P' may be taken in whole extent or partially. So the two positive aspects mentioned above may be fully exhibited as follows :—

- (1) (a) All S is all R
(b) All S is some R
- (2) (a) All R is all P
(b) All R is some P

Combining aspect (1) and aspect (2) together, we find that a syllogism may be of any one of the following forms :—

- (1) All S is all P (conclusion)
Because All S is all R,
All R is all P
- (2) All S is some P (conclusion)
Because All S is all R,
All R is some P
- (3) All S is some P (conclusion)
Because All S is some R,
All R is all P
- (4) All S is some P (conclusion)
Because All S is some R,
All R is some P

Hence we find that Dignāga admits only two conclusions, viz.

- All S is all P, and
- All S is some P

The second and third of the characteristics mentioned above indicate the relative extension of the middle term and major term. They show that the middle term is universally, invariably, or inseparably connected with the major

This universal, invariable, or inseparable connection between them is called in Sanskrit *vyāpti* and in Tibetan *Kāyah* was, as far as I find, first discovered by Dignāga. Assuming that the middle term or reason is R, and the term or predicate is P, the connection between the two may be symbolically set forth as follows :—

- (1) All R is all P, and
- (2) All R is some P.

Fourteen Fallacies

Owing to the violation of one or more of the three characteristics, there occur Fallacies of the Middle Term which may be of fourteen kinds as follows —

A. The unproved (Sanskrit *Asiddha*, Tibetan *Ma-grub*) which occurs.

(1) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognized by both the parties, *e.g.*

Sound is non eternal,
Because it is visible

(Neither of the parties admits that sound is visible)

(2) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognized by one party only, *e.g.*

Sound is evolved.
Because it is a product

(The Mīmāṃsakas do not admit that sound is a product)

(3) When the truth of the middle term is questioned, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery,
Because there is vapour

(Vapour may or may not be an effect of fire, and may or may not be connected with it otherwise)

(4) When it is questioned whether the middle term is predicable of the minor term, *e.g.*

Ether is a substance,
Because it has qualities

(It is questioned whether ether has qualities)

B. The uncertain (Sanskrit *Aniścita*, Tibetan: *Ma-neg-pa*) which occurs.

(5) When the middle term is too general, abiding equally in the major term as well as in the opposite of it, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is knowable

(The 'knowable' is too general, because it abides in the eternal as well as the non-eternal. This is a fallacy of being too general, called in Sanskrit: *Sādhāraṇa*, and in Tibetan: *Thun-mon*)

(6) When the middle term is not general enough, abiding neither in the major term nor in its opposite, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is audible.

¹ In Tibetan: *Cen labags ltargan* (ཅན་ལཔ་རག་ཀྱང་) and in Sanskrit: *Hotvābhāva* (होत्वभावा) 1

(This is a fallacy of being not general enough, called in Sanskrit *Asādhāraṇa*, and in Tibetan *Thun-moḥ-ma yin*).

(7) When the middle term abides in some of the things homogeneous with, and in all things heterogeneous from, the major term, e.g.

Sound is not a product of effort

Because it is non-eternal

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are products of effort, such as lightning, and abides in all things which are not non-products of effort)

(8) When the middle term abides in some of the things heterogeneous from, and in all things homogeneous with, the major term, e.g.

Sound is a product of effort,

Because it is non-eternal

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are products of effort, as lightning, and abides in all things which are products of effort)

(9) When the middle term abides in some of the things homogeneous with, and in some heterogeneous from, the major term, e.g.

Sound is eternal,

Because it is incorporeal

(Some incorporeal things are eternal as ether, but others are not as intelligence)

(10) When there is a non-erroneous contradiction, that is when a thesis and its contradictory are both supported by what appear to be valid reasons, e.g.

The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Mīmāṃsaka

"Sound is non-eternal,

Because it is a product"

The Mīmāṃsaka speaking to the Vaiśeṣika.

"Sound is eternal,

Because it is always audible"

(Both of the reasonings are correct, but as they lead to contradictory conclusions they are classed as uncertain)

C The contradictory (Sanskrit *Viruddha*, Tibetan *ljal-wa*) which occurs -

(11) When the middle term is contradictory to the major term, e.g.

Sound is eternal,

Because it is a product.

(12) When the middle term is contradictory to the implied major term, e.g.

The eyes, etc., are serviceable to some being,
Because they are made of particles,
Like a bed, seat, etc.¹

(Here the major term "serviceable to some being" is ambiguous, for, the apparent meaning of 'some being' = 'the body,' but the implied meaning of it is 'the soul.' Though things 'made of particles' are serviceable to the body, they are not, according to the Sāṃkhya, serviceable to the soul which is attributeless. Hence there is contradiction between the middle term and the implied major term)

(13) When the middle term is inconsistent with the minor term, e.g.

Sāmānya (generality) is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action;

Because it depends upon one substance and possesses quality and action.

Like generality-particularity—(*Sāmānya* or generality does not depend upon one substance, etc.)

(14) When the middle term is inconsistent with the implied
e.g.

Objects are stimuli of action;

Because they are apprehended by the senses

Obj. meaning (1) things and (2) pur-
inconsistent with the minor term in

The Example.

An example before the time of Dignāga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to illustrate the understanding of the

a universal proposition,
universal, invariable or

that the author of *Nyāya-pravāṇa*
as the object of the works on Sāṃkhya

proposition expressive of the universal
major term serves as the major premise
Aristotle. It was long unknown in
proposition marks a generalization in the

(inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, which stand to each other in the causal relation or in the relation of inherence, e.g.

The hill is fiery

Because it has smoke

All that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen (homogeneous example)

The above example is homogeneous. A heterogeneous example is thus given —

Whatever is not fiery has no smoke as a lake

Examples have already been stated to be of two kinds as

Fallacies of the homogeneous example 1 (1) Homogeneous and (2) Heterogeneous. Each of these kinds becomes fallacious under certain circumstances. Fallacies of

the homogeneous example are the following —

(1) An example not homogeneous with the middle term, e.g.

Sound is eternal,

Because it is incorporeal

That which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms

(The atoms cannot serve as an example, because they are not incorporeal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Middle Term)

(2) An example not homogeneous with the major term, e.g.

Sound is eternal,

Because it is incorporeal,

That which is incorporeal is eternal as intelligence

(Intelligence cannot serve as an example, because it is not eternal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Major Term)

(3) An example homogeneous with neither the middle term nor the major term, e.g.

Sound is eternal,

Because it is incorporeal,

That which is incorporeal is eternal, as a pot

(The pot cannot serve as an example, because it is neither incorporeal nor eternal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Middle and Major Terms)

history of Indian Logic, and shows a great development of the principle of induction

1 Called in Tibetan, *Chor-mthun-dpe-lar-gnan wa* (མཚན་པོ་ལྟན་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིད་) and in Sanskrit *Siddhanta-dipāntābhāsa* (सिद्धान्तदीपान्तर्भाषा).

Whoever is a speaker is passionate as a certain man in Magadha

(Though a certain man in Magadha may be both a speaker and passionate, there is nevertheless no universal connection between being a speaker and being passionate. This is a fallacy of Absence of Connection, called in Sanskrit *Anantaya*, in Tibetan *Bjes-su-hgro-wa-med*.)

(5) A homogeneous example showing an inverse connection between the middle term and the major term, e.g.

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product of effort,
Whatever is non-eternal is a product of effort, as a pot

(The pot cannot serve as an example, because though it is both non-eternal and a product of effort, the connection between the major term and the middle term has been inverted, i.e. all products of effort are non-eternal but all non-eternals are not products of effort. This is a fallacy of Inverse Connection called in Sanskrit *Viparīṭāntaya*, in Tibetan *Bjes-su-hgro-wa-phyin-ci-log-pa*.)

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example¹

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example are the following —

(6) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the middle term, e.g.

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as intelligence

(Intelligence is non-eternal, yet incorporeal. This is a fallacy of Included Middle Term in a heterogeneous example.)

(7) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the major term, e.g.

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as atoms

(The atoms are not incorporeal, yet they are eternal. This is a fallacy of included Major Term in a heterogeneous example.)

(8) An example heterogeneous from neither the opposite of the middle term nor the opposite of the major term, e.g.

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot.

.¹ Called in Tibetan *Chog-mi-ethun-dpo-lar gnas-wa* (མཐོག་མཐོག་ལོ་རྒྱུ་གྲུ་གྲུ་) and in Sanskrit *Vandharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* (वन्धर्म्या दृष्टान्तभ्रान्तिः) !

(A pot is neither eternal nor incorporeal. This is called a fallacy of Included Middle and Major Terms in a heterogeneous example)

(9) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of disconnection between the middle term and the major term, e.g.

It is person is passionate

Because he is a speaker

Whoever is non-passionate is not a speaker, as a piece of stone

(This is called a fallacy of Absence of Disconnection of a heterogeneous example)

(10) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of inverse disconnection between the middle term and the major term, e.g.

Sound is eternal

Because it is a product

Whatever is non-product is not non-eternal as ether

The example should be inverted as

Whatever is non non-eternal i.e. eternal, is not a product as ether. This is called a fallacy of Inverted Negation of a heterogeneous example

At the three levels of fallacy—of the Thesis, Middle Term and Example—are fallacies of reasoning. *Heṭhaka* is (not) a Sanskrit fallacy or it is Tibetan. Sanskrit consists in falling out in the reasoning of the opponent any one of the fallacies of argument, and *Heṭhaka* is of fallacious (not) in Sanskrit. It is Tibetan. Sanskrit consists in the fallacy of reasoning.

96 DIGNĀGA's Hetu-cakra-hamaru

(Logic of Nine Reasons).

The Hetu cakra-hamaru¹ is another small treatise on Logic by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original is lost, but a Tibetan translation
 tion 94.
 The ' of
 Za-hi 118
 called *Chen tsheg tsheg tsheg tsheg tsheg tsheg tsheg tsheg tsheg tsheg tsheg*

teristics of the Reason (or Middle Term) ””

In this work Dignāga has analysed all nine possible relations between the middle and the major terms and has found that there are among them two relations which conform to the three characteristics of the middle term already laid down, and the remaining seven relations are at variance with those characteristics. Accordingly he has concluded that only two relations are valid as will be evident from the annexed diagram.

97 Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti

The Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti is a commentary on the Pramāṇa-samuccaya by Dignāga himself. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation which extends over folios 12—26 of the *Bstan bcos* in part on *śāstra* volume 6.

¹ I brought a copy of the Tibetan version of the Hetu-cakra-hamaru from the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim which I visited in June 1907. This work is probably the same as the Hetu-dvāra-śāstra vide Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. 187.

² The Hetu-cakra is also called in Sanskrit *Pakṣadharmā-cakra* and in Tibetan *Thyogs-chog-dguhi-bkhor-lo*.

འདུལ་བའི་དུ་པའ་ཡི་མཁའ་མཛེད་པའི་།

མཁའ་མཛེད་པའི་དུ་པའ་ཡི་མཁའ་མཛེད་པའི་།

མཛེད་པའི་དུ་པའ་ཡི་མཁའ་མཛེད་པའི་།

མཛེད་པའི་དུ་པའ་ཡི་མཁའ་མཛེད་པའི་།

the end of the work it is stated that "led by the omniscient Mañjunātha (the god of learning) Dignāga the great dialectician of sharp intellect wrote this sūtra which is as deep as the ocean."

There is another translation of the *Pramāṇa-sūtra* current in Tibetan extending over folios 94-103 of the *Pratītya-samutpāda* section *Ydo* volume Cc. It was prepared by the Indian *Hansa* or *Kanaka Varma* (called in Tibetan *tsong-ka-pa*) and the Tibetan interpreter *Dad-pa-ke-sab* in the monastery of *tsu-wah-tse-gnas*.

94. *Pramāṇa-sūtra Nyāya-praveśa*

*Pramāṇa-sūtra Nyāya-praveśa*¹ is another work by Dignāga. It was translated into Chinese by the Chinese interpreter *Tsa-sam-tan*. The Chinese version² was translated into Tibetan by the Chinese scholar *Dge-wes-sin-gyan* and the Tibetan monk *ston-gshon* in the *sa-skyā* monastery of Western Tibet. The very venerable Chinese monk *Dharmaratna* (called in Tibetan *Chou-ku-zin-chen*) who edited the Tibetan version compared it thoroughly with the Chinese version. The Sanskrit original of the work appears to be lost but the Tibetan version still exists. It consists of folios 188-193 of the *Y-tan-hgyur* section *Ydo*, volume Cc. In Tibetan the work is called *Tshad-mahā-btan-yeo-rig-pa-lu-hyug-pa* signifying "An Entrance to the Science of Logic." The Chinese title of the work is *Qjen-min gshihi-cin-lhi-lun*.

99. *Ālambana-parikṣā*

The *Ālambana-parikṣā*³ is another work by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation which consists of one folio only (folio 180)

of the *Pratibhāṣā* ... The work in Tibetan
 is an Examination of the
 invocation to Buddha

100. *Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti*

The *Ālambana-parīkṣā vṛtti*¹ is a commentary on the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* by Dignāga himself. The Sanskrit original of this

work

101. *Trikāla-parīkṣā*

The *Trikāla-parīkṣā*² is a work by Dignāga. The Sanskrit

EXAMINATION OF THREE TIMES "

102. PARAMĀRTHA (493 A D —569 A D)

Paramārtha,³ born in 493 A D, was a Buddhist ascetic

China in 569 A D

In 550 A D he translated Vasubandhu's *Tarkasāstra* into Chinese. He is said to have translated the *Nyāya-sūtra*, too. It

¹ I have consulted the xylograph of this work as contained in the Ind. Office Library.

² I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work as contained in the

is further reported that he wrote a work called *Nyāya-bhāṣya*¹ or an explanation of the *Nyāya-sūtra* in five volumes.

103. ŚĀṆKARA SVĀMIN (ABOUT 550 A.D.)

Śāṅkara Svāmin,² as it appears from Chinese records, was a pupil of Dignāga. He seems to have been a native of Southern India. Logic is said to have been handed down by Dignāga through Śāṅkara Svāmin and ten other masters to Śīlabhadra, who was the head of the Nālandā University, and the favourite teacher of the Chinese pilgrim, Hwēn-thsang, in 635 A.D. According to the Chinese Tripitaka Śāṅkara Svāmin was the author of a work called *Hetuvidyā Nyāya-praveśa śāstra*, or *Nyāya-praveśa Tarka śāstra*,³ which was translated into Chinese by Hwēn-thsang in 647 A.D. This work seems to be different⁴ from the "*Nyāya-praveśa*" or more fully the "*Nyāya-praveśa-nāma-pramāṇa-prakarana*" which, as we have seen, is ascribed by the Tibetans to Dignāga.

104. DHARMAPĀLA (ABOUT 600—635 A.D.)

Dharmapala,⁵ a logician, was a native of Kāñcīpura in Drāvida (modern Conjeeveram in Madras). He was the eldest son of a great minister of the country. From his childhood he exhibited much cleverness, and as he was a young man the king and queen of the country condescended to entertain him at a feast. In the evening of that day his heart was oppressed with sorrow and, assuming the robes of a Buddhist recluse, he left home and applied himself with unflagging earnestness to learning. He was admitted into the University at Nālandā in which he acquired great distinction. Subsequently he became the head

The-fingert W. H. observes —

37. ¹ Vide Bunyio Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No 1216, and Appendix 1, No 13.

² The Tibetans do not know Śāṅkara Svāmin at all. The Chinese pilgrim I-t'ang, who visited India during 671—695, speaks of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but does not mention Śāṅkara Svāmin. Even Hwēn-thsang in his Travel does not mention him. Śāṅkara Svāmin's *Nyāya-praveśa Tarka-śāstra* seems to correspond to No 1216 of Bunyio Nanjo's Catalogue, is the original Sanskrit text of 1216 different from that of 1226?

³ Vide Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. 1, p. 237; vol. 11, pp. 110—223, 223 and 236. ⁴ Vide also Takakura's I-t'ang, p. 170, and Bunyio Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix 2, No 16.

of the University. He must have retired from Nālandā before 635 A.D., when Hwen-thsang visited it, and found that Śīlabhadra had succeeded him in the headship of the University. Dharmapāla conjointly with Bhartṛhari composed a *Beḍā-vṛtti* on Pāṇini's grammar.

He was a follower of the Yogācāra philosophy, and was the author of several works such as (1) *Ālambana-pratyaya-dhyāna-śāstra-vyākhyā*, (2) *Vidyamātra-siddhi-śāstra-vyākhyā*, and (3) *Śata-śāstra-vaipulya-vyākhyā* which was translated into Chinese in 650 A.D. Hwen-thsang, who visited India in 629 A.D., found in Kauśāmbī the ruins of a monastery where Dharmapāla had refuted the arguments of the heretics.

105. ĀCĀRYA ŚĪLABHADRA

(635 A.D.).

Śīlabhadra¹ belonged to the family of the king of Samatāṭa (Bengal), and was of the Brāhmana caste. He was a pupil of Dharmapāla at the Nālandā University of which subsequently he became the head. The Chinese pilgrim, Hwen-thsang, was his pupil² in 635 A.D. Śīlabhadra was a great logician and master of śāstras.

106. ĀCĀRYA DHARMAKĪRTI

(ABOUT 635—650 A.D.).

The excellent Dharmakīrti,³ called in Tibetan Chos-grags, according to the accounts of all earlier sages, was born in the south in the kingdom of Cūḍāmaṇi.⁴ Since, however, there is now no country of that name, and since on the other hand all the orthodox and heterodox alike name Trimalaya as the birth-place of Dharmakīrti, it is to be accepted that in olden times Trimalaya was called the kingdom of Cūḍāmaṇi. His father was a Tirtha of the Brāh-

years old, he was already deeply versed in

¹ Western World, vol. II, p. 110; and

² Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 175—

³ Cōḍa or Chola country in the Eastern the Deccan. Feḍa Pratikā-vṛtika-

tsan-gam-po who lived during 627—698 A.D.¹ It seems that in 635 A.D., Dharmakīrti was very young as Hwen-thsang does not mention him. On the other hand I-tsing, who travelled over India during 671—695 A.D., declares eloquently how “Dharmakīrti made further improvement in Logic”² after Dignāga. The Brāhmanic logician Uddyotakara³ is attacked by Dharmakīrti. The Mīmāṃsaka Sureśvarācārya,⁴ author of the Bhāḍāranyaka-vārtika, and the Digambara Jaina Vidyānanda, author of the Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā,⁵ have on the contrary criticised the definition of perception (*Pratyakṣa*) as given by Dharmakīrti, who is sometimes designated by the shorter name Kīrti. Vācaspati Miśra⁶ too quotes Dharmakīrti to criticise him.

107. Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā.

Dharmakīrti is the author of numerous works on Logic. The Pramāṇa-vārtika kārikā is one of them. A verse⁷ of this work was quoted by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the 14th

¹ Vide Wasmuth, p. 54, and Coema de Koros's Tibetan Grammar, p. 183.

² Takakusu's I-tsing, p. lviii.

³ Vide K. B. Pathak's "Dharmakīrti and Kumāra," *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1932, vol. xviii, p. 229.

⁴ Cf.

विशेष लविनाभावादिनि वक्ष्येऽर्थोक्तिम् ।

उल्लङ्घादि प्रतिशब्दं हीनेनाद्यो न च नवम् ॥

(Sureśvara's Bhāḍāranyaka-vārtika, chap vi.)

⁵ Vide *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. xix, 1895—97, p. 80.

⁶ Cf. वक्ष्ये वक्ष्येऽर्थोक्तिम्—

नव्याद्याद्ये न च नाने लविनाभावादिनिवृत्तम् ।

उल्लङ्घादि प्रतिशब्दमाहङ्गमेति न च नवम् ॥

(Vācaspati's Bhāmatī on Vedānta-sūtra, 2-2 28).

⁷ The verse runs thus —

अथ लविनिवृत्तौ वक्ष्येऽर्थोक्तिम् ॥

(Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā quoted in Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśanasamgraha, chapter on Buddha darśana.)

The Tibetan version of the verse runs as follows —

अथ लविनिवृत्तौ वक्ष्येऽर्थोक्तिम् ॥

अथ लविनिवृत्तौ वक्ष्येऽर्थोक्तिम् ॥

(Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā embodied in the Hstan-bgyur, Mdo, Co, folio 233. Vide Louis de la Vallée Poussin's *Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques*, p. 34.)

krit *Parārthānumāna*) Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noted below

Perception.

In chapter I, it is stated that all objects of man are accomplished by perfect or valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is of two kinds (1) Perception (in Sanskrit *Pratyaksa*) and (2) In-

ference. Perception is of four kinds (1) perception by the five senses; (2) perception by the mind; (3) self-consciousness, and (4) knowledge of a contemplative saint. An object of perception is like itself (*sva lakṣaṇa*) while an object of inference is like any one of its class (*śimānya-lakṣaṇa*), for instance, a cow which I see is

quick motion, journey by boat, shaking, etc., for instance, to a man journeying by boat, trees on both banks appear to move. Perception is of four kinds (1) perception by the five senses; (2) perception by the mind; (3) self-consciousness, and (4) knowledge of a contemplative saint. An object of perception is like itself (*sva lakṣaṇa*) while an object of inference is like any one of its class (*śimānya-lakṣaṇa*), for instance, a cow which I see is

knowledge. According to the proximity or remoteness of an object, perception of it varies. This is the peculiar characteristic of an object of perception, and this characteristic proves that it is not an object of inference. For instance, a hill which I see is

Inference for one's self

In chapter II, Inference for one's own self (*Śiṣṭhānumāna*)

is defined as the knowledge of the inferable derived through the reason or middle term bearing its three forms or characteristics. In the instance 'this hill has fire because it has smoke,' the knowledge of the hill as having fire is derived through smoke which is the reason or middle term.

The three forms or characteristics of the reason or middle term are the following —

(1) The middle term must abide in the minor term, e.g.

The hill has fire,
Because it has smoke,
Like a kitchen, but unlike a lake.

In this reasoning there must be 'smoke' on the 'hill'

(2) The middle term must abide only in cases which are homologous with the major term, *e.g.* in the above reasoning 'smoke' abides in a kitchen which is homologous with things that contain fire

(3) The middle term must never abide in cases which are heterologous from the major term, *e.g.* in the above reasoning 'smoke' does not abide in a lake which is heterologous from things that contain fire

The middle term = of three kinds
according to the relation which it bears to the major term, thus.—

(1) Identity (in Tibetan : Rañ-ḥshin, in Sanskrit *Svabhāva*),

e.g.

This is a tree,
Because it is śūmāpā

(2) Effect (in Tibetan : Ḥbraṣ-bu, in Sanskrit *Kārya*), *e.g.*

Here there is fire, because there is smoke

(3) Non-perception (in Tibetan : Mi-dmigs pa, in Sanskrit *Anupalabdhi*), which is of 11 kinds as follows —

(i) Non-perception of identity (*Svabhāvanupalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Here = no smoke, because it is not perceived (though smoke is of such a nature that it is perceptible if existent).

(ii) Non-perception of effect (*Kāryānupalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Here there are no causes of smoke of unobstructed capacity, because there is no smoke here

(iii) Non-perception of the pervader or container (*Vyāpakānupalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Here there is no Śūmāpā, because there is no tree at all

(iv) Perception contrary to identity (*Svabhāva viruddhopalabdhi*), *e.g.*

There is no cold sensation here, because there is fire

(v) Perception of the opposite effect (*Viruddha-kāryopalabdhi*),

e.g.

Here there is no cold sensation, because there is smoke

(vi) Perception of contrary connection (*Viruddha vyāptopalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Even the destruction of the past entity is not certain, because it is dependent on other causes

(vii) Perception contrary to the effect (*Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi*),

e.g.

Here there are no causes of cold of unobstructed capacity, because there is fire

(viii) Perception contrary to the container (vyāpakaviruddho-
palabdhi), e.g.

(ix) 'The ... of ... is ...'

(x) $\{abd\}$, e.g.

Hair on his body does not stand erect, because he sits near a fire

(१) Perception of effect contrary to its cause (Kāraṇa-viruddha kār̥yopalaḥḍhi), e.g.

This place does not contain any person on whose body hair stands erect, because there is smoke here

Inference for the sake of others.

In chapter III, Inference for the sake of others (*Parārthanumāna*) is defined as the declaration of

Definition of Inference for the sake of others

numāna) is defined as the declaration of the three-formed middle term in words, that is, when the reason is set forth in

words with a view to producing a conviction in others, it is said to be an inference for the sake of others

Inference is a kind of knowledge, and words are here called inference by the attributing of effect to cause, for, though they

Inference for the
or homogeneous (in
heterogeneous (in

1965-1966

Because it is a product.

because it is a product,
No non-non-eternal, i.e. eternal (thing) is a product as
ether (negative)

The minor term (*Paśca*) is that to which the relation of the

There is

major term is to be proved, as—This hill has fire, because it has smoke In this

reasoning 'hill' is the minor term which is to be proved as having 'fire' which is the major term. A minor term and its corresponding major term combined together, constitute a proposition which, when offered for proof, is called a thesis.

Fallacies of the theory
of Papistism

There are four fallacies of the theory
(*Pakṣabhāsa*)

A thesis is fallacious if it is incompatible with—

- (1) Perception, e.g. Sound is inaudible,
- (2) Inference e.g. Sound is eternal,
- (3) Conception, e.g. The moon is not *luna* (*Sādī a-candra*); or

- (4) One's own statement, e.g. Inference is not a source of knowledge.

It has already been stated that the middle term must possess three characteristics. Fallacies of the middle term (*Heivābhāsa*) occur even if one of the characteristics is unproved, uncertain or contradictory, thus—

A Unproved (*asiddha*)

- (1) Sound is eternal, because it is visible

(Visibility of sound is admitted by neither party)

- (2) Trees are conscious, because they die if their bark is taken off

(This peculiar kind of death of trees is not admitted by the opponent)

- (3) The hill has fire, because it has vapour

(Vapour as an effect of fire is questioned)

- (4) The soul is all-pervading, because it is perceived everywhere.

(It is a matter of doubt whether the soul is perceived everywhere).

B Uncertain (*anāikāntika*)

- (1) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is knowable

(The knowable is too general, because it includes the eternal as well as the non-eternal).

- (2) A certain man is omniscient,
Because he is a speaker

(The reason is not general enough, for speakers are not necessarily either omniscient or non-omniscient).

C Contradictory (*viruddha*)

- (7) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product

(Here 'product' is not homogeneous with 'eternal,' that is, the middle term is opposed to the major term)

- (8) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product

(Here 'product' is not heterogeneous from 'non-eternal').

Example is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous and (2) heterogeneous.

Fallacies of the homogeneous example occur as follows—

- (1) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like action.

(Action cannot serve as an example, because it is not eternal, that is, because it is excluded from the major term).

- (2) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like atoms.

(Atoms cannot serve as an example, because they are not incorporeal, that is, because they are excluded from the middle term).

- (3) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like a pot.

(Pot cannot serve as an example, because it is neither eternal nor incorporeal, that is, because it is excluded from both major and middle terms).

- (4) This man is passionate
Because he is a speaker,
Like the person in the street.

(The person in the street cannot serve as an example, as it is questionable whether he is passionate, that is, it involves doubt as to the validity of the major term).

- (5) This man is mortal,
Because he is passionate,
Like the person in the street.

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, that is, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate).

- (6) This man is non-omniscient,
Because he is passionate,
Like the person in the street.

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, that is, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate and non-omniscient).

- (7) This man is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Like a certain person.

(This example is unconnected (*anavaya*), for there is no inseparable connection between being 'passionate' and being a 'speaker').

- (8) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Like a pot.

(This example involves the fallacy of 'connection unshown,' *apradarśitānvaya*: the connection should be shown as follows
All products are non-eternal like a pot)

- (9) Sound is a product,
Because it is non-eternal,
All non-eternal things are products like a pot

(The example involves the fallacy of inverted connection, *viparīṭānvaya*: the real connection should be shown as follows
All products are non-eternal like a pot)

Similarly there are nine fallacies of the heterogeneous example.

Refutation (Dūṣaṇa) consists in pointing out in the reasoning

Refutation. of an opponent any one of the fallacies mentioned above

The fallacies or semblances of refutation are the analogues or futilities called in Sanskrit *Jāts*.¹

In the concluding lines of the *Nyāyabindu* it is stated by the

Concluding part translators that "Dharmakīrti vanquished the entire Tīrthikas as Śākyamuni had

subdued the large army of Māra; and as the sun dispels darkness, the *Nyāyabindu* has exterminated the Ātmaka theory (that is, the Tīrthika doctrine)—wonderful!"

Dharmakīrti criticises Dignāga.

The opposition of the middle term to the major term is a

Implied contradiction kind of fallacy called contradiction which

term

(in the d by

Dignāga in his *Nyāya-praveśa*² as another kind of fallacy called

implied contradiction (in Sanskrit: *śaṅka-śighāta-kṛt viruddha*, and

in Tibetan: *chos-kyi-khyad-par-phyin-ci-log tu-agrub-par-byed-*

¹ For *Jāts* vide *Nyāya-sūtra*, Book I, aphorism 58

² ལྟུང་རྒྱུ་ལམ་གྱི་རྟེན་པ་ཆེན་པོ།

འཇམ་གྱི་རྒྱལ་ལམ་ཐུ་རྟེན་པ་མ་ཆུང་།

ཐུ་མཐུ་རྒྱལ་རྒྱུ་ལམ་གྱི་རྟེན་པ་ལ་ལོག་།

གཤམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་ལམ་རྒྱུ་ལམ་རྟེན་པ་ཆེན་པོ།

(*Nyāya bindu*)

³ Vide *Nyāya-praveśa*, Fallacies of the Middle Term, concluding lines.

pa) Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāya-bindu* rejects this view saying that this second contradiction is included in the first kind¹

An illustration of the second or implied contradiction is given thus —

The eyes, etc., are for the use of another,
Because they are composite things
Like a bed seat, etc

Here the major term "another" is ambiguous, (inasmuch as it may signify either a composite thing (e.g. the body) or a non-composite thing (e.g. the soul). There would be a contradiction between the middle term and the major term if the word "another" were used by the speaker in the sense of a non-composite thing, but understood by the listener in the sense of a composite thing. The reasoning would then involve a contradiction of the middle term to the desired or implied major term.

Dharmakīrti² in his *Nyāya-bindu* considers this case as an illustration of the first or natural contradiction. A word, which is the major term of a proposition, can, as such, admit of only one meaning, and if there is ambiguity between the meaning expressed and the meaning implied the real meaning is to be ascertained from the context. If the meaning implied is the real one, there is a natural contradiction between the middle term and the major term.

Dignāga³ mentions yet another fallacy called the "non-erroneous contradiction" (*viruddhā vyabhicāri*, called in Tibetan *hgal-wa-la-mi-hkhrul-pa*) which he includes among the

¹ ननु च द्वितीयोक्तिरप्यविधानादहं विवक्षितः । न च द्वयवकाशोक्त्या अवयवोरेव अवयवार्थात् ।

(*Nyāya-bindu*, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, chapter III, p. 413)

अथ च विवक्षितं वाच्यार्थं दिक्त्वादेव उक्तं । न च वकाशोक्त्या वार्तिवकाशेव वना अथा बोधः ।

(*Nyāya-bindu-tikā*, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, chapter III, p. 78)

विदुषोरेव उक्तं बोधः । ... वकाशोक्त्या अवयवमनुमानवार्तिव विवक्षितवार्तिवार्थः ।

(*Nyāya-bindu-tikā*, p. 82)

Compare also Journal, Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. XIX,

The hill is fiery,
Because it is smoky,
Like a kitchen

In this reasoning the term 'smoky' includes a 'kitchen,' as well as other similar things, hence it is almost unnecessary to cite the example 'kitchen.' Nevertheless, says Dharmakīrti, the example has this much value¹ that it points out in a particular way what has been expressed in a general form by the middle term; thus, the general expression "all smoky things are fiery" is made more impressive by the particular example 'kitchen' which is smoky as well as fiery.

111 Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa

The Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa is another excellent work on Logic by

chapters as follows —

(1) Relation of identity between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan *Ran-bshin-gyi-gtan-tshig*, in Sanskrit *Stabhāva-hetu*), (2) Relation of effect and cause between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan *libras buhi-gtan-tshig*, in Sanskrit *Kārya-hetu*) and (3) Relation of negation between the middle term and the heterogeneous major term (in Tibetan *Mi dmigs-pahi-gtan-tshig*, in Sanskrit *Anupalabdhi-hetu*).

112. Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya

The Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya is another treatise on Logic

but
Ce,
181
sla
dra
ans-
ra-
in
1040 A.D.) and the interpreter-monk Dar-ma grags

१ ... यत्र चोदेव .. यत्र विवेचनं दृष्टव्यं वाच्यम् ।

(Nyāya bindu, p. 116).

¹ I have consulted the copy embedded in the Tibetan library of the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the work embedded in the Tibetan library of the India Office, London.

113. *Santānāntara-siddhi*

The *Santānāntara-siddhi*, also called *Tantrāntara-siddhi*, is a philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan version¹ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, Mdo, Co, folios 416—420. The work in Tibetan is called *Rgyud-gshan-grub-pa* signifying "Proof of the Continuity of Succession." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the Indian sage *Vāśuddha Simhā* and the Tibetan official interpreter *Dpal rtsegs*.

114. *Sambandha-parīkṣā*.

The *Sambandha-parīkṣā* is another philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost but there exists a Tibetan version in the *Bstan-hgyur*, Mdo, Co, folios 377—384. The work in Tibetan is called *Hbrel-wa-bytag-paḥi-hgrel-wa*. It was prepared by the Indian teacher *Jāna-garbhā* and the interpreter *Vande-nam mkhaḥ*.

115. *Sambandha-parīkṣā-ṛtti*.

The *Sambandha-parīkṣā-ṛtti*,² is a commentary on the *Sambandha-parīkṣā* by Dharmakīrti himself. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Bstan-hgyur*, Mdo, Co, folios 377—384. The work in Tibetan is called *Hbrel-wa-bytag-paḥi-hgrel-wa*.

116. DEVENDRABODHI
(ABOUT 650 A.D.)

Devendrabodhi, called in Tibetan *Lha-dwan-blo*, was a contemporary of Dharmakīrti,³ and so lived about 650 A.D. He wrote the following work on Logic.

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan version embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur* of the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the copy embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur* of the India Office, London.

³ I have consulted the copy of this work embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur* of the India Office, London.

⁴ Vide *Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp 154—157

⁵ I consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim in 1907

Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti called in Tibetan *Tshaj-ma-rnam-*

120 JINENDRABODHI
(ABOUT 725 A.D.)

In the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo, Re*, there is the Tibetan version of a work called *Viśāḍāmāla-vatī mīmāṃsā pramāṇa-samuccaya-ṭīkā*. This version was prepared by the Tibetan interpreter *Bdo-rje-*

idhi, called
ble to the

DOUBHĀTIVA (*DOUBHĀTIVA-deśiya*) He is perhaps the same person who wrote the well-known *Nyāsa* on the grammar of Panini in the eighth century A.D.

121 ŚĀNTA RAKṢITA
(749 A.D.).

Śānta Rakṣita,* called in Tibetan *Shi-wa-htsho*, was born in the royal family of Za-hor [in Bengal or near Lahor?]. The exact date of his birth is unknown, but it is stated that he was born at the time of Go Pala who reigned up to 705 A.D. and died at the time of Dharma Pala who became king in 763 A.D. He followed the Svatantra Mādhyamika school, and was a Professor at Nālandā. He visited Tibet at the invitation of King Khri-ston-deu-tsan who was born in 728 A.D. and died in 804 A.D. The king, with the assistance of Śānta Rakṣita, built in 749 A.D. the monastery of Sam-ye† in Tibet modelled after the Odantapura Vihāra of Magadha. Sam-ye was the first regular Buddhist monastery in Tibet and Śānta Rakṣita was its first abbot. He worked in Tibet for 13 years, that is, until 762 A.D. He was known there under the name of Ācārya Bodhisattva, and was the author of the following works on Logic—

Vāda nyāya vṛtti-vipaṭicchārtha, called in Tibetan, *Rtsod-paḥi-rigs-paḥi ḥbrel-pa-don-rnam-par ḥbyed-pa*, an elaborate commen-

works on Tantra, see Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Bṛhadharaṇī Stotra*, Introduction, pp. i-vii.

* I have consulted the copy of the India Office, London.

† *Vide* *Ḥpaḥi beam ḥyon beam* edited by Sarat Chandra Das, O.L.E., Calcutta, p. 112.

* For Sam-ye, མཚོ་མོ་ བོད་ བོད་ བོད་ *vide* Csoma de Kőrös's Tibetan Grammar, p. 153; Sarat Chandra Das in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1891, Part I, p. 226; and Waddell's *Lamasism*, p. 28.

tary on the Vāda nyāya of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Bstan-hgyur* *Mdo* *Tsho* folios 21—131, and in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Zo* folios 63—149. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāra-śrī-bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter monks venerable Śe-rah and Hbrun-ah kar (who was a native of the province of Hbrun o Do) in the holy monastery of Rām-ya² (Sam-ye). The work opens thus —

"Who constantly dispersing darkness by the ray of the lamp of various pure precious qualities, exerted himself in fulfilling the desire of various sentient beings and rejoiced to do good to the entire world—to that Mañju śrī bowing down in reverence, I compose this concise and stainless Vāda nyāya vṛtti vipaścitāṛtha."

Tattva-saṃgraha-kārikā called in Tibetan *De-kho-na-sid-bedu-pahi tshig-lehur-byā-pa* a work containing memorial verses on a summary of the Tattvas. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ue*, folios 1—146. The translation was prepared by the Indian Pandita Guṇākara-śrī-bhadra (belonging to the re-

at king Lalitāditya in the
great Tibetan interpreter
in the province of Guge
ous systems of philosophy

such as the Sāṃkhya, Jaina, etc."

¹ I have consulted the xylograph of this work contained in the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang Sikkim, which I visited in June 1907. For a detailed account of this work vide my "Buddhism in the Land of the Lamas" in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of*

बौद्धोद्योगादि [निबन्ध] रचितं यत् ।

कर्म सरस्वत्सम्भवं श्रवणादिसमाधत्तम् ॥

मुद्रयन्निबन्धानिधनवाचाद्युपाधिभिः ।

श्रुत्यनारोपितकारणव्यवस्थानुसारम् ॥

सुवचस्पष्टं प्रमादितव्यविविक्तम् ।

अवीचकापि मयि न भिद्येदुत्तमवराजम् ॥

The work is divided into 31 chapters, viz. (1) examination of nature (in Sanskrit *Svabhāva-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Ran-bshin-brtag pa*) (2) examination of the sense organs (in Sanskrit: *Indriya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Dwan-phyug-brtag pa*). (3) examination of both (in Sanskrit *Ubhaya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Gān-ka-brtag-pa*), (4) examination of the theory that the world is self-existent (in Sanskrit *Jagat-svabhāva-vāda-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Ugro-wa-ran-bshin-du-amra-wa-brtag-pa*), (5) examination of Brahma

pa-can-dan-bye-brag-pa-kun tu-brtag-paḥi-skyes-bu-brtag-pa); (8) examination of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: *Ātmamsaka-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Spyod-pa-paḥi-brtag-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa*), (9) examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit *Kapila-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Ser-skye-pa-kun-tu-brtag-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa*), (10) examination of the Digambara Jaina doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit *Digambara-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Nam-mkhah-pi-gos-can-*

Quna-sabdārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan *Yon-tan-gyi-tshug-gi-don-brtag pa*), (17) examination of the meaning of the word *Karma*

entity), etc. The last colophon appears to him to be *ཡན་ཤིང་མཁའ་མཁའ་* (examination of the doctrine of self-evidence). These are the very subjects treated in the *Hraṃsagrāha*. So the two works are identical.

Sāmānya-viśeṣa-labdārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan *Spyi-dan byo-brag-gi-tshig-gi-don brtag pa*); (20) examination of the meaning of the word 'co-existent cause' (in Sanskrit *Samavāya-labdārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Udu-wahī tshig-don-brtag pa*), (21) examination of the meaning of the word 'sound' (in Sanskrit *Sab-dārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Sgra yi-don-brtag pa*), (22) examination of the definition of perception (in Sanskrit *Pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Byed-kyi-mtshan-ñid-brtag pa*), (23) examination of other kinds of valid knowledge (in Sanskrit *Pramāṇāntara-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Tshad ma shan brtag-pa*), (24) examination of the doctrine of evolution (in Sanskrit *Vivartavāda-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Ugyur-war-zmra-wa-brtag-pa*) (25) examination of the three times (in Sanskrit *Kālatraya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Dug-gsum brtag-pa*), (26) examination of continuity of the world (in Sanskrit *Samsārā-santata-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Uyig-rteng-gyud pañi-brtag-pa*), (27) examination of external objects (in Sanskrit *Vāhyartha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Phyi-rol gyi-don-brtag-pa*); (28) examination of Śruti or Scripture (in Sanskrit *Śruti-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Thog-pa-brtag-pa*), (29) examination of self-evidence (in Sanskrit *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Rañ-laj-tshad-ma-drtag pa*); and (30) examination of the soul which sees things beyond the range of senses (in Sanskrit *Anyendriyāntārtha-darśana-puruṣa-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Gshan gyi-gwañ-po-laj-hdag-paṇi-don mthon-wa-can-gyi-skjes-bu-brtag-pa*)

122 KAMALA ŚĪLA
(ABOUT 750 A.D.).

Kamala Śīla,¹ also called Kamala Śrīla, was a follower of Śānta Rakṣita. He was for some time a Professor of Tantras in Nālanda whence he was invited to Tibet by king Khri-sron-deu-tsan (728—786 A.D.) While in Tibet he vindicated the religious views of Guru Padma-sambhava and Śānta Rakṣita by defeating and expelling a Chinese monk named Mahāyāna Ho-shang. He was of wide fame and the author of the following works:—

Nyāya-bindu-pūrva-pakṣe samkṣipta, called in Tibetan *Rig-yi-paṇi-thig-yi-paṇi-phyogs gna-ma-mdor-b-dug-pa*, a summary of criticisms on the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan transla-

¹ Vide *Dpag-bsam-hyon-bran*, part I, p. 112, edited by Sarat Chandra Das, and also the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, vol. I, part I, p. 10, and Waddell's *Lamasism*, p. 31.

tion in the *Bṛāhṣparyas*, Mdo. She, Folios 106-115. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Viśuddha Śaṁkha and the interpreter monk of Shu chen named Dpal rgye-rskita.

Tattva samgraha pañjikā, called in Tibetan De-khona-paṅ-
tō-dī-paṅ-tik-shā herel a commentary on the Tattva samgraha
Śānta Rakṣita. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost but
there exists a Tibetan translation⁶ of part I of this work in the
Böstan Yayur Miś Ye Folios 189-190, and part II of it in the
Böstan Yayur Miś Ye Folios 1-385. The translation was pre-
pared by the Indian sage Devendra Bhadra and the interpreter
mānāktīyaśaḥ library-asah.

121 KAYAKO KAKERA
 1901.11.23 A.D.

Kashya Bhakta² called in Fildan Bazar, was a great doctor and teacher of Pharmaceutics. He flourished during the reign of Maharaja Dharmapala who died in 821 A.D. He was the author of the aforementioned works. -

Barva is 115. Barva is called in Tibetan Thamsol phikhen
po, yul pa to - it is a large pa stangyang monastical place in
the area about 1000 m above sea level. It is surrounded by the Tibetan
people. The Barva is 115 and has the with a relation to
Barva is 115.

The manuscript was written by John H. Johnson, who was born in 1804 and died in 1876. It is a collection of letters and papers relating to his life and work.

[illegible]

The first of these is the fact that the
 government has been unable to raise
 the necessary funds to carry out
 its policy. This is due to a
 combination of factors, including
 the fact that the government has
 been unable to raise the necessary
 funds to carry out its policy.

He wrote two logical treatises,¹ viz *Avayavi-nirākaraṇa* and *Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā*.

collection of its parts (*avayava*) beyond which it has not a mere existence.² There is no eternal relation³ called inherent separate (*vāya*) existing between a whole and its parts. ■ (*sama-*

The second work, viz *sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā* with a resolution to oppose those who maintain that *śāstra*, begins *śāstra* is a eter- hough erness

many Brāhmana philosophers is evident from the last attacks of his *Avayavi-nirākaraṇa* which runs as follows — verse of

"Having uprooted the numerous thorns of criticism by wicked intellects, I have cleansed the broad macabrated of our Teacher. Let people removing their apites, moral path this path"⁴ on by

128 CANDRA GOMIN (JUNIOR) (ABOUT 925 A D)

Candra Gomin,⁵ called in Tibetan *Zla-wa-dge-ba* born in a Katriya family in thien, was

His life

Vārendra (modern Rajshahye in the east as

He was endowed with a very keen intellect and acquired (Bengal). tion in literature, grammar, logic, astronomy, music, and distinction fine arts

¹ The two treatises *Avayavi-nirākaraṇa* and *Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā* are included in the "Six Nyāya Tracts," edited by M M Hara Prasād, the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta. *Shastri in*

² मनु अवयविरूपेण व्यवहारी प्रतिज्ञायते यः स्वार्थं प्रत्यक्षयति ।

(*Avayavi-nirākaraṇa*, p. 7)

³ सापेक्षमित्येवमेषां सामान्यं प्रकल्पयति ।

गोचरमित्येवमेतत्प्रमाणं प्रकल्पयति ।

(*Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā*, Calcutta, p. 8)

⁴ एष मया वक्तव्यं दुर्बलं निर्दिष्टं ।

प्रत्यक्षयति यत्तु प्रत्यक्षयति ।

आचार्यगोविन्द एव विशेषतोऽयम्

सामान्यवक्तव्येन एव प्रमाणम् ।

(*Avayavi-nirākaraṇa*, p. 9)

⁵ Fede Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 143-153; and *Dzogchen-bon-hon-hon* edited in the original Tibetan 145-146, Chandra Das, Calcutta, pp. 95-96 by Sarat

f Ārya Nāgārjuna is medicine to some but poison to others, whereas the text of invincible Ārya Asaṅga is very ambrosia to all men." It is further stated that Candrar Gomin threw the original manuscript of his grammar into a well at Nālandā, thinking that it was not better than the one which Candrar Kirtī had

their intellect would become sharp." Candrar Kirtī was, however, a great admirer of Candrar Gomin. When the latter arrived at Nālandā the monks refused to give him a reception, saying that

was not proper for monks to welcome a man who had been a king. He then proceeded through the town in a great procession, attended by the whole body of priests who came really to recite hymns to Mañjuśrī, but apparently to accord a fitting welcome to Candrar Gomin. It is not known as to whether the Candrar Gomin lived at a time when Śīla, son of Śrī Harṣa, reigned in Kanoj and Simha of the Licchavi dynasty reigned in Varendra. The famous poet Ravi Gupta was a contemporary of Harṣa, son of Simha. Śrī Harṣa seems to be the same as king Harṣa Vardhana who was a contemporary of Hwen-thsang and reigned in 647 A.D. His son Śīla seems, on a rough calculation, to have reigned in 700 A.D., when his contemporary Candrar Gomin must also have lived. Jaina Hymns Can be

088—
amous
does not

where he beheld the face of Cakra-samvara, Vajravārāhī and many other deities, by whose grace he completely mastered the Buddhist śāstras. He received the royal diploma of the University of Vikramāśīla and was appointed a gate-keeper of the university. Afterwards he came back to Kāśmīra, whence he went through Udvāna (Kabul) to Tibet, where he was known by the name of Ācārya. He flourished during the reign of Canaka, and his approximate date may be placed between 970 A.D. and 1010 A.D. He was the author of the following work —

Yukti-prayoga, called in Tibetan *Ri-gy-pahl-gbyor-wa*, i.e. "application of reasoning". The Sanskrit original work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation the *Bytan-hgyur*, Mdo, Zo, Folios 372—373. The translation prepared by the Indian sage Śrī Subhūti-sānta and the interpreter-monk of Shu-chen, named Tā-ne-hdān-gzan-po

134 JINA MITRA (ABOUT 1025 A.D.)

Jina Mitra¹ was a native of Kāśmīra who, together with Sarvajña Deva, Dāna-śīla and others, visited Tibet and helped the Tibetans in the work of translating Sanskrit books into Tibetan. Jina Mitra lived about 1025 A.D., when his contemporary king Mahī Pāla reigned in Bengal. He wrote the undermentioned work on Logic —

Nyāya-bindu-piṇḍārtha, called in Tibetan *Ri-gy-pahl-thig-pahl-don-hdug-pa*, which contains the purport of Dharmakīrti's *Nyāya-bindu*. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the *Bytan-hgyur*, Mdo, She, Folios 115—116. The translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Surendrabodhi, and the interpreter of Shuchen, named Vande-ye-śeṣ-śde

135 DĀNAŚĪLA (ABOUT 1025 A.D.)

Dānaśīla,³ also called Dānaśrīla, was born in Kāśmīra about 1025 A.D., when Mahī Pāla II was reigning in Bengal. He was a contemporary of Parahita Bhadra, Jina Mitra, Sarvajña Deva and Tilopā. He visited Tibet and co-operated in the propaganda

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan version in the possession of the India Office, London.

² Fide Tāranātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefelbusch*, p. 226, and Dpag-tseu-lyon-tsan, pp. xvi, 118.

³ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁴ Fide Tāranātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefelbusch*, pp. 222—224, and Dpag-tseu-lyon-tsan, p. xli.

of the translations of Sanskrit books into Tibetan. He was the author of the following work on Logic —

Pustaka-pāṭhopāya, called in Tibetan *Gleg-bam-hklag-pah-thab*, signifying the method of reading books. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Zc*, Folio 270. The translation was prepared by the author himself.

136. JĀNA-ŚRI MITRA
(ABOUT 1040 A.D.)

same as Jāna śri Mitra. He was the author of the following work on Logic —

Kārya-kāraṇa bhāva siddhi, called in Tibetan *Egyu-dan-hbray-buhi-no-no-grub-pa*, signifying 'establishment of the relation of cause and effect'. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost.

Md
gro
Sākya-hoḍ. Subsequently, it was retouched and published by the Nepalese Pandita Ananta śri and the interpreter-monk afore mentioned.

¹ I have consulted the India Office copy.

² Vide Tseringtshe's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schönböck*, pp. 235–242, and *Dpaṅ beam lion tsan* pp. 117–120.

³ Vide the *Sarvadharma-samgraha*, chapter on Buddhista-Jarṇam :—

सदुक्त ज्ञानविद्या

यत् यत् सन् अविद्यया अज्ञानेन अज्ञानं भावा भवो ।

अज्ञानमज्ञिरिवावर्तयति तदेव विद्येयं विद्या य एव ॥

साद्यैवेव विद्यान्वया परस्परिदादि विद्याद्वैतम् ।

इत्यादि अविद्यया अज्ञानेन अज्ञानं भावा भवो ॥

⁴ I have consulted the India Office copy.

Chanda (prosody) called *Chanda rataākara*¹ and of the following works² on Logic —

Viśāpti-mātra siddhi, called in Tibetan *Rnam par-rig-pa-tsam-ñid-do-grub-pa*, signifying 'establishment of a mere communication of knowledge'. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo, Ze, Folios 335—338*. The translation was prepared by the Nepalese Pandita Śānti Bhadra, and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Śākya-hoḍ of the province of Hbro (Do). Subsequently, it was published by the same Pandita and Klog-ākya-śeṅ-rab-bṛtseṅ.

Antar vyāpti,³ called in Tibetan *Nsoḍ gi-khyab-pa*, signifying 'internal inseparable connection'. It is embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo, Ze, Folios 338—344*. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāra Kalasa and the interpreter-monk Śākya-hoḍ. The work argues that the inseparable connection

cause smoky.

139 YAMĀRI
(ABOUT 1050 A.D.).

Yamāri was specially versed in Grammar and Logic. But he was very poor. Once, being unable to support his family and children, he came to Vajrāsana (Buddha Gayā). There he related his poverty to a Yogin, who replied, "You Pandits despise

Pramāṇa vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan Tahad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyān-gyi-hgrel-bśad, which is an annotation on the Pramāṇa vārtikālaṅkāra of Prajñākara Gupta. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a very voluminous Tibetan translation which covers volumes Phe pp 101—312 and the whole of volumes Ba Mc. and Tse of the B-tar-hgyur, Mdo. The translation was prepared by Pandita Sumatī and the interpreter Blo-bdan-śe-rab in the monastery of Śū-chen near Lhasa. The volume Ba ends thus:—"From the immeasurable merit acquired by me by composing this regular annotation, may the world subduing its adversary death, obtain the indestructible and perfected Nirvāṇa."

140 ŚANKARĀNANDA (ABOUT 1050 AD)

Śankarānanda,* called in Tibetan Bde-byed-dgaḥ-wa, was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in Kāśmīra. He was learned in all sciences, and was above all an expert in Logic. He intended to write an original work on Logic refuting Dharmakīrti, but in a dream he was told by Mañjuśrī "Since Dharmakīrti is an Arya (an elect), one cannot refute him, and if thou seest mistake in him, it is the mistake of thine own understanding." Thereupon Śankarānanda repented and composed a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa vārtika in seven chapters. He flourished* during the time of Naya Pāla, who reigned in 1050 A D. He was the author of the following works on Logic—
Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan Tahad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-hgrel-bśad, being an annotation on the Pramāṇa-vārtika of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation* which covers volumes Phe, pages 103—354 and Phe, pages 1—101 of the Bstan-hgyur,

ཐུག་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུ་མཉམ་པའི་ཐུག་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུ་ ॥

ཐུག་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུ་མཉམ་པའི་ཐུག་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུ་ ॥

ཐུག་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུ་མཉམ་པའི་ཐུག་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུ་ ॥

ཐུག་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུ་མཉམ་པའི་ཐུག་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུ་ ॥

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ho folio 303)
(Notan-hgyur, von Schiefner, pp 247)

Dr. Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 247
Lam-hon-bra pp 107, 120
I maintain that Śankarānanda was a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti
Lama Tārānātha observes:—"The Brāhmaṇa Śankarānanda app-
ear later time and to call him a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti weak-
ens his position."—Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schief-
ner, pp 247
I published this work in the monastery of Labrang, in Sikkim, in 1907

Sambandha-parikṣānūśāra, called in Tibetan *Uḥrel-pa-hrtag-paḥi-rjeṣ-su-ḥbraḥ wa*, which is a commentary on the *Sambandha-parikṣā* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Bṣtan-hgyur Mdo, Ze, Folia 24—39*. The translation was prepared by the great Indian Pandita Parahita, and the Tibetan interpreter monk *Dgah-wahṣ-rdo-rje*.

The work begins thus —

“By whom connection² with the world has been renounced, in whom there are no “I” and “mine,” who is called free from concerns—to that Omniscient One I bow down.”³

“ ”

tha and the Tibetan interpreter *Blo-ḍan-śeṣ-rab* in the incomparable city of Kāśmīra.

The work opens thus —

“The Omniscient One who is free from all mistakes and who looks to the interests of living beings in all times, saluting him and relying on his mercy, I elucidate the puzzle of ‘self’ and ‘others’ connected with the doctrine of *Apoha*.”⁴

Pratibandha-siddhi, called in Tibetan *Uḥrel-pa grub-pa*, signifying “establishment of the causal connection.” The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost but there exists a Tibetan translation⁵ in the *Bṣtan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folia 334—335*. The translation was prepared by Pandita Bhāgya-rāja and the interpreter *Blo-ḍan-śeṣ-rab*.

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan version in the possession of India Office, London

²

གང་གིས་འབྲེལ་བ་ཀླང་ལ་གྱུར་པ་ ॥

འགྲོ་བ་འདུལ་དང་འདྲ་ལེ་ཡི་ ॥

གཞུང་འཛིན་མེད་ཀྱི་མཛད་གཞུང་ལ་ ॥

གྱུ་མཁའ་ཤིང་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ལ་ ॥

(*Bṣtan hgyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 24*)

³ I have consulted the India Office copy

⁴

གྱུ་མཁའ་ཤིང་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ ॥

ཇི་དུང་མཁའ་ཤིང་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ ॥

འཛིན་པ་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ ॥

འདུལ་གྱི་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ལ་ཐུག་པ་ ॥

(*Bṣtan hgyur, Mdo, Ze, folio .58*)

⁵ I have consulted the India Office copy

"Bowling down to the Teacher, the Lord of the world, I elucidate Tarkabhāṣā for the sake of introducing children of small intellect to the system of Dharmakīrti."¹

ཐུ་ས་འཕྲིན་ཏིན་དཔང་བཏུན་ནས་

བྱིས་བ་ཡིད་མཐུང་མ་ཁུང་བ་རིམ་མ།

ཙམ་བྱུ་གྲགས་པའི་ཁྱལ་མཉམ་བྱུར་

ཏོག་གའི་གད་ནི་རང་གསལ་ལྟོ ॥

(*Higyan hgyan, Hdo, Ze, folio 373*)

Jina Mitra, Prajñākara Gupta, Jetāri, Śāṅkarānanda and Mokṣākara Gupta appeared in the field to vindicate the Buddhist Logic from the attack of Brāhmanas. For nearly 800 years from 300 A.D. to 1100 A.D. the Buddhists fought valiantly against the Brāhmanas. But at last their principles of thought were almost entirely absorbed into the Brāhmanic Logic which left no room for an independent existence of the Buddhist Logic.

144 LOSS OF ROYAL PATRONAGE

From time to time Buddhism received encouragement and favour from the rulers. As already stated, Patronage in the past the first, second, third and fourth Buddhist Councils were held in Rājagṛha, Vaiśālī, Pāṭaliputra and Jālandhara under the patronage of King Aśoka about 260 B.C.

defended with much care and enthusiasm

King of Central Bengal
and a tree at Buddha-
Gaya. t Pataliputra and
smashed numerous Buddhist temples and monasteries about 600
A.D., Buddhism could not be totally extirpated by him. The
King of the Pala dynasty who ruled in Bengal and Bihar was

King Amoghavarṣa, whose reign extended from 815 A.D. to at

CHAPTER IV

The Decline of Buddhist Logic.¹

143 THE CONTENTIOUS SPIRIT OF BUDDHIST LOGIC.

Unlike the Jainas, the Buddhists . . .

Antagonism between
the Brahmana and Bud
dhist logicians

te
in
Br
his

ya-sūtra in which there
including four means of valid knowledge and five membe
syllogism The Buddhist logician Nāgārjuna
3rd century A.D. affirm
gism consisted of three
tator Vātsyāyana (about .
position of Aksapāda un
logician Dignāga who reduced the sixteen categories of N
sūtra to one, viz *pramāṇa*, and the four means of valid know
to two viz *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* "It was to dispel the
of Dignāga," that the Brāhmanic logician Uddyotakara wrote
Nyāya-vārtika about 633 A.D. He in his turn was assailed
the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti who defended Dignāga

After Uddyotakara there occurred a long gap in the suc
sion of Brāhmanic writers on Logic until in the 9th century A
Vācaspati Miśra wrote his Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā śikṣā. By t
time the Buddhist Logic had achieved a great triumph as
evident from the Buddhist writings of Devendra Bodhi, Śāli
Bodhi, Vinīta Deva, Ravi Gupta, Jinendra Bodhi, Śānta Rakṣa
Kamala Śila Kalyāṇa Itakṣa and others. In the 9th an
10th centuries Dharmottara, Aśoka and other Buddhist logicians
having attacked the Brāhmanic authors, Udayanacārya, a B
mana of Mithilā brought out, at the close of the 10th century
A.D. his *Atma-tattva-vivēka* etc
Buddhist Subwge.

least 877 A D was a follower of Digambara Jainism. Under him and his successors Buddhism languished until it finally disappeared in the 12th century A D.

Unlike the earlier kings the later rulers of the Pallava dynasty, from the 10th century onwards, became worshippers of Śiva, whose emblem the bull was adopted by them as their family crest.

In 1019 A D Gāṅgeya Deva of the Cēli race set up a kingdom in Tirhut (Mithilā). He died in 1040 A D and was succeeded by his son Karna Deva who was a contemporary of Nāya Pāla about 1038-1065 A D. Nāya Deva who was a Prāmāṇya Kātriya of Karmāta succeeded Karna Deva and reigned in Mithilā from 1089-1124 A D. These kings, who overthrew Buddhism, brought about the revival of Brāhmanism in Mithilā.

Vijaya Sena, a member of the Karmāṭaka Kātriya race and a contemporary of Nāya Deva of Mithilā, wrested from the Pāla kings a large part of Bengal about 1119 A D. Vijaya and his successors Vallāla Sena, Lakṣmana Sena and others who ruled in Bengal up to 1197 A D re-established the Brāhmanic religion in Bengal in opposition to their predecessors the Pāla kings who had been Buddhists.

Buddhism having thus lost all patronage, the Buddhist Logic could not prosper.

145 ADVENT OF THE MAHOMEDANS

The Mahomedan invasion is said to have exerted a considerable influence on the disappearance of Buddhism from India. About 1021 A D the Hindu Shāhiya dynasty of Kāśmīra was extirpated by the Mahomedans, and during the two centuries

that Magadha, a stronghold of Buddhism, was attacked by the Turuṅkas (Mahomedans) at the end of the 10th century A D while the Buddhist University of Vikramāditya was burnt by Bakhtiar Khilji about 1197 A D. A large proportion of the Buddhist population thought it expedient to embrace the Mahomedan faith. The Buddhists having in large numbers turned Mahomedans it became impossible for their Logic to attain a further development.

THE DECLINE OF BUDDHIST LOGIC

146 THE BRĀHMANIC PREACHERS by Brāhmanic

In the seventh century A D and onwards in Southern

In Southern India

preachers began to flourish about 630 A D)
 India to revive the Brāh the Brāhmanic
 there The attempts made by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (notice Early
 and Śaṅkarācārya (about 785 A D.) to re-establish ated Vaiṣṇava
 faith there are too well known to need a detailed at north east of
 in the 12th century A D Rāmānuja, the celeb of the Calukya
 preacher, flourished in Sriperumātor, 18 miles ea
 Kāñcīpura (Conjeeveram), and converted the kings referred to the
 and Cola dynasties to his religion. ārya of Mithila

As regards Northern India, I have already place Buddhism

In Northern India.

efforts made by Udayanācmon knowledge
 in the 10th century to reid the Vaiṣṇava
 by the Brāhmanic faith It is a matter of comahāpurus a sect
 how in the 13th century A D Caitanya foundeared account of
 sect in Bengal and Śaṅkara Deva founded the Miant Buddhism
 in Assam It is not necessary to give here a detaus established,
 the other sects that were founded in India to suppld continue to

The Brāhmanic faith of new orders being fl,
 there were left very few Buddhist writers who co
 work in the field of Logic

s

147 SHELTER IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES India it was

Thousands of
 While Buddhism was undergoing persecution in, Mongolia, Korea,
 accorded a warm reception in foreign countries. , where they
 enterprising monks visited Nepal, Tibet, China, Mceptors The
 Japan, Ceylon, Burmah, Siam, Sumatra, Java, etc, numbers, to
 were cordially welcomed and accepted as revered pri a was entirely
 Buddhist monks being thus attracted in large

least 877 A.D. was a follower of Digambar and his successors Haddhiers Langulledur in the 12th century A.D.

Unlike the earlier kings the later rulers, from the 10th century onwards, the Siva whose emblem the bull was adopted as crest.

In 1019 A.D. Gangaya Deva of the Revival of Brahman kingsdom in Tirhut was in 1019 A.D. and was

Karna Deva who was a contemporary 1034-1065 A.D.; Nanyas Deva who was of Karnata succeeded Karna Deva and reigned 1040-1125 A.D. These kings who overthrew about the revival of Brahmanism in Mitil

Vijaya Sena, a member of the Karnata a contemporary of the Brahman revival in Bengal wrested from the hands of the

successors Vallala Sena, Lakshmana Sena a Bengal up to 1107 A.D. re-established in Bengal in opposition to their predecessors had been Buddhists.

Buddhism having thus lost all political Logic could not prosper.

143. ADVENT OF THE MAHOMEDANS

The Mahomedan invasion is said to have had a considerable influence on the Buddhism from India. The Hindu Shahis were extirpated by the Mahomedans, and following there occurred great political changes. These circumstances led to the decline of

by the great Tibetan sage Bu ston of the monastery of Shālu near Tashi lhun-po under orders of the Tibeto-Chinese-Mongol Emperor

countries

Quisius, etc.

143 EXTINCTION OF THE BUDDHISTS AND THEIR DOCTRINES IN INDIA

I have shown that some of the Buddhists were received with hospitality in foreign countries while others became followers of Islam. The few that remained as a separate or

PART III.

THE MODERN SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

SECTION I.

Prakarana—Manual of Logic.

CHAPTER I

The Nyāya-Prākaraṇa reduces its Categories to one.

1 THE NEO-BRĀHMANIC AGE (CIRCA 900 A D — 1200 A D.)

In part II we have seen how Jainism and Buddhism exercised, for several centuries, a potent influence on the system of philosophy and culture of the Brāhmanas. In the Deccan, the decline of Buddhism commenced in the seventh century A D, while in North India the Buddhists became almost extinct by 1200 A D. The Brāhmanas, who survived them, organized their society on a secure basis. They took back into their folds some of their members who had embraced Buddhism or Jainism, but there arose the necessity of making strict rules for the maintenance of the integrity of their society and for the prevention of new admissions into it. It was at this period that different Brāhmanic legislators of

character and application. It may be observed that social exclusiveness became more marked in the Hindu Society at this period with the advent of the Muhammadans in India.

2. COMPOSITION OF THE *Prakarana*s, MANUALS OF LOGIC.

The works so composed in this period were technically called *Prakaranas* or Manuals of Logic. In the *Parāśara Upaniṣad* quoted in the commentaries on *Nyāya-sūtra* and *Saptapadārthi*, the *prakarana* is defined as a book which concerns itself with the topics of a portion of a *śāstra* which may deal even with matters not included in the *śāstra*, e.g. the *Nyāya-sūtra* and *Saptapadārthi*—two very early manuals of Logic—treat in a very loose way most topics of the *Nyāya-sūtra* and *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* respectively, and at the same time some topics not included in those *sūtras*. Many matters which are elaborately treated in the works of the ancient school have been dismissed with scant ceremony in the logical manuals, while some subjects which were merely referred to in the former, have been clearly explained in the latter, for instance, the topics of *chāla* (quibble), *analogue* and *nigrahasthāna* (points of defeat), which occupied so much space in the works of the ancient school, drew very little attention from the authors of the manuals. On the other hand, the syllogism (*anvaya*) which was briefly treated in ancient works has been elaborately explained in the manuals. This treatment of certain subjects in preference to other subjects is most probably due to the influence of the Jaina and Buddhist systems of Logic which intervened. In respect of their style while the ancient works differed considerably from the manuals the latter was expository. The *prakaranas* (manuals) are in a remarkable for their accuracy and lucidity as well as for direct handling of various topics in their serial order. Definitions of terms are broad and accurate and not full of

3 FOUR CLASSES OF PRAKARANAS

The manuals of Logic called *Prakaranas* may be principally divided into four classes: (1) The *Nyāya* works treating only of the *Nyāya* system; (2) the *Nyāya* works which embody in them the categories of the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy; (3) the works which treat of the *Vaiśeṣika* categories assimilating in them the *Nyāya* system of premises; and (4) the works which treat of the *Nyāya* and certain topics of the *Vaiśeṣika*. If out of these four manuals, the first is necessary to get the full picture of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* as would give us a complete

and a complete picture of the
philosophy of the Nyaya and
Vaiśeṣika systems.

theory of valid knowledge as well as of the objects which would give rise to that knowledge

4 NYĀYA-PRAKARAṆA DEVELOPING THE CATEGORY OF *pramāṇa*

The Jaina and Buddhist writers, who founded the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic, dealt with only one category, viz *pramāṇa*, the means of valid knowledge. Following them some of the Brāhmanic writers chose only one category, viz *Pramāṇa*, which they developed in such a way that it could assimilate in itself the remaining fifteen categories of the ancient school. Certain categories, such as *Prāmēya* (objects of knowledge), *jalpa* (wrangling), *vitandā* (cavil), *jāti* (analogue), and *nigrahaśāstra* (the point of defeat) had to be excluded, while other categories were conveniently stuck on to *Pramāṇa* as its sub-divisions. These Brāhmana writers, of whom accounts will shortly be given, were the true representatives of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. The earliest of these writers seem to have been Bhā-sarvajña,¹ who flourished about 950 A.D.

5. BHĀ-SARVAJÑA (ABOUT 950 A.D.)

The first Brāhmanic writer, who attempted to reduce the sixteen categories to one, was Bhā-sarvajña, the celebrated author of *Nyāya-sāra*.

Nothing is definitely known about the age in which he flourished or the country which he adorned by his birth. He seems to me to have been a native of Kāśmīra. His name, which is very peculiar, bears a close resemblance to the names of Sarvajña Mitra² and Sarvajña Deva³, who lived in Kāśmīra about 775 A.D. and 1025 A.D. respectively.

As the reputed author of *Nyāya-sāra*, he is mentioned by the Jaina sages Gunaratna⁴ (1409 A.D.), and Maladhāri Rājasekhara⁵ (1348 A.D.).

¹ Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāya-sāra* with Jaya Sukha's *Nyāyatīkṣepya-dīpikā* has been edited by Dr. Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana and published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series* of Calcutta.

² Vide Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana's edition of *Saṅgīdhārī-stotra*, published in the *Bibliotheca Indica series*, Introduction, p. xxx.

³ Vide Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana's "History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic," pp. 134-135.

⁴ भास्वरं प्रदीपे भावधारिणाद्वयकोकाः । तादृशं कोका भावधरणात् भावधारिणा अथवा भावधारिणा भावधरणाद्वयकोकाः ।

(Gunaratna's *Seṭhāriana-vṛtti*, edited by Dr. L. Sonst, p. 94).


⁵ भास्वरं भावधारिणाद्वयकोकाः ।

भावधारिणाद्वयकोका भावधारिणाद्वयकोकाः ।

kind named comparison (*upamāna*). It brought Bhā-sarvajña close to the Sāṃkhya and Jainas who admitted three kinds of *Pramāṇa*, but distinguished him from the Buddhists who dealt with only two, viz perception and inference. Like the Buddhist and Jaina writers, he divided inference into that for one's self

with an inference for the sake of others. Salvation (*mokṣa*) was described by him as the soul's attainment of eternal pleasure. In this respect he agreed with the Prābhakaras who affirmed that pleasure could be eternal, but differed from Akṣapāda who denied the eternality of pleasure.

The scheme laid down in the Nyāya-sāra, for the reduction of sixteen categories into one, may be exhibited in the tabular form thus —



From the above it is evident that Bhā-sarvajña embodied in his *Pramāṇa* all the categories of the Nyāya-sūtra except *prayojana* (4) and *siddhānta* (6) which did not, according to him, constitute its integral parts and *dr̥ṣṭānti* (5) which was included in *anayana* under the name of *udāharana*.

7 CONTENTS OF THE NYĀYA-SĀRA

Perception—*pratyakṣa*

In the opening lines of the Nyāya-sāra, Bhāsarvajña says:—
 Salutation. "Bowling down to Śambhū (Śiva) the supreme Lord of the universe, who by

nature knows all truths, I shall explain *Pramāṇa*, and its divisions and definition in order that children may understand them well.¹ *Pramāṇa* is defined in the work as the means of right knowledge freed from doubt and error. It is of three kinds, viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and verbal testimony (*śruti*).

Perception, which is the means of direct cognition, may be defined as either contemplative (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) or ordinary (*a-yogi-pratyakṣa*). The ordinary perception is that which exhibits gross objects through their interaction with our senses brought about by a favourable combination of light, space, time, nature, etc.

The intercourse may be of six kinds, viz. (1) union, (2) united inherence, (3) inherence, (4) inherence, (5) inherent inherence, and (6) particularity—all of which have been explained before. The contemplative perception exhibits objects which are too remote in time and space or too fine in nature. It is the perception of a saint, who may or may not be in a state of contemplation at the time.

While in a state of contemplation the saint perceives infinite objects through the mere union of his soul with his mind in consequence of his merit, etc. But while he is not in contemplation, he perceives objects through the union of four, three, two causes, viz. the soul, the mind, a sense and an object, the soul, the mind and a sense, or merely the soul and the mind. In the auditory perception there is a union of four causes. In the visual and tactual perceptions there is a threefold union, viz. the soul, the mind and the ear (the sound which inheres in the ear being identical with the same). In the perception of pleasure, etc., there is a union of merely two causes, the soul and the mind.

Perception may also be divided as determinate or indeterminate (*saukalpika*) and indeterminate or indeterminate (*nirikalpika*). The determinate perception is knowledge of an object indicative of a relation of the object to its name, genus, quality, action, etc., e.g. this is Deva. The indeterminate perception is the knowledge which exhibits the mere essence of an object independent of its relation to anything else.

to a name, genus, etc., e.g. the knowledge produced by the first union of a sense with its object or the knowledge of a saint while he is in a state of contemplation

Inference—*anumāna*

Inference (*anumāna*) is the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the senses through its inseparable connection with another thing which lies within their range. "The hill is fiery, because it is smoky"—this is an inference in which we ascertain fire from smoke with which it is inseparably connected.

The inseparable connection (in Sanskrit *anābhāva*) is also designated as pervasion or invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). It is of two kinds (1) affirmative (*antya*) and negative (*vyatireka*). The affirmative invariable concomitance (*antya vyāpti*) is the accompaniment of the middle term by the major term in all cases. The negative invariable concomitance (*vyatireka-vyāpti*) is the accompaniment of the absence of the major term by the absence of the middle term in all cases. In the affirmative universal proposition "wherever there is smoke, there is fire"—smoke is the middle term which is in all cases accompanied by fire "where-
fire is

Kinds of Inference

sthānumāna) and (2) inference for the sake of

|| (*svār-*

and subject or minor

Terms of an Inference. ful
abid

which the quality of the
to abide. A heterologue (*pratya-*
with certainty, that the quality of the major term does not abide
The essential nature of a syllogism (*prātīk-dharmatā*) refers to the
character of the pervasion of the middle term by the major term

sound-wave is produced by effort, but the succeeding sound-waves do not, it is said, depend on it]

- (6) Unproved in respect of the abode (*āśrayāśiddha*) = g there is primordial matter, because it evolves into the universe [The Naiyāyikas do not admit that primordial matter (Prakṛti) is the prime source of the universe]

- (7) Unproved in respect of a part of the abode (*āśrayaśāśiddha*)

- (8) Unproved on account of the substantive being useless (*tyarthatāśeṣyāśiddha*), e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it possesses generality which is a product [To say that "soundness is a product" is not only useless but also incorrect]

- (9) Unproved on account of the substantive being doubtful

(10)

it smokes [Here if the smoke turns out to be mist, the inference will be invalid]

- (11) Unproved on account of the substantive being doubtful

passions because he is a person who is always devoid of true knowledge. [It is doubtful as to whether he is always devoid of true knowledge]

The fallacies called unproved mentioned above are of two descriptions according as the lack of truth involved in them is recognized by both the parties or one of the parties engaged in a debate

B. THE CONTRADICTORY (*viruddha*)

Contradictory (*viruddha*) is the reason which abides in the minor term as well as in the opposite of it

are homologues to the minor term, the contradictory of four kinds as follows —

the minor term as well as its homologue, e.g. sound is a product [like ether (homologue)]

- and like a pot (heterologue) Productivity abides in sound as well as in its heterologue the pot]
- (2) The reason which abides in the minor term as well as a part of its heterologue (but not in its homologue), e.g. sound is eternal because it is a thing which possesses generality and is cognized by our external senses. (Here an instance of the heterologue is a pot (a) which is non-eternal, (b) which possesses generality *potness*, and (c) which is cognized by our external senses. "Pleasure" cannot be an instance of the heterologue, because though non-eternal it is not cognized by our external senses. So the reason abides only in a part of the heterologue. We cannot cite *potness* as a homologue, because though *potness* is eternal and cognized by our external sense, it does not possess generality *potness-ness*]
- (3) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term as well as in a part of its heterologue but not in its homologue, e.g. sound is eternal, because it is a product of effort. (The first wave of sound is a product of effort, but the succeeding waves are not products of the same nature. So the productivity of effort abides only in a part of the minor term. Similarly it abides only in a part of the heterologue. "Pot" is a heterologue which is a product of effort, but "grass" is a heterologue which is not a product of effort]
- (4) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term but in the whole of its heterologue (and not in its homologue) e.g. the earth is eternal because it is a product. [Productivity abides in the earth which is gross, but not in the earth which is subtle or atomic. At the same time it abides in all things which are non-eternal or heterologues to the minor term]

While there are no homologues, the contradictory reasons are as follow -

- 1) The reason which abides in the minor term as well as in its heterologue e.g. sound is a special quality of ether as it is knowable. [Knowableness abides in sound as well as in its heterologues such as smell. There are no homologues for the smelling but sound is a special quality of ether].

The reason which abides in a part of the minor term and in a part of its heterologue e.g. sound is a special quality of ether, because it is a product of effort. [Productivity abides in the first sound wave but does not abide in the succeeding sound waves. It abides in some heterologues as pot etc. but not in other heterologues as the grass etc.].

The reason which abides in the minor term and in a part of its heterologue e.g. sound is a special quality of ether

(4) "

the whole of its heterologues, e.g. sound is a special quality of ether, because it does not arise from words [Some sounds arise from words such as those which we read in books, while others do not, such as the sounds of a drum. No sound, which is not a special quality of ether, arises from words]

C. THE UNCERTAIN (*anaikāntika*)

Uncertain (*anaikāntika*) is the reason which abides in the minor term, its homologues and heterologues its subdivisions are the following.—

- (1) The reason which abides in the minor term, its homologues and heterologues, e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable
- (2) The reason which abides in the minor term, in a part of its

not in mind which is an atom in dimension. It abides in some homologues as soul, ether, etc., but not in other homologues as earth, water, fire and air. It abides in all heterologues as quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence).

- (7) The reason which abides in all homologues and heterologues, but only in a part of the minor term, e.g. ether, time — because they are

water, fire and air)

D. NOT-TRIED OR NOT-CONCLUSIVE (*anadhyatanta*, or *anupadāṣaṁhāra*)¹

Non-tried (*anadhyaravita*) is the reason which abides in minor term alone, without a definite connection with the m. term. It is subdivided as follows:—

- (1) The reason which abides in the minor term of which there are neither homologues nor heterologues, e.g. all are eternal, because they are existent ["All" having included every thing there is no homologue or heterologue left behind. The reason "existence" does however abide in "all""]
- (2) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term which there are neither homologues nor heterologues, e.g. all are non-eternal, because they are products ["A" which includes everything, has neither homologues nor heterologues. The reason "product" abides in non-eternal things but not in eternal things both of which are comprised by "all""]
- (3) The reason which abides in the minor term of which there are both homologues and heterologues, e.g. sound is not of ether ["Sound" has homologues which are of ether and heterologues which are not of ether]
- (4) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term of which there are both homologues and heterologues, e.g. all substances are non-eternal because they are generated

1 Mr. J. P. Varley advised - This hotel has been in operation for 116 years
valuable, except by Southern States who about the 11th century says that it is
valuable, except by Southern States who about the 11th century says that it is
valuable, except by Southern States who about the 11th century says that it is

activity [There is activity in earth but not in ether although both are substances. There is no activity in quality and action which are homologues and in generality particularity and inherence which are heterologues of the non-eternal]

- (5) The reason which abides in the minor term and has homologues but no heterologues, e.g. all products are eternal, because they are originated [There is no heterologue of "all products" which constitutes the minor term. Ether,
- (6) To

homologue but it is not composed of parts]

2. MISTIMED OR INCOMPATIBLE REASON (*lālātyayopadīṣṭa* or *bādhitā*).

Mistimed or incompatible is the reason which abides in the minor term as opposed by evidences. It is subdivided as follows:—

- (1) Opposed by perception, e.g. this fire is non warm, because it is a product
- (2) Opposed by inference, e.g. the atoms are non eternal, be

not omniscient, because he is passionate like the man on the street

- (3) An example of doubtful major and middle terms, e.g. this person will go to heaven, because he has accumulated merits, like Devadatta
- (4) An example whose support is doubtful, e.g. this person is not omniscient, because he speaks evil, like Devadatta's son who will be born

Similarly there are four kinds of negative examples of the negative term

E

Follow

(disputation), *vāda* (discussion), *nirṇaya* (ascertainment), *kāṭha* (disputation), *vāda* (discussion), *jāpa* (wrangling), *vilāpa* (cavil), *jāti* (analogue), *nirgrahasthāna* (point of defeat), etc

Verbal testimony—*āgama*.

Verbal testimony or reliable assertion (*āgama*) is the means of knowing things accurately through indicatory signs (or convention). It is of two kinds, according as the assertion refers to matter open to our senses or to matter beyond our senses. The authoritativeness of the first kind of assertion is evident from the action one takes on hearing the assertion, e.g. a boy runs to receive a mango when he is asked by his father to do so. The authoritativeness of the second kind is evident from the action one takes on hearing the assertion, e.g. a man runs to receive a mango when he is asked by his father to do so.

Other means of knowledge—other so-called means are included in them, e.g. presumption (*anumāna*) and probability (*samāhara*) are included in inference, rumour (*śruti*) and muscular movement (*ceṣṭā*), in verbal testimony, and negation or non-existence (*abhāva*) in any of the three according to circumstances. Muscular movement alleged to be a means of knowledge is only an action substituted for a word or assertion.

Emancipation—*mokṣa*

Prameya.

The object of our knowledge (*prameya*) is of four kinds as follows—

1. Bhāṣya: "The word *śruti* is a synonym for *śabda*. In reality our guides 'scripture' which enables us to know things beyond our senses, and the other means 'the assertion of a reliable person'."

- (1) That which is fit only to be avoided, viz misery or suffering (*duḥkha*), of which there are twenty-one varieties already explained

The soul is of two kinds, viz the individual soul (*apara ātmā*) and the supreme soul (*para ātmā*). The individual soul, which has to undergo sufferings from the bondage of the world, attains final emancipation (*mokṣa*) through the knowledge of the supreme soul called Śiva. In the state of final emancipation the individual soul, being finally freed from misery, enjoys eternal pleasure.

B. COMMENTARIES ON THE NYĀYASĪHA

Of the eighteen commentaries on Nyāyasāra enumerated by Jaina writers some are noticed below.—

- (1) *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa* the oldest commentary mentioned by Maladhārī Rāja Śekhara (1348 A D) and Gunaratna (1409 A D) and quoted by the author of the *Pratibha* at page 100.

- (2) *Nyāyākalikā* by Javanta, mentioned by Gunaratna in the *Saddarsana samuccaya Vṛtti* (1409 A D). No manuscript of it has yet been recovered.
- (3) *Nyāyakusumāñjali tarka* mentioned by Gunaratna in the *Saddarsana samuccaya Vṛtti* (1409 A D). No manuscript of it has yet been recovered.

(4) *Nyāyaprakāśa* by Rājā Śekhara mentioned by Gunaratna in the *Saddarsana samuccaya Vṛtti* (1409 A D).

- (6) *Nyāyastropadapāñjikā* by Vāsudeva. A manuscript of it has been recovered from Kāśmīra. (Vide S. R. Bhandarkar's Catalogue of MSS. in the Deccan College, 1883, p. 93). Another manuscript of it written in Kāśmīri character is to be found in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal bearing No. 1532. In the opening lines¹

¹ Vide Rājā Śekhara's *Saddarsana samuccaya* and Gunaratna's *Saddarsana samuccaya vṛtti*.

² The opening lines of the *Nyāyastropadapāñjikā* run as follows.—

इन्द्रियविवक्षया भावार्थं
बोद्धव्यमस्यैवमस्ति ।

Vācaspati speaks of himself as the author of the text and in the colophon he is stated to be a student of Kāśmīra.

- (7) *Nyāyasañcīkṣā* by Bhaṭṭa Rāghava. A manuscript dated Śaka 1174 A D 1252 is contained in the library of the Queen's College, Benares.
- (8) *Nyāyatātparyādīpikā* by Jayasīma Sūri, a Jaina of the Śvetāmbara Sect, who lived in the fourteenth cent A D as his *Kumārāpālarītra* is dated Śamvrat 1122 A D 1365.

वाचस्पतिविरचिता

न्यायसारसंक्षेपिका मता ॥

1 The *Nyāyasañcīkṣā* ends as follows —

मते चतुश्चरति संक्षेपे मते

मताधिक्येदमधिक्ये च चक्षुषि ।

द्विमानिनेत्येव वभूव वक्ष्यते

भूत विचारो वदितोऽपि वाचसा ॥

इति सारसंक्षेपिकादीन्यायसांख्यविशुद्धन्यायविचारसंग्रहसाराविरचिते व्यासविरचिते परिच्छेदे समाप्ता ॥

The verse may be interpreted to give Śaka 1174 (A D 1252) or Śaka 1362 A D.)

2 *Nyāyatātparyādīpikā* with the text of *Nyāyasañcīkṣā* has been edited by Satya Chandra Vajrasaheana and published in the *Bibliotheca Indica* Calcutta.

जीविकमक्षपाद् दि दि सम्बन्धेऽयमजायत ।

अथ चतुर्विंशतीपरचक्षुष्याणुमुभाद् ॥

(*Kumārāpālarītra* Praśasti, Chap. X)

CHAPTER II.

Nyāya prakaraṇas embodying Vaiśeṣika categories

■ THE NYĀYA INCORPORATES THE VAIŚEṢIKA

The Vaiśeṣika philosophy rendered considerable help to the development of the Nyāya (Logic) and many of the sūtras of the Nyāya philosophy pre-

erence of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika

leg

od

es

all

ally coalesced. The six or seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika are entirely absorbed in the treatise on Nyāya philosophy and Nyāya categories of pramāṇa in its developed form were ally absorbed in the

As instances of

may cite the cases

sā by Keśava Miśra

gories of Nyāya,

ra, not only the tw

ount of the two works is given here

10. VARADARĪJA

(ABOUT 1150 A.D.)

He wrote a work on Logic called Tarkikaraksā, or "Logiciana". He seems to have been a native of the Madras Presidency. Varadarāja must be of the 12th century A.D., possibly also after the time of the famous Trilocana, Vacaśpati Miśra,

on the other hand, all called Nyāya

§ M.M. Vindhyasvami

... Nyāyācārya
the other hand
adarśana sac-
bably he flour-
ūrna or Jaina

Deva, a disciple of Viṣṇu Svāmin, wrote a commentary on the
... is said to have
times the
was Jaina
and the

junior Trilocana⁴. Perhaps there followed a few other preceptors
before Vallabhācāryya, son of Lakṣmana Bhatta of Andhra (Tela-
gana), occupied the seat of guru at the end of the 15th century A D.
As Vallabhācāryya lived between 1450 and 1530 A D., and as
several preceptors intervened, the date of Varadarāja, if placed
in 1150 A D., will not be far wrong⁵.

11. TĀRKIKARAKṢĪ

The Tārkhikarakṣā, which at once begins its subject, is divided

Category

into three chapters the first of which deals

with the first fourteen categories of Nyāya,
viz. (1) *pramāṇa*, (2) *prameya*, (3) *samāya*, (4) *prayojana*, (5)
dṛṣṭānta, (6) *sukḥānta*, (7) *śāyana*, (8) *śarīra*, (9) *nirṇaya*, (10)
vāda, (11) *śāstra*, (12) *śānta*, (13) *śāntaśāstra*, and (14) *śānta*.
The second chapter deals with the fifteenth category, viz. *śānta*,
while the third chapter treats of the sixteenth category viz
nigrahasthāna

शरीर अथवा समस्तज्ञान प्रमाण

विषय अथवा विषयानुसंधान प्रमाण

(Tārkhikarakṣā p. 365, edited by M. M. Pandey, Varanasi Prakashan)

Varadarāja, a quondam Śānta varāṇasī thus —

अथवा, — अथवा अथवा शरीर (Tārkhikarakṣā p. 365)

śānta śāntaśāntaśāntaśānta, chapter on śāntaśāntaśāntaśānta in which

as usual —

Prameya, according to the Nyāya-sūtra, signifies ātman,

Tārkikaraksā incorpo-
rates the Vaiśeṣika cate-
gories

śarīra, indriya, artha, buddhi, manas, pra-
rthi, doṣa, pretyabhāta, phala, duḥkha, and
apavarga, but, according to Varadarāja, it
incorporates also the six predicaments of

the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, viz the substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action (karma), generality (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa), and co-existence or inherence (samarūpa)

The categories of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are thus combined

The scheme of com-
bination

together, but the combination is far from
being satisfactory. It is evident that the
categories of the Vaiśeṣika and objects coming

under Prameya of the Nyāya overlap each other. Moreover there is hardly any truth in the statement¹ that the knowledge of the sixteen categories of Nyāya is the direct means of our attaining emancipation whereas that of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika is only an indirect means, because ātman (the soul), manas (the mind), buddhi (intellect or knowledge), duḥkha (pain), etc., are included in both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems.

Varadarāja's scheme of combination of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems is shown below —

Padārtha

Pramāṇa, prameya, saṁśaya, prayojana, drśānta, svīdhānta, avaiava,
tarka, nistaya, vāda, jalpa, vitandā, hetvābhāsa, shala,
jāti, nigrahasthāna.

1. Twelve objects of Nyāya

2. Six categories of the Vaiśeṣika

Valid knowledge—pramāṇa.

The sixteen categories of Nyāya have already been explained

The Buddhist defini-
tion of pramāṇa con-
demned

Varadarāja, in his Tārkikaraksā, introduces here and there some peculiar discussions which are mentioned here. For instance, the Buddhists define valid knowledge (pramāṇa) as that which is not non-correspondent with our practical activity,² e.g. my knowledge of a cup of water is valid if the activity prompted by it is fruitful. Varadarāja condemns

नोपे वाचादवयवावयवस्यैव लक्षणम् ।

सम्बन्धसामुदायेव परम प्रमादि लक्षणे ॥

(Tārkikaraksā, p. 130)

अविश्वस्यद्विज्ञानं प्रमाद्ययिनि शोभता ।

Tārkikaraksā, p. 13, edited by M M Vaidhyasūri Prasek, Benares)

For instance if a thing that existed in the past or future we can test the validity of our knowledge only of a thing that exists in the present time. With regard to a past or future thing we can draw an inference, but cannot prove the validity of the inference inasmuch as there is no practical activity prompted by it.

Inference—*anumāna*.

According to Varadaraja, inference (*anumāna*)¹ is the knowledge of a thing derived through its invariable concomitance with another thing. Invariable concomitance, *anvaya*, is called *anumāna*.

which is

The thing with presence and absence, e.g. smoke is in invariable concomitance with fire, because where there is smoke there is fire and where there is fire there is smoke.

¹ *अविद्यादमिति महत्त्वं*

अनुमानविधिषु अनुमानेषु अन्वये ।

(Tārakarakakāś, p. 14)

² *आग्निपदवत्तत्वेन प्रसिद्धे वाचने विदुः ।*

अनुमानमिति ।

(Tārakarakakāś, p. 54)

³ *आग्निः पदवत्तत्वेन प्रसिद्धे ।*

(Tārakarakakāś, p. 55)

⁴ *Op. cit., condition, is thus defined —*

वाचनवाचक्या वाचक्यत्वात् अन्वयः ।

(Tārakarakakāś, p. 56)

It is of two kinds (1) sure (*niścita*) and (2) suspected (*śankita*). I do not quote here the definition of these terms as they will occur in the *Tattvasamāhāra*.

⁵ *दीर्घाद्या नारायणसुखमिति वाचक्याः । .. अन्वयः —*

आग्निपदवत्तत्वेन प्रसिद्धे वाचने विदुः ।

अनुमानमिति ।

महत्त्वं । अविद्यादमिति महत्त्वं ।

(Tārakarakakāś, p. 57)

This verse is quoted from Dharmakīrti's *Prasāngika-vārttika-kārikā*. The Tibetan version runs as follows:—

॥ ५८ ॥ अनुमानं द्विविधं ।

॥ ५९ ॥ निश्चितं शङ्कितं ।

and effect or identity in essence, e.g. there is rain, because there was cloud (cloud being the cause of rain); and this is a tree, because it is a *śimśapā* (*śimśapā* being a species of tree which is its genus)

Varadarāja condemns the Buddhists by saying that their definition is untenable. We infer the form of an orange from its taste, though between the taste and form there is neither the causal relation nor the relation of identity in essence.

Syllogism—*avayava*

In explaining the seventh category, viz. *avayava*¹ parts of a syllogism, Varadarāja says that according to the Mīmāṃsaka, a syllogism, which consists of three parts may either begin with an example or end with the same, as follows —

All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen,

The hill is smoky,

Therefore the hill is fiery

or

The hill is fiery,

Because it is smoky

All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen

The Sāngatas (Buddhists) are said to maintain that a syllogism consists of only two parts, viz. an example and an application in the following form —

All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen,

This hill is smoky

The sign—*linga*

A sign, reason or middle term (*linga* or *hetu*) which is in invariable concomitance with the predicate or major term (*sādhya*), possesses five characteristics as follows:—

- (1) *Paksadharmatā*, the existence of the sign in the subject or minor term, e.g. the hill has smoke

ਯੇਨ ਸ੍ਮਾਨੰ ਫਲਾਗ੍ਨਿਕਾ ਰੋਸ਼ਨਾਤ

ਸਾ ਮਹਿਤੰ ਯਥਾ ਸ੍ਮਾਨੰ ਫਲਾਗ੍ਨਿਕਾ ਰੋਸ਼ਨਾਤ ॥

(*Prasāṅga-vārttika-kārikā*, Hsien hgyur, Mdo, Co, leaf 196, also Prof. De La Vallée Poussin's French translation of *Sarvadāśāsanāśāstra*, p. 4, in *La Bouddhisme*)

ਬੀਜੁਧਾਰਧਾਨਾਯ ਨਾ ਬਹੋਧਾਰਧਾਦਿਧਾਨੰ ।

ਬੀਜਾਂਧਵਾ ਬੀਜਾਧਵੁ ਬੀਜਬੀਜਿਜੁਧਾਰਧਿਧੁ ॥

(*Tārakārakṣā*, p. 175)

- 2) 'Analogical' or 'symbolic' inference of the sign is not a logical inference but a psychological one.
- 3) 'Inferential' or 'inferential' inference of the sign is a logical inference but a psychological one.
- 4) 'Inferential' or 'inferential' inference of the sign is a logical inference but a psychological one.
- 5) 'Inferential' or 'inferential' inference of the sign is a logical inference but a psychological one.

In the case of an exclusively affirmative or exclusive inference the sign bears only one characteristic and then abides in the heterologue or homologue.

In the logical work called 'lakṣaṇamīmāṃsā' a sign is defined as that which is in the concomitance with the major term in any condition (upādhi), e.g. smoke is the sign of fire not necessarily a sign of smoke unless it is nourished (there is fuel is the condition).

Debate—*vaith*

In treating of the tenth category, viz *vāda*, *Prakāśa* gives an elaborate exposition (lakṣaṇa) which is defined as a sentence spoken by more persons than one as subjects for their judgment. The six requisites for debate are the following —

- (1) A set of rules as to a certain thesis and its proof
- (2) The method to be followed
- (3) *Samāhāra*
- (4)
- (5)

(6) *Aṅgavāda* as to the stage of termination of a debate

Some logicians hold that the requisites for a council are only four, viz (1) the disputant, (2) the respondent, (3) the president, (4) the members.

If it is intended to record a debate, a writer (*lekṣaka*) must be employed with the approval of the disputant and his respondent.

The disputant (*vādi*) must be equal to the respondent (*prati-vādi*) in respect of his learning. A debate, in which an expert stands against an ordinary person, is useless, inasmuch as the conclusion drawn from such a debate could have been obtained from the expert alone.

The members (*sabhāya*), acceptable to both the parties and conversant with their tenets, must be freed from affection and aversion. They must be capable of receiving, retaining and demonstrating the purport of others' speech, while their number must be uneven and not less than three. Their duty is to control the debate, to point out the excellence or defect of the debates, to awaken one who is broken-hearted and to repeat a speech to one who is slow.

The president (*sabdhāpaka*) must be satisfactory to the disputant, the respondent and the members. Capable of showing favour or frown, he must not be influenced by affection or aversion. His duty is to announce to the council the conclusion of a debate when it comes to a close.

the

They

mem

applies to a council¹ of fair debate or discussion, but in the case of wrangling and cavil even chance-comers act as regular members.

A debate is of three kinds, viz (1) discussion (*vāda*), (2)

Kind of debate wrangling (*jalpa*), and (3) cavil (*vitandā*).

A wrangling or cavil may be stopped by ex-

¹ तथा च सभानि,—

प्राज्ञैर्विविधैर्ज्ञाना यत्र पक्षवधोपधि वा ।

अधोपधित्वा विद्याः कुः वा यत्र सरसो यथा ॥

(Tārakakarakṣā, p. 208)

एते सभानि सर्वे समुदायाश्च विपद्याः ।

विश्वेदद्याः सभायां च दृष्टेर्लक्ष्यवित्तवती ॥

(Tārakakarakṣā, p. 362)

यानि सभायमानस्य तेनाभासो हि कारकम् ।

तथा विप्रबोधनानामनुवीर्य इति इत्यम् ॥

(Tārakakarakṣā, p. 363)

13 KEŚAVA MIŚRA
(ABOUT 1275 A D)

Keśava Miśra was the author of a Nyāya treatise called *Tarkabhāṣā*. He was a native of Mithilā

His life

and a preceptor of Govardhana Miśra who wrote a commentary on *Tarkabhāṣā*, called *Tarkabhāṣā Prakāśa*. Padmanābha Miśra, author of *Kiraṇāvalī*, *Bhāṣakara* and *Kaṇḍa-rahasya Muktaḥara*, was an elder brother of Govardhana.¹ Hence it follows that Keśava Miśra, Padmanābha and Govardhana were contemporaries.² Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar in his *Reports of Sanskrit Manuscripts, 1882-1883*, observed Cinna Bhāṭṭa was the author of a commentary on *Tarkabhāṣā* called *Tarkabhāṣā Praveśikā* and that he lived in Vijayanagar at the Court of King Harihara at the latter half of the 14th century. Padmanābha, brother of Keśava, is said to have been younger to Vardhamāna whom he mentions in his *Kiraṇāvalībhāṣakara*. So Padmanābha lived between the beginning of the 13th century and end of the 14th century A D. Probably he lived at the end of the 13th century A D.

14 *Tarkabhāṣā*—TECHNICALITY OF LOGIC

Categories—*padārtha*

Keśava Miśra opens his work thus—"In order that even dull people may get admittance into the science of Logic, I bring out this *Tarkabhāṣā* (Technicality of Logic) replete with concise arguments."

The *Tarkabhāṣā* deals with the sixteen categories of the Nyāya sūtra, viz (1) *pramāṇa*, (2) *prameya*, (3)

Tarkabhāṣā incorporated the Vaiśeṣika categories.

saṁśaya, (4) *prayojana*, (5) *dṛṣṭānta*, (6) *siddhānta*, (7) *avayava*, (8) *tarka*, (9) *niṣṇaya*, (10) *vāda*, (11) *jalpa*, (12) *vitandā*, (13)

hetvābhāsa, (14) *chala*, (15) *jāti*, (16) *nigrahasthāna*. The second

¹ Govardhana Miśra, his *Tarkabhāṣā Prakāśa*, observes —


विज्ञानयोग्यतया शोभयेत् इति चतः ।
तर्कानुभावी तनुते विविच्य नृप विनिर्दिष्टम् ।
यौ विज्ञानायानुज पदमाभासुनी शरीरान् वस्तुवद्भजन्याः ।
ननोति तर्कानुभावात् सर्वान् यौपयमाभासिदुषोविबोद्धम् ।
अपदिष्टा नृपपरविद्वत्ता वधेमानेव ।
विद्वत्तत्त्वानुभावात्तान् पदमाभासम् ।

(Quoted in preface to *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 1, edited by Surendralal Goswami, Benares)

² Surendralal Goswami's preface to *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 4.

The *Tarkabhāṣā* has also been edited with a learned introduction by Prof D. R. Bhandarkar, in the Bombay Sanskrit Series. The book has been translated into English by M. M. Dr. Ganga Nath Jha, in the Indian Thought, Allahabad.

category, namely *prameya*, includes (2) *dravya*, (3) *karma*, (4) *śūnya*, (5) *artha*, (6) *śabdha*, (7) *manas*, (8) *pratyakṣa*, (9) *pratyakṣa*, (10) *pratyakṣa*, (11) *pratyakṣa*, (12) *pratyakṣa*, and (13) *pratyakṣa*. The sixteen *artha* in the Nyāya *artha* signified five objects of sense: (1) *gandha* (smell), (2) *rasa* (taste), (3) *rūpa* (colour), (4) *spṛśa* (touch), and (5) *śabdha* (sound). In order to incorporate the Vaiśeṣika categories into Nyāya, Keśava Miśra explained *artha* as signifying (1) *dravya*, (2) *guna*, (3) *karma*, (4) *śūnya*, (5) *artha*, and (6) *śabdha*. Though the sixteen categories of the Nyāya are included in the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika these sets of categories are separately stated and the Vaiśeṣika categories are explained identically with *artha*. Keśava confirms that he adopts this overlapping discussion for a special purpose. The scheme of combination of the two sets of categories is shown below —



Instrument—*kāraṇa*

necessary antecedent of the latter, that is, it necessarily exists before the latter and does not bring about anything else, e.g. threads constitute the cause of the cloth, whose existence it, and the as of the threads as it brings about something as far as the cloth itself is

effect of threads.

Cause—*kāraṇa*

necessary consequence
e.g. a cloth is an

vāyā) exists between its parts and a whole, the qualities and substance, action and an actor, the individual and a class, its specific qualities and the eternal substance

- (2) The non-material, non-constituent or non-inherent cause (*asamarūpī lāṅkā*)—is that which inheres in the material cause and whose efficiency is well known, e.g. the conjunction of the threads is a non-material cause of the cloth, the colour of the threads is a non-material cause of the colour of the cloth. Colour inheres in thread and its efficiency in producing the colour of the cloth is well known

- (3) The effect of the non-material cause is that of a

(*nimitta*) cause

Perception—*pratyakṣa*

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is of two kinds—

- (1) *Nirvikalpa*, non-determinate, non-effective or abstract, and (2) *savikalpa*, determinate, reflective or concrete. The Buddhists admit only the first kind of perception and reject the second kind. They say that our perception is certainly indeterminate and individual, it has for its object an individual which alone can come in contact with our senses. A determinate percep-

as that which is excluded by non-cowness, i.e. which is not horse-ness, tigerness, etc.

Now if we are unable to perceive cowness because it pertains to all cows, how can we perceive non-cowness which covers a still wider area? Keśava's reply to the objection of the Buddhists is that even a genus is to be regarded as an entity, like an individual, which is, as such, capable of coming in contact with our senses.

Inference—*anumāna*

Inference is consideration from sign. A sign (*liṅga*) is that which indicates the predicate (*sādhya*) by the force of their

invariable concomitance, e.g. smoke is a sign of fire, inasmuch as there is an invariable concomitance of smoke with fire in the form "wherever there is smoke there is fire". Consideration (*parāmarśa*) is the knowledge that the sign pervaded by the predicate abides in the subject. Inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) is the knowledge which is derived through consideration, e.g. the hill has fire, because it has smoke which is in invariable concomitance with fire. Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the constant association of the sign with the predicate, e.g. the co-presence of smoke with fire. The concomitance or co-presence must be natural and not conditional (*aupādhika*).

Comparison—*upamāna*
analogy

Comparison or analogy (*upamāna*) is the knowledge of a certain thing as similar to another thing, derived through the remembrance of an indicative declaration on the subject, e.g. a man who has heard from a forester that a *bosgavaeus* (*garaya*) is like a cow, goes into a forest and sees an animal like a cow. Remembering the declaration of the forester, he ascertains that the animal he sees is a *bosgavaeus*. This knowledge is analogical or comparative knowledge derived through an analogy or comparison.

Word—*habda*

Word (*śabda*) if it is the assertion of a trustworthy person, is a means of right knowledge, e.g. the Veda is a means of right knowledge, inasmuch as it was spoken by God who is supremely trustworthy

15. COMMENTARIES ON THE TARKHIVNICH.

There are numerous comments

bhāṣā darpaṇa by Bhāṣkara Bhaṭṭa, Tarkabhāṣā prakāśikā by Candrā, Yuktimuktāvalī by Nāgārāja Bhaṭṭa about 1700 A D. He was a contemporary of Hari Dikṣita, a grandson of 10th Dikṣita who lived between 1610 A D and 1639 A D. He was a bhāṣāprakāśikā by Candra Bhaṭṭa about 1390 A D. He was the son of Sahaja Sarvajña, and brother of Sarvajña, must have lived about 1390 A D when his patron Harthara, King of

Vijayanagar, lived) *Tattva Prabodhini* by Gaṇeśa Dīkṣita, *Tarkabhāṣā-prakāśikā* by Kaundinya Dīkṣita, *Tarkadīpikā* by Keśava Bhaṭṭa, *Tarkabhāṣā-prākāśikā* by Govardhana Mīra, *Tarkabhāṣā-prakāśikā* by Gaurikānta Śārvabhauma, and *Nyāyapradīpa* by Viśvakarmā.¹

¹ Vide Surendralal Goswami's *Preface to Tarkabhāṣā*, pp. 9-13

- (1) *Nyāyabhināsa prakāśa* by Vardhamāna-Upiśhṛaya (about 1215 A.D.)
- (2) *Nyāyabhināsa bhāṣa* by Bhagvanīśa Śrīrāmaṇi (1500 A.D.)
- (3) *Nyāyabhināsa kaṇṭhābhāṣana* by Śaṅkara Bhāṣa (about 1675 A.D.)
- (4) *Nyāyabhināsa prakāśavācaka* (glory on Vardhamāna) by Mathuravīśa Tarkasāgrha (about 1570 A.D.)

20 ANNAM BHATTA (1627 A.D.)

Annam Bhatta is the author of an excellent Vaiśeṣika treatise called *Tarkasāgrha* and of a commentary thereon called *Dīpikā*, which two taken together, are often designated as *Annambhāṭṭiyam*. The *Nyāya-parīkṣā Prakāśa*, a commentary on the *Nyāya-parīkṣā* of Udayana is also ascribed to him. The prevailing tradition in South India is that Annam Bhatta was an Indian (Telugu) of Nor...
 Bhatta at begu...
 Dīpikā to King...
 manuscript of *Tarkasāgrha* was, as appears from Weber's...


... Catalogue, copied in the year 1724 A.D.² He is supposed to have written a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. He could not have flourished before the 17th century A.D.

21 Tarkasāgrha.

(*samavāya*), and (7) non-existence (*abhāva*). Quality is of twenty-four kinds, of which *buddhi* (intellect or knowledge) is one. *Buddhi* or knowledge = of two kinds, experience (*anubhava*) and *smṛti* (recollection). *Anubhava* or experience may be right or wrong. The right — — — — —
 viz (1) perceptual knowledge (*anumiti*),
 (2) verbal knowledge (*śabda*),
 (3) comparison (*upamāna*),
 (4) inference (*anumāna*),
 (5) perception (*pratyakṣa*),
 (6) verbal testimony (*śabda*),
 (7) comparison (*upamāna*),
 (8) inference (*anumāna*),
 (9) perception (*pratyakṣa*),
 (10) verbal testimony (*śabda*),
 (11) comparison (*upamāna*),
 (12) inference (*anumāna*),
 (13) perception (*pratyakṣa*),
 (14) verbal testimony (*śabda*),
 (15) comparison (*upamāna*),
 (16) inference (*anumāna*),
 (17) perception (*pratyakṣa*),
 (18) verbal testimony (*śabda*),
 (19) comparison (*upamāna*),
 (20) inference (*anumāna*),
 (21) perception (*pratyakṣa*),
 (22) verbal testimony (*śabda*),
 (23) comparison (*upamāna*),
 (24) inference (*anumāna*).

Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, together called *pramāna*, are thus included in *buddhi*, which = one of the twenty-four qualities. This sort of inclusion of the *pramāna* in the categories of the Vaiśeṣika is not altogether satisfactory, inasmuch as they do not completely fit into each other.

The scheme of incorporation is shown below —



The seven categories and their numerous subdivisions are most lucidly treated.

A right experience (*gathārthānubhava*) is defined as the experience of a generic nature as abiding in its subject, e.g. in the case of a piece of silver, the experience that "this is silver," that is, this is the subject in which "silverness" abides, is a right experience.

An instrument (*lāraṇa*) is defined as a special cause which is in operation, that is, which brings about an effect, e.g. he cuts a tree with an axe. Here axe is the instrument. A cause (*lāraṇa*) is that which invariably precedes an effect, which cannot otherwise take place, e.g. "clay is the material cause of a pot."

An effect (*lārya*) is the counterpart of an antecedent which dissolves into non-existence, e.g. "a pot is the effect of clay."

A cause is of three kinds: (1) a material or intimate cause (*samavīyilāraṇa*), (2) non-intimate or non-co-existent cause (*asamavīyilāraṇa*), and (3) the instrumental cause (*nimittalāraṇa*),¹ all of which will be explained later.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the knowledge which is produced from the intercourse of the sense organs with their objects. It is of two kinds: (1) indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and (2) determinate (*savikalpa*). The intercourse is of six kinds, which will be explained later.

Inference (*anumāna*) is the means for deriving inferential knowledge. Inferential knowledge is the knowledge which arises from consideration (*parāmarśa*). Consideration (*parāmarśa*) is the knowledge that the reason or the middle term, in invariable concomitance with the major term, abides in the minor term, e.g. this hill has smoke which is in invariable concomitance with the fire. Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the constant association of the middle term with the major term, e.g. wherever there is smoke, there is fire. *Paksadharmatā* (subjective law) refers to the fact that the smoke abides in the hill. As the Vaiśeṣika philosophy does not form a subject of this volume, the topics of Tarkasaṃgraha are not treated here.

22 COMMENTARIES ON TARKASAMGRAHA —

1.

23 VĪVANĀTHA NYĀYAPĀRĪCCHĀDA (1631 A.D.)

Vīvanātha Nyāyapāricchāda or simply Pāricchāda, was the author of a Vaiśeṣika treatise called Bhāṣā-parīcchada¹ (determination of categories), and of a commentary on the same called Siddhānta-muktāvalī (rows of pearls of logical truths). Vīvanātha, as it appears from his Pingala-prakāśikā,² as also from other sources, was the son of Vidyānirāsa and a brother of Rudra Vācaspati. Vidyānirāsa lived in 1599 A.D.³ when a book called Dīpa-kāṇḍa was copied for him by a scribe called Kavīcandra. Vīvanātha himself composed the Gautama-ūdravṛtti at Vṛndāvana in the year 1634 A.D.⁴ He was a native of Navadvīpa and an adherent of the Nyāya School of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.⁵

24 BHĀṢĀPARĪCCHĒDA.

¹ The Bhāṣā-parīcchada has been edited and translated into English by Dr G. Roer in the Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta.

² In the Pingala-prakāśikā Vīvanātha says —

विद्यानिवाचकः कविः विद्यावत्
विद्यामनिकषधिया समसराचो मुदे धविना ।
उर्वरौ नीलिरज्ज्वाला भद्राचार्यनवाक्या
रत्नविद्यानिवाचार्ता दानवाप्यायुजस्रव
कविमुद्रमौलिगुप्तिमहादे विद्येन.
मुद्रैव कविचन्द्रेण विद्यया धरिरोधिपदम् ॥

(Vide Eggeling's India Office Catalogue, Vol. III, page 409B, and M. M. Hara Prasad Śāstri's Nepal Catalogue, Preface, § xvi)

दध्यावतिथौ मन्त्रेण्वासी
धरणी कामिनीयौ मुद्रौ विद्यादे ।
अधरोन्मिषधरितिली
मनु इन्द्राविधिने च विद्यावत् ॥

(Vide M. M. Hara Prasad Śāstri's article on Bhāṣā-parīcchada in the J. A. S. B., Vol. VI, No. 7)

दधा मुनिचन्द्रमौलिमन्त्रवहनि
नीलिरज्ज्वाला कविना मुद्रमाज्यवर्ध ।
नीलमन्त्रमुद्रमाज्यस्रव अधरोन्मि-
नीलमन्त्रमौलि च यः अधरोन्मिषधरि ॥
(J. A. S. B., Vol. VI, No. 7, page 313)

मन्त्राया विद्यार्थिनाजिह्व समीपा वदामोदया ।
अज्ञानमन्त्राय च यः मन्त्रो हनिं समर्था दधु ॥

Viṣṇu :- A man who is desirous of attaining emancipation according to Jagadīśa, possesses a true knowledge of (ātman). In acquiring this knowledge, one should also be sent with things which are connected with and opposite to it.

In the first part of the Tarkamṛta called *Viśaya-kāṇḍ*

Subjects of Tarkamṛta on subjects), Jagadīśa divides things into two kinds, viz (1) positive (bhāva) and

negative (abhāva). The positive things or bhāvas are substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action (karma), generality (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa), and inherence (samavāya). The negative things or abhāvas are of two kinds, viz (1) relative non-existence (sargabhāva), and (2) reciprocal non-existence (anyonyābhāva). The first kind is subdivided as (1) antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva), (2) subsequent non-existence (pradhāva) and (3) absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva).

The second part of the Tarkamṛta, called *Jāna-kāṇḍ*

Knowledge (Jāna-kāṇḍ), is divided into two parts, viz (1) the manner in which the seven categories of the V and the four pramanas of the Nyāya, have been combined, is ingenious and

The scheme of amalgamation The categories do not coalesce with other, but are treated as a consistent whole

A scheme of combination of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems is given below —



Vaiśeṣika combined with Nyāya

न्यायवैशेषिकसंयुक्तसिद्धिचक्रम् ।
संयुक्तसिद्धिचक्रम् ।

26. LAUGĀKṢI BHĀSKARA.

Laugākṣi Bhāskara, well versed in Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā philosophies, was the son of Mudgala and nephew of the poet Rudra. His proper name was Bhāskara, his surname being Lau-
gākṣi. From the fact that he mentions the temple of Viśveśvara
and the pool of Manikarnikā, — the two most sacred spots in Benares,
— we may reasonably suppose that Laugākṣi Bhāskara lived in
that sacred city.¹

His age may be placed probably in the 17th century.

27. TARKAKAUMUDĪ.

His Tarkakaumudī, which opens with a salutation to Vāsudeva,
pays due obeisance to Akṣapāda and Kanāda. He divides cate-

| | |
|--|---------------------------|
| gories | |
| (guṇa), | |
| arity | |
| abhidhāna | |
| he so | |
| ion (śr | |
| | (apramā) * Tho means of |
| | is pramāna, which is of |
| | ; inference (anumāna) |
| | forms the main subject of |
| the Nyāya philosophy, is thus amalgamated with the doctrine of | |
| seven categories, forming the subject-matter of the Vaiśeṣika | |
| philosophy. | |

¹ Laugākṣi Bhāskara mentions Manikarnikā, the bathing place, and Viśveśvara, the presiding deity of Benares, in quite a familiar tone — ब्रह्मा वा नविर्ब्रह्मा, ब्रह्मैवेत्येवम् etc. (Tarkakaumudī, page 8 edited by Vāsudeva Lakṣmīpati Śāstri Panaskar, Bombay).

CHAPTER

Works treating of certain logical Topics of the Nyāya

28. THE NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA

Some manuals of Logic dealt with the nature of the Vaiśeṣika, not with the logical topics or subjects of the two systems and circulated in an abstract and general assumed more or less the nature of critical or controversial topics of the Nyāya as Śaśadhara's Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa (an important work of this kind)

29. ŚAŚADHARA (ABOUT 1125 A.D.)

Śaśadhara, styled Mahopādhyāya, have been a native of Mithila. The time is not definitely known. Probably he lived after Udayana whose words he quotes freely (some). Śaśadhara and Manidhara were tradition, two logicians, whose definitions (concomitance) were criticised by Gaṅgeśa.

Manidhara. According, however, to the tradition, he lived in the 12th century A.D.

30. NYĀYA-SIDDHĀNTA

The only logical treatise of Śaśadhara

Subjects of the work us, is Nyāya (logical truths) which op

1. Vide the colophon of the Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa Vidyāśekhara Prasad Divedi of Benares. It runs thus:

एति यद्यप्युक्तं तद्वदन्तं तद्वदन्तं तद्वदन्तं तद्वदन्तं ।

अधिनिरूपितान्धकारं
जीवन्मूर्खान्धकारम् ।
तस्मात्तद्वदन्तं
तद्वदन्तं तद्वदन्तं तद्वदन्तं ।

From the manuscript of Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa, Society of Bengal

Adhīṣa (Śiva). It deals with the topics of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy in a promiscuous way. This is evident from the titles of the various chapters of the work, viz (1) invocation of blessings (*mangalācarana*), (2) controversy on darkness (*andhakura-ripratipatti*), (3) examination of causality (*lāṇatā-ścāra*), (4) the power in generality as maintained by the Tautātikas (*jāti-śakti-vādi-*

nirūpana, etc.) The work ends with an examination of non-existence (*abhāva*) as a means of knowledge.

Commentary There is a commentary on the Nyāya-ād-
dhānta-dīpa called Nyāya-ādhānta-dīpa-
ṭīkā by Śeṣananta.

31. MĀDHAVĀCĀRYA (ABOUT 1331—1391 A D)

Mādhavācārya flourished in 1391¹ A D (1313 Śāka). He

to have been brother of Śāyana, while others hold that he was the same as Śāyana,² though essentially he was a writer on Mīmāṃsā.

¹ Vide Preface to Vivarana-prameya-saṃgraha printed in the Vizianageram Sanskrit Series.

² Preface to Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, translated by E H Cowell and A. G. Gough, pp vii-viii.

³ Perhaps Mādhava was born in the family of Śāyana. Compare—

श्रीमदाचार्यदुसरादि सुवराभाषी मया लिखितः ।

सिद्धये नाचराय्येह सर्वदार्शनिकसंग्रहः ।

दुसरादि सुवराभाषी सुवराभाषी मया लिखितः ।

philosophy. His preceptor was Sarvaśāstraśāstra of Śaśāstra.¹ He is mentioned here because he has supplied some other things some important information about the Nyāya philosophy. Besides giving a complete exposition of the Nyāya system under the head of Akṣapādāśāstraśāstra Mādhava throws a good deal of light on some of the Cārvāka and Heliophists.

32 SARVADARŚANA SAMGRĀHA, AKṢAPĀDĀŚĀSTRĀ

In the Sarvaśāstraśāstra samgrāha under the title of Akṣapādāśāstraśāstra, Mādhava has given a brief exposition of the sixteen categories treated in the Nyāya-sūtra. The Nyāya philosophy was so called, because it is specially treated of Vyākhyāna (otherwise called ājñāna (syllable)) which formed the predominant feature of the system and proved useful in the acquisition of all kinds of knowledge.²

INFERENCE AS A MEANS OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

Cārvāka denies inference as a means of right knowledge.

Those who maintain the authority of inference (anumāna), accept something as a sign or middle term, which is supposed to abide in the minor term, and to be in invariable concomitance with the major term. The invariable concomitance must be freed from all conditions, whether they are sure (nīdāta) or suspected (sandigdha). Now this concomitance by its mere existence cannot produce inference. The concomitance, if it is to produce inference, must be known. How do we then know this concomitance? We cannot know the concomitance by means of perception, which does not cognize past and future events. We cannot employ inference, the validity of which has not yet been established. Verbal testimony, which is included in inference cannot help us in this matter. Comparison is useless. Hence, the invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term cannot be known by any of the so called four means of knowledge.

श्रीमद्विष्णुसहस्रनामस्तोत्रम्

श्रीमद्विष्णुसहस्रनामस्तोत्रम्

(Sarvadarsana samgrāha opening lines)

‘मनु श्रुत्यादिप्रमाणैर्बोद्धव्यं प्रतिपाद्यमानं कथमिदं व्याख्यातमिति स्वदिशि गच्छेत् सर्वं
न्यायसाधारणं अथैवा मन्वीति यावेन व्याख्या प्रमाणानुसारव्याख्यां यत्कलमिदं
प्राप्तव्यं तत्प्रमाणानुसारव्याख्यां प्रमाणानुसारव्याख्यां यत्कलमिदं प्राप्तव्यं। Sarvadarsana-sam-
grāha, Akṣapādāśāstraśāstra, p. 130, edited by Tārānātha Tārānāthesapātri, Calcutta.

Similarly, the invariable concomitance has also been described as freed from conditions (*upādhi*). A condition (*upādhi*) is that which constantly accompanies the major term, but does not constantly accompany the middle term, e.g. the hill has smoke because it has fire nourished by wet fuel (where wet fuel is a condition). A condition may be fully defined as that (1) which does not constantly accompany the middle term, (2) which constantly accompanies the major term, and (3) is constantly accompanied by the major term. That the condition must be equipollent in extension with the major term is evident from the statement of the Great Doctor (probably Udayanācārya) who says "When an equipollent concomitance and a non-equipollent concomitance do both abide in an object, the non-equipollent concomitance, if it is not covered by the equipollent concomitance, is inadmissible, that is, not conducive to the true conclusion."

"this hill has smoke because it has fire nourished by wet fuel," where "smoke" and "fire nourished by wet fuel," are equal in their extensions, that is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire nourished by wet fuel, and wherever there is fire nourished by

the fire is greater in extension than smoke, that is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen, but wherever there is fire there is not necessarily smoke, as in a red-hot iron ball.

Now an equipollent concomitance and a non-equipollent concomitance do both abide in smoke in the following instances — (1) the hill has smoke because it has fire, and (2) the hill has smoke because it has fire nourished by wet fuel.

In the first instance smoke is in non-equipollent concomitance with fire, whereas in the second instance smoke is in equi-

¹ Varadarāja in his commentary on Tarkikarakaś called *śaraṅgaśāstra* quotes this verse as an example of the fallacy *āśrubbhāṣā*, called *aprayoga* (inadmissible), which is identified in the conditional (*upādhi*) quoted in the *śaraṅgaśāstra* chapter I, *Cārvāka darśana*.

समाधत्तविधाभावरेश्वरस्यो यद्वा नदा ।

यदेव यदि नो यान्तथोरोरोरोराजम् ॥

The portion which is added to the middle term or subtracted from the major term is called an *upādhi* (condition), *anyathābhāṣā* (conditionality) or *aprayoga* (inadmissible). Tarkikarakaś, page 252, edited by Vinayachandran Prasad, Benares.

philosophy. His preceptor was Sarvajña-varṇa, son of Sarva-pāṇi.¹ He is mentioned here because he has supplied, among other things, some important information about the Nyāya philosophy. Besides giving a complete exposition of the Nyāya system under the head of Akṣapādadarśana, Mādhyama throws a good deal of light on Logic of the Carvāka and Buddhists.

32 SARVADARŚANA-SAMGRĀHA, — AKṢAPĀDA DARŚANA.

In the Sarvadarśana-samgrāha under the title of Akṣapādadarśana, Mādhyama has given a brief exposition of the sixteen categories treated in the Nyāya-sūtra. The Nyāya philosophy was so called, because it is specially treated of Nyāya, otherwise called anuyama (syllogism), which formed the predominant feature of the system and proved useful in the acquisition of all kinds of knowledge.²

INFERENCE IS A MEANS OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE.

Carvāka denies inference as a means of right knowledge. Those who maintain the authority of inference.

The view of Carvāka-darśana.

abide in the minor term with the major term from all conditions, whether they are sure (nikṛita) or suspected (sandigdha).³ Not prod-
ference,
tance?
which does not cognize past and future events. We cannot employ inference, the validity of which has not yet been estab-
lished.

or known by any of the so called four means of knowledge

सर्वदार्शनिकसंग्रहस्य निखिलसंग्रहः

अक्षपाददार्शनिकसंग्रहस्य प्रारम्भः

(Sarvadarśana-samgrāha, opening lines)

¹ अनु सभाषादिपदाद्यंशोद्धरणे प्रतिपाद्यमाने
न्यायदर्शनादयम् अपरिभाष्यमस्मीति
पादकतया सर्वदार्शनिकसंग्रहः
grāha, Akṣapādadarśana-

² न्यायदर्शनमिति अत्रदिश्यते अर्थे
न्यायदर्शनस्य अत्रदिश्यते
दुष्यते । Sarvadarśana-sam-
grāha, Akṣapādadarśana-

in Turkuvaṇṇaspeti, Calcutta.

identity between the jars. We cannot predicate one thing of another thing, if there is no difference whatever between the two. It is therefore proved that we can infer one thing from another thing through the relation of cause and effect or when the two things are in essence the same.

The Buddhists further maintain that inference as a means of knowledge can on no account be denied. It would be a mere assertion, if a person were to say that inference is not a means of knowledge. To think of inference as a means of knowledge and yet to deny it involves him in an absurdity, as if he were saying *that his mother was barren*.

SECTION II.

Tarka-Sāstra—the Science of Dialectics.

CHAPTER I

Formation of the Tarka Sāstra.

33. THE NYĀYA CANNOT BE COMBINED WITH THE VAIŚEṢIKA

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika

34. ADOPTION OF *Pramāṇa* ALONE.

tion

Gre

prā

wet

mā

of verbal testimony.

35. ADOPTION OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA PRINCIPLES.

The theory of *pramāṇa* became very subtle when it adopted the principles of generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*),

that thing is also perceptible by the same sense

Thus the Nyāya theory of perception, etc., considered from the standpoint of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, became very subtle and intricate.

36. SUBTLETY OF MEANINGS AIMED AT.

A hair-splitting subtlety in the discussion of meanings of terms is the distinguishing characteristic of the Tarka-śāstra (the science of dialectics). Thus Akṣapāda defines a proposition in quite a simple style as "the laying down of what is to be established." But in elucidating the meaning of a proposition Gaṅgeśa, Raghunātha, Gadādhara and others produce definitions which are terribly long and intricate. The subtle explanation is, however, an excellent training for the intellect.

37. FINE DEFINITION OF TERMS.

The technicalities of Tarka-śāstra have repelled students of Sanskrit from its study. The immemorial practice has been for Nai-

Modern Logicians do not trouble themselves about the nature of things. They are satisfied if they can evolve a correct definition, and in their verbal definitions they evince a subtlety and skill, which to a certain extent compensate for the paucity of their materials.

38. THE USE OF TECHNICAL TERMS.¹

In bringing out the subtlety of meanings and in giving fine definitions, the modern logicians have invented numerous technical terms of which some are given here.

atiryāpti—Being too wide

anugata-dharma—Common property.

anugama—Generalisation

anuyogi—The quality of being an *anuyogi*. When a thing stands to another thing in a particular relation, that upon which it stands is called *anuyogi*, while it itself is called *pratiyogi* (counterpart) in regard to the relation. Thus a jar standing on the ground in the relation of union is called *pratiyogi* and the ground is the *anuyogi* of the relation.

anuyati-saṁkī—Concomitant circumstances which are not causes.

¹ *Id.*

¹ *Pradha Śāstra's Muktāvatī Vol. II, and Mahimānopādhyaya's Brief notes on the modern Nyāya system of Indian Thought.*

CHAPTER II

Tattva-cintāmaṇi the earliest Work on Tarka-sāstra

39. IMPORTANCE OF TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI.

The Tattva-cintāmaṇi ("a thought-jewel of truth"), otherwise known as Pramāṇa-cintāmāṇi ("a thought-jewel of valid knowledge"), of which a short summary in English is given in the following pages, was written by a Brāhmaṇa logician of Mithilā named Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. It introduces a new era in the development of Logic in India and is justly reckoned as the first work on the Modern School of Hindu Logic. In modern India Sanskrit scholarship is not considered of any worth unless it is accompanied by a knowledge of the Tattva-cintāmaṇi or at least a portion of it. The study of this work develops to an enormous extent the discursive faculty in the reader and enables him to argue with hair-splitting distinctions and subtleties.

The book, since its first composition in the 12th century A D., has been a subject of close study by the Pandits of Mithilā, and about the middle of the 15th century its study was introduced into Bengal by Vāsudeva Śārvalhaṇa, who had been educated in the academies of Mithilā. Since 1503 A D., when the university of Navadvīpa was established, the Tattva-cintāmaṇi was much popularised in Bengal through the endeavours of the famous Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and others. Gradually the book was intro-

made to present the contents of the work in English, Bengali, Hindi or any other modern language, perhaps on account of the bewildering abstruseness of its style and thought.

40. GAṆGEŚA—THE AUTHOR OF THE TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI (1200 A D.)

pitiated the goddess Kālī, on the cremation ground adjacent to

his uncle's house, and acquired from her, as a boon, deep erudition in the science of Logic

Gaṅgeśa mentions the name of Śivāditya Mīra,¹ the well-known author of *Saptapadārthī*, and makes frequent quotations from *Ratna-kośa*,² which is a work on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy

Gauḍa Mīmāṃsaka³ or

1st have flourished after

Sāri and Amaracandra

ours,⁴ whose opinions he has quoted flourished. As he criticises

son Vardhamāna Upādhyāya lived, in other words Gaṅgeśa is assigned to the last quarter of the 12th century A.D.⁵

tion of pupa Ithagiratha Thakkura was seventh in descent from Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, and allowing an average life of thirty years for each generation, we may assume that Gaṅgeśa lived 180 years before Ithagiratha, that is, about the year 1370 A.D.

The succession of pupa from Gaṅgeśa is as follows:—

1 Gaṅgeśa, 2 Vardhamāna, 3 Vajrapati & Hari Māra, 4 Bhambhara, 5 (a) Vāmbhara, (b) Haradatta, (c) Candrapati (7), 7 (a) Mahadev Thakkura, (b) Ithagiratha Thakkura, 8 A pupa, 9 Bhavānātha 10 Gaṅgura Māra.

The inscription is found on a stone slab attached to a well at the village Dhanuādh near Janakpore in Darbhanga. It runs thus:—

वाग्देव दक्षिणवर्तकवाग्देवो धर्मवर्तकवाग्देवः,

काव दक्षवर्तकवाग्देवो विदितवर्तकवाग्देवः कवोः

कावे दक्षवर्तकवाग्देवो धर्मवर्तकवाग्देवः,

वाग्देवो दक्षवर्तकवाग्देवो विदितवर्तकवाग्देवः कवोः

[Those who maintain that Gaṅgeśa lived in the fourth quarter of the 15th century A.D.¹ base their contention on the mention of Vardhamāna, son of Gaṅgeśa, in the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* in the 14th century A.D.² and upon an interpretation of the expression *śakābda* in *śam* 1509, occurring in a manuscript of Pakṣaśāstra Mītra's commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, as equivalent to 1275 A.D.³ Now the verse on the authority of which Vardhamāna is supposed to have been mentioned in the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* is obviously an interpolation, and the expression *śakābda* in *śam* 1509, written in very modern characters, refers in opinion not to Lakṣmana's samvat 159, corresponding to 1275 A.D., but to *śaka* 1509 corresponding to 1687 A.D., the word *śam* being either redundant or implying simply a year. In fact, if Gaṅgeśa had been older than the author of *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, his work would have been reviewed, or at any rate cited to, in it.]

41 THE TEXT OF TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆĪ

Book I.—Perception—*Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa*.

The *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* is divided into four books dealing respectively with (1) Perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference (*anumāna*), (3) Comparison (*upamāna*), and (4) Verbal testimony (*śabda*), which are the four means of deriving valid knowledge. The first book, which treats of perception, opens with stanzas extolling God Śiva.⁴

has Mahesh That-
the opening line
for 1916, p. 255.

¹ *Vide Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, Pāṇinīya darśana.*

² *Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa* (*Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa*), which is a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* by Pakṣadhara Mītra, was, according to its colophon, copied in the year 1509 (corresponding to 1657 A.D.) and not in the Lakṣmana samvat 159 corresponding to 1275 A.D., as the date contained in the colophon runs thus —

मनु नीरस मन्त्रात् ॥ ४४ १५०९ मे वावसव ॥ ४४

गुरातीनीदीनकिमुचयिचकचरमव

विद्यार्तिर्व सार्धकिनिविचकचरमवि तनुवे ।

हवावावावा वरवविचकचरमवि

मन्त्रक मन्त्रविचकचरमवि गुरविरे ॥ १ ॥

चन्नीचम वमचकच गुरविर्वावा गुरवा मन्

विद्याविचकचरमव च मन्त्रो वार् विचकचरमवि

मन्त्रो वीरमवेन वुर्वमवे विद्याविचकचरमवि

मन्त्रमन्त्रो विचकचरमव वीरमविचकचरमवि ॥ १ ॥

Invocation of Blessings—*Vaṅśa-nāda*

Salutation is offered to Śiva to invoke his blessings. The invocation is of three kinds, viz bodily, vocal, and mental. The bodily invocation consists in uttering the eulogy of Śiva. "All polite people invoking blessings if they wish to bring their work to a successful completion." Though we do not find any explicit text in the Veda enjoining the practice of good people of such a text. It is not the invocation itself which is the means of removing obstacles which beset the work. In the case of an atheist finishing his work successfully without any invocation of blessings we are to suppose that there were no obstacles in his way or that he performed the invocation in his previous life. The case of a theist invoking blessings and yet failing to finish his work is explained on the supposition that he encountered enormous obstacles which his feeble invocation could not remove. The Kulambiri which opens with a profuse invocation of blessings furnishes an illustration of a work remaining unfinished, owing to the excess of obstacles in its way.

The Validity of Knowledge - /r/1w1ayz c11s

In determining the true meaning of *propositio* (the means
of valid knowledge) one must understand that it
proposui or said know the true meaning of the word *proposui*
scire (valid knowledge). *Proposui* or valid know-
ledge is the knowledge of a thing as it is, it is the knowledge
of the general nature as abiding in its own subject that is
abiding in every one of its individual essential moments. But in
science, to know a thing is to know the essence of a thing as it is
in itself as a substance which has no other nature or reality
than the actuality of its own existence.

15. The following information is for the year ended 31/12/2019:

The company has a number of subsidiaries, all of which are wholly owned. The subsidiaries are:

- 1. A subsidiary in the United Kingdom, which is a manufacturing company.
- 2. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 3. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 4. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 5. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 6. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 7. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 8. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 9. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 10. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.

The company has a number of other subsidiaries, all of which are wholly owned. The subsidiaries are:

- 1. A subsidiary in the United Kingdom, which is a manufacturing company.
- 2. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 3. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 4. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 5. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 6. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 7. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 8. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 9. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 10. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.

The company has a number of other subsidiaries, all of which are wholly owned. The subsidiaries are:

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- 6. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 7. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 8. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.
- 9. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a manufacturing company.
- 10. A subsidiary in the United States, which is a service company.

knowledge were derived from the general grounds of knowledge

knowledge of a dubious character, and the Mīmāṃsikas cannot satisfactorily explain the production of this dubious knowledge or doubt. If there is consciousness of knowledge, there is, according to them, along with it a consciousness of its validity which leaves no room for doubt, and if on the other hand, there is no consciousness of knowledge, there cannot arise any consciousness of its dubiousness. Hence Gaṅgeśa concludes that the validity of knowledge is not derived from its general grounds (or causes). It, according to him, derived through its special cause called instru-

emission), that of comparison is the knowledge of similarity, and that of verbal testimony is the knowledge of consistency. Our

whether it is not conducive to activity which is fruitful is not valid knowledge." Suppose for instance, a person cognises from experience a white thing to be a piece of silver. His knowledge will be valid if it harmonises with his actual experience when he approaches the piece of silver. Our consciousness of the validity of a particular knowledge arises therefore from our consciousness of the fruitful correspondence or harmony between the particular knowledge (idea) and the activity which it leads to.

Invalid Knowledge—*Anyathākhyāti*

Gaṅgeśa says that invalid knowledge or error, in Sanskrit *apramā*, *anyathākhyāti* or *bhrama*, is the knowledge (experience) of a thing as it is not,—it is the knowledge (experience) of a generic nature, which does not abide in its

apramā, *anyathākhyāti*,
bhrama, or invalid know-
ledge.

own subject, but which abides in the subject of another quite nature. For instance, to know a pearl to be a piece of silver is invalid knowledge, inasmuch as the generic nature "silverness" does not abide here in the piece of silver which is its own subject but abides in a pearl which is the subject of another quite nature i.e. "pearliness."

The Mimāṃsākas (Prābhākaras) do not admit invalid knowledge or error. All knowledge, even if it is *asakya* by *pramāṇa* *śakti* to them is valid and as such prompts to activity. In the case of a person who takes a pearl to be a piece of silver by saying 'this is silver' he should bear in mind that he acquires the knowledge of 'this' (pearl) through perception and that of 'silver' through recollection. But he owing to some defect, is not conscious of the distinction between "this" (pearl) and "silver" that is, between 'perception' and 'recollection' and this misapprehension of distinction leads him to activity.

Therefore oppose the Mīmāṃsākas by saying that the mis-

in a subject. As already stated when the generic nature abides in its own subject, the knowledge is valid, but when it abides in the subject of another generic nature, the knowledge is invalid. A valid determinate knowledge (*pramā*) leads us to activity which is fruitful, while an invalid determinate knowledge (*apramā*) leads us

there is only one kind of knowledge, viz. determinate knowledge, and it will be cumbrous to assume two kinds, viz. perception and recollection

Intercourse between Senses and their Objects—*Sannilāsa*.

Ordinary Perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*).

Perceptual knowledge, or, more simply, perception, has been defined (by Akṣapāda) as knowledge which arises from the intercourse of a sense with its object, and which is non-erratic, being either reflective (mediate) or non-reflective (immediate). This definition, according to Gaṅgeśa, is too wide in so far as it includes recollection and inference of the soul, and is also too nar-

direct." Perception is further defined by Gaṅgeśa as knowledge whose instrumental cause is not knowledge. The instrumental causes of inference, comparison and verbal testimony are respectively the knowledge of premisses, the knowledge of similarity and the knowledge of consistency, but the instrumental cause of the perception is a sense-organ which is not knowledge.

The word perception, which ordinarily signifies perceptual knowledge or rather the means by which we derive perceptual knowledge, does sometimes stand for the whole process in which a sense in intercourse with its object produces knowledge. The senses are six, viz. (1) the eye, (2) the ear, (3) the nose, (4) the tongue, (5) the tactual surface, and (6) the mind. Their objects are respectively the following:—(1) colour, (2) sound, (3) odour, (4) savour, (5) touch (of warmth, coldness, hardness, softness, etc.), and (6) feeling (of pleasure, pain, etc.). Correspondent with the senses there are six kinds of knowledge (perception), viz. the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual and mental (internal).

eye and "smokeness" (the generic nature of smoke) is also an ordinary one which is called united-inherence (*samyukta-samavāya*). But the intercourse between our eye and all cases of smoke is not an ordinary one. It is a transcendent intercourse, as there is no ordinary union of our eye with all cases of smoke of all times and all places. The intercourse consists here of the knowledge of "smokeness", a generic nature which is possessed by all cases of smoke of all times and all places. This sort of intercourse which consists of the knowledge of a generic nature, is called a transcendent

perceive their mutual differences, and as such cannot be omniscient.

Intercourse (perception) whose character is knowledge—If in the perception of a thing the knowledge of the thing itself constitutes the intercourse, it is called an intercourse whose character is know-

intercourse whose character is general, and there is no necessity for our assuming another intercourse whose character is knowledge. On seeing a piece of sandal-wood there arises in us the recollection of fr

"y" (the generic nature of sandal-wood) in the relations of inherence (*samavāya-samavāya*) respectively, through the intercourse the perception of this particular

intercourse
the perception
of the per-
ception" (which
through the inter-
perception of "fragrance", with
thereof

ceived since it is not perceived, there is no pot here. The non-perception of a pot is therefore the means of knowing the non-existence of the pot. Gaṅgeśa does not admit non-perception to be a means of knowledge. Non-existence, according to him, is perceived by our senses through the intercourse of particularity. For instance, in the perception of non-existence of a pot on the floor, there is the union of our eye with the floor in which abides non-existence of the pot as a particularity, that is, there is perception of the floor as possessed of the non-existence of the pot. The

existence by the tactual surface, and pleasure and its non-existence by the mind

Non existence (or negation)—*Abhāva-vāda*

existence of the thing, and that the intercourse through which we perceive the thing, must be the same as that through which we perceive its non-existence, viz union, etc. For instance, our perception of the non-existence of a pot (in the form "there is no pot on the floor") does not presuppose a separate entity called "non-existence", but rests entirely on "the floor" which is the locus of the non-existence of the pot, and is carried on through the inter-

does not rest on "the floor", that is, the non-existence of the pot is not identical with the floor. Had the one rested on the other, or had the two been identical, there would have been perception of the non-existence of the pot even when the pot was on the floor and further there would have been a disturbance of the relation of container and contained that exists between the two. Since this contingency is disastrous, we must admit that there is something on the ground which operates in our failure to perceive the

Non-existence is of two kinds (1) universal and (2) particular. The universal non-existence is subdivided into (a) the antecedent, (b) the subsequent, and (c) the absolute. The antecedent non-existence is that which has no beginning but has an end, e.g. a jar is in antecedent non-existence before it is made up. The subsequent non-existence has a beginning but no end, e.g. a jar is in subsequent non-existence after it is destroyed. The absolute non-existence is that whose counterpart is viewed in relation to all the three times—past, present, and future, e.g. there is no jar on the floor. The reciprocal non-existence is the non-existence of identity, e.g. a jar is not a pot.

Cause of Perception—*Pratyakṣa-karana-vāda*

The causes of perception are the following—

- (1) A union of the mind with the actual surface and the soul.

| | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Cause of knowledge in general | While a person is in deep sleep there is produced in him no knowledge as there is then a union of his mind with the soul alone but not with the actual surface. The mind itself called <i>mānā</i> is called <i>in-recol-</i>
<i>the actual</i> |
|-------------------------------|--|

the senses with their objects, *e.g.* in the perception of a colour there is a union of our mind with the eye which is in intercourse with the colour

- (3) Proportionate extension of the objects of sense, that is, the objects must not be of infinite extension as ether, or of no extension as atoms. The ether and atoms are not

cannot be perceived. Similarly, a fire which exists in the latent condition in a heated frying-pan, is not perceptible

- (5) A special connection of light with the object of sense, *e.g.* a pot, if it is to be perceptible, must have sufficient light on its front rather than on its back.
- (6) Absence of obstacles, *e.g.* too much proximity or too much distance, is often obstructive to our perception

The Atomic Nature of the Mind—*Manonutva-vāda*

The senses through the instrumentality of which we perceive colour, sound, odour, savour and touch, are the eye, ear, nose, tongue and tactual surface respectively. The sense which operates as an instrument in our perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and volition, is the mind, which is called the internal sense in contrast to the other five senses which are external

The mind is atomic in extension, inasmuch as we cannot perceive various objects at one and the same time. Although there

union with all the five external senses at once so as to give rise to the five kinds of perception simultaneously. But everybody is aware that it is impossible for more than one kind of perception to arise at one and the same time. This shows that the mind can come into union with only one external sense at a time, or in other

senses simultaneously, should be told that the operations, which they suppose to be simultaneous, do really take place in succession, as the hundred leaves of a lotus are pierced one after another by a needle.

The Doctrine of Self-consciousness—*Anu-nyāsa-vāda*.

Some philosophers maintain that any particular kind of knowledge performs by itself all its practical functions and does not depend upon another knowledge for the same. For instance, all practical functions connected with a pot can, according to them, be performed when there is knowledge of the pot, but we cannot perform those functions when there is no such knowledge. It is therefore knowledge which performs all its practical functions. We must not however suppose that all practical functions are promiscuously, in fact nature, related to a particular knowledge, its corresponding functions

Some others, who hold the doctrine of triangular perception (*tripuṭi-pratyakṣa-vādinah*), say that each kind of knowledge is self-manifest and that it manifests itself in the form "I know this," which involves an assumption of a knower (the soul), a knowable (the object), and knowledge (the act), and as such performs all its practical functions.

Gangeśa, in opposing the above views, says that a particular kind of knowledge cannot by itself perform its practical functions, but is dependent upon another sort called self-consciousness (*anu-nyāsa-vāda*) which enables it to perform the same. Our knowledge, continues Gangeśa, arises in the form "this" or "pot," but not in the form "I know this" or "I know the pot," and until it assumes the latter form no practical functions can be performed. He therefore lays down that after the origination of knowledge of the form "this" or "pot," there arises another knowledge called self-consciousness of the form "I know this" or "I know the pot," which performs all practical functions. This latter variety, called self-consciousness, arises through the intercourse of the previous knowledge with our mind. The intercourse is united-inherence (*samyukta-samanīya*), inasmuch as there is a union of the mind with the soul in which resided the previous knowledge in the relation of inherence. In fact the latter knowledge or self-consciousness is the mental (or internal) perception of the previous knowledge.

Immediate Perception—*Nirvikalpa-vāda*.

Perception is of two kinds, viz. (1) the immediate, non reflective or abstract (*nirvikalpa*) and (2) the mediate, reflective or concrete (*svikalpa*). The immediate is perception of an indeterminate character. It is perception of a subject and its generic nature is separate from each other, e.g. the perception of a "man" or "mere" potness" without any mutual connection.

Even the mere "pot" or mere "potness" is of the form "something" of which it is absurd to talk as a "pot" or "potness." On the intercourse of a sense with its object the first perception that takes place is immediate or non-reflective. It is supersensuous, that is, not cognisable by any of our senses, not even by the mind. It has been defined as knowledge which is devoid of all connection with name, generic nature, etc., which indicates no relation and involves no specification.

Mediate Perception—*Savikalpa-vôda*

The mediate or reflective perception is of a determinate character. It indicates a subject and its generic nature through their relation to each other, e.g. "this is a pot" where "potness" (the generic nature) abides in "this" (the subject) in the relation of inherence. The perception of the form "this is a pot" is therefore mediate or reflective.

The doctrine of mediate or reflective perception may be set forth as follows —

Immediate perception—the perception of "pot" and "potness" as separate from each other

Mediate perception—the perception of "potness" as abiding in "this" in the form "this is a pot"

Self-consciousness—the mental perception of the knowledge of "potness" as abiding in "this," in the form "I know this is a pot"

Book II—Inference—*Anumāna-lānda*

THE DETERMINATION OF INFERENCEAL KNOWLEDGE—*Anumiti-nirūpana*

Inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) is that knowledge which is derived through another kind of knowledge, viz. that the middle term, in invariable concomitance with the major term, abides in the minor term, e.g.

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here "hill" is the minor term which is also called the subject, locus or side; "fire" is the major term, also called the

This other knowledge, viz. that smoke, in invariable concomitance with fire, abides in the hill, is an instance of what is called

necessary to define the phrase "invariable concomitance." In Sanskrit it is called *vyāpti* which is rendered by such expressions as pervasion, inseparable connection, perpetual attendance, constant co-presence, etc.

Five Provisional Definitions of Invariable Concomitance—*Vyāpti-pāñcalam*.

1 Invariable concomitance is the non-presence of the middle term in the locus of the non-existence of the major term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

Diagram I




Diagram II.



Here smoke (the middle term) is absent from all regions outside the region of fire (the major term) as shown in diagram I. Gangeśa observes that the definition is defective inasmuch as II does not apply to an exclusively affirmative inference, such as "all are nameable, because they are knowable", illustrated in diagram II, in which outside the region of the nameable there is nothing from which the knowable may be absent.

Diagram III.



2. Invariable concomitance is the non-presence of the middle term in that locus of the non-existence of the major term.

e.g. the ape, because it is the tree.

Here "the tree" is the middle term, and "occupied by the ape" is the major term. In diagram III the tree is totally absent from the region not occupied by the ape. The part of the tree not occupied by the ape is excluded from the locus of the non-existence of the major term by the clause "which is not the locus of the major term itself." This definition too is defective, because it, like the previous one, does not apply to an exclusively affirmative inference

the non-co-presence of the
non-existence whose counterpart

is the non-existence of the

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

In diagram I. we find that smoke is not co-present with anything which is non-existent in reciprocity to fire. Water, rock, cloth, table, etc., are all non-existent in their reciprocal relation to fire, that is, they are not fire.

Gangeśa observes that this definition too is defective as it does

4. Invariable concomitance is the state in which the middle term forms the counterpart of that non-existence which abides in the locus of the non-existence of the entire major term, e.g.

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

Here smoke forms the counterpart of the non-existence of fire which abides in the region of the non-existence of entire fire.

According to Gangeśa this definition is defective, as it fails to explain the case of an exclusively affirmative inference. In diagram II. we find that there is no non-existence of the knowable which abides in the region of the non-existence of the nameable.

5. Invariable concomitance is the non-presence of the middle term in what is not the locus of the major term, e.g.

The hill is full of fire
because it is full of smoke

Here smoke is not present in anything which is not the locus of fire. This definition is not applicable to the case of an exclusively affirmative inference. In diagram II we find that there is no non-existence of the knowable in what is not the locus of the major term.

Definition of Invariable Concomitance given by "Lion" and
 "Tiger"—*Siṃha-vyāghroḥta-vyāptilakṣaṇa*

1. Invariable concomitance is the state in which the middle term has not a locus in which there is the non-co-presence of the major term, e.g.

The hill is full of fire
 because it is full of smoke

Here fire = always co-present with smoke in the locus of the latter. It never occurs that in the locus of smoke there is no fire.

2. Invariable concomitance is the state in which the middle term has not a locus which is different from the locus of the major term, e.g.

The hill is full of fire,
 because it = full of smoke

The locus of smoke is never different from that of fire, that is, the former never extends beyond the latter.

Gaṅgeśa observes that both these definitions are defective, inasmuch as their import is to show that the middle term has not a locus which is also not the locus of the major term. On the contrary we find that the middle term has often a locus which is not the locus of the major term. For instance, smoke on a hill has a locus which is not the locus of fire in a kitchen.

Non-existence whose Counterpart is Qualified by a Nature abiding in a Different Locus—*Vyadhilakṣaṇa-dharmavacchinābhāvaḥ*.

Most of the definitions of invariable concomitance given above were defective inasmuch as they did not cover the case of an exclusively affirmative inference. They involved such phrases as "non-existence of the major term" and "difference of locus of the major term" which could not apply to an exclusively affirmative inference in which the major term was all-pervading. To make the "non-existence of the major term" and "difference of locus of the major term" possible, even in an exclusively affirmative inference, some logicians assume a non-existence whose counterpart = qualified by a nature abiding in a locus different from the counterpart. The expression "there is no fire possessing the nature of a pot" signifies that "there is non-existence of a fire as qualified by the nature of a pot" which, according to them, is quite correct inasmuch as the nature of a pot abides in the relation of inherence in a pot and not in fire. Similarly "there is no nameableness possessing the nature of a pot" signifies that "there is non-existence of nameableness as qualified by the nature of a pot." Though nameableness (major term) is all-pervading we have, they say, been able to talk of its non-existence by assuming the nature of a pot to abide in it (instead of it in the pot).

Here "the tree" is the middle term, and "occupied by the ape" is the major term. In diagram III the tree is totally from the region not occupied by the ape. The part of the not occupied by the ape is excluded from the locus of the existence of the major term by the clause "which is not the locus of the major term itself". This definition too is defective because it, like the previous one, does not apply to an exclusive affirmative inference.

3. Invariable concomitance is the non-co-presence of a middle term with that reciprocal non-existence whose counter-existence abides in the locus of the major term, e.g.

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

In diagram I we find that smoke is not co-present with a thing which is non-existent in reciprocity to fire. Water, bed, cloth, table, etc., are all non-existent in their reciprocal relation to fire, that is, they are not fire.

the middle term is not co-present with the major term in the locus of the major term

Here there is co-presence of smoke (the middle term) with fire (the major term) which is not qualified by the nature of a pot, and the absolute non-existence, whose counterpart is the pot, abides in the same locus with smoke, but abides in a different locus in respect of the pot.

This definition covers the case of an exclusively affirmative inference inasmuch as it does not involve a non-existence of the major term, and the major term is not the counterpart of that non-existence which abides in the same locus with the middle term. Looking at diagram V, we find that there is co-presence of the knowable with the nameable which is not qualified by the nature of a pot (though the pot is qualified by the nature of the nameable), and the absolute non-existence, whose counterpart is the pot, abides in the same locus with the knowable, but in a different locus in respect of the pot.

Non-existence of the General Form.—*Sāmānyābhāvaḥ*

Some say that even the conclusive definition given above is defective inasmuch as in seeking to establish the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire we notice that fires are manifold owing to the difference of their loci, *e.g.* the fire of a kitchen, of a sacrificial ground, and so on. There is non-existence of these fires, except one, in the locus of a particular case of smoke. This, by making fire the counterpart of that non-existence which abides in the same locus with smoke, altogether upsets the conclusive definition.

Gangeśa in reply says that though in the locus of smoke there is the non-existence of various fires, the natures which qualify the counterparts of those non-existences are not one and the same, *viz.* the nature of fire in general. They are different, that is, particular fires have particular natures, as for instance, the nature of the fire of a kitchen is different from that of the fire of a sacrificial ground, and so on. It is therefore necessary to admit a non-existence of fire of the general form—such as 'there is no fire' distinguished from non-existences of particular forms as 'there are

have arisen in us a doubt of the form—'is not there a colour in air?' It is perfectly known to us that in air there are no particular colours as red, yellow, etc., yet we entertain a doubt in our mind as to whether there is not in air a non-existence of colour of the general form.

hending invariable concomitance of the one with the other, *e.g.* we apprehend the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire after we have observed repeatedly that the one accompanies the other.

Gangeśa opposes the above view on the following grounds —

- (1) Of the repeated observations each one separately cannot
to
va-
her

but they cannot produce apprehension of the invariable concomitance which involves unequal things such as occurrence of smoke in a kitchen, a sacrificial ground, a hill, etc

(2) What again is the meaning of repeated observations? Does it mean observation in numerous places, or observation of numerous instances, or observation of the same instance numerous times? None of these alternatives are of any help to us in apprehending invariable concomitance. Can we establish invariable concomitance of colour with savour, even if we have observed them together in numerous places? Can numerous instances of colour observed along with savour in the same place (as a pot) entitle us to establish invariable concomitance between them? As regards the observation of an instance numerous times, it may be asked how many times? There is certainly no fixity as to the number of times. There cannot in fact be an invariable concomitance of a pen with the floor even if they have been observed

serve the former co-accompanied by the latter, and by apply-

fire.

all cases of fire. We can establish the invariable concomitance of

the knowledge of a generic nature is called an intercourse whose character is general. It is described by some logicians as an ordinary intercourse of particularity, while others describe it as a transcendent intercourse. The logicians, who hold the first view, say that in perceiving a particular smoke by means of our eye, there is the intercourse of union, while in perceiving "smokeness" there is the intercourse of united-inherence, and in perceiving all cases of smoke (at all times and in all places) through the knowledge of "smokeness" there is the intercourse of union.

ordinary intercourse of union and united-inherence respectively, but in the perception of all cases of smoke through the know-

ance of a particular case of smoke with a particular case of fire refers through the intercourse whose character is general to all cases of smoke and all cases of fire.

Conclusion about the Intercourse whose Character is General.—
Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa siddhāntah

If the intercourse, whose character is general, were not accepted, there could not arise any doubt as to whether there were instances in which smoke (the middle term) did not accompany fire (the major term). As to the cases of smoke which were present, we could perceive their co-accompaniment with cases of fire, and they could leave no room for doubt regarding any case of exception. As for the past and future cases of smoke, or the

being impossible, there could not be any reasoning employed to remove it. Hence we could not apprehend an invariable concomitance. But if the intercourse whose character is general, is admitted, we can explain the perception of all cases of smoke through the intercourse of "smokeness". It is possible for doubt to arise in respect of some of these cases of smoke through non-recognition of their special properties. We must therefore admit intercourse whose character is general.

The Conditional Middle Term—*Upādhi-vādaḥ*

The middle term, if it is to be in invariable concomitance with the major, should be devoid of condition, that is, should be unconditional. A condition (*upādhi*) is that which constantly accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle term, e.g.

The hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of fire (nourished by wet fuel)

Diagram VI



Here smoke is the major term, fire is the middle term and wet fuel is a condition. The wet fuel constantly accompanies smoke, but does not always accompany fire. For instance, the fire in an ignited iron-ball is not accompanied by wet fuel at all.

"Accompanying the major term" signifies the state of not being the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which abides in the locus of the major term, that is, the state of not being absent from the locus of the major term. "Not accompanying the middle term" is the state of being the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which abides in the locus of the middle term, that is, the state of being absent from the locus of the

middle term In diagram

is not absent from the
regions of fire and ab-

complexioned
tables, is black,
not eat vegetab
diagram VII. we
accompanies Mitra's black son, but does not accompany her fair-
complexioned sons

Diagram VII



He is black,
because he is a son of Mitṛā
(who eats vegetables)

Some say that "eating vegetables" is not a condition inas-
much as it does not always accompany blackness; for instance,
the blackness of a pot is not the result of eating vegetables
Gangeśa meets the objection by saying that the blackness marking
Mitṛā's son is not of the same nature as the blackness which
abides in a pot. A "condition" is, according to him, to be clearly
defined as follows —

A condition is that which constantly accompanies the major
term, but does not always accompany the middle term, in respect
of an entity of a fixed nature.

Condition is of two kinds, viz (1) sure, and (2) suspected.
A condition is said to be "sure" when we know with certainty that
it constantly accompanies the major term, but does not always
accompany the middle term, and it is said to be "suspected" when
there is doubt as to its accompanying the major term or as to its
not accompanying the middle term. An instance of a suspected
condition is given below —

The earth has a maker,
because it is a product (caused by a body)

Here "caused by a body" is a condition which constantly
accompanies a maker (if the maker is a person, but not if the maker

is a collection of atoms), but does not always accompany a product (for instance, a product like a pot = caused by a body, but a product like a lightning is not so caused) The condition, viz. "causing by a body", is therefore a suspected one.

A condition is not in itself a defect but its attachment to the middle term indicates that that term is erratic and the conclusion drawn therefrom wrong.

The State of Being the Locus or Minor Term—*Paśsatā*

The state of being the locus or the minor term (*paśsatā*) has been defined by some logicians as the state in which it is doubtful whether the major term abides in it or not. Seeing that the connection of the major term with the locus or minor term, may not necessarily involve a doubt, Gaṅgeśa prefers to define the minor term as that whose connection with the major term is not known with certainty in consequence of the absence of a desire to know the connection. E.g. in the proposition "the hill is full of fire", the hill is the minor term whose connection with fire was hitherto neither investigated nor known. The minor term is so named not merely if there is an absence of knowledge of its connection with the major term, but also if the absence of knowledge is due to the absence of a desire to arrive at the knowledge. We cannot treat the minor term as such merely by establishing with it a connection of the major term if that connection has already been known, but we shall be justified in treating it as the minor term if there is in us a desire again to establish the connection.

A homologue, a similar locus, a homogeneous affirmative or positive example (*sapaśa*), is that in which the major term is known with certainty to abide, e.g. the hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke, as a *kitchen*.

A heterologue, a dissimilar locus, a heterogeneous or negative example (*vipakṣa*), is that in which the major term is known not to abide, e.g. the hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke, where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as a *lake*.

Consideration or Knowledge of Premises—*Parāmarśaḥ*

Consideration (*parāmarśaḥ*) is the knowledge that the middle term, in invariable concomitance with the major term, abides in the minor, e.g.

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke

Here consideration consists of the knowledge that in the hill abides smoke which is in invariable concomitance with fire. This knowledge (consideration) is the cause of inference.

Ti

actually perceived together with the knowledge that it is in invariable concomitance with fire, is not the cause of inference, but consideration or knowledge that in the minor term abides the middle term which is, in invariable concomitance with the major term, such a cause.

An Exclusively Affirmative Inference—*Kevalānuyāyanumānam*

affirmative

negative

ive negative

no negative example. It may also be defined as an inference in which the major term is not the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which has an abode, or, as an inference in which there is no non-presence of the major term, e.g.

This is nameable,

because it is knowable—(vide diagram II)

An Exclusively Negative Inference—*Kevalavyatirekyanumānam*

An exclusively negative inference is the inference in which the major term has no affirmative example. It may also be defined as the inference in which the major term does not abide in anything else but in the minor term, e.g.

Diagram VIII



AN AFFIRMATIVE NEGATIVE INFERENCE

The affirmative-negative is an inference in which the major term has both affirmative and negative examples, e.g.

The hill is full of fire
because it is full of smoke,
as a kitchen and not as a lake

PRESUMPTION—*Ārthāpatti*.

The Mīmāṃsakas say that presumption (*arthāpatti*) is a separate means of knowledge. On hearing that "Devadatta, who is fat, does not eat in the day", we at once conclude that he eats in the night. Since a person cannot become fat unless he eats either in the day or in the night, and, since he does not eat in the day, it follows by presumption that he eats in the night.

Gangeśa does not admit presumption to be a separate means

of knowledge with non-eating in the day

INFERENCE FOR ONE'S SELF—*Śvāsthānumāna*

Inference is of two kinds: (1) inference for one's self (*svāsthānumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*). A person having himself repeatedly observed in the kitchen and other places the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, goes near a hill and sees smoke on it. He recollects that, wherever there is smoke there is fire, and thereupon knowledge arises in him that "this hill has smoke which is in invariable concomitance with fire". This knowledge is called "consideration of the sign" (*lingaparāmāṇa*) or simply "consideration" (*parāmāṇa*), from which follows the knowledge that "this hill has fire", which is called inferential conclusion (*anumiti*). This is the process of inference for one's self.

INFERENCE FOR THE SAKE OF OTHERS—*Parārthānumāna*.

When a person, having inferred fire from smoke, demonstrates it to others by the employment of a syllogism, it is called "an inference for the sake of others." The process of this inference is as follows —

1 A person who is fat must take his food either in the day or in the night—(A proposition).

Devadatta, who is fat, does not take his food in the day—(E proposition).

Therefore Devadatta must take his food in the night. (This is a demonstrative categorical syllogism.)

- (1) The hill is full of fire.
- (2) Because it is full of smoke
- (3) All that is full of smoke is full of fire as a kitchen.
- (4) This hill is full of smoke.
- (5) Therefore this hill is full of fire

The demonstration given above produces in other persons "consideration of the sign", which necessarily makes them aware that the hill has fire

Syllogism—*Nyāya*

Syllogism (*nyāya*) is the name for a collection of five sentences which give rise to knowledge that produces consideration. It is set forth as follows—

- (1) This hill is full of fire—*Proposition*
- (2) Because it is full of smoke—*Reason*
- (3) All that is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen—*Example*
- (4) This hill is full of smoke—*Application*
- (5) Therefore this hill is full of fire—*Conclusion*

After these five sentences have been employed there arises in the mind of the listener consideration of the form 'this hill is full of smoke, which is in invariable concomitance with fire', from which follows the conclusion, "this hill is full of fire". Syllogism is therefore the name for the entire collection of these five sentences each of which is called a part or member

Parts of a Syllogism—*Avayavāḥ*.

A part or member (*avayavāḥ*) is a sentence that gives rise to knowledge which contributes to the production of an entire knowledge which produces consideration. On the employment of the two sentences there arises, at first, knowledge from each of them separately. Then arises collective knowledge from the five sentences combined together. This collective knowledge which produces consideration is based on each of the five sentences called a part or member. The parts are five, viz. (1) the proposition, (2) the reason, (3) the example, (4) the application, and (5) the conclusion

The Proposition—*Pratijñā*.

The proposition (*pratijñā*) is a sentence which causes knowledge, whose object is the same as that of the conclusion and which contributes to the production of the entire knowledge which produces consideration, e.g.

This hill is full of fire

It may also be defined as a sentence which gives rise to an inquiry necessitating the mention of the reason, e.g. this hill is full of fire (Why so? because it is smoky)

The Reason or Middle Term — *Hetuh*

The reason or middle term (*hetuh*) is a word, with the instrumental or ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge whose object is not the probandum (major term) but which contributes to the production of the entire knowledge that gives rise to consideration e.g. because it is full of smoke (i.e. by or from smokiness).

The reason is of two kinds (1) the affirmative (*anvayi*) and (2) the negative (*vyatireki*). The affirmative reason is a member with the instrumental or ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge that necessitates the mention of the member expressive of an affirmative invariable concomitance, e.g. because it has smoke (i.e. by or from 'smokiness'), all that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen. The negative reason is a member with the instrumental or ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge that necessitates the mention of the member expressive of a negative invariable concomitance, e.g. because it has smoke, (i.e. by or from 'smokiness'), all that has no fire has no smoke as a lake.

Example—*udāhāranam*

The example (*udāhāranam*) is a word which, while producing knowledge of connection of the form that the locus of the middle term is constantly occupied by the major term causes another knowledge which proceeds from the sentence expressive of consideration, e.g.

All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen
[No this hill has smoke]

Application—*upanayak*.

The application (*upanayak*) is a member which produces consideration, e.g. All that has smoke has fire, this hill too has smoke.

Conclusion—*Nigamanam*.

Conclusion (*nigamanam*) is a sentence which, while causing the knowledge which gives rise to consideration, produces knowledge of the major term as indicated by that of the middle term invariable concomitance with the major term and

Here the reason is ether, which has no locus. Ether abides neither in the locus of fire nor in that of the absence of fire.

A reason is said to be *non-exclusive*, if it is destitute of an example, whether affirmative or negative, e.g.

All things are impermanent,
because they are knowable.

Here we cannot cite any example, as "all things" is the subject.

The Contradictory Reason—*Viruddhaḥ*.

The contradictory (*viruddhaḥ*) is a reason which is the counterpart of that non-existence which constantly accompanies the major term, e.g.

This hall is full of fire,
because it is full of water.

Here the reason is contradictory, inasmuch as water is the counterpart of the non-existence of water, which constantly accompanies fire.

The contradictory may also be defined as a reason (middle term) which is constantly accompanied by the absence of the *probandum*, major term.

The Counterbalanced Reason—*Saṃpratipādikāḥ*.

If, at the time of the consideration of a reason which seeks to establish the *existence* of the *probandum* or major term, there occurs the consideration of another reason which seeks to establish the *non-existence* of the same, the first reason is a counterbalanced or counterhanced, e.g.

"Fire is audible."

"Fire is a product."

"The sides pre-

one reason

are two in-

ish.

three kinds: (1) un-
(*āśrayaviruddhaḥ*), (2)
(*vipratyākṣaḥ*), and (3)
(*saṃpratipādikāḥ*).

the part of its locus, if
- not being to it

This hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here the reason "smoke" is unproved, as its locus is not an account of the "goldenness" not belonging to a hill.

(2) A reason is said to be unproved with regard to its nature if it does not abide in the locus of minor term, e.g.

This lake is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here the reason is unproved, as smoke from its very nature does not abide in a lake.

(3) A reason is said to be unproved in respect of constant accompaniment, if its generic nature is not useful in establishing its invariable concomitance with the major term. It is subdivided as follows—

(a) Unproved on the part of the major term (*atītyāśāddhā*) which occurs when there is a useless adjective appended to that term, e.g.

This hill is full of golden fire,
because it is full of smoke.

"Golden" is useless.

(b) Unproved on the part of the reason (*hetuvāddhā*) which occurs when there is a useless adjective appended to it, e.g.

This hill is full of fire,
because it is full of blue smoke.

"Blue" is useless.

(c) Unproved in respect of invariable concomitance (*vyāpṛāśāddhā*) which occurs when there is a condition attached to the reason, e.g.

This hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of fire nourished by wet fuel (which is a condition attached to the reason).

The Incompatible Reason—*Bādhitāh*.

An incompatible reason (*bādhitāh*) occurs when there is the knowledge that the major term, which is assigned to the minor term, does not really abide in it, e.g.

Fire is cold,
because it is a substance.

The incompatible reason, which is of ten kinds, occurs under the following circumstances—

(1) The minor term being incompatible with the major term (*pratyaḥśāda bādhitāh*), e.g.

A pot is all pervading,
because it is existent

- (2) The minor term being incompatible with inference (*pakṣaḥ anumāna-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

An atom has parts,
because it has a shape

An atom has in fact no shape and no parts

- (3) The minor term being incompatible with verbal testimony (*pakṣaḥ śabda-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

The golden mountain (Meru) is stone
because it is a mountain

- (4) The minor term being incompatible with perception which establishes the counterpart of the major term (*pakṣaḥ sādhyā-pratīyogī-pratīyaka-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

Fire is non-warm,
because it is a product.

- (5) The minor term being incompatible with the inference which establishes the counterpart of the major term (*pakṣaḥ sādhyā-pratīyogyānumāna-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

Sound is inaudible,
because it is a quality (of ether)

- (6) The minor term being incompatible with comparison which establishes the counterpart of the major term (*pakṣaḥ sādhyā-pratīyogyupamāna-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

Bos-garvus-ness is not the connotation of the term
bos-garvus,
because it is a general notion

- (7) The minor term being incompatible with the evidence which is analogous to the evidence that establishes the major term (*pakṣaḥ sādhyā-grāhaka-pramāṇa-jāṇīyā-pramāṇa-samānā-rūpā-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

The skull of a deceased person is pure,
because it is the limb of a being that had life, as a
conch shell.

[The scripture declares a conch-shell to be pure but not the skull of a deceased person.]

- (8) The minor term being incompatible with perception which establishes the middle term (*pakṣaḥ hetu-grāhaka-pratīyaka-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

Water and air are warm,
because they are possessed of touch, unlike that of the
earth.

The ... is ... with ... and ... the ... (which ...)

The ... is ...
because it is a ... of ... which is a ... of ...

The ... is ... with ... testimony ... the ... (which ...)

The ... should be celebrated by ...

because it is the means of conquering heaven

[From verbal testimony the ... is ascertained to be a duty of the Kṣatriya and not of the Brāhmaṇa].

Fallacies are serviceable as they point out inefficiency—*Hidā-
bhāṣaṇaśāstraśāstra-nirūpaṇam*.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argument | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " |
| Fetch | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " |
| Effect | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " | " |

Inference of God—*Iśvarānumānam*.

By inference we can prove the existence of God, the Maker of the universe. The inference employed for this purpose is as follows—

The universe has a maker,
because it is a product, as a pot

The causes which operate in the case of a product may be stated thus—

There must be (1) a direct knowledge (perception) by an agent himself of the materials which constitute a product, (2) a desire on the part of the agent to make it, and (3) an act of

m
(2)

Book III Comparison—*Upamāna-khaṇḍa*.

A man, who does not know the signification of the word

How knowledge is derived through comparison

the instructive assertion of the elder, he institutes a comparison by which he arrives at the conclusion that the animal which he sees is the thing signified by the word *boś-gavaeus*. The means by which this conclusion has been arrived at is called comparison (*upamāna*). This means is the knowledge of likeness between a cow and a *boś-gavaeus*. The word comparison is ordinarily taken to signify the whole process

The *Mīmāṃsakas* maintain that likeness (*sādrśya*) is a distinct object which is not included in the seven categories of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. The

Likeness explained

refer. The real signification of the word *boś-gavaeus*, according to *Gauḍeśa*, is not an animal which possesses likeness to a cow but an animal which possesses the generic nature of a *boś-gavaeus* (that is, which is a type of all *boś-gavaeus*). Hence the result of comparison consists of knowledge of the relation between the word *boś-gavaeus* and the animal which possesses the generic

called *boś-gavaeus* may be perceived in a particular case with which our eyes are in union, it is impossible for us to perceive such a relation in other cases which are beyond our eyes. Therefore the knowledge of signification of the word *boś-gavaeus* is not derived through perception, but through a separate means of knowledge, called comparison.

(c) *Verbal testimony is not included in perception*

Gangeśa holds that speech which is attended with expectancy, etc., and need not be derived from perception means or and the perceptual knowledge is the result, so in verbal testimony, speech is the means or instrument, the recollection of things signified by it is the intercourse and the verbal knowledge is the result. Speech therefore serves the same purpose in verbal testimony as the sense-organs do in perception, in other words, knowledge, and considering the fact, we must admit verbal testimony.

(d) *Is verbal testimony included in inference?*

The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that verbal testimony is not a distinct means of valid knowledge but is included in inference. In deriving knowledge from speech we first hear the words constituting the speech and then recollect the things signified by the words. The knowledge of the mutual connection of things thus recollected, which is designated as verbal knowledge, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, derived from inference. Suppose one utters a speech thus: "he beat the cow with a stick," the hearing this speech the listener may, say the Vaiśeṣikas, infer as follows:—

- (1) The words constituting this speech must have been preceded by knowledge of the mutual connection of things as intended by the speaker and recollected by his words—*proposition*
- (2) Because they are possessed of expectancy etc., and convey the intention of the speaker—*reason*
- (3) The words of all speeches possessing expectancy etc. and conveying the intention of a speaker are preceded by the knowledge of the mutual connection of things as intended by the speaker and recollected by his words, just as the words of a speech, e.g., "bring a pot" uttered by me (the listener),—*example*

If we can thus derive knowledge of the speech by means of inference, there is, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, no necessity for admitting a separate means of knowledge called verbal testimony.

(e) *Verbal knowledge is not included in inference.*

Gangeśa opposes the above view as follows:

The inference as shown above is not valid, inasmuch as it does not involve knowledge (recollection) of actual things as in the case of verbal testimony, but the knowledge of the general fact, i.e., the knowledge of knowledge (recollection) of the

things. This is not only cumbersome but also fallacious. Our activity in respect of a thing arises from our knowledge of the thing itself, but not from our knowledge of knowledge of the thing,

tency, etc.; existing among them have been known. Again, after verbal knowledge has been produced, there arises self-consciousness of the form "I know from *the speech*" but not of the form "I know through inference."

It has already been observed that a speech cannot produce verbal knowledge unless the words composing it possess expectancy, consistency, contiguity and potentiality and convey intention.

Expectancy—*Ālāṅkā-śādaḥ*

A word is said to bear the relation of expectancy (*ālāṅkā*) to another word if it cannot without the latter produce knowledge of its interconnection in a speech. For instance *Devadattāḥ grāmam gacchati* (*Devadatta* goes to the village) is a speech in which the word *Devadattāḥ* (in the nominative case) is expectant for the word *gacchati* ('goes', the verb), and this latter in its turn is expectant for *grāmam* ('village,' in the objective case). In the same way the crude word *Devadatta* is expectant for *ḥ* (the same as *su*, the first-case-ending), the crude word *grāma* for *am* (the second-case-ending) and *gam* (the root) for *ti* (the verbal suffix). A crude word (*nāma*) and a case-ending (*vidhāti*), a root (*dhātu*) and a verbal suffix (*ālhyāti*), and a verb (*kriyā*) and a case (*kāraka*) are expectant for each other.

Consistency—*Yogyatā*

Consistency (*yogyatā*) consists in a word not bearing a meaning which is incompatible with the meanings of other words in a speech. For instance, no verbal knowledge is derived from such a speech as *agninā śīḥa* (sprinkle with fire) because it is incompatible with fire being an instrument in the act of sprinkling. Consistency may be certain or doubtful, but in either case there will be verbal knowledge.

Contiguity—*Āśattiḥ*

Contiguity (*āśattiḥ*) consists in the enunciation of words, which are connected with each other, without a long pause between

them, & the speech "bring water", will convey the meaning of one uttering the word "bring" now, and the word "water" after an hour.

Intention *Tadparyam*

Intention (*Tadparyam*) which indicates the wish of a speaker, consists in the utterance of a word to convey knowledge of a special thing. If at the time of eating a meal, one says "bring *saindhava*" we are to understand by the word *saindhava* a quantity of salt and not a horse.

The Non-eternity of Sound *Śabdānityatā-vādaḥ*.

them to be non-eternal
that arose in the material
that sound is liable to destruction

Sound destroyed and not concealed *Pracchanna-pracchanna-vādaḥ*

also : the speeches, must
non- : is consequently
collection of speeches is liable to destruction, as it has come
down through succession of teachers, its continuity is uninter-
rupted. Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view by saying that from
illusions occurring in the socio-religious institutes (*saṁsthā*) and
customs that have prevailed from olden times we can infer
that once there existed certain branches of the Vedas which have
since disappeared. Therefore the Veda is non-eternal.

an verbal testimony

Injunction—*Viśhi-vādaḥ*

is
and
"Let a person, who wishes to go to heaven, perform a horse-
sacrifice" is an injunction. "Let not a man drink wine" is
other injunction.

According to Kumārila the conviction, which in an ordinary

directs me to perform or to desist from performing the act signified by it."

Prabhākara says that the conviction consists of the belief that merit or demerit that accrues from the act signified by the speech, is capable of being earned by our efforts

explan-
ation con-
the speech
mance of
the incon-

venience will accompany the performer

All logicians agree, however, in holding that the conviction is produced by the potentiality of the hortative particle *hi* (corresponding to the English word 'let') in the speech itself

Merit and Demerit—*dharma-vādaḥ*

Prabhākara says that the conviction produced by a Vedic speech, consists first of the belief that the merit or demerit that accrues from the act signified by the speech, is capable of being acquired by our efforts. This belief is followed by the presumption that the act from which merit or demerit accrues, is such as can be performed by us. Gradually there arise two other beliefs, viz (1) that the act if performed, will fulfil the object of our desire, and (2) that there is no serious inconvenience involved in the act

This belief in the theory of Gaṅgeśa includes in it two other beliefs, viz. that the act is capable of fulfilling our desire and that there is no serious inconvenience involved in it.

Potentiality—*śakti-vādaḥ*.

The relation that exists between a word and the thing referred to by it is a special relation¹ called *indication* (*vyāpti*). It

¹ The relation is not an ordinary one, e.g. the word (sound), or does not produce as the recollection of either although the former abides in the latter in the relation of inherence (*anvaya*).

is on account of this special relation that we are, on hearing the word *pot*, able to recollect the thing known as a *pot*. This special relation is called *potenti*.
this is
kinds,

the capacity of a word to refer to (i.e. produce recollection of) a particular object.

will of man. There is according to them as much potentiality in an ordinary word as in a technical one. The potentiality of a word is ascertained from the following sources —

- (1) Grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), e.g. in the sentence, *Caitraḥ paṇḍitaḥ* (*Caitra eva*) the potentiality of the crude word *Caitra*, the nominative case ending *h*, the root *jan* and the verbal suffix *ti* is ascertained from grammar.
- (2) Comparison (*upamāna*), e.g. in the sentence, "a *baḥ gāva* eva || like a cow," the potentiality of "*baḥ gāva*" is ascertained through comparison.
- (3) Dictionary (*śloka*), e.g. the potentiality of the word *śukla* to refer to the quality of blueness is ascertained from dictionary.
- (4) Reliable assertion (*īpra-tūṅya*), e.g. that the word *paṇḍita* signifies a black cuckoo is ascertained from the word of a competent scholar.
- (5) Cause (*nyaya*), e.g. on hearing "bring a table," "take away a table" etc., on remembering the table brought and taken away one understands the potentiality of the word *table*.
- (6) Context (*prāyaśa*), e.g. if in a sentence the meaning of the word *śukla* is not clear, it may refer to a blue object or a white object, but if the context is clear, it will refer to a blue object or a white object.

is we suppose that the potentiality refers to an individual, we shall have to assume, say the Mīmāṃsakas, an infinite number of potentialities corresponding to the individuals to which they refer. If, on the other hand, we assume that the potentiality refers to a genus, we shall have to assume only one potentiality corresponding to the genus which will also include individuals without which it cannot stand.

Gangeśa opposes the above view by saying that we could not recollect individuals unless the potentiality resided in them. On the supposition of the potentiality referring to an individual, it is not, continues he, necessary to assume an infinite number of potentialities, as one and the same potentiality refers to all the individuals which are comprehended under one genus. Hence, he concludes that the potentiality really refers to the individuals coming under a genus and possessing a form.

Words possessed of potentiality may be specified as follows —

- (1) The *etymological* (*yaugika*) is a word which is understood by

itself

1.

to a thing which is
indicative
of

if,

word changes in the sentence. 'the cow-keeper' does not signify the current which is referred to by the changes, but signifies the bank which bears the potentiality of the word but signifies the bank which bears the current the relation of proximity. Similarly the word 'cow' in the sentence protect the curd from the crow's attack implication any thing that injures the curd.

Compound Words - *Samāsa vidadh*.

In Sanskrit the compounds are of four kinds.

- (1) *avayavabādhā* (the compound in which the component words are connected by a bond).
- (2) *dvandvabādhā* (the compound in which the component words are connected by a bond).
- (3) *tatparyabādhā* (the compound in which the component words are connected by a bond).
- (4) *samāhārabādhā* (the compound in which the component words are connected by a bond).

(1) *avayavabādhā* (the compound in which the component words are connected by a bond) is of three kinds: (a) *avayavabādhā* (the compound in which the component words are connected by a bond), (b) *avayavabādhā* (the compound in which the component words are connected by a bond), and (c) *avayavabādhā* (the compound in which the component words are connected by a bond).

In the attributive compound the first word possesses its fixed potentiality and the second word, which through its potentiality points out a thing, refers also by implication to another thing, e.g. *citragum ānaya* (lit. bring the brindled-cow-man) signifies "bring the man having a brindled-cow". The first word *citra* (brindled) refers through its potentiality to the quality of "brindledness" while the second word *go* (cow) besides pointing out, through its potentiality, the thing called "cow" refers also by implication to its owner.

Grammarians say that

the word *citra* and above *angeśa* holds in the words and there is

possesses its potential-

which the word *rāja* signifies an officer belonging to the king in connection with him. *rāja* refers to a "king" as well as to "connection".

In the descriptive compound in which the component words stand to each other in the relation of identity, there is no special rule for the possession of potentialities by them, e.g. *nilotpalam* (blue-lotus). The same is the case with the numeral compound, e.g. *pañca-gavam* (five cows).

In the aggregative compound there is no special rule for the assumption of potentiality or implication by the component words, e.g. *yama varuṇau* (Yama and Varuṇa)

In an indeclinable compound there are both potentiality and implication in the last word, e.g. *upalumbham* (near the jar)

Verbal Suffixes—*Ākhyāta-rādah*

A verbal suffix (*ākhyāta*—*ti, tas, anti* etc.) used after a root, refers to the effort favourable to what is signified by the root, e.g. *Castraḥ pacati* (Castra cooks) signifies that Castra is possessed of efforts favourable to cooking. If the agent is an inanimate thing the verbal suffix refers by implication to the operation favourable to what is signified by the root, e.g. *rathaḥ gacchati* (a chariot moves) signifies that the chariot is possessed of the operation favourable to moving.

The Root *Dhātu-rādah*

The root (*dhātu*) of a verb refers to the operation favourable to the effect of what is signified by the verb, e.g. the root *gam* (going) in the sentence, viz. *as gāmanas gacchati* (he goes to the village) refers to moving, which is favourable to his connection with the village, which is the effect of his going. In the case of an intransitive verb the root refers merely to the operation, e.g. *as tiṣṭhati* (he stays) in which *sthā* signifies merely staying.

Pretia *I janyate-rādah*

The pretia (*janyate*) by itself does not bear any meaning but points out the speciality of meaning borne by the root that follows e.g. *as tiṣṭhati* (completely conquers) signifies a completeness of conquest.

Validity of the Four Means of Knowledge *Prāmāṇya-rūpavaya-jedmd-ya-rādah*

Some say that a gesture (*pratyak*) is a means of valid knowledge. But this is absurd, inasmuch as a gesture merely reminds us of words which produce knowledge. That a deaf person is not entitled to activity by a gesture, must be due to the fact that he infers the desire of the man who makes the gesture. So a gesture is included in either verbal testimony or inference. Similarly tradition (*śruti*) and rumour (*śruti*) are not distinct from verbal testimony while presumption (*anumāna*) and recognition (*anupalabhi*) are comprised in inference.

CHAPTER III COMMENTARIES ON THE TATVA-CINTĀMAṆI

42 THE POPULARITY OF TATVA-CINTĀMAṆI

The popularity of the *Tatva-cintāmaṇi* is attested in innumerable terms by the numerous commentaries, sub-commentaries and glosses that have grown around the book since its first appearance. The text of the work covers about 300 pages, but its expository treatises extend to over 1,000,000 pages. In the following pages are enumerated some of the important expository treatises and the accompanying table shows their mutual relationship.

43 THE MITHILI SCHOOL.

The Mithilā School of Nyāya flourished from the 12th to the 15th century A D. The great masters were Gaṅgeśa, Vardhamāna, Pakṣadhara and others. Their style of writing was terse and they discussed the meaning of *vyākṛti* more than did their predecessors. In the 16th century Nyāya studies waned in Mithilā and made progress in Nadia. The Principal Naiyāyikas¹ of Mithilā School are mentioned below.

44. VARDHAMĀNA UPĀDHYĀYA (1250 A D)

Vardhamāna Upādhyāya was the son² of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, and surnamed Mahopādhyāya³ or Mahāmahopādhyāya⁴. He was the author of the following works —

- (1) *Tatva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa*, commentary on *Tatva-cintāmaṇi*.
- (2) *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa*, a commentary on *Nyāya-vārttika-tātpariya-parasuddhi*.

¹ *Yadavajaya Gana* from the *Angal*, No 9, 1910. Also *Hiraniyamaṇi Chakravarti* *Bahadur* *College* *Varanasi* *India*.

Pakṣadhara had two disciples (named Viśvadeva Miśra a nephew) and Hucolatta Miśra. He must be older than 1509 the date of copying of his Pratyakhaṇḍa, which accords to some correspondence with 1274 A.D. He is said to be of the third quarter of the thirteenth century.

It is traditionally known that Pakṣadhara lived in the court of Raja Bhairava Sinha of Mithila and was a close-fellow of Vidyapati. But as Bhairava Sinha lived in 1423 to 1420 A.D. Pakṣadhara if the tradition be true must have lived in the middle of the 15th century A.D. He is said to have copied a manuscript of Viṣṇupurāṇa in 1452 A.D.

16. Viśvadeva Miśra (c. 1275 A.D.)

He was nephew and pupil of Jayadeva Miśra, and he wrote a commentary on the famous Tattva cintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya called Tattva cintāmaṇi tika in order to vindicate the work of his teacher, Jayadeva or Pakṣadhara Miśra. He is called Nyāya sūdhānta (truth) in the colophon. He probably

1. H. Mitra Notices p. 29) No. 1274 (समवर्षिक) The date is written curiously, and runs thus — १५०९ मकराब्द १ कार्तिक १५०९. Some think that 1509 = 159 mile sam 159 + 1119 = 1278 A.D. But I think it probable that 1509 = 1509 + 78 = 1587 A.D. In some means a year.

this work

- 3 वाचस्पत्युते, कश्चनयने व्यासते चाने ।
चोमव मोक्षमोक्षतो मुददिने मार्गे च वसेषिने ।

(A palm leaf manuscript of Viṣṇupurāṇa from Mithila, colophon)

- 4 अक्षरेवगुरोर्वाचि वे केचिदोपदर्शिन ।
प्रबोधाय मया देवा दीक्षिभुषाभिर्दीक्षते ।

(Introductory verse)

- 5 इति व्यापारिणालकाराभिधमिषमर्षिपचपरमिषमालमुकन्याचरिणालकाराभिधमालदेव-

...निराया विष्णुमहितीकापाद्...

(Index)

47 RUCIDATTA MĪRA (ABOUT 1275 A D)

He was a pupil of Pakṣadhara or Jaydeva Mīra. His parents were named Devadatta and Renukā and he had two brothers named Śaktidatta and Matidatta*. The name of his family is given as Sodarapurakula*.

Two of his works are now extant (1) *Tattva-cintāmaṇi prakāśa*, a commentary on the famous work of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, (2) *Nyāya-kusumāñjali-prakāśa-makaranda*, a commentary on the commentary of Vardhamāna on the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* of Udayanācārya.

A Ms. copy of a portion of his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi prakāśa* is said to be as old as 1370 A D*. He had the title Mahamahopādhyāya added to his name. As a pupil of Pakṣadhara he may be placed in the fourth quarter of the 13th century A D.

48 BHADJRATHA OR MEHHA CHAKKURA (ABOUT 1400 A D)

of Mahesha
fied Jalada,
alled Kusu

—*nyāya prakāśa prakāśa*. Besides this, he prepared two other commentaries on Vardhamāna's work. They are (1) *Kiraṇāvali-prakāśa-prakāśikā*, (2) *(Nyāya) līlāvati prakāśa vyākhyā*. He seems to have lived about 1400 A D.

49 MAHESHA THAKKURA (ABOUT 1400 A D)

He was born in Bhaur, 17 miles N E of Darbhanga on the Kamālā. He was son of Dhīrā and Candrapati,* and younger

1 चधीन विद्वत्तः अष्टवैवाङ्महद्वयी ।

विजानतो मन्त्रो यो प्रकाशितः प्रकाशितः ।

(*Tattva-cintāmaṇi prakāśa*, Introductory verse 2)

4 श्रीदेवदत्तनयो विनोदमूलाः

श्रीदेवता विद्वत्तमुद्रोपमान ।

श्रीमन्निद्वत्तनिद्वत्तनोदरी च

श्रीमन् विद्वत्तः अष्टवैवाङ्महद्वयी ।

(*Tattva-cintāmaṇi prakāśa*, Śloka-khaṇḍa verse 2 at the end)

* इति श्रीदेवदत्तमुद्रोपमानविनोदमूलविद्वत्तनिद्वत्तनोदरी च

प्रकाशितः (Colophon of *Tattva-cintāmaṇi prakāśa* Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa)

* See Peterson's Sixth Report, p 76, No. 17a.

1 अष्टवैवाङ्महद्वयी च

brother of Mahādeva, Bhagīratha and Dāmodara.¹ He belongs to the Khandwāl family. He wrote a commentary called *Da* on the *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara Miśra on Gaṅgeśa's work, of which only the chapter on perception is extant. He was also the author of several Smṛti works, such as *Tīrtha cintāmaṇi*.

His work on logic, the *Darpana*, is held as an author Sankara Miśra's *Tri-śūtri-nibandha-vyākhyā*.² He lived between Pakṣadhara and Śaṅkara or between 1270 and 1450 A.D.

One of his pupils, Raghunandanadāsa Rāya, was a great scholar, who at the suggestion of Akbar went out to all quarters of the empire. Akbar, being pleased, installed him in the province of Mithilā, which he however made over to Maheśa Thakur teacher as preceptor's fee (गुरुदक्षिणा). So the latter became a holder and founder of the Darbhanga Raj family.

50. ŚAṅKARA MIŚRA (1450 A.D.).

Raghudeva Upādhyāya or Kanāda as well as Maheśa Thakur

महि धीराचन्द्रवर्माकनूजः ।

अथर्वचन्द्रमुनिना कोशभाषितं विज्ञ-

प्रसिद्धं अथर्वदीर्घवेत्तं कोशवेत्तः ॥

(*Anumāṇśloka-darpana*, verse 1 at the end)

अथ महोदयमहोदयदीर्घादीनां चण्डिकाचन्द्रवर्मा ।

(च) दीर्घं विनिर्दिष्टमहोदीर्घं अथर्वदीर्घं विज्ञाद्वयो महेन्द्रः ॥

(*Anumāṇśloka-darpana* of Maheśa Thakur, verse 2 at the end)

प्रकाशदीर्घवेत्तमहोदीर्घादीनां चण्डिकाचन्द्रवर्मा ।

महोदीर्घं विनिर्दिष्टमहोदीर्घं अथर्वदीर्घं विज्ञाद्वयो महेन्द्रः ॥

(*Tri-śūtri-nibandha-vyākhyā*, Introductory verse 2.)

Quoted by H. Śāstri, *Notices*, Vol. III, pp. 65-2, No. 126.

अथर्वचन्द्रवर्माचन्द्रवर्माचन्द्रवर्मा

महोदीर्घं विनिर्दिष्टमहोदीर्घं अथर्वदीर्घं विज्ञाद्वयो महेन्द्रः ॥

अथर्वचन्द्रवर्माचन्द्रवर्माचन्द्रवर्मा

महोदीर्घं विनिर्दिष्टमहोदीर्घं अथर्वदीर्घं विज्ञाद्वयो महेन्द्रः ॥

अथर्वचन्द्रवर्माचन्द्रवर्माचन्द्रवर्मा

महोदीर्घं विनिर्दिष्टमहोदीर्घं अथर्वदीर्घं विज्ञाद्वयो महेन्द्रः ॥

(*Anumāṇśloka-darpana*, Intro. verse 2)

He was a contemporary of Narendrasimha Rāya. He was the author of various works on various subjects.

- (1) Pañḍita vijaya, in which he speaks of himself thus

बाह्योऽहं जगद्गुरुः । न मे बाह्यं परस्मिन् ।

अहं यदेतत् सर्वं सर्वेषामि जगद्गुरुः ।

- (2) Ātma-tattva-vivēka-kalpa-latā, a commentary on Udayanā-

- (4) Tattva-cintāmaṇi mayūkha, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's famous work on Nyāya

- (5) Tri-sūtri-nibhanda-vyākhyā, a commentary on the commentary of Udayanācārya on the first three sūtras of Gotama

- (6) Nyāya-līlāvati-kaṭṭhābharāṅga, a commentary on the Nyāya-līlāvati of Vallabhācārya

- (7) Bheda-prakāśa or Bheda ratna-prakāśa, a criticism of the non-dualistic Vedānta. It is criticised in its turn in the

- (8) the mar-
at the in-

- (9) Vaiśeṣika-sūtraprakāśa, a popular commentary on the Kaṇāda-sūtras

- (10) Vēdi-vinoda, contains a discussion on the categories of Nyāya.

- (11) Bauddha-dhikkāra-tikkā

- (12) Abheda-dhikkāra, a refutation of non-dualistic Vedānta

māna-Upādhyāya he cannot be much older than this time. He may be placed in the second and third quarters of the fifteenth century.

51 VĀCASPATI MĪRA (THE YOUNGER OR JUNIOR) (ABOUT 1450 A.D.)

He is known as Abhinava Vācaspati Mīra. Though he is more famous as a smṛti-writer, yet he wrote ten works in philosophy, as he himself has said in his Pitr-bhakti-taranginī. He flourished in Mithilā about 400 years ago, and was the Paṇḍit or court-officer of the kings Bhairavendra and Rāmabhadra (who reigned in the third and fourth quarters of the fifteenth century)

Of the ten works four at least are traceable —

- (1) Anumāṇa khaṇḍa tika, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *Anumāṇa*
- (2) *Nyāya-sūtra*
- (3) Nyāya-sūtrārthodhāra, a gloss on the Nyāya-sūtra
- (4) Śabda-nirṇaya, a treatise on the nature of words

No MS has yet been found of this last work, but the name is known from his implicit work called *Dvaita-nirṇaya*.

52 MISARU MIŚRA (ABOUT 1475 A D)

He is the author of an original treatise on the Vaiśeṣika system, named *Padārtha-candra*. The work deals, as the name implies, with the authorship of the *Padārtha-candra*, a work of Candra. So it is a work of the 15th century.

It is to be noted here that Misaruka, the author of the *Nyāya-dīpaka*, is a different person.

53 DURGĀDATT MIŚRA (ABOUT 1550 A D)

He wrote the *Nyāya-bodhinī*, an elementary work, on the first principles of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems combined. Though we have as yet no data to fix his exact time, it seems most probable that he flourished in the 16th century.

54 DEVANĀTHA THAKURNA (1562 A D)

He is the author of the *Tattva-sintāmanjālīka-parīkṣā*, which, as the name implies, aimed at supplying the shortcomings of Jayadeva's *Āloka* on Gaṅgeśa's work. From the date of a copy

नौचन्द्रविद्वत्पदविना नविनामपराहो ।

एषयनि पदविद्वत्पदविना नविनामपराहो ।

H. Mitra, Notices, IX, 12, No 2901, introd verse 2.

H. Mitra, Notices, V, p 54, No 1764 and IX, p 129, No 3020 H. Śrin

of his work (*viz. la samvat 443 or 1582 A D*)¹ made by his order, it is ascertained that he must have lived in the third quarter of the 16th century.

55 MADHUSUDANA THAKKURA (1575 A.D.)

He is the author of the *Tattva cintāmaṇyāloka kaṭṭakoddhāra*,² a refutation of the hostile criticisms of Pakṣadhara in his *Āloka* on Gaṅgeśa's work.

His date must fall between that of the younger Vācaspati Mīra on whose *Dvāita-nirṇaya* he wrote another *Kaṭṭakoddhāra* and *la samvat 491 or 1610 A.D.*, the date of a Ms of his work. Thus roughly speaking, he flourished in the third quarter of the 16th century.

56. THE NADIA SCHOOL (1600—1800 A D)

The Nadia School of Nyāya flourished during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries under the great masters Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Mathuranātha Tarkasāgare, Jagadīśa Tarkalankāra and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. They explained the *Tattva-chintamani* of Gaṅgeśa in a critical way.

Before the Navadvīpa Naiyāyikas, the Mithilā Logicians stooped down. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and others made the language of Nyāya quite stereotyped and made the use of *avacchedaka* and *avacchinna* very extensive. Their pride and abnormal growth of critical faculty put the logicians of all other provinces into the shade. The principal logicians of Nadia School are mentioned below.

57 VĀSUDEVA ŚĪRVARHĀNA (ABOUT 1450—1525 A D)

Vāsudev
century A D
education in
With a view
while about
into the academy of Pakṣadhara Mīra, the foremost logician of the place at that time. After finishing his studies in Mithilā he was subjected to a difficult test called *Śāloka-parikṣa*, "probe-examination," in the course of which he had to explain any leaf of a manuscript that was pierced last by the probe as it was pushed into the manuscript. One by one he explained one hundred

¹ See R. Mitra, *Notices*, V, p. 81, No 1764, IX, p 129, No. 3029. See H. Śāstri, *Notices*, III, 75, No 118.

² See Śāstri, *Notices*, III, p 75, No. 116.

Logical works brought
to Nadia.

to copy their works on Logic, Visions.

Kusumāñjali, and, the way back from Mithilā, he, on the pretext of coming to Śaśa, went secretly to Benares where he studied for some years the Vedānta philosophy returning home at the close of the 15th century A D

Having transcribed the above mentioned two works from

The first academy of
Logic in Nadia.

distinguished pupils, v
ity on modern Logic,
in Bengal

In his old age Vāṇudeva is said to have accepted the Vaiṣṇava tenets preached by his pupil Caitanya. He passed the closing portion of his life in Orissa, where he was patronised by King Gajapati Pratāpa Rudra about 1529 A.D. He was the author of a work on Logic called *Sārvabhauma nishukta*, which is a commentary on Gaṅgeśa.

Though an academy of Logic was thus for the first time opened outside Mithila and schools of it gradually multiplied in the

Income a convert to 1,000,000,000

ଆର୍ତ୍ତ ସହାୟତା ମଧ୍ୟ

ଶିଳ୍ପୀ ସଂସ୍ଥା

ଅନ୍ତର୍ଜାତୀୟ ସ୍ତର

ਦੇਵ-ਦੇਵੀ ਸਾਹਿਬਜ਼ਾਦੇ ॥ *Madhusakala* ॥

ਭੀਮ ਸੰ ਕੋਰਥਨੁ

४ कुसुमं चक्रेऽप्यहम् ।

काहेंगी मैं सुखी बनूँ

ਅੰਤਿਮ ਪ੍ਰਕਾਸ਼ਨ ਮਾਰਚ ੧੯੭੩

U.S. Trade Representative Robert C. Lauder, U.S. Trade Representative
Washington, D.C.

heart of Bengal, all was not gained. It yet remained for the academies of Nadia to acquire a university character and authority. To procure that power for Nadia, it was necessary that a representative from it should vanquish the teachers of Mithilā in philo-sophical controversy. That honour it was reserved for the genius and patriotic perseverance of Raghunātha Śīromanī to win for his country.

59 RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĪROMANĪ
(1477—1517 A D).

Raghunātha was born in Nadia about the year 1477 A D. While he was about four years old he lost his father. His mother supported him with the greatest difficulty. When a boy of five years, Raghunātha once at the order of his mother had to fetch fire from the academy. He did not take with him any vessel for

reserved to be done by him, took up the entire charge of maintaining and educating the boy. While Raghunātha began to learn the consonants he used to ask why *k* should precede *kh*, and his teachers had to explain to him the rules of phonetics and grammar along with the alphabet. After finishing grammar, literature, lexicon and jurisprudence Raghunātha began assiduously to study Logic under Vāsudeva Śārvabhauma and discussed with him the knotty points of that branch of learning. He used sometimes to sit in deep meditation on problems of Logic under banyan trees in the neighbouring field, which he did not quit until his doubts were cleared. Soon he surpassed his teacher in many respects and demonstrated the worthlessness of the latter's commentary on Logic. To exact a charter for the academy of Nadiya to confer degrees, Raghunātha went with the permission of Vāsudeva Śārvabhauma to Mithilā in the disguise of a pupil, and entered the academy of the famous teacher, Pakṣadhara Mīra, who was still alive. Raghunātha who was blind of one eye was ridiculed by the students of the academy. "Indra is thousand-eyed, Siva is three-eyed, all others are two-eyed, verily why art thou one-eyed?"

However, getting admittance into the academy, Raghunātha very soon demonstrated his own worth and was promoted to the highest class. The teacher found him a hard pupil to deal with, and many were the controversies the brilliant pupil carried on with him. Matters soon came to a crisis. One day in the course of a hot and protracted disputation before all the numerous students and doctors, the renowned teacher, foiled and exasperat-

- (2) *Tattva cintāmaṇi prahāsa*, a commentary on famous work
(3) *Maṅgaloka-tippaṇī* (or 'ryākhyā'), a sub-gloss on commentary, the *Āloka*.
the Sanskrit

In the Sankara Matha of Puri there is a copy of the work prepared during 1573, 1600 and 1607 A.D.

He wrote the "
on the four kinds
A.D. This work
Cintāmaṇi
called Bhāṣacārya Cūḍāmaṇi or Nyāya-cūḍāmaṇi.

01. KAYIN Tİ - . . .

1
a
1900 A.D. - Gudamani? Kanāda salutes one Cōḍama
Kanāda wrote the following. In that case Kanāda's date is

- (1) *Mañi-vyākhyā*,^a a commentary on Gaṅgā's *Taittiriya-sūtra*.
- (2) *Bhāṣa-ratnam*, on the seven Categories of the Vaiśeṣika system.
- (3) *Āpa-śabda-khaṇḍanam*, another Vaiśeṣika work.^b

62 RIMAKRISHNA BHATTACHARYA CAKRAVARTI
(ABOUT 1500 A.D.)
says that he was the

Hall says that he was the son of Raghunātha Śiromani. He himself calls Śiromani his Guru¹ or preceptor. He must be older

माने विद्युत्वाहिकतापराधिकार
कर्मचारीपक्षीक हर्ष लिखित ।

(Quoted in Navadvipa-mahimā)
 m., Notices IV, p. 167.

* For the *Maṇḍavyākhyā*, see R. Mitra, *Notices IV*, p. 167, *Bana. Coll. Cat. III*, p. 327, No. 582 (Saka 1705), and H. Sastri, *Notices V*, p. 13, No. 14. For the *Bhāṣā-ratna*, see R. Mitra, *Notices IV*, p. 119 No. 1631, *intro. verso 1* —

पूजामण्डपद्वाराकोषधर्मोद्भूतकोटिमा ।
उत्तम्य श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

Peterson's South Report, p. 24

¹ For some traditional accounts of Kapāda, see *his* Notices, Vol. I, p. xviii.

* Ind. Off. Cat. No. 2068, introd. volume 2;

man 1603 A.D., the date of a manuscript of his *Guna-Śiromani-prakāśa*. He in all probability flourished in 1660 A.D. He was the author of *Guna-śiromani-prakāśikā*¹ and possibly also of *Nyāya-tīkā*.

63. MATHURĀNĀTHA TĀKKAVĪCĪŚA.
(ABOUT 1570 A.D.).

general name
this reason are
He was the

- (1) *Tattva-cintāmaṇi rahasya*.² This work is familiarly known in Bengal as *Phakkikā* or *Māthuri*.
- (2) *Tattvacintāmaṇy āloka-rahasya*, a sub-commentary on Jayadeva's *Āloka*.
- (3) *Didhiti rahasya*.
- (4) *Siddhānta-rahasya*.
- (5) *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-rahasya*, a sub-commentary on Varḍhamāna's work.
- (6) *Nyāya-ullāṣaṭī-prakāśa-rahasya*, a sub-commentary on Varḍhamāna's *Prakāśa*.
- (7) *Nyāya-ullāṣaṭī-prakāśa-dīpikā-rahasya*.
- (8) *Bauddha-dhikkāra-rahasya*.
- (9) *Ayur daya bhāvanā*.
- (10) (?) *Śādi-kriya-viveka*.

Mathurānātha mentions *Sundara Upādhyāya* and *Harinātha Upādhyāya*, but nothing is known about these.

(?) द्यूतमेव सुहृन्नामि तयो ह्यनामि
वाचार्थक इदमि निजमुदाहरामि ।
तस्मात्तर्कं दुष्टविशेषमवाकयाम्य
दूरे विरोधविपरीतिरिह रामहृत् ॥ १ ॥

¹ Ind. Off. Cat., No. 2069.

² *Veda Notices of Sanskrit Mss. in Bengal*, 2nd series, Vol. I, p. xvi.

³ The beginning of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-rahasya* runs thus. —

आद्यामुपनिषदादेर्मु चेन्मु औपनिषद्विचक्षणमेतः ।
कार्त्तं विमुक्तयोर्त्तं तर्कावधारणार्थमुदाहराम्य ॥ १ ॥
चौमना भद्रुदावाच तर्कणयोर्त्तं औपनिषदः ।
विमर्शोऽहं द्यूतमेव तद्वचनविचक्षणम् ॥ १ ॥

⁴ This work has been published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series*.

64. KṚṢṢADĪSA ŚĪRVABHAUMA BHATṬICĪRYA
(ABOUT 1575 A.D.)

- (1) Tattva cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prasāriṇī, a sub-commentary on Raghunātha's commentary
- (2) Anumāṇaloka-prasāriṇī, a sub-commentary on Jayadev's *Loka* (Anumāṇa khanda)

65. GUṆANANDA VIDYAVIJĪṢA
(ABOUT 1570 A.D.)

He has been criticized by the Jaina logician, Yaśovijaya Gaṇī¹ (1608—1688 A.D.), in his *Nyāya-khaṇḍana-khāḍya*. Guṇananda must be older than 1622 A.D., in which year a manuscript of his *Guṇavivṛti-vivēka* was copied. He was considerably later than Raghunātha Śiromaṇi whose works he commented on, and he may be placed roughly at about 1570 A.D. He was the author of the following works —

- (1) Anumāṇa-dīdhiti-vivēka
- (2) Ātma-tattva vivēka-dīdhiti tīkā
- (3) Guṇa-vivṛti-vivēka.
- (4) Nyāya-kusumāṇḍajāl-vivēka.²
- (5) Nyāya-līlāvati-prakāśa dīdhiti-vivēka.
- (6) Saṁdāḥlōka-vivēka.

66. RĀMABHADRA ŚĪRVABHAUMA
(ABOUT 1680 A.D.).

Rāmabhadra Śārvabhauma, son of Bhavanātha and Bhavānī praises his father's teachings as better than those contained in

¹ This work is being printed in the Bib. Ind. Series; for No. 3 see p. 8 —

विचारस्य अनुमानालोकप्रसारिणाद्यनुसरेण ।

² Guṇananda is mentioned by Yaśovijaya in his *Nyāya-khaṇḍana-khāḍya*, leaves 2, 11, 60, 70, 80. — Śaṭṭha Chandra Vidyabhūṣaṇa's *Yaśovijaya Gaṇī* (1910,) p. 468

³ He was the author of *Nyāya-kusumāṇḍajāl-vivēka*, which begins:—

यस्य कर्मकविद्याने ईदृशानाकारेणैव
निरुद्धाविहाराणां यथाने निवृत्तयोः ।
मुद्रावन्नेव विपुला विचार्यं प्रविचरिष्ये
विचिन्त्ये प्रवर्तेत प्रमुद्राविहाराणि ॥

the Prakāśa and the Makaranda.¹ From his famous *tol* were produced such learned scholars as Jayarāma Nyāya-pañcānana and Jagadīśa Tarkālakāra. He is older than 1613 A.D.², when, a manuscript of his Padārtha-tattva-vivecana-prakāśa was copied. He was later than Raghunātha. He probably flourished in 1680 A.D. He was the author of the following works —

- (1) Dīdhiti-ṭīkā.
- (2) Nyāya-rahasya.
- (3) Guṇa-rahasya.
- (4) Nyāya-kusumāñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā.
- (5) Padārtha-viveka-prakāśa, a commentary on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's Padārtha-khaṇḍana.
- (6) Sat-cakra-krama-dīpikā.

67 JAGADĪŚA TARKĀLANKĀRA (ABOUT 1625 A.D.).

.....om Sanā-
..... Caitanya
..... the same
..... hat Jaga-
..... y activity
..... ate agrees
well with the fact that a work of his named Kāvya-prakāśa-rahasya

where he finished his studies in Logic. Jagadīśa Tarkālakāra calls himself the pupil of a Sarvaabhauma,³ who should be identified with Rāmaḥhadra Sarvaabhauma, as Jagadīśa quotes his Nyāya-rahasya with the remark that it was his Guru's.⁴ Jagadīśa

¹ The Kusumāñjali-vyākhyā, Sans. Coll. Ms. Cat. III 316, intro. verses and 3.—

भगवतीभवनावासां विख्यातां प्रवृत्ताम्पदेः
यदुपशान्तादिदं शान्तं करुणीरोपमं लभ्यते ॥ १ ॥
नकरुण्यप्रकाशे वा भाषायां भक्तिमयेवपि ।
नमोऽधिकं विदुर्भाषायां भाषायां यदुपशान्ता ॥ २ ॥

² Sans. Coll. Cat., III, p. 241, No. 389, final colophon.

एति श्रीरामभट्ट शान्तं भोजनप्रदायकं भविष्यत्प्रकाशं यथाज्ञा ॥
यस्य १९०० यन्त्रे आदिभ्यस्तदादौ लिखितं विदुः प्रोक्तं परोपशान्ताये ॥

³ The Mani mayūkha, Sans. Coll. Cat., III, p. 324, No. 575, intro. verses 2.

शान्तं भोजनं मुनी वदन्ति विद्याचिन्ताय कल्पवरो प्रवक्ष्य ।
विदितं योजनदीपविदितं विदितं भाषायां यदुपशान्ता ॥ १ ॥

⁴ For his Guru's work, see the Śabda-śikṣa-prakāśikā, Cal. ed., p. 25.—

एति पुनर्भाषितं यदुपशान्ताये ॥

Tarkāśāhāra was older than 1631 A.D., the date of his manuscript of Tarkāmṛta. As he was a pupil of Rāma Sārabhaṅga, his date falls about 1625 A.D. He was the author of the following works.—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi dīdhiti prakāśikā, (familiarly known as Jagadīśa's)
- (2) Tattva-cintāmaṇi mayūkha, a commentary directly on Rāma's works, of which only portions have survived.
- (3) Nyāyādarśa or Nyāya sārvaṇī, dealing with the doctrine of causality
- (4) Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā on the force of words, etc., a grammatico-philosophical treatise.*
- (5) Tarkāmṛta.
- (6) Dravya-bhāṣya-ṭīkā or Padārtha tattva-nirṇaya.
- (7) Nyāya-līlāvati dīdhiti-vyākhyā.

68. ŚABDA-ŚAKTI-PRAKĀŚIKĪ (ELUCIDATION OF THE POWER OF

... I give below some idea of the śabda, verbal knowledge, as explained by Jagadīśa —

VERBAL KNOWLEDGE (śabda-bodha).

1. The Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, delighting the learned, is composed by Jagadīśa, who was versed in debate as well as in the dogmas
2. The goddess Sarasvatī who is gracious and approaches all persons and is able to fulfil their ends, makes herself manifest immediately, when she is worshipped.

or,

Words, which possess the three requisites of mutual interdependence, juxtaposition and compatibility in their signification, become at once a means of knowledge to any man who hears them.¹

3. Knowledge of the mutual connection of things signified by correspondent words is neither perception nor inference, being limited in its scope.

4. Word or verbal testimony is the knowledge of the mutual connection of things signified (presented) by correspondent words. This knowledge is neither perception nor inference, for, in the case of

¹ Published in the Chowkhamba series.

² Printed in Calcutta (Saka 1789) and in Benares; later (1918) by the Calcutta University

ception, knowledge of things is derived through the contact of
 se and in the case of inference through consideration (recogni-
 a of sign). Such is not the case here. Here arises the know-
 ge only of those things which are signified by corresponding
 rds.

In the case of verbal testimony there is (1) the hearing of
 rds, then (2) there is the recollection of things signified by the
 rds, e g *ghaṭa'st*. Here from *ghaṭa* + *su* + *as* + *t*, there is recol-
 tion of *ghaṭa* a pot, *su* one, *as* existing and *t*, abode; (3) there is
 owledge of the mutual connection of the four things, thus recol-

no perception of the mutual connection of those things
 nce it is necessary to admit an extra means of knowledge,
 mely, "verbal knowledge"

Verbal knowledge is not inference, compatibility pertains to
 ngs, whereas correspondence pertains to words. These two
 nhined together do not abide in any one thing, and cannot there-
 s' be the cause (sign) in an inference. Each one of these
 arately too cannot be the cause, for compatibility can abide in
 a-correspondent words where there is no verbal knowledge
 rrespondence does not abide in things at all and cannot there-

to the knowledge of the mutual connection
 between itself and existence, just like a

is Vādeśika position

ollected

means

means

In verbal testimony the recollection of things signified by
 words is the cause (sign), but not the know-
 ledge of things recollected by words. In
 Naryāyika's reply. inference the knowledge of sign is the cause. Therefore, where
 have such knowledge as "the word cow is not the thing of which
 am reminded by the word cow connected with the word

existence" --

expression there is a
cause there is no knowl

o -- of the connection of

existence) in the abode.

That is, where we have no previous knowledge of a cow connected with existence, we can on hearing, "there is a cow," draw verbal knowledge, but not inference, because the knowledge of a cow as connected with existence is not recollected by me, not having seen cow and existence together previously. Therefore verbal testimony is a means of knowledge different from inference.

Inference cannot serve the purpose of verbal knowledge as far as mental perception of the knowledge (बुद्धि) is concerned. There is a cow by this expression we first draw knowledge of the mutual connection of cow and existence (in the form: a cow exists), and then we have mental perception of the knowledge as: I hear that a cow exists. If you say that this form of mental perception is wrong and that verbal knowledge is really included in inference, I may say, as there is no fixed rule, that inference is included in verbal knowledge. Just as you incorporate verbal knowledge in inference by contriving a general proposition on the recollection of things through words, I shall include inference too in verbal knowledge by postulating correspondence between words recollected by things.

In an inference where the thing signified by the major term is unfamiliar, knowledge of the general proposition (major premise) is derived by means of a heterogeneous example, e.g. "the lake has not smoke because it has not fire." This inference is not a heterogeneous

Objection

is unfamiliar,

knowledge of the general

proposition (major premise)

is derived by

means of a heterogeneous example, e.g. "the lake has not smoke because it has not fire." This inference is not a heterogeneous

expression, "the lake has not smoke because it has not fire," is not drawn through verbal testimony but through inference. Therefore inference is to be admitted as a separate means of knowledge.

It is true there was no knowledge of the thing signified by the

major term,

but the word of which the

thing was a sign could be recollected by means of an association. Hence there is no necessity for admitting inference as a separate source of knowledge.

All verbal testimony cannot be included in inference. The expression "being different from a pot"

Reply 2

affords the verbal knowledge (testimony) of

the first "preceding" date to a

This knowledge cannot be drawn from inference, for inference cannot take place where there is no minor term, as here. Hence it is necessary to admit a separate means of knowledge named verbal testimony.

If you say that the knowledge can be drawn from inference thus, the distinction is counterpart of a pot as it is recollected by another word correspondent with the same distinction. This is absurd, for the inference merely affords knowledge of distinction which is counterpart of the pot, but not of the thing which possesses the distinction. But, if you admit a separate means of knowledge named verbal testimony, then the peculiar knowledge of the expression can be easily drawn from correspondence, etc.

"Being different from a pot", here *different* may, by a secondary application (अनुवृत्ति), refer to anything other than a pot, i.e., non-pot.

As a single word cannot afford any verbal knowledge, we may form connection with any other word, such as a "cloth." Consequently now we can make the inference of this form "a cloth = non-pot."

If you say so, statements arrive at absurdity, e.g. if the word "different" itself could afford the know-

be useless.

Obj.
sāhita.

On h... verbal knowledge only if he is conscious that it is the expression of a competent person, otherwise not; or, in other words, the consciousness that a certain expression is that of a competent person precedes verbal knowledge. Now if the conclusion (viz., that there is a pot) thus precedes verbal knowledge and there is no desire for drawing an inference, there cannot be any. Consequently it is to be admitted that verbal knowledge is a separate

Objection.

of perceptions right knowledge cannot abide in the series beginning with the second perception. For the

thing already known by the first perception is the object of knowledge at the second perception

Right knowledge which concerns itself with things unknown is the correct knowledge which is different from that which is produced after knowledge of the same form in a series

In the case of a series of ...
with the second

assertion of a competent person, viz. the ...
it is

... unknown before verbal knowledge occurs. The meaning of a sentence, because it contains verbal knowledge occurs even when there is doubt as to whether a certain assertion is that of a competent person. If the cause of verbal knowledge was the belief that something was the assertion of a competent person who was aware of the meaning of a sentence as signifying connection of one thing with another thing then verbal knowledge could not be inference as the knowledge of the conclusion preceded the same. In fact it is not necessary that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence should precede verbal knowledge. Otherwise the Vedic text which is a competent assertion would be a mere reiteration, not being a source of right knowledge because it would indicate what was already known. Therefore the belief in the assertion of a competent person is not the cause of the belief, viz.

Objection

... on, is the ...
... derived ...
... hat verbal ...
... the Veda

... incompetent person is the cause in one place but not in the other. This difference of hypothesis is unnecessary. The belief that it is the assertion of a competent person is not the cause of verbal knowledge, because that knowledge takes place even where there is doubt of the connection of one thing with another or where there is doubt that a certain expression is the assertion of a competent person

In verbal knowledge, even if the assertion of a competent person is not the cause, context must be admitted to be the cause. Otherwise the word *ghaṭa* would have afforded the verbal knowledge, viz., "an object connected with *ghaṭa*", even though we had not the belief that it was pronounced with the desire of expressing

Even if knowledge of the context was the cause of verbal knowledge, the true meaning of the expression (viz., one thing as connected or qualified by another thing) is not contained in the former when there is the knowledge, viz., the word *ghaṭa* is not pronounced with the desire of expressing an object specified as *ghaṭa*, even if there be verbal knowledge of *ghaṭa* (viz., an object specified as *ghaṭa*); because there is knowledge of context of the form, it is pronounced with the desire of expressing an object specified as "knowable." But this does not take place, wherefore knowledge of context of the form "it is pronounced with the desire of expressing an object specified as *ghaṭa*" must be admitted as the cause of the verbal knowledge of an object specified as *ghaṭa*. Now, the true meaning is not contained in the knowledge of the context. Therefore there is no harm in admitting an inference beyond verbal knowledge.

The word *śaindhava* in the expression "bring *śaindhava*" would indicate salt and not a horse if the expression is used at the hour of meal. Hence the cause of such verbal knowledge is admitted to be the knowledge of context of the form "This word *śaindhava* with the desire of indicating salt" arises from knowledge of that of meal, etc. Therefore in knowledge of the occasion of context, comprehensive, as being comprehensive of context too

the desire of expressing here in the word

expressing an object called *ghaṭa*"; and suppose the belief, "is," exists in the word *ghaṭam* which existed at another time, but not in the one which exists now, in such cases there is no verbal knowledge. Therefore each expression must be taken as indicating an object called *ghaṭa* which exists at the time of the expression. Hence owing to the expressions being different on different occasions, knowledge of context becomes different. Therefore we may rather admit knowledge of occasion as the cause, but not knowledge of context.

Knowledge of context must be admitted as the cause of verbal knowledge, because where there is
Refutation of Prabhā.
kara

Therefore, in context, the conclusion

... context is not the cause of verbal knowledge
Naiyāyikas' reply A poet uses a word in one sense, while
thoughtful person may take it in a different
sense, though the poet had no knowledge of context in that sense
A parrot which repeats words which

verbal knowledge
I have added that
meaning words

A certain word is significant in a certain sense, if that word with the association of another word produces verbal knowledge of the thing which is presented by its own power or by the power of its marks. Significant words are of three kinds: crude word, suffix and indeclinable. In the expression *paṭīś* (३), the word (३) *paṭī* in association with the suffix *ś* (३) produces verbal knowledge of the form *paṭīś* (cloth) as possessing meaning, i.e. the piece of cloth.

12 RUDRA NĀYĀVĀCA-PĀTH.

Rudra Nāyāvācāpati was son of Vidyānanda Bhattacharya
— founder of Vidyāvācāpati who had been honoured by the

* 12. Rudra Nāyāvācāpati is named as a master word.

king of Gauda. Viśvanātha Suddhāntapañcanana was his younger brother, and Govinda Bhaṭṭācārya Cakravartī was his son. By order of his father, Vidyānīvāsa, copies of the *Kalpa-taru*, the poetic digest of Lakṣmīdhara (*Naiyatakālīka* and *Dāna-khaṇḍas*) were copied in Śaka 1510 or 1558 A.D. His time is further fixed by the poem composed in honour of Bhāvasimha, whose father, the 50th
ra must
Rudra
Tarka-
philoso-
phaspati

Bengal

(5) Bhramara dūtam.

(6) Vṛndāvana-vinoda-kāvya

70 JAYARĀMA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA

(ABOUT 1700 A.D.)

Jayarāma was a pupil of Rāmaprabhadrā Sārvaśhauma¹. His title Nyāyapañcānana is sometimes shortened into Pañcānana.

Jayarāma, with Devanātha Tarkapañcānana, is mentioned as an authority in the rhetorical *Eka-śaṣṭhyalankāra-prakāśa*, and in the *Alankāra-sāra-sthiti* of Bhīmasena Dikṣita², composed in Samvat 1712 during the rule of Ajitasingha in Jodhpur. He is older than 1659 A.D., the year in which the *Padārthamālā* was composed. As pupil of Rāmaprabhadrā Sārvaśhauma, he lived about 1700 A.D.

He was patronised by Rājā Rāmkrishna of Krishnagar who obtained from the Pandits of Nadia the hereditary title of Nava-

¹ The *Anumāna-dīdhiti-gudhārtha-vidyotana* (Ind. Off. Cat., p. 620, No. 7900, and Peterson's Sixth Report, p. 15) introd. verse —

नौविदेमनवेनद्वन्द्वसुखं भुवोऽभिव्यक्त्यादिरामं
भुवोऽभिव्यक्त्यादिरामं भुवोऽभिव्यक्त्यादिरामं
भुवोऽभिव्यक्त्यादिरामं भुवोऽभिव्यक्त्यादिरामं
भुवोऽभिव्यक्त्यादिरामं भुवोऽभिव्यक्त्यादिरामं

² Madras Catalogue, No. 43037, introd. verse 2:—

भविर्भो भविर्भो भविर्भो भविर्भो भविर्भो
भविर्भो भविर्भो भविर्भो भविर्भो भविर्भो

- (3) Ānanda-lahari-tarī
- (4) Vidagdha mukha-maṇḍana-viṭikā

72. BHAVĀNANDA SIDDHĀNTAVĀṢĪŚA
(ABOUT 1625 A.D.).

.....

17th century. He was the author of the following works —

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi dīdhiṭi prakāśikā, familiarly known as Bhavānandī.
- (2) Pratyak śloka-śāra-maṇḍarī.
- (3) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-tīkā.
- (4) Kāraka-vivecana

73. HARIRĪMA TARKAVĀṢĪŚA
(ABOUT 1625 A.D.)

.....

the following works —

- (1) Tattva cintāmaṇi-tīkā-vicāra
- (2) Ācārya mata-rahasya-vicāra.
- (3) Bhaṭṭa-koṣa-vicāra or vāda as it is sometimes named
- (4) Eva prakāśa rahasya-vicāra or Bhaṭṭa-mata-siddhānta-vicāra.

74. VIŚVANĀTHA SIDDHĀNTAPAṢCAIṢANA
(ABOUT 1634 A.D.).

Viśvanātha was the son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya and a younger brother of Rudra Nyāyavācaspati Bhaṭṭācārya. He composed his Bhāṣāparīcheda in 1634 A.D. He was the writer of the following works. —

- (1) Alaṅkāra-parīṣkāra
- (2) Nāṇ-vāda-tīkā.
- (3) Nyāya-sūtra-vṛttī¹

¹ Published under the authority of the General Committee of Public Instruction, Bengal.

77. RAGHUDEVA NYĀYĀLANKĀRA
(ABOUT 1650 A D)

Raghudeva was a disciple of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa.¹ Raghudeva is older than 876 A D, the date in which Anumiti-parā-rāsa-vāda was copied. He is older than Yaśovijaya Gaṇi (1608-38 A.D.) who quotes him in his Aṣṭa-sāhasī-vīvarana.² He probably flourished in 1650 A.D. He was the author of the following works.—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi guihārtha dīpikā
- (2) Navīna-nirmāṇa
- (3) Dīdhiṭi tīkā
- (4) Nyāya kuṣumāṇjali-kārikā vyākhyā
- (5) Dravya-sāra saṁgraha
- (6) Padārtha-khaṇḍana vyākhyā

78. GADĀDHARA BHATTĀCHĀRYA
(ABOUT 1650 A D)

Gadādhara, whose father was Jīvācārya, was born in the middle of the 17th century A.D. in the district Lakshmīpasa, gra, in Eastern Bengal. He came to Nadia and became a pupil of the famous logician Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa. On the death of the teacher, Gadādhara became the head of his academy. At first the students in Nadia did not at first accept him as their teacher as he was a man of Eastern Bengal and did not belong to the family of hereditary Pandits. Gadādhara left the academy and established a new college on a public street, where he also set up a garden of flowers. As soon as any student came to collect flowers from the garden, Gadādhara used to deliver lectures on logic, dressing a tree there. Charmed with his exposition of the

— — — — —
stead of thinking
“atoms, atoms,
Logic which are

¹ The Nāṭya-vāda-vyākhyā (Madras Catalogue, No. 4234) introd. verse, 1 —

निर्बन्धनं ननु यच्चान् यत्परमार्थोत्तरं नुपय ।

निर्बन्धे रघुदेवेन यच्चान् यत्परमार्थोत्तरं नुपय ॥ १ ॥

² J. A. S. B., 1910, p. 468. Bala Chandra Vidyabhusana's article on Yaśovijaya.

80 RĀMDEVA CIRĀṢĪVA
(ABOUT 1700 A.D.).

Rāmdēva who is generally known as Cirāṣīva must be older than 1703 A.D., when his Kāvya-vilāsa was composed. He is generally believed to have lived about 1700 A.D. He was the author of the following works.—

- (1) Vidvānāmoda-taraṅgiṇī.
- (2) Kāvya-vilāsa.
- (3) Mādhava-campu.
- (4) Vṛtta ratnāvalī.

81. RĀMARUDRA TARKAVYĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1700 A.D.).

Ramrudra, or simply Rudra, was the grandson of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa and son of Śrī Rāma or Rāmeśvara. He was probably a pupil of Madhusūdana. He probably lived about 1700 A.D. He was the author of the following works —

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-tīkā,
- (2) Vyutapatti-vāda-vyākhyā.
- (3) Kāraṇādyaṛthe nirṇaya-tīkā.
- (4) Dīnakarya-prakāśa-taraṅgiṇī.
- (5) Tattva-saṅgraha-dīpikā-uppaṇi.
- (6) Siddhānta-muktāvalī-tīkā.

82. ŚRĪ KṚṢṆA NYĀYĀLANKĀRA
(ABOUT 1650 A.D.)

Śrī Kṛṣṇa Nyāyāṅkāra was a son of Govinda Nyāyavāgīśa and author of the Bhāva-dīpikā, a commentary on the Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī.

83 JAYARĀMA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA
(ABOUT 1700 A.D.).

Jayarāma Tarkāṅkāra was born in the district of Pabna in Eastern Bengal. His father was a court pandit at Putia. He was a pupil of Gadādhara and wrote a commentary on the Śāktivāda in the year 1700 A.D.

नमोऽर्चयिष्ये एव सुखी भवति न चानयो

नमोऽर्चयिष्ये एव सुखी भवति न चानयो

And the final colophon: सुखी भवति न चानयो

84 RUDRARĀMA
(ABOUT 1750 A.D.).

Rudrarāma was a son of Bhavānanda Siddhāntarāgīa and therefore lived about 1725 A.D. He was the author of —

- (1) Vāda-pariechoda.
- (2) Kāraka vyūha.
- (3) Citta rūpa.
- (4) Adhikaraya candrikā.
- (5) Vaiśeṣika-śāstriya-padārtha nirūpaṇa

85 "BUNO" RĀMANĀTHA
(ABOUT 1780 A.D.).

At the close of the 18th century there were two scholars at Nadia who both bore the name of Rāmanātha Tarkasiddhānta— one was versed in Logic and the other in Jurisprudence. The logician, who had his school in a wood on the outskirts of the town, was called *Buno* (wild) Rāmanātha in contradistinction to the jurist, who lived at the centre of the town.

Buno Rāmanātha was a pupil of Rāma Nārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana. He was a man of extraordinary genius, but has left no work behind him. His circumstances were very poor, yet he did not seek help from any body. He had sometimes to live on boiled tamarind leaves only.

Once Maharāja Śiva Chandra of Krishnagar, wishing to patronise him, came to Nadia and asked him, "Are you in any difficulty?" Buno Rāmanātha replied "No, thanks; I have repeatedly gone through the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* but have met with no difficulty." Then the Maharāja said, "I did not enquire of you have any pecuniary wants." The reply again was: "No, thanks."

86 KṚṢṢA KĪNTA VIDYASĪKḤA
(ABOUT 1780 A.D.)

He was a pupil of Rāma Nārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana and was equally versed in Logic and Jurisprudence. He wrote the following works:—

- (1) Nyāya ratnāvalī
- (2) Dāyabhāga śika.
- (3) Gopāla bhāṣṇa.
- (4) Caitanya candrāṁṣa.
- (5) Kāminī kāma-kautuka.

(6) Upamāna-cintāmaṇi-tikā.

(7) Śabda-sakti-prakāśa-tikā.

He flourished during the time of Maharajā Girīśa Chandra of Krishnagar. He was too conscious of his genius. On his death-bed when he found that his end was drawing nigh, he said —

"Let many stars shine in the sky, let lamps too spread their lustre in every house, let the little fireflies glitter from quarters to quarters, alas! the sun having set, what things do not shine before people!"

87. RĀJACUDĀMAṆIMAKHIN

Writers of Navya Nyāya have spread all over the country In Madras Rājacudāmaṇimakhin¹ who was a minister in the Court of Raghunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore, wrote a Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dar-pa in 1630 A D.

88. DHARMARĀJADHVARIN.

Dharmarājadhvarin, a native of Kandarāmānlikkam, wrote a commentary on the Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa of Rucidatta²

89. GOPINĀTHA MAUNI

(ABOUT 1650 A D.).

He wrote Śabdāloka-rahasya, Tarkabhāṣa-tikā, and Padārtha-viveka-tikā. He was a Maratha and lived in Benares during the time of Raja Jai Singh. He calls himself Lord of the Lily of Logic³

- 1 अदिप्रमत्तमेकाकारका दीप्तिभावा
प्रतिप्रवर्तते दीप्ता दमंस्तु प्रमुखा ।
दिशि दिशि विस्तृतं तद्वत्प्रदीपवत् ।
अदिप्रति प्रतिपत्ते दिप्तिं लोके लोके ॥
- 2 अधीनं मिथिलं मातृदत्तमादौ चरेत्तु ॥
राजपूजामहिमको कुर्वते अविद्वद्वत् ॥
तत्र अत्रमादिप्रधानमस्मिन्निवादिना ।
महिप्रकाशविनिर्भरं प्रदीपं मयि ॥
इत्यादि लोकाणां भद्रं कुर्वन् अविद्वत् ॥
अनुमानप्रमाणं विहितं करमाद्यत् ॥

¹ Śabdāloka begins thus —

वनामसिन्धुं अहमे प्रवले वरं दत्तिवाचकः प्रवाच ।
तथाप्यमले वनं वाचयित्ते येन वनामस्यममिवावाः ॥
अदिप्रति प्रतिपत्ते अविद्वत् विद्वत्तुं यत्ने ।
महाप्रकाशकं लोकाणां विवेचयति ॥

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92 RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĀSTRĪ (PĀRVATA)
(ABOUT 1815 A D.)

He was a Maratha, who wrote a gloss on Gadādhari-pañcavāda¹ while residing at Poona about 70 years ago

¹ वाग्विद्वत्, पदवी, अथवा, साधना विद्वत् ।

---COURSE TAKE AN INTEREST IN DIALECTICS.

The Jesuit missionaries, who lived in India in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, took a great interest in Sanskrit and much valuable information is available from the accounts which they have left. The Portuguese Jesuits, while sending manuscripts from Pondicherry and Chindernagore to the King's library at Paris, remark in 1732, that most of the manuscripts were collected from Navadvipa. One missionary says: "The famous Brāhmana called C. . . ."

the missionary goes on to observe.—

"Gāṅgeśa is very famous: he is the author of the *Anta-*

known since the decadence of letters under the Mogols." ¹

Father Pons remarks —

"The School of Nyāya (reason or judgment) has surpassed all the others in Logic, especially from the time, some centuries back, that the Academy of Nadia, in Bengal, became the most celebrated of India, thanks to its famous Professors, whose works have spread in every direction . . . Nowadays they teach in the Nyāya schools hardly anything else besides Logic, which the Brāhmanas have stuffed with an endless number of questions, a great deal more subtle than useful. It is a chaos of minutiae, as Logic was in

spend several
ties on the me
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trides and go away without having acquired any other knowledge. The Nyāya has in consequence been given the name of *Tarkashāstram*."

Anquetil Du Perron, who had known Father Mosac at Chander-nagore since 1756, says that Father Mosac learnt Sanskrit at Nadia University and that his translation of the four Vedas, specially the Yajur Veda forms a part of his vast and learned collections.²

At the time the Portuguese searched for the books, the following works of Nyāya were prevalent in Bengal —

- (1) Kusumāñjali, of Udayana
- (2) Commentary on Kusumāñjali by Vardhamāna.
- (3) Dravya-kiraṇāvali of Udayana
- (4) Commentary on Dravya-kiraṇāvali by Vardhamāna
- (5) Guṇa kiraṇāvali of Udayana
- (6) Commentary on Guṇa kiraṇāvali by Vardhamāna.
- (7) Commentary on Gotama-sūtra of Vacaspati

- (10)
- (11) Vādārtha-khaṇḍana showing that there is no other cause but God.
- (12) Ākhyāta-vāda of Mathuranātha, on some points of grammar
- (13) Apūrva-vāda, on fate
- (14) Śakti-vāda, on power
- (15) Siddhānta-mukṭāvalī
- (16) Cintāmaṇī by Gaṅgeśa
- (17) Pratyakṣa and Anumāna-khaṇḍa by Raghunātha.
- (18) Commentary on Pratyakṣa and Anumāna-khaṇḍa of Mathurānātha.
- (19) Mathurānātha on Vidhi-vāda
- (20) Bhavānanda on Anumāna
- (21) Bhavānanda on Śabda
- (22) Gadādhara the Master on the Pratyakṣa of Śiromani.
- (23) Gadādhara the Master on Anumāna of Śiromani.
- (24) Some special works of Gadādhara the Master
- (25) Jagadīś on Anumāna of Śiromani.

90. BRITISH GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES NYĀYA.

in 1830 by the Governor-General in Council at the request of H. H. Wilson, the great orientalist.²

given to Tula -

THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF REVENUE IN CALCUTTA

The humble petition of Sub Chandra Surmondal and other students belonging to the Nalanda Sanskrit College.

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The Government is spending lots of money for the maintenance of the chairs of Nyaya in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, at

etc., and by such an act of benevolence your petitioners will ever pray.

CALCUTTA,
February 1830 }

To

A. STERLING, Esq.

The humble petition of Sub Chandra Surmona and other students belonging to the Nuddea Sanskrit College

... and by your such an act of humanity your petitioners will ever pray for your welfare and increase of wealth.

CALCUTTA.

(No. 1031)

To

W. W. BIRD AND W. FAME, Esq.,

Sudder Board of Revenue

GENTLEMEN,

With reference to your letter, dated the 12th February last, relative to a monthly allowance of 100 rupees paid from Treasury of the Collector of Nuddea for the support and instruction of students, resorting from distant parts of the country to that place, I am directed by the Governor in Council to transmit to you for information the accompanying copy of a letter and of its enclosures from the Deputy Persian Secretary to Government, dated the 16th ultimo, on that subject. You will be pleased to instruct the Collector to continue the pension in question to the Nuddea students and to discharge the arrears which may have accrued from the date on which the payment of it was stopped.

I have the honour to be,

Sr,

Your most obedient Servant,

(Sd) W. H. MACNAUGHTEN,
Off. Deputy Secy to Govt.

FORT WILLIAM,
The 3rd August, 1830 }

Navadvīpa, Bhātpārā, Puri and other places. Public examinations have been instituted for the encouragement of Nyāya along with other branches of learning.

A subsidy has also been granted to the Asiatic Society of Bengal for publication of Sanskrit books, including dialectical works.

At present all the works and dialectics are being collected. English, French, German and other scholars are collecting Sanskrit books including books on dialectics.

There are heaps of manuscripts in the libraries of Europe, such as the British Museum, India Office, the Imperial Academy of Vienna, the Imperial Academy of St Petersburg, Musée National of Paris, etc. Catalogues are being prepared, and great facilities are being given for the study of dialectical works.

97. RISE OF VERNACULAR DETRIMENTAL TO NYĀYA.

On account of the great attention given to vernaculars at the present time, Great encourage-

The Dacca University
language has made great
development should

Musings—
organized societies such as the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad and the Sahitya Sabha have been founded to cultivate the Bengali language. Nyāya written in Sanskrit is not much appreciated. Nyāya written in an easier language is acceptable, but even then the diction of such works cannot be easy.

98. THE UNIVERSITIES ON THE WESTERN MODEL

As a result of long controversies dating from 1792 A.D. the

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Imperial British Government, with the object of encouraging eastern and western learning side by side. In spite of the strenuous efforts made by the British Government to foster study and research in indigenous Logic, it is at its lowest ebb, as the degrees of

ge, and less profitable in its material results

known since the decadence of letters under the Mogols." 1

Father Pons remarks —

"The School of Nyāya (reason or judgment) has surpassed all the others in Logic, especially from the time, some centuries back, that the Academy of Nadia, in Bengal, became the most celebrated of India, thanks to its famous Professors, whose works have spread in every direction. Nowadays they teach in the Nyāya schools hardly anything else besides Logic, which the Brāhmanas have stuffed with an endless number of questions, a great deal more subtle than useful. It is a chaos of minutiae, as Logic was to spend several centuries on the minutiae of the genera, the trifles and go away without having acquired any other knowledge. The Nyāya has in consequence been given the name of *Tarkashāstram*."

Anquetil Du Perron, who had known Father Mosac at Chander-nagore since 1756, says that Father Mosac learnt Sanskrit at Nadia University and that his translation of the four Vedas, especially the Yajur Veda forms a part of his vast and learned collections.²

At the time the Portuguese searched for the books, the following works of Nyāya were prevalent in Bengal:—

1. *Nāya*.

2. *ardhamāna*.

- (6) Commentary on Guṇa kīrṇāvalī by Vardhamāna.
- (7) Commentary on Gotama-sūtra of Vacaspati.
- (8) Līlāvātī with Commentary
- (9) Vādārtha in one volume comprising (i) Devatā vāda, on the nature of the gods, (ii) Muktī vāda, on salvation; (iii) Pralambhāva, on future contingent things, (iv) Visrūtha.

- valishta vāda, on the question, (8) Vāda vāda on
 meaning of ātma etc
 (10) Baudhāyana's of Pāṇini's vāda on the vāda
 Anumāna-jāt
 (11) Vāda vāda showing that there is no other vāda
 but this
 (12) Ābhyāsa vāda of Mathurānātha on some points of grammar
 (13) Apūrva vāda, on fate
 (14) Sattā vāda, on power
 (15) Nidhāna multāvall
 (16) Cāntamāni by Śaṅkara
 (17) Pratyakṣa and Anumāna ābhāga by Śaṅkara
 (18) Commentary on Pratyakṣa and Anumāna-ābhāga of Mātā
 vāda
 (19) Mathurānātha on Vāda vāda
 (20) Ubhaya vāda on Anumāna
 (21) Ubhaya vāda on Sattā
 (22) Gadādhara the Master on the Pratyakṣa of Śaṅkara
 (23) Gadādhara the Master on Anumāna of Śaṅkara
 (24) Some special works of Gadādhara the Master
 (25) Jagadīśa on Anumāna of Śaṅkara

90. BRITISH GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES NYAYA

India came into the possession of British in 1757 A.D. Since
 then the students of Navadvipa have received grants from the Bri-
 tish Raj. In the year 1829 this was stopped, but was again restored
 in 1830 by the Governor-General in Council at the request of
 H. H. Wilson, the great orientalist.

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THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF REVENUE IN CALCUTTA

The humble petition of Bab Chandra Sircar and
 other students belonging to the Nuddea Sanskrit
 College.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

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The Government is spending lots of money for the maintenance of the chairs of Nyāya in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, at

to retain and continue their said pension as they have obtained all along and thereby they might be able to acquire a competent knowledge of their progress etc. and by such an act of benevolence your petitioners as in duty bound shall ever pray).

CALCUTTA,
February 1830. }

To

A. STRLENS, Esq

The humble petition of Sib Chandra Siromoni and
other students belonging to the Nuddea Sanskrit
College

their said allowance through the Collector of that district as that is has been all
along carried and by your such an act of humanity your petitions shall ever pray
for your welfare and increase of wealth.

CALCUTTA.

(No. 1031)

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Sudder Board of Revenue.

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Off. Deputy Secy. to Govt.

FORT WILLIAM. }
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97. RISK OF VERNACULAR DETRIMENTAL TO NYĀYA.

On account of the great attention given to vernaculars at the present day the study of Nyāya is declining. Great encouragement is being given to vernacular studies. The Dacca University Committee observes¹ that "the Bengali language has made great progress under British Rule and its further development should

Nyāya written in Sanskrit is not much appreciated. Nyāya written in an easier language is acceptable, but even then the diction of such works cannot be easy.

97. THE UNIVERSITIES ON THE WESTERN MODEL

¹ Dacca University Committee Report, Chap VII, p. 31.

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Navadvīpa Bhātpāra, Puri and other places. Public examinations have been instituted for the encouragement of Nyāya along with other branches of learning.

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Imperial Academy
Musée National
and great facilities

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97. THE UNIVERSITIES ON THE WESTERN MODEL

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by the Śaka satraps in Taxila, but the princes continued to hold the Kabul valley until the last vestiges of their rule, which had survived the attacks of the Śakas, were swept away by the Kushans.

There is a copper-plate inscription of the satrap of Taxila, Patila by name, which records the deposit of the relics of Buddha and a donation made in the 78th year of some (Parthian¹) era.

THE GARDUQILAS, A GREEK MONUMENT AT TAXILA, WHICH RUNS AS FOLLOWS —

"This Garuda-column of Vāsudeva (Vishnu) the god of gods, was erected here by Heliodorus, a worshipper of Vishnu, the son of Dion and an inhabitant of Taxila, who came as Greek Ambassador from the great king Antialcidas to King Kasiputra Bhāgabhadra, the Saviour, then reigning, prosperously in the fourteenth year of his kingship."

B

"Three immortal precepts (footsteps) . . . when practised lead to heaven—self restraint, charity, conscientiousness."²

Taxila was one of the great cities of the East, and was famous as the principal seat of Hindu learning in Northern India, to which scholars of all classes flocked for instruction, especially in medical science.³ In the *Mahāvagga*

VIII. 3 (Dr Oldenberg's ed.), we find Jivaka, who was a physician to Buddha, was educated in surgery and medicine at Taxila. Ample references have been met with in the Jātakas that people received education in lieu for school-fees or service rendered to their teachers. Jivaka, the physician of Buddha is said to have received education by rendering service to the physicians at Taxila.⁴ Generally the three Vedas and eighteen Vidyās or *sippas* were taught there.

Philostratus in his life of Apollonius of Tyana gives an account of that philosopher's visit to India. The account tells us that the philosopher had a Babylonian guide, named Damis; that Phrontes, king of Taxila, spoke in Greek and that up to 12 years of age he was educated in the Greek fashion and was sent afterwards to the Brahmins. Also that Taxila was about the size of Nineveh and walled like a Greek city.

Mutual exchange of Hindu and Greek culture at Taxila.

¹ Sir John Marshall, K.C.I.E., in the journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1909, p. 1033.

² Vide Archaeological discoveries at Taxila by Sir John Marshall.

³ Vide my Buddha-deva, pp. 169–170 and 230–232, also Jātakas, Vol. I, p. 259, Vol. V, pp. 181, 210, 457.

APPENDIX A.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TAXILA.

A

Takṣaśilā or Taxila was the capital of a province of Gāndhāra and is situated near the river of

Taxila (Its political history

(i) Persian conquest of Taxila.

Satthert in the Rawalpindi district. The high antiquity of Taxila can be best gathered from the fact that it was famous in the time of Buddha as a University town

in India and that Gāndhāra of which it forms a part, is mentioned in both the Rig veda and the Atharva-veda, and in the Upanishads and Buddhist literature. In historical times¹ we notice it came under the sway of Cyrus the Great (558—530 B.C.), who is said to have conquered it along with other provinces of Gāndhāra. It is said to have remained in the possession of his successor,

from 530 to 522 B.C.

two centuries; and after the fall of the empire in 331 B.C., it, along with other provinces, came under the sway of Alexander the Great. Herodotus relates that Skylax was first sent by Darius (probably about 510 B.C.) to conduct a fleet of ships from a tributary of the Indus into the Gāndhāra country. Ctesias (415-319 B.C.) resided at the Persian Court for 17 years as physician during the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes Memnon, during which time Gāndhāra is said to have remained a Persian province. An interesting relic of Persian influence at Taxila is an inscription in Aramaic character of the fourth or fifth century B.C., which is the only Aramaic record that has yet been found in India.²

Early in the spring of 326 B.C. Alexander with his army entered into the territories of the king of Taxila, who had already tendered his submission. Later on we find it to be a part of the Magadha Empire under the Mauryas, which is clearly evidenced by the fact that Aśoka was viceroy of Taxila. The territory of Gāndhāra, including Taxila, was again conquered by Euthydemus or Democritus and was subsequently wrested from the family of Greek princes by Eucratides. The inscriptions and coins further show that the family of Eucratides was supplanted

¹ E. J. Rapson's 'Ancient India.'

² 'A Guide to Taxila' by Sir John Marshall.

the Śaka satraps in Taxila, but the princes continued to hold the Kabul valley until the last vestiges of their rule, which had survived the attacks of the Śakas, were swept away by the

and a donation made in the 1st century B.C. (probably corresponding to 93 B.C.) during the reign of King Moga or Manes. There has been discovered a column-inscription of one Heliodorus, a Greek native of Taxila and a Vaishnava convert which runs as follows:—

Heliodorus, a Greek native of Taxila, a Vaishnava convert, who was a devotee of the god Krishna, erected this column in the 1st century B.C. during the reign of King Moga or Manes.

B.

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Mutual exchange of
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¹ Sir John Marshall, K.C.I.E., in the journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1909, p. 1052.

² Vide Archaeological discoveries at Taxila by Sir John Marshall.

³ Vide my Buddha-deva, pp. 160—170 and 220—223, also Jātakas, Vol. I, p. 209, Vol. V, pp. 161, 210, 457.

APPENDIX A. THE UNIVERSITY OF TAXILA

A

Taxila was the capital of a province of the Punjab and is situated near the river Indus in the Muzaffargarh district. The name of the province of Taxila can be lost. It is derived from the fact that it was famous in the time of Buddha as a University to which scholars of which it forms a part, is mentioned in both the Rigveda and the Atharvaveda, and in the Upanishads and Buddhist literature. In historical times we notice it came under the sway of Cyrus the Great (559-530 B.C.), who is said to have conquered it along with other provinces of Gandhara.

It was one of his successors who ruled from 530 to 332 B.C. for two centuries; and after the downfall of the empire in 331 B.C., it, along with other provinces, came under the sway of Alexander the Great. Herodotus relates that Skylax was first sent by Darius (probably about 510 B.C.) to conduct a fleet of ships from a tributary of the Indus into the Gandhara country. Ctesias (413-319 B.C.) resided at the Persian Court for 17 years as physician during the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes Memnon, during which time Gandhara is said to have remained a Persian province. An interesting relic of Persian influence at Taxila is an inscription in Aramaic character of the fourth or fifth century B.C., which is the only Aramaic record that has yet been found in India.¹

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² "A Guide to Taxila" by Sir John Marshall.

APPENDIX B

INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYLLOGISM IN INDIAN LOGIC

1 TARKA-ŚĀSTRA OF GOTAMA (ABOUT 550 B.C.).

mata-pariśāḍ) The first subject, ample references to which are met with in the old Brahmanic, Buddhist, and Jaina works, seems to have been first handled by a sage named Gotama or Gautama, who is reputed to have flourished in Mithilā (North Behar) about 550 B.C. The second subject, which is also referred to in old books, was associated with the art of debate at a very early stage. These two subjects, combined together constitute the Tarka-śāstra (the philosophy of reasoning), popularly known as Gautamī-vidyā (the Gotamade learning) *.

2 THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA OF AKṢAPĀDA (ABOUT 150 A.D.)

The third subject, the doctrine of the Syllogism, does not appear to have been known in India a considerable time before the Christian era. The fourth subject refers to numerous philosophical doctrines that were propounded from time to time up to the second century A.D. * Gotama's Tarka-śāstra, after these two subjects had been introduced into it, became, about the second century A.D., designated as the Nyāya-sūtra—the aphorisms on logic. The term "Nyāya" in the sense of logic occurs in the Mahābhārata (*Ādi-parva*, *adhyāya* 1, *verse* 67; *adhyāya* 70, *verses* 42-4, and *Sānti-parva*, *adhyāya* 210, *verse* 22), *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* (3rd pt., *adhyāya* 6), *Matsya-purāṇa* (3, 2), *Padma-purāṇa* (*Uttara-*

(3) Example (*dṛṣṭānta*) That which is non-produced is eternal, as ether.

(4) Application (*upanaya*) The soul is non-produced

(5) Conclusion (*nigamana*) Therefore the soul is eternal

COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION (*pratipāṣanā*)

(1) The soul is non-eternal

(2) Because it is cognized by the senses

(3) That which is cognized by the senses is non-eternal, as a pot

(4) The soul is cognized by the senses

(5) Therefore the soul is non-eternal

The Caraka-saṃhitā, which analyses demonstration and counter-demonstration into five members, does not give any clear definition of those members. "Dṛṣṭānta," which in the old Tarka-sāstra, signified an instance familiar to the learned and the fool alike, was adopted designate the third member, although in its old sense it did not indicate the principle of connexion (between the middle term and the major term) involved in the member

refutative enthymeme of Aristotle, like the counter-demonstration of the Caraka-saṃhitā, consists in drawing conclusions which are inconsistent with those of one's adversary

The enthymeme is defined by Aristotle (in his *Rhetoric*, bk 1, p 16, Welldon's ed) as a syllogism with its constituent parts fewer than those of a normal syllogism, that is, a syllogism of which the major premise, minor premise, or the conclusion is suppressed as being well known to the audience, who can supply the same of their own accord

The demonstration in the Caraka-saṃhitā is obviously a combination of an enthymeme which comprises the first two parts of the demonstration and an example which comprises the last three parts of it. This is quite in conformity with the rule of Aristotle, who (in his *Rhetoric*, bk 1, p 18, Welldon's ed) observes that an example may be used as a supplement to an enthymeme to serve the purpose of a testimony which is invariably persuasive. This rule may be illustrated as follows —

Enthymeme

(1) The soul is eternal,

(2) Because it is non-produced.

Example,

(3) That which is non-produced is eternal, as ether,

(4) The soul is non-produced,

(5) Therefore the soul is eternal.

Affirmative Example.

- (1) The hill is full of fire
- (2) Because it is full of smoke
- (3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen (affirmative conclusion).

- (1) The hill is not smoky.
- (2) Because it is non-fiery
- (3) That which is non-fiery is not smoky, as a lake (negative conclusion)

Negative Example

- (1) The hill is full of fire.
- (2) Because it is full of smoke
- (3) That which is not full of fire is not full of smoke, as a lake.

The reason (*hetu*), as expounded by Akṣapāda (in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1, 1, 34, 35), is of two kinds, viz affirmative and negative. An affirmative reason is the means which, through its homogeneity or connexion with the example, establishes what is to be established, while a negative reason is the means which, through its heterogeneity or separation from the example, establishes what is to be established. The definitions may be illustrated as follows —

Affirmative Reason.

- (1) The hill is full of fire
- (2) Because it is full of smoke
- (3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen

Negative Reason

- (1) The hill is not full of smoke
- (2) Because it is not full of fire
- (3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

The negative example and negative reason expounded by Akṣapāda (in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1, 1, 35, 37) possess apparently no counterparts in the *Organon* (Prior Analytics) of Aristotle. From the illustration of the example and reason (affirmative and negative) given by Akṣapāda it appears that he admitted the universal affirmative conclusion in what is called by Aristotle the "first figure" and the universal negative conclusion in the first and second figures. Now, if a conclusion in the first figure is to be negative, the major premise must be negative, and, if a conclusion in the second figure is to be negative, the minor premise must be negative (*vide* Prior Analytics, bk 1, chs iv, v, pp 85-94). Considering that the major and minor premises of Aristotle correspond respectively to the example and reason of Akṣapāda, it becomes absolutely necessary to admit a negative example and a negative reason as counter-parts of the negative major premises and the negative minor prem se

II AKṢAPĀDA (ABOUT 150 A D) *

b. Analysis into five members (*Avayava*)

Akṣapāda in his Nyāya-sūtra (1, 1, 32) mentions the five parts of a demonstration under the name of *avayava* (members) as follows —

(1) Proposition (*pratijñā*) This hill is full of fire

(2) Reason (*hetu*) Because it is full of smoke

(3) Example (*udāharana*) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen

(4) Application (*nyāyana*) This hill is full of smoke

(5) Conclusion (*nyāgamana*) Therefore, this hill is full of fire

c Example (*udāharana*)

Akṣapāda calls the example an *udāharana* which he divides into two kinds, viz affirmative (*sādharmya*) and negative (*vaidharmya*). An affirmative example is defined in the Nyāya-sūtra (1, 1, 36) as a familiar instance, which, being similar to the minor term, possesses the property of that term as co-present (with the reason). A negative example is defined (in the Nyāya-sūtra 1, 1, 37) as a familiar instance, which is contrary to what has been stated in the case of the affirmative example, that is, in which there is an absence of the property implying an absence of the reason. The definition may be illustrated as follows —

B. ARISTOTLE

Analysis of syllogism and demonstration (*analytics*)

The term *avayava*, used by Akṣapāda to signify parts or members of a syllogism or demonstration, corresponds to the term *analytics*, which refers to the section of the *Organon* in which Aristotle analyses the syllogism and demonstration into their principles (vide O.F. Owen's translations of the *Organon*, Prior Analytics, bk 1, ch 1, p 80).

c. Example (*paradeigma*)

The affirmative example (*sādharmya udāharana*), as defined by Akṣapāda corresponds exactly to the example (*paradeigma*), as explained by Aristotle (in his Prior Analytics, bk II, ch xxiv, p 232). An example, according to Aristotle, occurs when the major term is shown to be present with the middle, through something similar to the minor; but it is necessary to know that the middle is with the minor, and the major with what is similar, *eg* —

(1) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

(2) The hill is full of smoke.

(3) Therefore the hill is full of fire

* Concerning the age of Akṣapāda, vide introduction in *Indapadārthi*, translated by Mr. U. and edited by Dr. F. W. Thomas (in the press).

- (1) The hall is full of fire.
 - (2) Because it is full of smoke
 - (3) That which is full of smoke
- is full of fire, as a kitchen

D. VASUBANDHU
(ABOUT 450 A.D.)

e. Syllogism of two members

Vasubandhu in his *Tarka* *śāstra* (Chinese version, ch. 1) treats of syllogism as consisting of five members, but in his *Bonki* (*Vādaśūtri*), as quoted by Kuei-he¹ he is said to have maintained that a syllogism consists of two members only, viz. the proposition and the reason, and that the terms necessary for a syllogism are only three, viz. the minor, the major, and the middle. In the *Nyāya-vārttika* (1, 1, 37) and the *Nyāya-vārttika - tātparya-śikā* (1, 1, 37)² Vasubandhu, designated as Subandhu, is stated to have held that a syllogism consists of only two members, and that the example is quite superfluous. The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara³ (in his *Nyāyavātara*, v. 20) refers to Vasubandhu, when he says that according to experts in logic a

We may also regard the syllogism expounded by Nāgārjuna and Maitreya as comprising an enthymeme and an example, for the example sometimes consists of only one proposition⁴

D. ARISTOTLE

a. A perfect Syllogism

The form of syllogism laid down by Vasubandhu conforms in the main to the rules laid down by Aristotle with regard to a perfect syllogism, viz. that every syllogism consists of two premises and one conclusion, so that there are altogether three terms in a syllogism (*vide* *Prior Analytics*, bk. 1, ch. xxv pp. 140—2). A syllogism is defined by Aristotle (in *Prior Analytics*, bk. 1, ch. 1, p. 92) as a sentence (or speech) in which, certain things being laid down, something different from the premises necessarily results in consequence of their existence, *e.g.*

Premises

- (1) All that is full of smoke is full of fire.
- (2) This hall is full of smoke.

¹ George Grote, in his *Aristotle*, vol. 1, *Analytics Priora*, ii, ch. vi, p. 275, observes in a footnote as follows: "If we turn to ch. xxvii, p. 70, a 30—4, we shall find Aristotle on a different occasion disallowing altogether the so-called syllogism 'from example'."

C. NAGĀRJUNA (250-300 A D.)
MAITREYA (400 A D.)¹

C. ARISTOTLE.

d. *Function of an Example*

d. *Use of an Example*

The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, in his *Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra* (Chinese version, ch. 1, sect. 1), gives an elaborate explanation of example (*udāharana*), which is either affirmative or negative, and which must, according to him be mentioned to make clear the reasons of the disputant and his respondent. The Buddhist philosopher Maitreya, in his *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra* (Chinese version, vol. xv), treats of proofs (*sādhaka*) which include a proposition (*siddhānta*), a reason (*hetu*), and an example (*udāharana*, affirmative or negative). Though in the commentaries (*Nīṭya-bhāṣya*, l. 1, 37, and *Nīṭya-vārttika*, l. 1, 37) on the *Nyāya-sūtra* the "application" and "conclusion" are considered as essential parts of a syllogism, inasmuch as these on the strength of the general principle involved in the example reassert the reason and restate the proposition in a decisive way. Nāgārjuna and Maitreya on the other hand, reject them as superfluous on the ground of their not being different from the reason and proposition.² The three members of a *vijñāna*, explained by Nāgārjuna and Maitreya are as follows:

The three members of a syllogism, as explained by Nāgārjuna, Maitreya, and others, constitute what is called an example. Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric* (bk. II, p. 184, Welldon ed.), observes that it is proper in default of enthymemes, to make use of examples as logical proofs, these being the natural means of producing conviction. In the *Prior Analytics* (bk. II, ch. xxiv, p. 233, O. F. Owen's ed.), it is further observed that the example differs from induction in that the latter proves the universal from a complete enumeration of individuals, while the former attempts to prove it from a single individual or from some selected individuals, and in that the induction steps at the universal, while the example draws syllogistically a conclusion in respect of the minor term, e.g.

- (1) That which is full of smoke is full of fire as a kitchen
- (2) The hall is full of smoke
- (3) Therefore the hall is full of fire

The above may also be put in the reverse order as follows:

- (1) The hall is full of fire
- (2) Because it is full of smoke
- (3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire as a kitchen

¹ See p. 1. *Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra* of Indian Logic, pp. 46-71.

² It is perhaps the case of Nāgārjuna and Maitreya, and others, and of the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra* to consider the reason of - *hetu* - as the 2nd member of a *vijñāna*.

predicated. The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara¹ (500-550 A.D.), in his *Nyāyavātara*, verse 14, says that in an inference for the sake of others the minor term is to be defined as that of which it is assumed that the major term is predicable. In an inference for one's self, on the other hand, the minor term is to be defined, according to old Indian logicians, as that of which it is questionable whether the major term is predicable.

h Three characteristics of the middle term

In an inference for one's self, as well as in that for the sake of others, the middle term, if it is to lead to a valid conclusion, must possess the following characteristics².—

(1) The middle term must cover the minor term e.g. the hull is smoky.

(2) The middle term must be present in places in which there is the major term, e.g. that which is smoky is fiery.

(3) The middle term must be absent from places where there is an absence of the major term, e.g. that which is not fiery (non-fiery) is not smoky.

tion or doubt, while in an inference for the sake of others it is a matter of assumption, so also in the *Organon* of Aristotle (*Prior Analytics* bk. 1, ch. 1, § 81) the dialectic is an interrogation of contradiction, while the demonstration is an assumption of one part of the contradiction. In the *Organon* (*De Interpretatione*, ch. xi, pp. 67-8, O F Owen's edition) a dialectic is stated indeed to be an interrogation, for a choice should be given from the interrogation to enunciate this or that part of the contradiction. This statement coincides with the definition of Dignāga, according to whom the debater chooses the major term as predicable of the minor.

h The middle term in a syllogism.

The characteristics laid down by Dignāga correspond exactly to those laid down by Aristotle in the *Organon* (*Prior Analytics*, bk. 1, ch. iv, pp. 85-6 O F Owen's edition) it is stated that, when three terms so subsist with reference to one another that the minor is covered by the middle and the middle is or is not covered by the major, then there is necessarily a perfect syllogism of the major and the minor.

This statement may be illustrated as follows.—

¹ *Sādhyaśāhyapagamaḥ pakṣaḥ* (*Nyāyavātara*, verse 14, edited by S. C. Vidyabhūṣaṇa) *Sandigdha-sādhya-dharmatām pakṣatvam* (quoted in the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, *anumāna-khaṇḍa*, p. 407, *Bibliotheca Indica*).

² (1) *Phyoge kyī choe-śad dan*. (2) *Mithun-pakṣa-phyoge-śad la yod par-ma-pa-dan*. (3) *Mithun-pakṣa phyoge la-mad-pa-śad-du-ma pa-jan no*, (Dignāga's *Nyāyapraśaṅga*, Taoyü, Mdo, xcv, fol. 183b).

proposition can be proved without any example, if there is invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term, and in the absence of such invariable concomitance the proof is impossible even with the example.

Such being the view of Vasubandhu, his syllogism is of the following form —

- (1) This hill is full of fire
- (2) Because it is full of smoke
- (3) All that is full of smoke being full of fire

E. DIGNĀGA

(ABOUT 500 A.D.)¹

Conclusion.

- (3) Therefore this hill is full of fire

■ ARISTOTLE

f. Inference for one's self and inference for the sake of others

f. The dialectic proposition and demonstrative proposition

Avāṅga in his *Prakaranārya-vācā-sūtra* (Chinese version, vol. xi) omits inference altogether and substitutes for it a syllogism of five members. Dignāga in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* retains inference under the name of an inference for one's self and affiliates syllogism to inference by calling it an inference for the sake of others.²

The distinction made by Dignāga between an inference for one's self and that for the sake of others corresponds exactly to the distinction made by Aristotle (in his *Prior Analytics*, bk. 1, ch. 1, p. 81) between a dialectic proposition and a demonstrative proposition.

g. Definition of the minor term

In the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*,³ ch. iii, Dignāga defines a minor term (*pālā*) as that of which the major term is chosen to be

g. Explanation of a proposition

Just as in an inference for one's self the predicability of the major term in respect of the minor term is a matter of ques-

¹ See B. Vidyabhusana's *Medieval School of Indian Logic*, p. 81.
² *Ras-kurni* (shul'grun' rtag las shun-mthun waho
 (Pramāṇa-samuccaya, ch. ii, Tangyur, Mdo, xcv, fol. 8)
 (Guhān-gyid-don 2) r-rje-dpyag-ni rang-gis mthun-shun-gal byed yin
 (Pramāṇa-samuccaya, ch. iii, Tangyur, Mdo, xcv, fol. 9).
³ *Ide* Tangyur, Mdo, xcv, fol. 7.

fect (middle term) stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect e.g. all that is smoky is fiery

(3) Non-perception¹ (*anupalab-
dhi*), e.g. whatever thing (being per-
ceptible) is not perceived is non-
existent

f. Nature of the universal preposition

The relations which estab-
lish invariable concomitance of
a middle term with the major
term are the bases of universal
propositions. "Invariable con-
comitance" is designated in
Sanskrit as *vyāpti* (pervasion or
inherence), *nānātīyāta* (non-
exclusion), and *avinābhāva* (the
inseparability owing to which one can-
not exist without the other)

term), is said to be the cause of the
latter

g. Nature of the universal proposition

The proposition in which the
predicate is related to the sub-
ject *per se* or *causally* is a uni-
versal one. Aristotle in his
Posterior Analytics (bk I, ch
iv, pp 253-5, O. F. Owen's edi-
tion) calls that (the) universal
(major term) which is predi-
cated "of every" and "*per se*",
that is, which being predicable
of the middle term *per se* is pre-
dictated of it in every instance.
In the Posterior Analytics (bk
I, ch xxiv, p 301) Aristotle
further observes that the uni-
versal (major term) is the cause
of the middle term, which is
essentially co-present within it.
In Prior Analytics, bk I, ch.
xxiv, pp 138-9, Aristotle says
that in all syllogisms we must
have a universal proposition
(premise) which is shown by
the universal term

¹ *Anupalabhi* and his followers, who say that non-existence is inferred
from non-perception, assume non-perception as a middle term (*sign*). But the
theory of Indian logicians maintains that non-existence of a thing is perceived by
the sense by which the thing itself is perceived. Hence non-perception is
known by them as a middle term (*sign*)

It is also the relation of
 a thing to its effect, as
 for instance, a tree to its
 fruit, or a man to his
 son.

I

- (1) The tree is green.
- (2) Therefore it is green.
- (3) That which is green is

II

- (1) This tree is not green.
- (2) Therefore it is not green.
- (3) That which is not green is

THE DHARMAKĪRTI

(100-50 A D)

*Demonstration through three
 kinds of middle term*

The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, in his *Nyāya-bindu*, ch. II, divides the middle term (*linga*, sign)¹ into three kinds in accordance with the relations which it bears to the major term. The relations are as follows—

(1) Selfsameness or "being the essence of that" (*svabhāva, samatāpa, tādātmya*), which occurs when the predicate (or major term) is in essence wholly included in the subject (or middle term), e.g. this is a tree, because it is a *śāṇḍapā*.

(2) Effect, also called "origination from that" (*kārya, tadutpatti*), which occurs when the predicate (major term) and the sub-

I

- (1) That which is green is
- (2) Therefore it is green.
- (3) Therefore this tree is

II

- (1) That which is not green is
- (2) Therefore it is not green.
- (3) Therefore this tree is

THE NĪSTHĀNĀ

*Demonstration through the
 medium of essence and cause*

The two relations, viz. selfsameness (or "inherence") and "effect" as expounded by Dharmakīrti, correspond to the two relations, viz. "per se" (inherence) and "causal", as expounded by Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics* (bk. I, ch. IV, pp. 233-5, and bk. I, ch. VIII, p. 301).

(1) *Per se* (essence or inherence)—The predicate (major term) is said to be related to the subject (middle term *per se* essentially), if the properties of the former are inherent in the definition of the latter.

(2) The causal—The predicate (major term), which is essentially present with the subject (middle

¹ Vide S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *Medieval School of Indian Logic*, pp. 103-5.

² Dignāga in his *Pratimā-samuccaya*, Chap. II.

³ Tīrtaveśa ca lokaṇi, anupalabdhiḥ svabhāva-kārya-eva (Nyāya-bindu, ch. I, p. 164, *Bibliotheca Indica*).

called by Uddyotakara *parāmarśa*¹ (syllogism) or *linga-parāmarśa* (syllogism from a sign), and all the three parts combined together are designated as *parāmarśa rūpanumāna*² (a syllogistic inference). Since the time of Uddyotakara no further development has been made in the form of the syllogistic inference, except that the three parts of it have been called respectively the instrument (*ka-raṇa*), operation (*vyāpāra*), and consequence (*phala*). The first two parts (premises) combined together have been uniformly designated as *parāmarśa* (syllogism or enthymeme).

puted to have been derived from the *Organon* of Aristotle, as taught in a developed form in the Syro-Persian School of Gundeshapur³ in Susiana about 350 A D.

According to certain Roman commentators⁴ too, the premises alone constitute the syllogism.

6 *Migrations of the Logical Theories of Aristotle from Alexandria into India (175 B.C.-600 A.D.)*

to 30 B.C., when the Greeks occupied the north-western parts of

¹ Tasmāt smṛtyanugrhitō *linga parāmarśo* 'bhīstārtha pratipādako bhavati (Nyāya-vārttika, I, I, 5, p. 47, *Bibliotheca Indica*).

² Tad idam antimanam pratyakṣam pūrvābhyām. Pratyakṣābhyām smṛtyanugrhyamāṇam parāmarśa-rūpanam anumānam bhavati (Nyāya-vārttika, I, I, 6, p. 48, *Bibliotheca Indica*).

³ Vide C. Huari's *Arabic Literature*, pp. 137, 280.

⁴ George Grote, in his *Aristotle*, vol. 1, *Analytica Priora*, I, ch. v. p. 200, says that Aristotle includes in a syllogism the two premises as well as the conclusion. But on the same page he quotes in a footnote the opinion of Julius Paetus (ad. Anal. Prior 1), who said that the syllogism consisted of the two premises alone and the conclusion was not a part thereof, but something distinct and superadded.

⁵ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol. 1, p. 493.

G UDDYOTAKARA
(600-50 A D)¹

k *Syllogism from a sign* (*linga-
parāmarśa*)

Uddyotakara, who completely incorporated syllogism into inference in his *Nyāya-vārttika*,² defines inference as knowledge which is preceded by the perception of the middle term (sign) and recollection of its invariable concomitance with the major term in the following form: "I perceive that this hill has smoke, which I remember to be invariably concomitant with fire, and hence I infer that this hill has fire" The above may be properly put in the following form —

- (1) Whatever is smoky is fiery
- (2) This hill is smoky
- (3) Therefore this hill is fiery

The first part (major premise) of the above inference is called *vyāpti* (a universal proposition); the second part (minor premise) is called *upanaya* (an application of the universal); and the third part is called *anumiti* (inferential knowledge or conclusion). The first two parts (premises) constitute what is

G.

k *Enthymem*

Aristotle, *Analytics* (bk. ii, 40), speaks of enthymemes as a type of inference from a like to a like. The first figure of the syllogism is infallible and leads to a conclusion which is necessarily true. The enthymeme corresponds to the syllogism from a sign³ (*linga-parāmarśa*) as defined by

Just as in the case of Uddyotakara's (*parāmarśa*) syllogism, the first two parts of the inference, as in the case of Indian Logic,⁴ (e.g. in the *Shāstra* of 1250 A D) the syllogism comprises only the first two parts and not the third. The third part may be added to the first two parts of the syllogism of the school of 1250 A D and Bāṇarasi

gives a local explanation of a sign.
+ Dr. George Grote, in his *Elements of Logic*, states in a footnote as follows: "If one premise only of the syllogism is added, it becomes a syllogism."
+ Dr. George Grote, in his *Elements of Logic*, states in a footnote as follows: "If one premise only of the syllogism is added, it becomes a syllogism."

L. 1. *Analytics*, bk. ii, 40.

library of Alexandria, where they were duly appreciated and whence they gradually spread to India and other countries. To the scholars at Athens and Rome these works were practically lost, until copies of some of them reached the island of Rhodes, where they were edited by Andronicus in 50 B.C. Even the edition of Andronicus was not available in the Middle Ages to the Greeks and Romans, who depended for their knowledge of Aristotle on the Latin translation of Boethius (480-525 A.D.). But the original works of Aristotle seem to have been carefully preserved in Alexandria, and on the downfall of the Greeks and Romans they found their way into Syria and Persia, whence they reached the Arabic school of Bagdad about the beginning of the ninth century A.D. The original Greek texts of Aristotle's works after these strange vicissitudes reached the country of their birth via Constantinople about 1204 A.D. The presumption, therefore, is that from the third century B.C. to 1200 A.D. Aristotle's works were more extensively read and better appreciated in the East than in the West.

India¹ and had their capital at Śākala, officially called Taxila (modern Sialkot) in the Punjab. The work of which we find a trace in this period is the Art of Rhetoric, which was evidently a favourite subject of study among the Greeks and from which the syllogism of five members is derived. It is mentioned in the *Caraka* and *Arthashastra* but not in the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya. It was of great importance in the history of Indian logic.

The masters of Alexandria, Syria, and Persia, on a brisk trade between Alexandria and India. Aristotle which comes to our notice in this period is the *Posterior Analytics* (and possibly also the *De Interpretatione*) from which Akṣapada, Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, and others seem to have, as shown above, borrowed the doctrine of the *śūnyatā*.

The *Prabhāsa* and Dignāga, were inhabitants of (Prabhāsa) and Conjeeveram (Kāñchi), which were the seaports on the eastern and western coasts of India, by merchants and travellers from Alexandria. It is probable that the *Prior Analytics* was widely read in those days, either in the original or in vernacular translation. The introduction of different parts of the Greek *Prior Analytics* into Indian thought must need have been gradual, as these had to be adapted into and harmonized with the parts previously existing in Indian thought and language. The third period extends from about 450 A.D. to 600 A.D. when the Syro-Persian Empire of the Gunde-shapur, established in Susiana (Persia) in 350 A.D. dispersed some of the best works of the Greek philosophers. At this time, in the height of its glory and spread, it is not quite certain whether any introduction of new ideas took place.

It is mentioned in the preceding pages to show that the works of Aristotle were very well known in India during the third century.


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¹ p. 302. ² Fide Huet's *Arabic Literature*, p. 100. Grant's article on Aristotle in the *Encyclopædia*.

they admonished each other, juniors and seniors mutually helping to perfection. Learned men from different cities came to Nālandā to acquire renown, and some persons even usurped the name of Nālandā students in order that they might be received everywhere with honour. "Of those from abroad who wished to enter the schools discussion, the majority, beaten by the difficulties of the problems, withdrew; and those who were deeply versed in old and modern learning were admitted, only two or three out of ten succeeding." Hwen-thsang mentions some celebrated men of Nālandā, such as Dharmapāla and Candrapāla, Guṇamati and Sthiramati,⁴ Prabhāmitra and Jinamitra, and Jñānacandra and Silabhadra.

Another Chinese pilgrim named I-tsing, who resided in Nālandā for ten years (probably 675—685 A.D.), says that there were eight halls and 300 apartments in the monastery of Nālandā with more than 3,000 resident monks. The lands in its possession contained more than 200 villages which had been bestowed upon the monastery by kings of different generations.⁵

Nālandā assumed the character of a university from about 150 A.D.⁶ Balāditya, king of Magadha, who built a monastery at Nālandā, was a contemporary of the Hun king Mihrakula, who reigned first in Śākala and afterwards in Kāśmīra. Now Mihrakula⁷ began his reign in 515 A.D., and his contemporary, Balāditya, must also have lived about that time. There were three predecessors of Balāditya who built monasteries at Nālandā. Of them, the earliest, named Sakṛāditya, must have reigned about 450 A.D. if we suppose 25 years as the average duration of the reign of each of them. The year 450 A.D. is then the earliest limit which we can roughly assign to the royal recognition of Nālandā. The latest limit which we know with certainty is



APPENDIX C.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NĀLANDA

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Nālanda was a village wh. is identified with modern Bara-gaon 7 miles north of Raigar in Behar. Though occasionally mentioned in the Pali literature, Nālanda was not of great importance before the rise of the Mahāyāna at the beginning of the Christian era. Nāgārjuna about 200 A.D., and Ārya Deva, about 320 A.D. were the earliest scholars to take an interest in the educational institution at that village. A Brahmana named Suviṇṇu, a contemporary of Nāgārjuna is said to have established 104 temples there in order that the Abhidharma of the Mahāyāna might not decline. About 400 A.D. the Chinese pilgrim, Fa-hien,* visited this place, which he calls "the village of Nalo." He saw there a tower which had been erected on the spot where Śāriputra, the right-hand disciple of Buddha, had entered Nirvāṇa. Early in the 7th century A.D. another Chinese pilgrim, the famous Hwēn-thsang, visited Nālanda and halted there 15 months to study the Sanskrit language under Śīlabhadra. According to him the site of Nālanda was originally a mango garden which was bought by 300 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and given to Buddha. After the Nirvāṇa of Buddha, five kings, named Sakraditya, Buddha Gupta, Tathāgata Gupta, Baladitya, and Vajra, built five Saṅghārāma or monasteries at Nālanda. A king of Central India established another magnificent monastery, and began to build round these edifices a high wall with one gate. A long succession of kings continued the work of building, using all the skill of the sculptor, till at the time of Hwēn-thsang in 637 A.D. the whole was "truly marvellous to behold." In the establishment were some thousands of monks, all men of great ability and learning. They were very strict in observing the rules of Vinaya, and were looked up to as models by all India. Learning and discussing, they found the day too short, day and night

they admonished each other, juniors and seniors mutually helping to perfection. Learned men from different cities came to Nālandā to acquire renown, and some persons even usurped the name of Nālandā students in order that they might be received everywhere with honour. 'Of those from abroad who wished to enter the schools discussion, the majority, beaten by the difficulties of the problems, withdrew; and those who were deeply versed in old and modern learning were admitted, only two or three out of ten succeeding.' Hsuen-thsang mentions some celebrated men of Nālandā, such as Dharmapāla and Candrapāla, Guṇamati and Sthiramati,⁴ Prabhāmītra and Jinamītra, and Jñānacandra and Śilabhadra.

Another Chinese pilgrim named I-t'ung, who resided in Nālandā for ten years (probably 675—685 A D), says that there were eight halls and 300 apartments in the monastery of Nālandā with more than 3,000 resident monks. The lands in its possession contained more than 200 villages which had been bestowed upon the monastery by kings of different generations.⁵

Nālandā assumed the character of a university from about 450 A D.⁶ Balāditya, king of Magadha, who built a monastery at Nālandā, was a contemporary of the Hun king Mihirakula,

limit which we can roughly assign to the royal recognition of Nālandā. The latest limit which we know with certainty is

⁴ Dr. D. B. Spooner observes —
Nālandā, as is widely known, was one of the principal seats and centres of Buddhist culture and Buddhist learning in the Gupta period of Indian history, and for some centuries thereafter. The precise date of its foundation as "University" is now unknown, but from the circumstance that the Chinese pilgrim Fa Hien, makes no particular mention of the place, whereas the pilgrim who followed him, Hsuen Tsang, describes the place at length, leads modern scholars to infer that it must have risen in the interval between the visits of these two, namely, somewhere about the middle, perhaps, of the fifth century A D (p. 31 of the "Annual report of the Archaeological Survey of India, Eastern Circle, for 1915-16").

APPENDIX C. THE UNIVERSITY OF NALANDA.

(About 300-400 A.D.)

Nalanda was a village which is identified with modern Barigaon, 7 miles north of Rajahmundry in Bihar. Though certainly mentioned in the Pali literature, Nalanda was not of great importance before the rise of the Mahayana at the beginning of the Christian era. Nāgārjuna, about 300 A.D., and Arya Deva about 350 A.D. were the earliest scholars to take an interest in the educational institution at that village. A Brahmana named Surisnu, a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, is said to have established 104 temples there in order that the Abhidharma of the Mahayana might not decline.¹ About 400 A.D. the Chinese pilgrim, Fa-hien,² visited this place, which he calls "the village of Nalo." He saw there a tower which had been erected on the spot where Śāriputra, the right-hand disciple of Buddha, had entered Nirvāṇa. Early in the 7th century A.D. another Chinese pilgrim, the famous Hsuen-thsang, visited Nalanda and halted³ there 15 months to study the Sanskrit language under Śīlabhadra. According to him⁴ the site of Nalanda was originally a mango garden which was bought by 500 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and given to Buddha.⁵ After the Nirvāṇa of Buddha five kings, named Dāśarāditya, Buddha Gupta, Tathāgata Gupta, Bālāditya, and Vajra, built five Saṅghārāma or monasteries at Nalanda. A king of Central India established another magnificent monastery, and began to build round these edifices a high wall with one gate. A long succession of kings continued the work of building, using all the skill of the sculptor, till at the time of Hsuen-thsang in 637 A.D. the whole was "truly marvellous to behold." In the establishment were some thousands of monks, all men of great ability and learning. They were very strict in observing the rules of Vinaya, and were looked up to as models by all India. Learning and discussing, they found the day too short, day and night

[x A].

x 70-86.

115-170

-- not above been given to a Buddhist saint of a later age and not to
the himself

they admonished each other, juniors and seniors mutually helping to perfection. Learned men from different cities came to Nālandā to acquire renown, and some persons even usurped the name of Nālandā students in order that they might be received everywhere with honour. 'Of those from abroad who wished to enter the schools discussion, the majority, beaten by the difficulties of the problems, withdrew, and those who were deeply versed in old and modern learning were admitted, only two or three out of ten succeeding.' Hwen-thsang mentions some celebrated men of Nālandā, such as Dharmapāla and Candrapāla, Gunamatī and Sthūramatī,² Prabhāmītra and Jināmītra, and Jñānacandra and Śilābhadrā.

Another Chinese pilgrim named I-tsing, who resided in Nālandā for ten years (probably 675—685 A D), says that there were eight halls and 300 apartments in the monastery of Nālandā
 * its posses-
 n bestowed

from about 450 A D.³ Balāditya, king of Magadha, who built a monastery at Nālandā, was a contemporary of the Hun king Mihirakula,

limit which we can roughly assign to the royal recognition of Nālandā. The latest limit which we know with certainty is

² See the museum, perhaps, of the 11th century A D. report of the Archaeological Survey of India, Eastern Circle, for 1915-16

APPENDIX C.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NĀLANDA.

(About 300-450 A.D.)

Nālandā was a village which is identified with modern Bara-Naon¹ 7 miles north of Rajahm in Bihar. Though minutely mentioned in the Pali literature, Nālandā was not of great importance before the rise of the Mahāyāna at the beginning of the Christian era. Nāgārjuna about 200 A.D. and Ārya Deva about 250 A.D. were the earliest scholars to take an interest in the educational institution at that village. A Brahmana named Suvarṇa, a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, is said to have established 104 temples there in order that the Abhidharma of the Mahāyāna might not decline.² About 400 A.D. the Chinese pilgrim, Fa-hien³ visited this place, which he calls "the village of Nalo." He saw there a tower which had been erected on the spot where Nāriputra the right-hand disciple of Buddha had entered Nirvāṇa. Early in the 7th century A.D. another Chinese pilgrim the famous Hsuen-thsang visited Nālandā and halted⁴ there 15 months to study the Sanskrit language under Śīlabhadra. According to him⁵ the site of Nālandā was originally a mango garden which was bought by 300 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and given to Buddha.⁶ After the Nirvāṇa of Buddha five kings named Sakraditya, Buddha Gupta, Tatbhagata Gupta, Baladitya, and Vajra, built five Saṅghārāma or monasteries at Nālandā. A king of Central India established another magnificent monastery, and began to build round these edifices a high wall with one gate. A long succession of kings continued the work of building, using all the skill of the sculptor, till at the time of Hsuen-thsang in 637 A.D. the whole was "truly marvellous to behold." In the establishment were some thousands of monks, all men of great ability and learning. They were very strict in observing the rules of Vinaya, and were looked up to as models by all India. Learning and discussing, they found the day too short, day and night

¹ From the author's "Indian Logic: Medieval School" (Appendix A).

² Vide Cunningham's *Ancient Geography of India*, p. 468.

³ Vide Tāranātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 70-76.

⁴ Vide Beal's *Fa-hien*, p. 111.

⁵ Vide Cunningham's *Ancient Geography of India*, § x.

⁶ Vide Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. II, pp. 116-170.

⁷ It must have been given to a Buddhist saint of a later age and not to Buddha himself.

APPENDIX D.¹

LIST OF KINGS OF THE PĀLA DYNASTY OF BENGAL AND BEHAR

(From Tibetan sources)

he south to the Vindhya ranges. It is stated that during his reign Śānta Rakṣita died. Now Śānta Rakṣita visited Tibet during the reign of Thi-srong-deu-tsan in 749 A.D., and worked here for 13 years, that is, till 762 A.D. His death must therefore have taken place after 762 A.D. Dīpankara Śrījñāna, *liś Atiśa*,
ung Naya . . .
sho-lotsava

son of Lha-lu-ma-yo-sgrub-pa, was born in 762 A.D. These facts throw a good deal of light on the dates of the Pāla kings.² It is further stated that the death of Mahī Pāla is exactly synchronous with that of the Tibetan king Khri-ral. Now Khri-ral (or Rat-pa-can) died in 899 A.D.³ This fixes the date of the death of Mahī Pāla. As the period of reign of each of the kings that preceded and succeeded Mahī Pāla is definitely stated by Lama Tārānātha, and also by the author of the *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, there is no difficulty in ascertaining the dates of the Pāla kings. Proceeding in this way, we can fix the dates as follows:—

| | |
|--------------|--------------|
| 1. Go Pāla | 660—705 A.D. |
| 2. Deva Pāla | 705—753 A.D. |
| 3. Rasa Pāla | 753—765 A.D. |

¹ From the author's "Indian Logic, Mahāyāna School" (Appendix B).

² Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus*, von Schöfner, pp. 202—253, and *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., pp. 112—121.

³ Vide the 16th volume of *Klon-ridol-gsum hbum*, and Sarat Chandra Das's "Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow," pp. 50—78.

⁴ Vide the Chronological Table extracted from the *Vanijyākarpā* in *Compendio della Grammatica Tibetana*, p. 183.

750 A D, -

Nālanda
there was
and Nāland

approximately until 850 A D that the latter continued to exist

According to Tibetan accounts¹ the quarter in which the Nālanda University, with its grand library was located was called Dharmagañja (Prot. st

ings called
tively In

sacred scrip

such as Samāja-guhya etc After the Turuṅka raiders had made incursions in Nālanda, the temples and Cātyas there were repaired by a sage named Mudita Bhadra. Soon after this, Kukutaśiddha, minister of the king of Magadha, erected a temple at Nālanda, and, while a religious sermon was being delivered there, two very indigent Tirthika mendicants appeared. Some naughty young novice-monks in disdain threw washing-water on them. This made them very angry. After propitiating the sun for 12 years, they performed a *yajña*, fire sacrifice and threw living embers and ashes from the sacrificial pit into the Buddhist temples, etc. This produced a great conflagration which consumed Ratnodadhi. It is, however, said that many of the Buddhist scriptures were saved by water which leaked through the sacred volumes of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and Tantra.

¹ Vide Pag-sam jon-zang, edited in the original Tibetan by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C I E, at Calcutta, p 92

APPENDIX E.¹

THE ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF VIKRAMAŚĪLA. (ABOUT 800—1200 A D)

Vikramaśīla,² mentioned in Sanskrit Sragdharāstotra-tikā,³ Vṛhat-svayambhū-purāṇa,⁴ Tibetan Tangyur,⁵ etc., was a great collegiate monastery, or rather University, founded by King Dharma Pala at the close of the 8th century A D. It was situated on a precipitous hill⁶ in Behar at the right bank of the Ganges, possibly at Śīla-saṅgama, now called Patharghat near Colgong in the Bhagalpur district. Dharmapala endowed the university with rich grants sufficing for the maintenance of 108 resident monks besides numerous non-resident monks and pilgrims. At the head of the university was always a most learned and pious sage. Thus at the time of Dharma Pala, Ācārya Buddha-jñāna-pāda directed the affairs of the university, and during 1034—1038 A D Dipankara or Śrījñāna Atiśa

श्रीमद्विजयनमोक्तदेवनागविद्यारोच राजमुद्रपद्धतिभिः श्रीविजयनमोक्तता वाक्यार्थकुति-
हीन परिचयः (Sragdharāstotra, edited in the Bibliotheca Indica series by Satish
Chandra Vidyabhusana, p. 80)

- ४ नारायणां वर्याणां च विद्यारोच वचनार्थकम् ।
वरा विजयनमोक्तवि विद्यारोच वचनमुत्तमम् ॥
वर्धमानेन नारायणे भिक्षुः पञ्चनमोक्तम् ।
वर्धने दिव्यनारायणं नामवर्धनीति च वदाम् ॥

(Vṛhat-svayambhū-purāṇa, edited by M. M. Hara Pressed Sastri chap. vi, 220—231).

¹ Numerous Sanskrit works such as श्रीविजयनमोक्तताख्ये वचने, नारायणविजयनमोक्तम्,

² This was modern Buxar, which is a small village three miles north of Bargaon (ancient Nālandā) and six miles to the north of Rajpur in the subdivision of Behar (see Report of the Archaeological Survey, vol. viii p. 13). But this identification does not tally with the description found in Tibetan books, for the Ganges never passed by Buxar, nor is there any hill near to it.

| | | |
|----|--------------------------------|----------------|
| 4 | Dharma Pala .. | 755—829 A.D. |
| 5 | Manu Mahasimha | 829—837 A.D. |
| 6 | Vasudha Pala | 837—847 A.D. |
| 7 | Maha Pala | 847—872 A.D. |
| 8 | Maha Pala | 872—900 A.D. |
| 9 | Parasu Pala | 900—952 A.D. |
| 10 | Śrīratha Pala or Prasanna Pala | 952—955 A.D. |
| 11 | Chandaka | 955—983 A.D. |
| 12 | Rudra Pala | 983—1015 A.D. |
| 13 | Naya Pala | 1015—1030 A.D. |
| 14 | Amra Pala | 1030—1043 A.D. |
| 15 | Hasthi Pala | 1043—1078 A.D. |
| 16 | Kantika Pala | 1078—1092 A.D. |
| 17 | Itama Pala | 1092—1138 A.D. |
| 18 | Yaksha Pala | 1138—1139 A.D. |

The researches on the Pala kings, by the late Dr Rajendra Lal Mitra, arrived at a conclusion which is somewhat different from mine. Dr Mitra's list of Pala kings¹ is given below —

| | | |
|----|------------------|----------------|
| 1 | Go Pala | 855—875 A.D. |
| 2 | Dharma Pala | 875—895 A.D. |
| 3 | Deva Pala | 895—915 A.D. |
| 4 | Vijaya Pala I | 915—935 A.D. |
| 5 | Narayana Pala .. | 935—955 A.D. |
| 6 | Raja Pala | 955—975 A.D. |
| 7. | Pala | 975—995 A.D. |
| 8 | Vijaya Pala II | 995—1015 A.D. |
| 9 | Mahi Pala | 1015—1040 A.D. |
| 10 | Naya Pala | 1040—1060 A.D. |
| 11 | Vijaya Pala III | 1060—1080 A.D. |

¹ Probably the same as Narayana Pala who, in the Bhagalpur plate, is styled "the lord of Anga."

² See Dr. Rajendra Lal Mitra's "Indo-Aryans," vol. II, p. 232.

APPENDIX F.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MITHILA (1173-1575 A D)

In the Rāmāyana, Mahābhārata and in Buddhist literature, Mithilā or Tirhut figures as a renowned kingdom. Mithilā was protected on the north by the impenetrable jungles of the Himalayas. On the other three sides the three rivers Gandakī, Ganges and Kausikī¹ surrounded it, while the land itself is intersected by small rivers. On account of the natural protection, Tirhut was not attacked by foreign invaders frequently though we hear that in the 13th century it was attacked by the ninth Malik Izzuddin-Tughri (1233-1244 A D.) When Vijaya Sen was reigning in Bengal, Nanyadeva² of the Karnatak dynasty was ruling in Mithilā in 1097 A D. He was defeated by king Vijaya³

Kameśvara, (2) Bhāgīśvara, (3) Gangeśvara, (4) Viśvanāthadeva (5) Kirtimukha (6) Bhavānāthadeva (7) Devāsīmha, (8) Sivasīmha, (9) Padmasīmha, (10) H
sīmha, (12) Dhīrasīmha
(15) Lakṣmīnāthadeva
founded a line of Rajas in 1097, 1098

¹ History of Mithilā during the pre-Mughal period and History of Navya-Nyāya and Smṛiti, November and December, 1915. Rai Mohan Chakravarti Bahadur; vide also University of Nadia by Satya Chandra Vidya bhāsana.

सन्देशविन्दुविभुसिद्धिद्वयसं
सन्देशविन्दुविभुसिद्धिद्वयसं
सन्देशविन्दुविभुसिद्धिद्वयसं
सन्देशविन्दुविभुसिद्धिद्वयसं

Vide the Rock Edicts on the ruined walls of the ancient fort of Surdāsa.

सं नान्यदेव विजयति विजय विजय
सं नान्यदेव विजयति विजय विजय

Drupada Vijaya Sen Inscription.

APPENDIX G.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NADIA

(1575—1920 A D)

Navadvīpa, which is popularly known as Nadia, is a small town in Bengal situated on the river Bhāgīrathī (Ganges) at the point of its junction

Situation of Nadia.

with the Jalāngī. It occupies the north-western part of the Gangetic delta and literally signifies "a new isle." Once it was a very important centre through which trade was carried on by the Bhāgīrathī between Saptagrāma (a port on the river Saravati, a little to the north-west of Hugli and nearly 16 krosas south of Nadia) and the United Provinces and by the Jalāngī between Saptagrāma and Eastern Bengal.

Nearly four miles to the east of the modern town of Nadia there is a small village called *Suvarna-vihāra*

Traces of the Pala Kings in Nadia.

(golden hermitage) which is often pointed out as the place where the Buddhist Kings

of the Pala dynasty used to reside in the days of yore, when a branch of the Bhāgīrathī, flowing from the north of the modern village Mayāpur, rolled below the hermitage. Even now the ruins of the ancient buildings can be found here and there, silently testifying to the former grandeur of the place. The decaying

10th century A D.

But, practically speaking, Nadia was unknown in history until it rose to importance for the first time in

Nadia raised to the status of a town under the Sena kings

1063 A D (or rather about 1106 A D)

when, according to a local legend cited in the Imperial Gazetteer¹ of India and Statistical Account of Bengal² it was selected by Mahārāja Lakṣmana Sena of Gauda³ as the place of his residence in consideration of the sanctity of the Bhāgīrathī flowing by it. The ruins of the palace of Lakṣmana Sena are still extant in Nadia at the south of the village Bīlpukur and north of the village Samudragada.

¹ W. W. Hunter's Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol VII p 12.

² W. W. Hunter's Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol II, p. 142.

³ Lakṣmana Sena is said to have reigned in Bengal between 1106 and 11 A.D. For the date of the kings of the Sena dynasty, vide Rajendra Lal Mitra Indo-Aryans, Vol. II, p. 258.

which has continued up to the present time. Most of the later productions of Mithilā appeared in these periods.

The Modern School of Nyāya commenced with Gaṅgeśa on the eve of the 12th century. Similar is the case with Smṛti writers who began with Graheśvara in the 13th century.

The most important scholar of the Kāmeśvara period is Jagaddhara who besides writing commentaries on a variety of subjects, such as the Gītā, Devimahātmya, Meghadūta, Gita Govinda and Māliki Mādhava and others, wrote original treatises on erotics (Rasika Sarvasva, Sangita Sarvasva). The next is Vidyāpati whose name is associated with Maithilī songs or Padavali generally. His works stirred up the later Vaiṣṇava writers of Bengal. The next scholar to be mentioned is Śaṅkara Miśra. His works on the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya are of high value. His other works on Smṛti are also of great value.

The next scholar of great importance = Vācaspati Miśra who flourished in the time of Bhairavendra and Rāmabhadra and wrote mainly on the Smṛti. But the great influence of the age did not spare him and he wrote also on Nyāya. His works on the latter subject are the Nyāya-sūtrādhāra, Khandana khandadhāra and the Anumāna khandatīka his other works being the Niti-santānaṁ a work on the morals.

Many other scholars flourished at this time. But they are overshadowed by the glory and achievements of the scholars named above. It was an age of great scholastic activities. The same spirit spread throughout

14th and 15th centuries. It was the resort of a large number of students who flocked there from all parts of India to study specially Logic or Nyāya philosophy.

* Students who studied the subject in the 14th and 15th centuries, as mentioned in the Sanskrit literature, are called 'Kāmeśvara' scholars. They were asked to write the paper several times by a committee. In this way they had to show their skill in writing a paper. After passing the examination they received the degree of 'Kāmeśvara'.

him. Then came the turn of Mahamahopādhyāya Rājākṣṇa Tarkapañcānana, who took up the same questions and explained them fully, steadily and clearly. He elucidated each difficult word and that so thoroughly and clearly that every point in the argument was driven home to the audience. He then assailed the arguments put forward by his rival and thoroughly exposed his hasty exposition. Mahamahopādhyāya Rājākṣṇa, in recognition of his lucid exposition and convincing logic, was declared senior logician by the Council.

In Smṛti there is a chair¹ of the Senior Smṛta (Jurist), which was inaugurated by Raghunandana, the most famous jurist of his time. Raghunandana

flourished in the sixteenth century A.D. His *Jyotiṣ-tattva* was written in 1567 A.D. After him there flourished

Tantrik studies flourished under Raghunandana's successors in his followers.

A chair of astronomy was established in Nadia a long time ago. As late as 1718 A.D. there was born in Gargya gotra an astronomer named Rāmarudra Vidyānidhi who was the author of *Jyotiṣa-sāra-saṅgraha* and Court-Pandit of Pañcakota. From the time of Mahārāj Rāmarudra Vidyānidhi, who is related by

¹ *Feḍa Navadvīpa Mahamāṇḍal*, by Kanti Chandra Barua and "Nadia Aśikūṭ," by Kumudanath Mukherjee.



Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and the tutor of the Lama went to the Government College to make a preliminary examination of the Brahminic Sanskrit manuscripts, copies of which had already been translated into Tibetan at various dates between 629 A D and

December. Captain O Connor, accompanied by Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and others, made a preliminary inspection of the sacred sites in Buddha Gaya. The Tāshi Lama offered his worship to the Bodhi tree and the image of Buddha on the 21st December, one of the most auspicious days according to the Tibetan calendar. On entering the sacred shrine His Holiness bowed down before the great image and sat down himself. An hour after His Holiness came out of the temple and changed his dress for a yellow one and sat in meditation in the *vasṛāṣana* under the Bodhi tree for about three hours from 9 A M to 12 A M, while his numerous devotees stood round him in deep silence. At noon the Lama opened his eyes and received ovations and gifts from his followers.

The Tāshi Lama left Buddha Gaya at 10 P.M. on the 25th December and reached Calcutta by a special train on the 26th at 7-30 A M. He was greeted by a salute of 17 guns and was received by the Aide-de-Camp of the Viceroy. His Holiness was

APPENDIX H.

THE TASHI LAMA'S VISIT TO INDIA

During the year 1905

Tashi Lama and his party

and Princess of Wales

for India early in November (8th Nov). The Government of India made ample provision for the reception and escort of the party. Accordingly Captain W. F. O'Connor, C.I.E., B. Trade Agent, Gyantse (Tibet) sent

by easy stages halting at various stations at Gangtok. His Holiness and his followers in Sikkim who placed his

Very many of the Bhutias, all round the camp lay camps devout Bhutias, who, clad in their motley dress, had ridden for miles to pay their respects to the Lama. His Holiness and suite arrived at Rawalpindi on the 7th December at 2-30 p.m. and on the same day His Holiness had an audience with His Royal Highness the Prince and Princess of Wales. On the 10th December, 9-30 a.m., His Holiness left for Taxila, called in Tibetan Do-Jog, about 26 miles north of Rawalpindi, whence he started for Agra, which place he reached on 11th

w-covered lake at
conspicuous posi-
the Grand Lama
less beauty of the
impressive The
ing, can better be
imagined than described

There are very few human habitations here, still there is a bazar where rice, *dal*, *ghee* and even potatoes are available. Besides, there are a post office, a telegraph office, a medical hospital, a police station and an excre patrol and a magnificent Dak Bungalow—all testifying to the great importance of the place.

In the morning of 2nd June I left Rung-Po Valley for Gangtok. The river Rung-Po falls into the Teesta at a place called Bhotang which is about a mile down the Rung Po Valley. Again following up the

north of Rung-Po Valley. It is the present capital of Sikkim situated on the peak of a hill girt by two rivers on its sides. There is a good road from Gangtok. The good natured Maharaja of Sikkim and the intelligent Maharani are both very much interested in Buddhism and showed me the kindest consideration.

Mr. J. C. White, C I E, Political Resident of Sikkim, to whom I was already known in connection with the Tashi Lama's pilgrimage in India, received me very kindly and gave me letters of introduction to the Lamas at Labrang and P'hodang, a copy of it is given below —

ལམ་ལོ་ལ།

༡༠། རྒྱལ་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་
རྒྱལ་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་
རྒྱལ་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་
རྒྱལ་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་མཆོད་པོ་

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I
RECEIVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI
ON 10/10/68

Having been associated with the Hialeah Social Circle
for 12 years in the capacity of the
organizer and secretary of the same
and that there were no back grants of the
same to the Hialeah Social Circle
and that there were no back grants of the
same to the Hialeah Social Circle

I started with credentials from Mr. [redacted] of Public Instruction, [redacted] and Mr. C. H. [redacted], U.S.D., [redacted] May, 1907, first day.

[illegible]

as a travel...
found them very...
withing a distance of about...
Teesta Bridge. This is a very important...
Tibet, Sikkim, and India, and through it...
own passed to Lhasa in 1903-04. There is a small bazar where
the river Teesta and there is a small building
blm are procurable. I was welcomed here by the Deputy For
anger, who accommodated me in the upper flat of a new building
ected by a Marwar trader in the centre of the bazar. Within
mle of the bazar there is a Triveni junction, where the
Tangut and another river flow into the Teesta. Nepalese and other
hillmen attach great sanctity to these junctions, where the
wash themselves every year at Pous Sankranti (about the middle
of January). On this occasion for three days, Teesta Bridge Valley
bold a fair which continues by hills and dales,
a charming place surrounded by hills and dales,
and following up the course of the river
Teesta, by the Tibetan trade route, I
In the morning of 1st June, I left the Teesta Bridge Valley
the north of Teesta Bridge and is situated on the river Rung-Po,
on which there is an artistic drawbridge the river,

all around. We never reach them, like will-o'-the-wisp. At last a glow of a lamp, coming out from a humble cottage. The Lama, who was our guide and interpreter, knocked at the door, but the inmate would not open the door easily. "Are these ghosts or elves that come to me at so late an hour in the night?" That was the first murmur that reached our ears, and we came to know that it was a woman that spoke. We had no breath to argue with her. We begged and implored, and to our relief the door flew open and we saw she was preparing barley flour then. She received us very hospitably and gave us plenty of milk she had kept reserved for selling in the following morning. Our cook got this milk properly warmed on the fire and some of our attendants prepared tea with it. I drank a quantity of milk and felt somewhat refreshed. She supplied us with water which she kept in very big bamboo from which the soft portions had been carefully scooped out. These bamboos contained the hands and feet, etc. We hear of a Lama that is, one who is which he serves for six days keep his connection with his home on the seventh day. Next morning we were going to take leave

Labrang and Phodang. of Khangri. There is an old monastery belonging to the oldest religious sect of Tibet, named *Nying-ma-pa* or the unreformed sect. It contains images of Buddha, Bodhisattvas and saints, and a very large collection of the Tibetan Buddhist manuscripts and block prints including the encyclopedias of the Kangyur and the Tangyur.

Phodang is nearly a mile below Labrang. Here, too, there is an old monastery (which is being reconstructed) belonging to the Karma-pa sect of Tibet. This monastery is said to have been

བུག་དགོས་དང་། ལྷག་པར་ཁོང་ལ་རིག་ས་རྒྱ་གར་དགོས་ཅི་ཡོད་ཀྱི་ལོ་བ་
 རེ་ལྷག་ས་ཐུག་ས་འཇག་ས་ལྟ། མེ་ཐུག་རྒྱ་བ་འཇི་བའི་ཆོས་ཉེས་ལྷན་སྐོར་
 གི་ནས། ལུལ།

འབྲས་ལྗོངས་སྤྱི་ཁྱབ་ལྷོ་ར་ས་ནེ་བཀྱི་ས་ཡིག།

From

WARA SAKIS,

Political Resident of Sikkim

To

The Council of Monks,
Labrang

Communication

Now from here Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana is going to Labrang to see and examine Hetan-tigyar how much of it is there. For that purpose the Lamas must let him read the Putha. Moreover whatever assistance he wants must be given. In this direction keep your heart—I request.

Fire sheep year, fourth month, date 23th, from Gangtok Kuthi sent letter from

WARA SAKIS,

Political Resident, Sikkim,

1907

(Sd) G J WARR,

Political Officer

Gangtok, 4th June 1907

A similar letter was written to the Phodang Lama's monastery

I got this letter at about 2 P.M. and started in the company

Hospitality of a lady

of my attendants towards Labrang. The weather that day was extremely foul and

some inhabitants of Sikkim advised us not to set out that afternoon. But as the time at our disposal was rather short, and we could ill afford to lose even a single day, we felt constrained to start that very afternoon, even in the face of the stormy weather. We had not gone far when the sky began to pour forth its torrents. Taking the reins of the horse in one hand and the umbrella in the other we tried to brave the elemental frowns as best as we could. But we got terribly drenched and thoroughly exhausted after a short time and to our consternation we saw the shades of the evening were falling fast. Swiftly we rode on but no trace of human habitation was to be found. At last the darkness of the night made it absolutely impossible for us to keep the horses on the roads, and every moment they began to stumble. Thoroughly exhausted and horribly frightened, we heard for human abodes but none could be found—it was dreary and it was late

from Tibet to spread Lamaism. By efforts of the priests and their followers and patronage of the king and his successors Buddhism or rather Lamaism, was firmly established and became the state religion in Sikkim. People from Tibet, Bhutan, China, Mongolia and Nepal migrated to Sikkim and were mixed up with the Lepchas to give rise to a new race called Bhutias. They profess Lamaism and have built numerous monasteries, temples, *chattras*, etc. The Tibetan term for a monastery is *gompa*, meaning a

Sikkim

and

this

1908

d in

1897 A.D., is a most democratic institution which is open to all classes of Tibetans, Lepchas, Limbus, etc., both male and female. It consists of several two-storied stone-buildings with

founded in 1718 A.D. It is the holiest place resorted to by pilgrims from all quarters. Phodang, 13 miles north east of Gangtok and facing the snow of Khangri, was founded in 1740 A.D. on the site once occupied by the fort of the Bhutanese invaders. All its Head Lamas were disturbed by evil spirits that appeared in the shapes of scorpions, rock-snakes, etc., until one named Dumchot totally destroyed them by his magic powers. The monastery has recently been rebuilt, and its Head Lama at the time of my visit was the late Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, Sed-kayong-tul-ku. Labrang, 2 miles founded by a n teries, built on th on the tops of hi soot, with the ex

sect. They contain a large collection of xylographs, but the famous encyclopædia called the *Tangyur* is contained only in Labrang and Pamungchi. Almost every family in Sikkim is bound to spare at least one boy for devotion to the

founded in 1725 A.D. by the then Maharaja of Sikkim who visited the headquarters of the Karma-pa sect in the north of Lhasa and was asked by the head of that sect to establish some Karma-pa monasteries in Sikkim. In the Phodang monastery too there are numerous images and books but the Tangyur is not to be found here. It is shown here by the Karma-pa, the very centre of the

pa or Buddha, who preached years ago. There are images of Chong-kha-pa, Gye-chag rino

po-che and others

print
the
the
exha
even
their

tsam-pa or flour from the parched barley. A dish of bamboo offshoot being regarded as a great delicacy. Their only luxury is tea unmixed with milk or sugar. The Marwaris, whom one can see in almost every hill or wood where there are three or four householders or coolies, have totally failed in their enterprise here. I heard that a Marwari retail-dealer had once set up a small shop here, but finding demand of no kind had to break it up.

Both Phodang and Labrang are solitary places almost abandoned by men. On the way from Gangtok to Labrang—a distance of thirteen miles—I found no human habitation and came across only three cowherds who had come from distant villages to graze their cattle. Sikkim is very thinly populated. I asked an old man at Labrang why the road from Gangtok to that place was bad and there were no shops. The reply was "because no Englishman treads the path. There are very few people here. Our only hope is that with the increase of population in the plains men might revert to the hills to make them comfortable."

I passed a week at Phodang and Labrang very happily. I have never seen people more simple or more charitable than the Lamas there.

Sikkim was inhabited by Lejchas who were a mild pastoral race without any settled government. Buddhism was unknown in the country and the

APPENDIX J.

REMINISCENCES OF A VISIT TO PAMIYANGCHI

During the Puja vacation of the year 1908, I received a letter of invitation from the Maharaja and Maharani of Sikkim His Highness the

Invitation from the
Maharaja of Sikkim

on my behalf. I also received the following letter from Her Highness the Maharani of Sikkim enquiring the date on which I might start —

Bhutia Sa Tel
Year, 4th month
GAWOTOK,,
24th June 1909

MY DEAR PROFESSOR,

Last year when you came up about this time to go through the Tengpor at Labrang, you told me that you were so much interested that you would come up again this year to Pamiyangchi. Do you think that you will be able to do so, and if you do about what time will it be? You must let me know beforehand, as to when you intend coming up, so that I may make some arrangements about making your journey and sojourn in Sikkim as easy as we can. At present we are having copious rains here, but we are all in sound health. Trusting you also to be in perfect health.

I remain,

Yours truly

S. P. S. S.

MAHARAJA

MAHARAJA OF SIKKIM, DAINI CHUBRA VIDYABHUTANA, M. A.

Secy. to the Buddhist Shrine Restoration Society,

CALCUTTA

The letter was very kind, and I at once made up my mind to undertake a journey to Pamiyangchi. Reception on the way. I started from Darjeeling on the 10th of October with a passport from Mr. Crawford, Deputy Commissioner Darjeeling, and on first setting foot on the territory of the Maharaja of Sikkim I was simply surprised to notice the extraordinary arrangements that had been made by the Maharaja to provide me with all possible necessaries and comforts on the way. The royal mandate had gone forth to furnish us with all possible help and at every stage of our halt, we found numbers of men waiting for us with various articles of provision and fuel—all much too great for us to carry. Rice, dal, oranges, fruits, vege-

monastery, and he has to undergo various grades of training before attaining the exalted position of a Lama. It is to be regretted that the pure Lepchas are rapidly dying out, and the Bhutras cannot stand the heat of Sikkim below the height of 4,000 feet.

Handwritten text in Devanagari script, likely a signature or a name, with a circular stamp or seal at the bottom center.

The original letter of introduction in Tibetan given by the Dalai Lamas of Lhasa.

ribbles, hay, butter, milk, etc., almost in cartloads, were placed freely and abundantly at our disposal. On the third day we arrived at Pamiyangchi. Here we saw three European Convals, who had come here on a pleasure trip, mainly for sight-seeing. Pamiyangchi commands an excellent view of the lofty and snow-covered hills of Kanchenjunga, and the Europeans were enjoying themselves immensely seeing sights and taking photos. They were a large company, being attended by a good many servants and camp-followers. They were however badly in need of provisions, and as we had more than what was necessary for ourselves we gave them a quantity of our own.

When I reached the monastery I was wonder-struck at the majestic and imposing sight which was presented from the lofty heights of the peak of Pamiyangchi which commands an excellent prospect of the picturesque and snowy peaks of Kanchanjunga from which silver-white liquid streams seem to be perpetually running out. On entering the monastery I introduced myself to the monks and presented before them the following letter of introduction, which had been sent to me by the Maharaja of Sikkim before I started from Calcutta —

(TRANSLATION.)

To

THE INCOMPARABLE SCHOOL OF PRECIOUS MONKS.

Communication

From Gangtok Palace Farth Ape Year month 8 date 8
 Important Bear this in mind.

From Gangtok Palace Farth Ape Year month 8 date 8

The monks received me well and gave me a ready access to the Ba-tan-h-gyur Block Prints. They offered me a seat there for the night. But this I thankfully declined and put up in the Dak Bungalow. I stayed at Pamiyangchi for eight days during which time I had every opportunity and facility for making a searching examination of and for studying of the Ba-tan-h-gyur.

APPENDIX K

THE TERTIARY PERIOD

Having devoted me to the study of the history of the Buddhist Monasteries in Ceylon, I started for the island on the 20th June 1902, leaving at 4 P.M. 20th June I arrived at Colombo on the 25th June via Madras and Tutuora. I passed six months in Ceylon making researches in the Pali language under the guidance of Venerable Sri Sumangala Mahathero, High Priest of Western Ceylon, and Prof. Ven. Sri Venissara Mahathero, Member Executive Council Ceylon, kindly helped me with various books and information. I also derived much help from Rev. Ingaika Dharmapala, Secretary Maha Bodhi Society, Colombo. On the 25th November I started back for Benares via Tutuora, Patnan, Madras, Trichinopoly, Chidambaram, Madras and Calcutta arriving on the 11th December at 10 A.M. In Ceylon I visited on the 27th October, the Buddhist monasteries and remains at Galle, Dodondra and Tutuora, and on 1st July Anuradhapura, Mihintala Hill and Candy, etc.

I received addresses from all the important monasteries dated at 1-1-1902 including the Tertiary (Tirthagrama), in which the Bhikkus observed that for more than 150 years after the demise of Ramacandra Kavibharati, no Pundit had come from India. Tirthagrama is a chosen spot of nature. On one side rolls the limitless ocean and on the other rise the eternal hills and in front is spread a charming lake. The stone-walls of the monastery I found still standing at the time of my visit eleven years ago, though in ruins. But a new monastery has been erected in the midst of a grove of areca-nut-trees, cocoanuts and flowers unnumerable and here the monks reside. I was then honoured me with an address of welcome and I was addressed with a simplicity most befitting to monks, whether I was a Chandra, a Bengali Brahmin, was a relation to Ramacandra or not. The memory of the Kavibharati in their minds. The Venerable Sumangala Mahathero convened on the day previous to my departure a grand meeting in which most of the learned gentlemen of the island were present. I first addressed the meeting in Pali.

Departure

On the 1st of January 1903 I started for the island on the 20th June 1902, leaving at 4 P.M. 20th June I arrived at Colombo on the 25th June via Madras and Tutuora. I passed six months in Ceylon making researches in the Pali language under the guidance of Venerable Sri Sumangala Mahathero, High Priest of Western Ceylon, and Prof. Ven. Sri Venissara Mahathero, Member Executive Council Ceylon, kindly helped me with various books and information. I also derived much help from Rev. Ingaika Dharmapala, Secretary Maha Bodhi Society, Colombo. On the 25th November I started back for Benares via Tutuora, Patnan, Madras, Trichinopoly, Chidambaram, Madras and Calcutta arriving on the 11th December at 10 A.M. In Ceylon I visited on the 27th October, the Buddhist monasteries and remains at Galle, Dodondra and Tutuora, and on 1st July Anuradhapura, Mihintala Hill and Candy, etc.

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
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| 245, n 1: | ལྷ་ལྷ་ལྷ་ | ལྷ་ལྷ་ལྷ་ |
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| 257 3 n 6: | Hean-hgyur, | Hean-hgyur |
| 257, § 82: | teppitaka, | teppitaka |
| 275, L 15/16- | De dpag, | De-dpag |
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| 298, bottom: | Mnon-muq ltar-nan, | Mnon-sum-ltar-nan. |
| 299, l 5. | q do, | q do, Vol. co. |
| 299, bottom: | hgrel wa, | hgrel pa. |
| 300, § 98: | Dge-las | Dge-las. |
| 301, § 100- | bttag pañña hgrel. | bttag-pañi-hgrel pa. |
| 301, § 101: | Dug-hyem, | Dug-gyem. |

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| 307, n 4 | as m thar a m g | as m thar |
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| 309, 1 8 | man par | man par |
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| 317, n 3 | ad | ad |
| 318, § 114, § 118 | Hlrol-wa | Hlrol-wa |
| 321, passim | ad | ad |
| 322, last line | hbral | hbral |
| 323, n 3 | Korus | Korus |
| 325, Tib 1 4, fr II | o g g | o g g |
| 328, 1 26 | Tiltan | Tiltan |
| 328, 1 2 fr b | po | po |
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| 343, 1 4 | do, | do |
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| 343, n 1, 1 1 | ga a g a p | ga a g a p |
| 317, 1 11 | Therong, | Therong |
| 317, 1 17 | lama, | lama |

Passim. See Index V I § 24 is not the name of a great reformer. Certain other irregularities have not; index enables the reader to draw his own inferences.

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| Pag.: | Fon: | Read: |
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| 307, n 4 | ཨ་ཁ་ཤར་ཁཱཱུ | ཨ་ཁ་ཤར་ཁཱཱུ |
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| 319, § 114, § 118: | litral wa | litral pa |
| 321, passim | id | id |
| 322, last line | lbral, | lbral |
| 323, n 3 | Korow. | Korow. |
| 325, Tib. l 8, fr b | egq | egq |
| 326, l 26 | Tibetan, | Tibetan |
| 326, l 2 fr b | po, | po. |
| 327, l 12 | shan, | shan |
| 327, l 23 | qtag. | ltag |
| 330, § 129, l 13: | Sbe. | Tbe. |
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| 517, l 17 | lama, | lia-ma |

Passim. See Index V I ཨ་ཁ་ is not the name of a country, but a great river. Certain other irregularities have not been indicated, as index enables the reader to draw his own inferences.

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